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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis is an examination of the sociocultural ramifications of the migration / 
resettlement phenomenon. A rapidly increasing population sharing an affluently 
disparate world has contributed to an ever-increasing migrancy. A corollary of 
this migration, in an ethnically heterogeneous world, is that more people than ever 
find themselves living amid unfamiliar cultures. In consequence of this both 
settler and host communities are obliged to find modi vivendi with which to 
achieve harmonious coexistences. There appear to be three trajectories possible in 
such intercultural encounters: (1) the abandoning of ethnocultural lifeways by way 
of acculturation, (2) the reification of existing cultures, and (3) the exchanging of 
cultural values. To what degree individuals or groups are prepared to compromise 
their ethnic identities or cultural values in achieving modi vivendi is dependent on 
circumstance. Via an analysis of the sociocultural changes that have occurred in a 
specific Philippine zone of resettlement I demonstrate that integration into new 
societies is less fraught where mutual cultural exchange takes place. 
 In the course of the twentieth century the Philippines experienced a ten-
fold increase in its population. The demographic imperative – coupled with the 
recognition by both colonial and independent administrations that an increase in 
land inventories was required to ensure food security, improve livelihoods, and 
ameliorate social unrest – created the conditions for the resettlement of millions of 
Filipinos to less populated regions. However, the Philippine’s polyethnicity 
dictated that this internal migration would have implications for intercultural 
accommodations, ones that state planners and bureaucrats had failed to anticipate. 
To comprehend the complex intercultural interactions that have taken place – and 
the requisite cultural compromises required in achieving modi vivendi – I have 
chosen the former state-sponsored resettlement scheme centred on Narra / 
Palawan
1
 as a representative model.  
 This thesis analyses the manner and degree of the sociocultural changes 
that have taken place in heterogeneous populations dislocated by Philippine rural 
resettlement programs – a process I term transmigration. For many, this internal, 
inter-island, inter-provincial, rural-to-rural population transfer experience has not 
                                                 
1
 The nomenclature ‘Narra / Palawan’ is used deliberately to indicate that both the Municipality of 
Narra and the Province of Palawan are coterminously linked as zones of transmigration. 
Furthermore the joint taxonomy is used to avoid confusion. Firstly, the Municipality has adopted 
the acronym of the former resettlement agency NARRA as a self-designation. Secondly, Narra 
(Ptercarpus indicus) also represents the national tree of the Philippines. 
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proved socially onerous – integration into new societies has been unproblematic. I 
chose the Narra / Palawan resettlement zone to test the hypothesis that interethnic 
harmony is contingent upon the degree to which individuals and groups are 
prepared to adapt their lifeways by means of a mutual exchange of cultural 
particularities – a process I term transculturation. Not all resettlement in the 
Philippines – as the tribulations of the Mindanao resettlement zone attest – have 
gone unchallenged. It is the contrary outcomes in intercultural encounters, in both 
Mindanao and the wider migrancy world, that were at once the catalyst for this 
study and a means for understanding the potential possible in such encounters. 
 While fieldwork for this thesis was confined to the Municipality of Narra 
in the Province of Palawan I draw on exemplars of resettlement in the wider world 
to help decode the observable sociocultural transformations that have occurred in 
Narra. As reference points the scholarship of others investigating a wide range of 
archipelagic
2
 resettlement scenarios has been drawn upon.  
 To comprehend and anchor the progression of cultural change in the Narra 
‘contact zone’ I chose as a framing theory the Ortizian concept transculturation in 
conjunction with that of ethnic identity theory. To determine the trajectory, degree 
of interaction, rate of change and its ramifications for a wider resettlement world, 
the thesis poses two fundamental questions: (1) ‘What cultural changes take place 
among heterogeneous populations disrupted by resettlement?’ and (2) ‘Under 
which circumstances are transmigrant ethnocultural identities maintained, 
diminished or amplified during this process?’ Just as cultures are made of 
continuities and changes, in Narra I discerned that cultural exchange was an 
ongoing process, one from which observable inferences could be gleaned. 
Individual interviews and engagement with key informants provided the 
data that determined Narra as a zone of transculturation. Although the requisite 
intercultural interaction necessary for harmonious interethnic coexistences has 
failed to replicate in all resettlement milieux, this thesis suggests that as a model 
for such coexistences Narra provides an exemplar that is paradigmatic for ongoing 
migration / resettlement scenarios.  
                                                 
2
 I use the term ‘archipelagic’ to represent the Malay Archipelago or insular Southeast Asia, 
especially Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. While the Philippines and Indonesia in some 
minds constitute individual Archipelagos, they concomitantly form part of a grander archipelago – 
the Malay Archipelago. Context will dictate whether the Philippines, Indonesia, or the Malay 
Archipelago at large is being referred to. To avoid confusion I intend to capitalise the noun 
‘Archipelago’ while employing the adjective ‘archipelagic’ in lower case.  
 
 MAP 1 – INSULAR SOUTHEAST ASIA / MALAY ARCHIPELAGO 
 Source: Google Image / <http://alturl.com/c9qju> 
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MAP 2 – THE PHILIPPINES: POLITICAL 
 
 Source: Google Image <http://alturl.com/2v2um>    
NB. The South China Sea 
lies to the west of The 
Philippines. To the east of 
Palawan lies the Sulu Sea  
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 xviii 
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3
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3
 NB. This thesis uses the ISO-8601 dating convention, one which allows the date to be written 
with reduced precision. That is, a year-month-day format. For example, the 23
rd
 of February 2009 
would be displayed as 2009-02-23. 
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PSU Palawan State University 
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CHAPTER I – INTRODUCTION 
 
The aim of this chapter is to set out the structure of the thesis. Before proceeding 
to the objective and focus of this study I provide a generalised background to the 
migrancy / ethnocultural interaction duality, a phenomenon not limited to the 
Philippines. As a sociocultural treatise dealing with ethnocultural and resettlement 
specificities, a Definition of Terms will precede their further explanation in 
subsequent and relevant chapters. The research design will include an initial 
outline of why Narra / Palawan was chosen as a case study to illumine the thesis 
contentions. An explanation of the research methodology employed to gather 
supporting data for the thesis will include an insight into the involvement of third 
parties in that process. The theoretical underpinning of the thesis, as well as the 
centrality of the demographic challenge as the raison-d’être – for both the 
resettlement phenomenon and the resultant ethnocultural interaction – will be 
canvassed to put the phenomena into perspective. 
 
Setting the Scene 
To understand the social and political outcomes of resettlement initiatives in the 
Narra / Palawan context requires an appreciation of the internal migration 
(transmigration) phenomenon and the factors driving that migration. Furthermore 
it requires an appreciation of the attendant cultural interactions that take place as a 
consequence of those migrations. Although the focus of this thesis continues to 
revolve around a specific Philippine zone of resettlement, a more universal 
contextualisation of the forces motivating the migrancy / ethnocultural interaction 
duality is required. While some of the issues I raise here (demographic stress, 
migrancy, and ethnocultural interaction) will be covered in depth when they 
become Philippine-specific or site-specific, their foregrounding here will afford 
them added significance. The population / migrancy / ethnocultural interaction 
trichotomy are interconnected phenomena that are not confined within national 
borders. They are of universal significance, albeit their grand scale is revealed via 
the prism of the Narra study. 
 The first issue I raise here is that of demography. Population growth rates 
and fertility rates in the twentieth century have conspired to increase the world’s 
population several-fold. It is estimated that in 1927 the planet supported 2 billion 
people. In 2011 the population was reputed to have reached 7 billion and by 2025 
– if the fertility variable is maintained – a further one billion will be added to the 
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total (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs).
4
 There are several points 
to stress here. At the turn of the twentieth century most of the world’s populace 
relied on agriculture, thus rural resettlement frontiers were the ‘safety-valve’ that 
absorbed the population increases. The Philippine rural-to-rural resettlement 
phenomenon began when the population of that country had not reached 10 
million, or one-tenth of today’s population. The frontier however is a finite 
resource. It might be made more productive, but cannot be extended. As a result 
larger populations are required to seek non-agricultural livelihoods, increasingly 
in urban milieux. 
 This brings us to the second and third aspects of the population / migrancy 
/ culture trichotomy. Because their regions-of-origin are unable to sustain them, 
people seek livelihoods in places unknown to them, and among people with whom 
they may not have had any exposure. However, it is not only the finiteness of the 
agricultural frontier that impels people to migrate. An array of factors: continuing 
high birth rates, the maldistribution of populations, disruptions to livelihoods 
caused by climate change, social and political upheaval, and the lure of 
opportunities imagined in the more ‘affluent world’, all contribute to an increased 
migrancy. This holds for both intranational and international population 
movements. While contemporary volumes of population movements may be 
unprecedented, the phenomenon of migration is not. Whether it is the migration 
out of Africa (as suggested by some human evolutionists), the Austronesian 
Völkerwanderung (migration of peoples) out of East Asia, or later migrations of 
Europeans to ‘new worlds’, people have always been on the move. 
 A corollary of migration is that it often puts migrants into the orbit of 
peoples who may be ethnically and culturally dissimilar to themselves. It is the 
ways in which individuals and groups cope with such dissimilarities that form the 
basis of this thesis. Simply stated there are three primary actions possible in such 
cultural encounters. Firstly, one party may acculturate to another group’s ways; 
secondly, both parties may reject each other’s ways and reify their cultures and 
thirdly both parties (at times more than two) may find modi vivendi in which 
cultural particularities are mutually exchanged via a process identified as 
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 It is estimated that it took all of human history till 1804 to reach a world population of one 
billion. The 2 billion figure was reached 123 years later in 1927, and thereafter the gap narrowed 
as death rates decreased: 3 billion in 1960, 4 billion 1974, 5 billion 1987, 6 billion 1999, and 7 
billion in 2011. This has implications for the migrancy / cultural exchange dynamic, given that one 
of the impetuses for an increased migrancy is provided by the uneven spread of the world’s 
resources and talents.  
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transculturation by the Cuban anthropologist Fernando Ortiz (1881-1969). While 
I posit that the third option is the more democratic, and better reflects what social 
and political outcomes have occurred in the Narra / Palawan zone of resettlement, 
it is not necessarily a majority outcome for intercultural encounters. 
 In theory it should not be difficult for migrating peoples to find modi 
vivendi with others, given that man’s commonalities far outweigh the differences 
delineating any ethnocultural groups. Or as Kwame Appiah (2006: 135) puts it, 
what is often subsumed “is the connection not through identity, but despite 
difference.” Yet, notwithstanding the many cultural values that groups share, it is 
often the valorisation of seemingly minor differences that provides the basis for 
group identity. Rather than the embrace of commonalities, ethnic groups, as 
would-be arbiters of cultural values, tend to reinforce the “countless mine-and-
thine distinctions [despite] the inevitably mongrel, hybrid, nature of living 
cultures” (Appiah 2006: 129). Even in the absence of the migration / ethnocultural 
interaction duality, people living within a community exhibit differences – that is 
what makes us human. But it is in the migrancy milieu that differences are more 
likely to be valorised, and the threat of the undermining of a group’s identity by 
cultural contamination, imagined. 
 A rejection of the contamination incrimination is movingly illustrated by 
Salman Rushdie (1991) in Imaginary Homelands, where he states that the novel at 
the centre of his fatwa predicament is antithetical to the cultural purity contention. 
On the contrary, he suggests, it “celebrates hybridity, impurity, intermingling, and 
the transformation that comes of new and unexpected combinations of human 
beings, cultures, ideas, politics, movies, songs. It rejoices in mongrelism and fears 
the absolutism of the Pure. Mélange, hotchpotch, a bit of this or that is how 
newness enters the world” (p. 394). In the modern technological age the adoption 
or adaptation of another’s cultural particularities may be absorbed from a distance. 
They may be rejected or embraced. In the migrant / resettlement world that 
rejection and embrace can spawn unforeseen repercussions. Rushdie celebrates 
both the ‘newness’ associated with cultural transformation and the migrations that 
have speeded up the potential for those transformations, when he acknowledges: 
“It is the great possibility that mass migration gives the world, and I have tried to 
embrace it” (p. 394). 
 Having backgrounded the migrancy / cultural interaction duality I now 
turn to the Philippine setting which in many ways (polyethnicity, cultural 
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plurality, transmigration, and resettlement) allows an insight-in-microcosm into 
the wider migrancy world and its attendant cultural interaction ramifications. To 
test the hypothesis that mutual cultural exchange (transculturation) provides a 
positive model for interethnic coexistence in polyethnic milieux, the thesis 
examines what social and political transformation has taken place in the former 
state-sponsored resettlement initiative centred on Narra / Palawan. To anchor the 
Narra discourse I will from time to time refer to other migrant / resettlement 
scenarios both inside the Philippines, the wider Malay Archipelago, and the world 
at large which is witnessing increased population movements. 
 
Objective and Focus of the Study 
Overview 
This dissertation is an analysis of the manner and degree to which ethnocultural 
adaptation and appropriation take place among heterogeneous populations 
dislocated by Philippine rural resettlement programs via a process that broadly 
speaking may be termed transmigration. In a polyethnic society such as the 
Philippines such dislocations have the potential to impact on social harmony, 
national unity and nation-building. Coexistence in polyethnic milieux, I suggest, 
is contingent upon the degree to which individuals and groups are prepared to 
compromise aspects of their ethnocultural identities via a process I term 
transculturation. To comprehend and anchor the progression of cultural exchange 
in the ‘contact zone’ I have chosen the concept of transculturation as a framing 
theory to identify the trajectory, degree, and impact of that cultural exchange. In 
addition, I apply ethnic identity theory to position and make sense of the complex 
social ramifications that take place when heterogeneous populations come into 
contact. 
 The thesis is prompted by the need to better understand why disparities in 
sociocultural integration have contributed to the tribulation of ethnic violence and 
displacement in some resettlement zones, while in others a smoother pluricultural 
transition has occurred. Previous migration / resettlement zone scholarship has 
tended to focus on the socio-economic outcomes, impacts on indigene 
populations, and environmental ramifications of resettlement initiatives. 
Inadequate attention has been paid to the sociocultural ramifications of the 
migration process and the way the transmigrant – and often the host community in 
which he settles – deals with the reality of intercultural interaction. In view of the 
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tribulation witnessed in several resettlement regions on the Philippine island of 
Mindanao it behoves social scientists, political decision-makers, and state 
bureaucrats to better grasp the social implications of migration / resettlement 
initiatives.
5
 Given the current focus of Philippine migration scholarship on the 
Overseas Foreign Workers (OFW) phenomenon (Tigno 2009, Asis 2011), a gap 
exists for a sociocultural study of the former, extensive, internal migration 
(transmigration) phenomenon. An internal migration study is further abetted by 
the knowledge that the pioneer generation of transmigrants is being augmented by 
descendant generations, among whom generational change is expected to 
influence the sociocultural environment. 
 I chose the former state-sponsored resettlement project centred on the 
Municipality of Narra in the Province of Palawan in the Philippines as a research 
site. As a zone of resettlement Narra has attracted transmigrants from across the 
Republic. Its polyethnicity made it an obvious choice for a study on intercultural 
relations. When compared with various other Philippine resettlement zones it 
appeared to be a harmonious model of interethnic, in effect intercultural, 
collaboration. In that sense its choice was vindicated, but with reservations. Based 
on fieldwork analysis, the perception, and rigidity of what it means to belong to an 
identity such as an ethnolinguistic or ethnocultural group – when juxtaposed 
against settler experiences, their extended lifeworlds,
6
 and the attitudes attendant 
with generational change – was brought into stark relief.  
 A chance Internet encounter with a previous Philippines researcher, 
Celeste Lacuna-Richman in Finland, encouraged a preliminary visit to Narra / 
Palawan in mid-2010. Via the intercession of a local NGO, the Katala Foundation, 
I was introduced to the Municipal Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) with 
whom I was able to establish bona fides for a return visit. As the inheriting agency 
                                                 
5
 Mindanao in the Philippines is not the only resettlement milieu in which interethnic tribulations 
have occurred. State-sponsored resettlement initiatives and auxiliary spontaneous transmigrations 
throughout the Malay Archipelago states (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and 
Timor-Leste) have at times generated instances of ethnocultural disharmony, or at minimum a 
forced tolerance. At times throughout the thesis comparisons will be drawn with such migrancy / 
resettlement outcomes. 
6
 I use the term ‘lifeworld’ (lebenswelt) – as defined by Husserl and augmented by others 
including Habermas – to relate to the cultural baggage with which the transmigrants arrived in the 
contact zone. Edgar and Sedgwick (1999: 193-4) suggest that the lifeworld is composed of “stocks 
of knowledge… or skills and expectations that allow us to give meaning to (and indeed to 
construct) the social world within which we live.” In the resettlement context, migrants were 
called upon to engage with diverse groups whose lifeworlds (and attendant lifeways) were 
divergent from their own. Not all aspects of others’ lifeworlds were amenable to be accepted more 
universally, thus providing pretexts for distrust, confusion, misunderstanding, and antipathy – 
thereby inhibiting coexistence. 
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and current managing unit for some of the settler-beneficiaries of the former state 
resettlement project, engagement with the Municipal DAR office was central to 
engaging with pioneers and their descendants. Additionally their archives reflect 
the settlement history from its inception. During the preliminary visit I was also 
encouraged to gain institutional and academic support from Palawan State 
University (PSU), which was readily forthcoming. I returned to Palawan in March 
2011 to conduct the interviews that form the basis of the findings to be discussed 
in this thesis. 
 The methodology adopted was one of triangulation: engagement with key 
informants, a questionnaire / interview of individuals, and participant observation. 
In juxtaposition to the Narra-as-resettlement-model I have employed as reference 
points diverse other resettlement models in both the Philippines, and those of its 
archipelagic neighbours Indonesia and Malaysia, which have experienced 
contemporaneous rural-to-rural population readjustments on a considerable and 
coterminous scale. As well I draw on the scholarship of others in the wider world 
who have delved into the migrancy / ethnocultural interaction phenomenon, to 
better situate the sociocultural transformation that has taken place in Narra. 
 
Context 
In the course of the twentieth century the Philippines – along with the Malay 
Archipelago in general – has witnessed both population growth and mobility of 
hitherto unimagined proportions.
7
 Simply stated, in a single century the 
Archipelago states experienced a several-fold increase in their populations – for 
Indonesia (the former Dutch East Indies) it has been a five-fold increase, while the 
Philippines at century’s end had ten times the population recorded at the first 
American-instigated census of 1903.
8
 The rapid rise in population has had social 
repercussions. Mid-century decolonisation saw the archipelagic states with little in 
the way of an industrial base – manufacturing having been the colonial preserve 
of the metropolitan power. Inherited, predominantly rural economies, in which a 
                                                 
7
 Malaysia and Indonesia were initially intended to form a part of this study, but time and fiscal 
constraints necessitated their excision. However, at times salient comparisons will be made to 
show how transmigration has not evolved uniformly in the various archipelagic models. As well 
the archipelagic comparisons allow the emerging of a picture that indicates the similarities in the 
problems faced by the various resettlement agencies. 
8
 While the momentum might have slowed the upward trend continues. Though population figures 
and projections between agencies (CIA Factbook) and texts (EBYB) differ, a trend of increasing 
population is evident. Results for the 2010 census indicate that the figures for the Philippines, 
Malaysia, and Indonesia are 94, 28, 238 million respectively. Estimates for 2020 suggest 
continuing increases reflecting 111, 32, and 262 million respectively (after EBYB 2012: 774-779, 
NSO, UN). 
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rapidly increasing population continued to exert stress on existing land resources, 
necessitated the formation of strategies for increasing land inventories. Pressured 
by the spectre of an ever-increasing populace and ancillary economic and social 
objectives, archipelagic administrations deemed it necessary to resettle millions of 
their citizens in state-directed, rural-to-rural land settlement programs variously 
designated as: ‘resettlement’, ‘land colonization’ and ‘new settlements’ in the 
Philippines; ‘land colonization’ (during the Dutch era) and transmigrasi 
(transmigration) schemes in post-independence Indonesia (Bahrin 1988: 1). It is 
my intention to use the term transmigration to denote the process of rural-to-rural 
migration across, but within the nation-state, and the term resettlement to denote 
the result of this process. 
In his seminal treatise Pioneer Settlement in the Asiatic Tropics Karl 
Pelzer (1945) stated as long ago as the last years of the colonial era that “(t)he 
population in all the countries of Southeastern Asia is distributed very unevenly” 
(p. 81). It is this population maldistribution that has formed the cornerstone of 
resettlement policy initiatives of both the colonial-era and post-independence 
administrations. This is aptly illustrated by the Soal Transmigrasi adalah Soal 
Mati-Hidup Bangsa Indonesia (The Issue of Transmigration is a Life and Death 
Matter for the Indonesian Nation) speech given by President Sukarno (1964). 
Indonesia, it was argued, could easily support 250 million people provided that 
they were more evenly distributed. 
The notion of population maldistribution was not the only stimulus driving 
the transmigration / resettlement impulse. Archipelagic states facing a raft of 
social and economic problems (landlessness, hunger, insurrection) imagined that 
land resettlement programs would alleviate socio-economic stresses. Additionally 
the economies that newly independent states inherited were beset by several 
phenomena peculiar to the region. Late colonialism’s social uplift programs had 
decreased mortality rates. In essentially rural economies that meant more people 
exploiting a given land resource. Furthermore, the destruction and disruption 
wrought by the Asia-Pacific War (1941-1945) became a legacy with which the 
newly independent states – rather than the departing colonial regimes – had to 
contend. It was in this environment that population dispersal was mooted. The 
reasoning was that opening up more lands for settlement would act as a ‘safety-
valve’ until social ills could be more generally addressed. Whatever the socially 
inspired resettlement objectives were, they all required the alienation of less 
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populated lands, which, given their existing occupancy, would have further, 
unimagined social repercussions. 
 
Rationale 
The rationale for this project was to understand the social and political outcomes 
of the Narra / Palawan resettlement initiatives and as a corollary determine why 
resettlement programs have impacted unevenly on settlers and their host 
communities in a range of settings. At the outset it appeared that the integration 
paradigm was contingent upon the degree of dilution or maintenance of a given 
ethnocultural identity. In her study of Balinese migration to Parigi (Central 
Sulawesi), Gloria Davis (1976) demonstrated that when settlers were few in 
number their propensity to acculturate facilitated their non-problematic integration 
into the host community. However, as the momentum of their transmigration 
increased and a critical mass was reached, Balinese identity was not only 
recovered by those locally assimilated, but an exclusivity developed among the 
now larger cohort of Balinese. On this basis it appears that the degree to which 
transmigrants (and their indigene hosts) maintain their collective identities is not 
necessarily predicated on the degree of transculturation experienced. The volume 
or concentration of resettlement, attitude, and degree of difference no doubt 
played their part in positive coexistence resettlement outcomes, but ethnocultural 
difference in itself need not be a barrier to coexistence. 
 Since the Cold War, international attention has increasingly altered its 
gaze to what is perceived as a new or increasing phenomenon but is in reality a 
continuity – that of ethnic resurgence. This may manifest benignly, but more than 
often reflects subsumed – but not forgotten – grievances. Recourse to ethnic 
revivalism has contributed to the disintegration of some states: the former 
Czechoslovakia, Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia, while at the same time Burma, 
Nigeria, and Zaire (among others) are attempting to avoid this fate. It is in this 
context that an understanding of what factors contribute to ethnic detachment is of 
value, and why this detachment occurs in some milieux and not others. 
 When there are systemic failures in the way nation-states manage to 
accommodate their ethnic heterogeneity, an understanding of why and how this 
impasse has manifested is of concern to a wider world. No nation-state can sustain 
itself if it is continually wracked by internal dissension, and in view of the 
increased migrancy rates witnessed in modern times, social upheavals have 
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implications for and are not confined to the nation-state affected. While there 
appears to be a correlation between recourse to ethnic identity and weak nation-
states, as often exemplified in so-called ‘developing states’, this in my opinion is 
too simplistic an observation. Many societies in the affluent Euro-American world 
also face the spectre of ethnocultural discord. Witness the experience of Mexican 
immigrants in the United States
9
, the Flemish / Walloon division of Belgium, or 
the Québec issue in Canada. 
 Furthermore, cognisance of the fact that the world’s approximately 7,000 
ethnolinguistic groups reside in approximately 200 nation-states demands the 
realisation that some ethnic overlap must occur; that many of these states be 
heterogeneous by definition. The Malay Archipelago (insular Southeast Asia) is 
more than illustrative of the fact that the coexistence of heterogeneous populations 
has at times been impossible to achieve. The Philippine state alone encompasses 
171 living languages (Ethnologue 2009).
10
 In the absence of population mobility 
and resettlement, the issue of pluricultural accommodation would be a moot point. 
However, reality dictates that once begun the process of accommodation must 
continue. The thesis will show that accommodation is possible within diverse 
polyethnic situations if certain cultural compromises are entertained. That is, 
where individuals or groups in polyethnic communities adapt their own lifeways 
or are prepared to adopt facets of others’ lifeways (customs, language, religious 
practice) the potential for harmonious interethnic relations is improved. It is this 
process of adoption and / or adaptation of other’s customs and traditions – when 
experienced in a reciprocal manner – which I intend to call transculturation. 
 The Philippines is an example par excellence of ethnic plurality; all the 
more reason why sociocultural interdependence needs to be fostered and increased 
if it is to prosper economically as a nation-state, or even survive as a polity. 
Unlike traditional nation-state formation (Slovaks in Slovakia, Swedes in Sweden) 
the Malay Archipelago states, such as the Philippines, owe their genesis to the 
                                                 
9
 Their exploitation to provide cheaper food for all Americans is less decried than the fact that they 
are taking American jobs, and the fact that they are Mexican. This is both a socio-economic and a 
sociocultural conundrum. 
10
 Ethnologue (2009) suggests that Indonesia, which has been a further example of mass internal 
migration, supports 719 living languages. These range in size, from several hundred adherents (the 
Abinomn in Papua) to more than 85 million for the ethnic Javanese (2000 census). This has 
implications for ethnocultural coexistence in Indonesian resettlement milieux in which there is 
often a dominant ethnic group. 
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defining role played by colonialism in their construction.
11
 The extent of the 
Philippine state is predicated on the imperial, economic, and military reach of 
former Spanish and American hegemonies. Borders were arbitrarily determined 
and delineated spheres of influence that took no cognisance of ethnic diversity or 
local sensibilities. When the Americans departed the Philippines, local elites, 
imbued with a Eurocentric notion of the nation-state, did not question the premise 
on which their polities were conceived. By extrapolation, if a single colonial 
power had held sway over the Archipelago, there would have devolved a single 
inheriting polity. Whichever way this is viewed, nascent state national borders 
were blind to ethnocultural realities. 
 Mindanao, in the southern Philippines – exemplifying the tribulation 
component of the thesis title – has become a byword for interethnic violence. For 
more than four decades parts of the island have been wracked by what is often 
deemed to be communal violence, which has left tens of thousands dead and at 
times an IDP population of more than a million. The regions most afflicted have 
been in-migration areas that have absorbed many millions of essentially rural 
migrants, that is, those who have been uprooted from their original ethnocultural 
bases and lifeways, and moved – at times great distances – to live among others. 
This thesis presupposes that there exist underlying reasons – apart from the 
obvious one of a ‘struggle for scarce resources’ – that contribute to the mayhem 
faced by some (though not all) multiethnic societies.
12
 It might be asked why 
some transmigrant cohorts are better able to accommodate the diverse cultures 
among which they find themselves as a consequence of the resettlement process. 
Further, the thesis presupposes that spatial situations and individual agency exert a 
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 That said, ethnic Swedes also form a minority in Finland – with which Sweden has been 
historically associated, while the separating of Slovakia and the Czech Republic from the formerly 
conglomerated state in 1993 has left an overlap of ethnicities in each of the new polities. 
12
 While religious communalism is often touted as the factor most representative of promoting 
ethnocultural flashpoints in the indigene-settler Mindanao imbroglio, it needs to be acknowledged 
that stress points other than the religious difference between the ‘lowland Christian’ settler and 
‘indigene Muslim’ host community play a role in ethnocultural disharmony. One factor that 
appears to have been underestimated is the role played by intra-ethnic or interethnic clan feuding 
known as ‘rido’. While Wilfredo Torre’s (2007) edited text Rido: Clan Feuding and Conflict 
Management in Mindanao provides background to this cultural practice, it was the November 
2009 Maguindanao (also known as Ampatuan) Massacre of 57 people, including many journalists, 
that reverberated around the world. See Patricio Abinale’s (2010) Orthodoxy and History in the 
Muslim-Mindanao Narrative for a postscript to the Massacre. Rido and patronage exist in unison. 
The patronage issue was highlighted at the ANU Philippine Update Conference (11-12 Oct. 2012). 
It was suggested that only when the state can guarantee its citizen’s basic needs (health care, 
sufficient calories, and education) will the patronage of groups be undermined in favour of the 
state. Simons (1997) makes the case that a correlation exists between patronage – or charts of 
trustworthiness – and the existence of weak states.  
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bearing on how readily, and to what degree, this accommodation will occur. The 
research will show what cultural determinations take place among transmigrants 
uprooted from the familiarity of their ethnocultural heartlands. Germane to this 
process, it will be shown that the uneven resettlement outcomes alluded to have at 
their core an ethnocultural dimension. 
 While it has become obvious that the neo-cultural imaginings of the 
archipelagic nation-states’ founding intelligentsias have not materialised – except 
possibly in the cities, among the educated and within individual diasporic 
communities – an understanding of why chauvinism, communal tension, ethnic 
antipathy, and enclavism afflict some regions (but not all) is called for.
13
 For 
instance, it is interesting to speculate why the nominally Christian Dayak in 
Kalimantan resent the ethnic Madurese transmigrants, but not necessarily the 
Muslim co-religionists of the Madurese, the ethnic Javanese. One might interpret 
this as involving cultural disengagement predicated on factors other than religion. 
While this study concerns itself primarily with the ethnocultural dimension of the 
transmigration phenomenon, the musings of observers such as Myrthena Fianza 
(2004) suggest – in the case of the Moro insurgency against the settlers in 
Mindanao – that what is deemed an ethnocultural conundrum may indeed have a 
subliminal economic dimension.
14
 Is it the Christianity of the settlers that the 
Mindanao Muslims and Lumads (Animists) are railing against or is it the land of 
which they have been dispossessed by the settlers that reinforces the reaction to 
the northern Christian migrants? 
 Using the Narra / Palawan state-sponsored resettlement project as a 
representation-in-microcosm of national ethnic diversity, the thesis will 
demonstrate and analyse why coexistence (in certain circumstances) is difficult to 
achieve in heterogeneous transmigrant settings. This insight, I suggest, is 
replicable on a society writ large. Understanding why, under certain 
circumstances, harmonious integration in settlement areas is thwarted, may help 
                                                 
13
 Jorge Tigno (pers. comm. 2010-10-04) suggests that Filipinos – many millions of whom work 
abroad – would identify as Filipinos whilst away from the Philippines, but revert to a regional or 
ethnolinguistic self-identification on return. The neo-cultural imagining in which a civic 
nationalism replaces or minimises group loyalties, is oft a slow process. Polyethnic settler-nations 
such as Australia and the United States, representative in the modern era as bastions of civic 
nationalism, have in the past been riven by ethnic and communal chauvinism. 
14
 Mindanao, Palawan and Mindoro – comprising 40 percent of the national territory – supported 
approximately 7 percent of the population at the 1903 census. The scale of migration to Mindanao 
may be gauged by recent censuses that show that it alone now supports 25 percent of Philippines 
population. In the censuses 1918, 1939 and 1970 we see the Muslim percentage of the population 
fall from 60%, to 55% to 28%. During this period the Christian Filipino element rose from 3%, to 
20% to 67% (after Rodil 2004). 
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enlighten state bureaucrats, political decision-makers, as well as adherents of 
individual ethnic groups themselves. Taking cognisance of the changed 
ethnocultural makeup of an individual resettlement community may allow a better 
understanding of the processes at work and the potential to view this process on 
the broader national canvas. The thwarting of harmonious nation-building or the 
promulgation of national unity, whether viewed through the prism of a 
resettlement program or a wider view, needs to be better understood if the 
potential for national disintegration is to be minimised or eliminated altogether. In 
a world in flux – in which few states mirror those in existence even two centuries 
ago – national cohesion is not a given. 
 
Hypotheses 
The Narra / Palawan resettlement project, in which a diversity of ethnocultural 
groups appears to coexist harmoniously, may be regarded as a successful model of 
a state-initiated resettlement scheme. To understand why this particular polyethnic 
resettlement has prospered – while others have failed – is central to why a 
sociocultural study of the settlement was undertaken. To test the hypothesis that 
interethnic harmony is contingent upon the degree to which individuals and 
groups are prepared to adapt their lifeworlds, two fundamental questions were 
canvassed: (1) ‘What cultural changes take place among heterogeneous 
populations disrupted by resettlement?’ and (2) ‘Under which circumstances are 
transmigrants’ ethnocultural identities maintained, diminished, or amplified 
during this process?’ The resultant data obtained from the Narra / Palawan field-
visit is also juxtaposed against secondary material from other settlement projects 
in a comparative analysis, the aim being to determine what factors have 
contributed to a positive resettlement outcome in the Palawan model. 
 The major hypothesis of this study is: 
 that ethnocultural identity in the resettlement zone – its accretion, 
reification, or diminution – is dependent upon the degree of 
transculturational change that a given individual or group is prepared to 
accept and that this is further dependent upon: (1) the degree of cultural 
difference of those settled (religious practice, language, customs), (2) the 
numerical strength of a given settler cohort, (3) the diversity and numbers 
of settler cohorts, in which no dominant group exists, (4) access to 
education, the mass media and the world beyond the settlement area and 
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(5) the degree of ongoing mobility for individuals – both social and 
economic. 
 The following minor hypotheses help investigate the veracity of the claims 
of the major hypothesis: 
 that the acculturative process has been influenced by political actors 
(politicians, religious figures, capitalists) exploiting the anxieties of 
ethnocultural groups who perceive their position marginalised vis-à-vis 
society at large. 
 that the weakness or inability of the nation-state to minister to the socio-
economic needs of its citizens contributes to recourse to the ‘familiar’. 
That is, recourse to relying on those one knows and trusts, thus enhancing 
group identity. 
 that the very nature of rural-to-rural transmigration has militated against 
successful integrative outcomes for settler-settler and / or indigene-settler 
coexistence, and in some instances has contributed to a destabilised or less 
stable society. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
The premise that the uptake or rejection of mutual sociocultural exchange – which 
I deem to be represented by the term transculturation – is a process that has 
ramifications in the resettlement zone is possibly a converse way of unpacking the 
theoretical context of this thesis. If newfound identities: pluricultural, supraethnic, 
or cosmopolitanism have the potential for being the social end-product of 
resettlement, an understanding of what it is that the process of transculturation 
impacts upon is crucial. The simple answer is culture, which we may paraphrase 
as the customs, civilisation, capability, and achievements of a particular group of 
people (Tylor 1891). However, this definition does not exist in isolation, but 
rather as an adjunct to the ethnicity phenomenon – which in itself is not a static 
phenomenon. An ethnic identity (as will be demonstrated) is malleable, one that 
may be influenced by individual agency and group negotiation. 
 While I have chosen transculturation as a framing theory with which to 
examine the sociocultural processes that have taken place in Narra, I do so by 
contextualising those processes through the prism of ethnic identity theory. To 
better understand the social hurdles confronting the heterogeneous individuals and 
groups who have faced the transmigration experience, the differentiae associated 
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with belonging to an ethnic group is of some significance. Therefore, when 
investigating the resettlement zone integration of diverse ethnocultural groups, I 
choose the notion of ‘identity’ in the abstract, and ‘ethnic identity’ in the concrete 
as a foundation. It is the appreciation of the differences / similarities associated 
with any identity that allows for more transparent analyses of how these 
differences might impact on resettlement zone integrations. 
 But what is meant by the term ‘identity’ is open to conjecture. Amin 
Maalouf (2003: 9) is wary of the very label ‘identity’: “A lifetime spent writing 
has taught me to be wary of words. Those that seem clearest are often the most 
treacherous. ‘Identity’ is one of those false friends. We all think we know what 
the word means and go on trusting it, even when it’s slyly starting to say the 
opposite.” This anxiety notwithstanding, I acknowledge the need of some 
parameter for gauging the efficacy of sociocultural transformation in the wake of 
Philippine resettlement, and ‘ethnic identity’ is a starting point. 
 Maalouf goes on to suggest that all identities are complex and critiques 
those who would compartmentalise them: “It presupposes that ‘deep down inside’ 
everyone there is just one affiliation that really matters, a kind of ‘fundamental 
truth’ about each individual, an ‘essence’ determined once and for all at birth, 
never to change thereafter. As if the rest – a person’s whole journey through time 
as a free agent; his own individual tastes, sensibilities and affinities; in short his 
life itself – counted for nothing” (p. 2). The affiliation under scrutiny here is that 
of ethnic identity, although, as Maalouf points out, ethnicity is not the only 
identity an individual incorporates. Attachment to place, social class, or others 
with similar passions may transcend or complement that of attachment to 
ethnicity.
15
 However it is the difference between ethnic groups that is central to 
this thesis. I use both the term ‘ethnolinguistic’ and ‘ethnocultural’ in an 
understanding of that difference. There are times when ‘ethnocultural’ is more 
appropriate in view of the fact that not all ethnicities in a given society necessarily 
have a unique language that marks them as distinct.
16
 Additionally, identity need 
                                                 
15
 The Mindanao imbroglio is a case in point. The Bangsamoro claim for a separate state or at 
minimum some measure of autonomy is premised in part on a religious framework. This involves 
more than one ethnicity, just as the rejection of a bifurcated state is promoted by more than one 
ethnicity. The world abounds with examples of dissonances in which passions other than ethnic 
difference have impacted negatively on intercultural harmony – Northern Ireland, 1930s Spain, a 
religiously divided Netherlands, and France in the time of the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, 
are ones that spring to mind. 
16
 If we look at the constituent parts of the British Isles for example we see that the ‘Celtic fringe’ 
(Irish, Manx, Scots and Welsh) have differing degrees of language maintenance. Less than 2% of 
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not always be sheltered by an ethnic umbrella. Societies of a single ethnicity may 
be riven by an issue as simple as religious non-conformity, vital enough to 
reinforce identity difference.
17
 
 In land area the Philippines ranks 73
rd
 in the world (practically the size of 
Italy), while in population it ranks 12
th
. What is of more significance, however, is 
the country’s ethnic diversity; it supports 171 living languages. Why is this 
important? It reflects the notion that for a nation-state – such as the Philippines – 
to exist and survive, compromises between groups have had to occur. Unlike the 
classic nation-state model, encompassing one major ethnicity or identity group, 
there has never existed a dominant ethnic group in the Philippines.
18
 Had this been 
the case, the outcome may well have been the assimilation of minority groups into 
the body politic by a process of acculturation, as has occurred in many regions of 
the world.
19
 The accommodation of diverse immigrant groups in the U.S. might 
be said to fit this model. That is, a mythological sense of entitlement, ‘firstness’, 
and righteousness, as represented by the seventeenth century New England 
settlements is still resonant. While Filipino ethnicities may exude chauvinist 
tendencies, a sense of entitlement ensuing from a position of dominance is not 
inherent. Erosion of ‘sense of entitlement’ may be cause for angst in former 
dominant groups.
20
 
 By contrast, Philippine resettlement zones, as exemplified by Narra / 
Palawan, allow us to witness in microcosm what the nation-building process in 
this polyethnic society entails, namely one of compromise and an ongoing re-
conceptualisation. How otherwise could a second-generation settler identity at one 
and the same time feel strong attachment to a specific ethnolinguistic cohort, to a 
                                                                                                                                     
Irish, 1% of Scots and 20% of Welsh speak their languages, while Manx is extinct; yet because 
English is the majority language, it cannot be argued that these groups are no longer ethnically 
distinct. 
17
 Prior to the secularisation of society in the last decades, the Catholic-Protestant divide in 
Australia is illustrative. Its divisiveness was reflected politically, in the realm of employment, 
attachment to the metropole, in the field of education and interpersonal relations such as marriage. 
18
 The designation of Tagalog to represent the national language Filipino should not be interpreted 
as the numerical dominance of Tagalog speakers within the Philippines. Rather it could be viewed 
as an ‘accident of history’, as it was the Tagalog region that became the political centre of the 
Spanish colonial project. Had they chosen Cebu as the centre it is conceivable – that Cebuano 
would have evolved to become the national language. 
19
 An example would be the British Isles. Millennium-long assimilation processes – and in some 
instances transculturation processes – have erased traces of the individual ethnicities that once 
peopled York, the Isle of Man or Dublin. Who in Dublin can trace their ethnic origins to the 
Vikings? The traces of Danelaw or the Anglo-Saxon south have been subsumed into what is now 
regarded as English – notwithstanding the Celtic, Roman (itself polyethnic), Angle, Viking, 
Saxon, and Norman ethnic heritages of former migrants, invaders or sojourners. 
20
 This is exemplified by Samuel Huntington’s (2005) critical assessment of a perceived Hispanic 
erosion of the former Anglo-Protestant cultural hegemony of the United States. 
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new regional loyalty (Palaweño) predicated on the settlement zone, to an 
overarching nation-state formation, to a religious persuasion and to other identity 
signifiers. 
 The Narra / Palawan model of resettlement and attendant sociocultural 
transformation might best be understood as a trajectory that has the potential to 
impact upon all but does not necessarily do so. Ethnic groups consist of 
individuals, and as Maalouf (2003: 10-11) attests, each individual’s identity is 
made up of a number of elements, some that dovetail with the group and some 
that have the potential to play a role in group identity bifurcation. In essence these 
may contribute to possible transcultural tendencies that may in turn lead to the 
formation of new ethnic identities or the rejection of allegiance to an ethnic 
identity altogether in what may be deemed a supraethnic or cosmopolitan 
condition. Whatever the trajectory, there will continue to exist an identity. In his 
paper ‘Towards a theory of ethnic identity and migration’ (1995) Tony Waters 
declares that the problem of explaining ethnicity in immigrant groups is a 
theoretical quagmire.
21
 In transmigration’s wake we might employ Waters’ 
hypothetical question: ‘When does an ethnic group stop being an ethnic group?’ to 
introduce the notion of ethnicity itself. 
 To put ethnic identity into perspective I draw on a range of theorists to 
demonstrate that the persistence of this identity is well documented. Ethnic 
identity is best viewed as a lived melange of cultural practices, which individuals 
and groups may have absorbed as part of an enculturation process, or have 
adopted in their ongoing identity growth. However as Fredrik Barth (1998) attests, 
a single degree of variation, which he terms a ‘boundary’ is sufficient to 
differentiate one identity group from another, which may at times engender 
friction between individuals and groups, whether those individuals and groups 
self-ascribe their difference or are ascribed it by others. Maalouf (2003: 14) 
contends that the “…identity a person lays claim to is often based, in reverse, on 
that of his enemy.”22 He illustrates this with the antagonism between the Irish and 
English. Dichotomies exemplified by Catholicism and Protestantism, and 
                                                 
21
 Water’s paper investigates six groups of ethnic Germans that had variously migrated to Russia 
and the North America in the time-frame of the thirteenth to nineteenth centuries, some of whom 
had assimilated while others had maintained ethnic distinctions. 
22
 ‘Enemy’ is too zealous a word in the context of this study, and might better be designated by 
adversary, economic competitor, or someone with a disparate ethnocultural identity not necessarily 
hostile to others in his orbit. A Swiss citizen represents such a situation. Whether he is ethnically 
French, German or Italian, he is more likely to feel a natural affinity with his fellow-citizens than 
he does for his co-ethnics across the frontier. 
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Republicanism and Monarchy have been used for centuries in a them-and-us 
struggle. Yet today, despite centuries of antagonism the Irish use the English 
language in lieu of Irish Gaelic. Where does that locate their ethnicity / identity? 
When one ethnic (or culture-bearing group) adopts the customs of another group 
(in this case language) do they cease being a part of their birth-heritage? Does an 
Ilocano settler’s son in Narra – unable to speak Ilocano – cease to be Ilocano 
ethnically? 
 An engagement with the complexities of ethnic identification is central to 
an understanding of whether the transmigrant experience in any given 
circumstance has been a positive or negative one. However, I suggest that this is 
possible only in the context of comprehending what sociocultural exchanges 
(transculturation) have taken place in a given migrancy / resettlement zone. 
 Key thinkers in the field of ethnicity, though not always agreeing on the 
weight to be attached to concepts such as primordialism, ethnic boundaries and 
the ‘melting pot’ theory, nevertheless help in an understanding of how and why 
archipelagic transmigrant integration or acculturation has been experienced 
irregularly. While Edward Shils (1957) and Clifford Geertz (2000) support the 
influence of primordialism on individual or group action, Eller and Coghlan 
(1996) detract from this view by speaking of the ‘poverty of primordialism’. 
Other thinkers such as Judith Nagata (1981) contribute to the ethnicity discourse 
by interpreting ‘circumstantial’, ‘situational’ and ‘instrumental’ variations of 
ethnic deployment. Glazer and Moynihan (1975), who helped popularise the term 
‘ethnicity’, also grappled with the concept as they analysed the interaction of 
ethnicities (1970). In 1969 Barth (1998) proposed that ethnic identities are 
sustained by the maintenance of ‘boundaries’, however subtle, between groups, 
while Jamie Davidson (2008) and Abner Cohen (1996) more cynically view 
ethnicity as essentially a political phenomenon, to be exploited. 
 However, before venturing into any discourse that elucidates the 
scholarship of the key thinkers in the field of ethnicity, I consider a step back into 
the region’s prehistory is required. While it is accurate to depict a plethora of 
existing ethnocultural differences that separate archipelagic peoples, there are 
historically many shared backgrounds; which may have the capacity to influence 
the transculturation process. Peter Bellwood (2007: 1) suggests that “(t)he Indo-
Malaysian Archipelago demonstrates a certain unity in human terms today, in the 
sense that all its indigenous populations (with the restricted exceptions in the 
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Malay Peninsula and the far east of Indonesia) belong to the same major 
Austronesian-speaking ethnolinguistic group of mankind.”23 This observation 
notwithstanding, ‘a certain unity’ appears to be insufficient solace for many 
archipelagic transmigrants failing to integrate, by acculturating into or 
transculturating within their host communities. A concomitant observation might 
be that, assailed by the daily grind of survival, they have been ill-equipped to 
rationalise how or why their ‘differences’ are magnified at the expense of their 
‘unities’. 
 ‘Transculturation’, the term coined by the Cuban social scientist Fernando 
Ortiz circa 1939, may be a slippery concept to elucidate but in my opinion best 
serves the centrality of this thesis – that is to discover how sociocultural change 
underpins the renegotiation of identities, particularly ethnocultural identities. As a 
concept ‘transculturation’, or the mutual cultural exchanges that take place 
between heterogeneous groups and individuals, was promulgated by Ortiz (and 
encouraged by his mentor Bronisław Malinowski) because it was felt that the term 
‘acculturation’ did not adequately represent the mutuality inherent in the Ortizian 
imagining of how all cultures in a settler society like his Cuba, contributed to the 
cultural makeup of that society. Acculturation, Ortiz argued, presupposed that 
there was a hierarchy of cultures and that the dominant one (in the mid-twentieth 
century world that usually implied the European) would expect the other cultures 
to conform to the dominant reality. Transculturation, on the other hand, 
envisioned that the dominance, or cultural imperialist factor, would be 
undermined by the mutuality of cultural exchanges between ethnoculturally 
dissimilar cohorts. 
 While I will look at Ortiz and his term ‘transculturation’ more closely in 
Chapter 3, here I wish to make some observations that position the term in this 
thesis. In the years since its promulgation it has been maligned as being both an 
unnecessary neologism, and one that no better represents the terms in usage at the 
time Ortiz conceptualised it. The fact that it was ‘hijacked’ by Latin Americanists 
                                                 
23
 Bellwood’s monograph The Prehistory of the Indo-Malaysian Archipelago should be seen as 
representing the Archipelago (Insular Southeast Asia) in it broadest sense. Scholarship’s 
nomenclature at times does not make clear that the Philippines is an integral feature of the Malay 
Archipelago. It was a Filipino after all – Wenceslao Vinzons – who in 1932 (long before there was 
an inkling of a future ‘British-Malaya Malaysia’) “dreamed of a unified Malaysia extending from 
the northern extremity of the Malay Peninsula to the shores of the remotest islands of Polynesia” 
(Salazar 1998: 126). I mention this in passing merely to highlight that the Austronesian heritage, 
despite its approximately 800 languages, is nevertheless a starting point in viewing what has the 
potential to bind peoples as much as separate them. 
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as a tool to re-position, or valorise mestizaje studies, does not in my opinion 
negate the term’s relevance to the current migrancy / resettlement phenomenon. 
As I envision it, ‘transculturation’ best represents what is taking place in the Narra 
/ Palawan resettlement zone – mutual cultural exchanges between a heterogeneous 
cohort of peoples in which there is no dominant group. The Narra phenomenon of 
sociocultural interaction cannot be better represented by concepts such as 
acculturation, multiculturalism, or cosmopolitanism – which may represent that 
which has taken place in other Philippine resettlement zones and is taking place in 
the wider world.
24
 
 To paraphrase, the theoretical underpinning of this study is premised on an 
understanding of ethnic identity as it is revealed in Narra / Palawan, a polyethnic 
society that is a microcosm of the Philippines writ large. To comprehend and 
anchor the progression of cultural change in the ‘contact zone’ I have chosen the 
theoretical framework of ethnic identity theory and the concept of transculturation 
as a framing theory to identify the trajectory, degree, and impact of cultural 
change. 
 
The Demographic Challenge 
The demographic imperative in the context of this thesis cannot be overstated. If 
archipelagic populations had remained stable, or risen at a more modest rate as 
experienced in Europe or other regions of Asia, the immediacy of developing 
more ‘rice-bowls’ would have required less urgency. To emphasise the point of 
demographic stress, and why more rice-bowls were needed as the twentieth 
century progressed, we need to reflect on the fact that were the Philippines and 
Indonesia one state they would be the third most populous nation on Earth after 
China and India. I mention this by way of making the point that this large 
population, living in a primarily pre-industrial age needed to bring ever-more 
agricultural land into play. Population-to-land ratios were such that many millions 
in both countries were essentially landless. Food security, social security and 
national security demanded the increase in the agricultural land inventory, and this 
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 Culture-dominant societies are variously represented by Australia, Bhutan, Chile, and Denmark. 
Each of them has a dominant cultural tradition – albeit ethnic-based, or communally-based. 
Migrants arriving in these nation-states are expected to acculturate to the norms of those states – 
reciprocity is minimal or absent. In affluent societies such as Australia a sense of ‘fair play’ has 
allowed the institution of multiculturalism, which in theory tolerates cultural diversity, but in 
practice expects an acculturation to the dominant host to occur. In weak states such as Bhutan, 
acculturation is more deterministic – those ethnicities unwilling to wear the national dress are 
expelled. 
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was the genesis of transmigration – moving people from densely populated areas 
to those deemed underpopulated – where the potential existed for agricultural 
development. This movement of population was complicated by both the logistics 
of resettlement and the polyethnic realities of the Philippines and its archipelagic 
neighbours. In essence it is the polyethnic nature of the Archipelago that 
underpins the raison-d’être for this thesis. The prime motivation for a study into 
ethnocultural interactions and transformations results from the reality of the 
Archipelago’s polyethnicity in the first place. In the absence of ethnocultural 
difference non-integration in the resettlement ‘contact zone’ would have been a 
moot point. 
 
Population Redistribution 
Intranational population movements, be it in the Philippines or the wider world, 
are not a new phenomenon. However, the trajectory and the numbers involved are 
unprecedented. The urbanward drift in search of livelihoods and opportunity, 
though a feature of the twentieth century, did not impact on all states evenly. In 
Europe for example, devoid of alienable frontiers, where lands were already 
heavily utilised, urbanisation or emigration were options open to those who had to 
leave the land behind.
25
 The archipelagic states, disadvantaged by colonialism and 
the agrarian nature of their economies, could not compete with a modernising, 
industrial North; nor could their citizens emigrate in numbers sufficient to 
ameliorate their socio-economic position. The apparent solution for both planners 
and politicians was to better exploit those lands under their dominion that were 
less densely populated. Thus intrastate migration (transmigration) appeared a 
potential solution to both the rapid population increase and its maldistribution. 
 In the Philippines the centre of population gravity hinged on central Luzon 
and parts of the Visayan Islands. From the vantage point of Manila the frontier 
zones encompassing especially the MPM (Mindanao, Palawan and Mindoro) 
islands appeared underutilised to both the Americans and the nascent independent 
Philippine’s politicians. The MPM, constituting some 40 percent of the country’s 
land area, supported at the beginning of the twentieth century an estimated 7 
percent of the Philippine population. As such, the region offered the prospect of 
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 This created a cyclical dilemma of sorts. Pressure on the land resource facilitated urbanization, 
which facilitated an increased industrialization, which provided opportunities that drew in more of 
the rural populace, which necessitated an increased mechanisation of rural pursuits, propelling 
more of the populace urbanward.  
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relieving population pressures in the more settled areas, and at one and the same 
time the concomitant social instability occasioned by peasant unrest. In essence, 
the less settled regions of the country were imagined to be a potential ‘safety-
valve’ able to address a range of society’s social tribulations. What bureaucrats 
were less willing to acknowledge was the fact that those lands they deemed under-
utilised were nevertheless inhabited, that is, they were not terra nullius. 
 Furthermore, just as the transmigrant cohort hailing from the densely 
settled zones was a heterogeneous one, so too was the indigene cohort around 
whom resettlement took place. In an effort to address the country’s socio-
economic problems, decision-makers often failed to take cognisance of the 
Philippine’s polyethnic reality, a fact that was to have sociopolitical repercussions 
in some resettlement scenarios. 
 
Ethnocultural Redistribution 
The Philippines supports a diversity of ethnolinguistic groups, and particular 
groups are over-represented in the resettlement statistics. While in the Netherlands 
East Indies, Dutch rule gravitated to the region already productive and advantaged 
– namely Java, the Spanish colonial project in the Philippines also determined 
which region would be advantaged. Had Mindanao instead of Luzon become the 
locus of Madrid’s rule, it is conceivable that the interethnic or communalist 
tribulation faced in Mindanao during the last four decades would not have 
developed. Unlike the Dutch, for whom commerce was the driving colonial 
motivation, the Iberians (Spanish and Portuguese) augmented their commercial 
imperatives with evangelising proclivities. The choice of Manila as capital 
ensured that Luzon would have developmental advantages, including that of 
agriculture, and thereby concomitant population expansion. It is Luzon and the 
Visayas region that experienced agricultural and population increases under the 
stable rule of Spain, and after 1898 that of the United States. The land: man ratio 
deteriorated rapidly as the population increased. Public lands were opened and 
state support for resettlement was introduced to assuage the peasant unrest 
occasioned by landlessness and tenantification. 
 The Philippines (majority Christian), and Indonesia (majority Muslim) 
have had similar tribulatory experiences in the wake of transmigration 
experiences. While it cannot be claimed that religious difference alone has been 
responsible for misunderstandings on the settlement frontier, it has been a 
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contributory factor in situations where Barth’s (1998) ethnic ‘boundaries’ are 
invoked in what might rather be ‘economic’ interethnic struggles for resources. 
An example illustrates. As outlined above, both Javanese and Madurese 
transmigrants were resettled in Kalimantan. Though co-religionists, they have 
experienced dissimilar integrative outcomes while living in Dayak-dominant 
areas. In the Philippines, conversely, the interethnic divide has been reinforced by 
a resort to communal attachments. In Mindanao, the transmigrant community was 
represented by various ethnicities: Cebuano, Ilocano, Ilonggo, among others, and 
the host areas encompassed among others Bagobo, Maguindanao, and Maranao. 
However, unlike in West Kalimantan, where Dayaks were prepared to coexist 
with Javanese but not necessarily with Madurese, ethnic divisions in Filipino 
resettlement areas were often subsumed under communal umbrellas. That is, 
whatever the actual ethnicity of the settler, he identified (and was identified) as a 
Christian. The recipient areas, at times resistant to the resettlement process, were 
identified as Muslim or Lumad (Animist), whatever the actual attributed ethnicity. 
 A further complication in the ethnicity reality has occurred in the Narra / 
Palawan context. Like most other lands in the Archipelago that were deemed to be 
lightly populated – and therefore amenable to being developed by closer 
settlement – Palawan was not ‘unpopulated’. What came to be euphemistically 
known as ‘public lands’ or the ‘public domain’ were in effect ‘traditional lands’ or 
the ‘ancestral domain’ that supported various groups of swidden agriculturalists, 
the ethnic Tagbanua and Pala’wan for example. (See below for an explication of 
the Palawan nomenclature).
26
 Because their agricultural practices did not coincide 
with what was considered to be world’s best practice – that of sedentary farm-lots 
– they were marginalised following the arrival of what are euphemistically called 
the ‘lowland Christian’ settler communities (Lopez 1986, Brown 1991, Veloro 
1995, Dressler 2009). Swidden agricultural practices, Animist beliefs and a 
simpler, self-sufficient life-style all conspired against the indigene faced with a 
‘more sophisticated’, yet equally poor settler cohort.27 Rather than resist incursion 
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 As well as being nomenclatured as Pala’wan (current academic best-practice) this ethnic group 
has also been known as Palawanos, Palawan and Palaw’an. Within the thesis it will be made clear 
when the conventions of other authors are cited. The ethnic group ‘Pala’wan’ should not be 
confused with the term ‘Palawan’ designating both the Province of Palawan and Palawan Island. 
27
  By ‘more sophisticated’ I imply that the transmigrant generally hailed from the mainstream 
society, in which he had been politicised, formally educated, and imbued with values (dress codes, 
cultural practices and ways of thinking) that linked him to others in a modernising world. The 
‘sophistication’ observation is in no way intended to signify the worth of any one ethnocultural 
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into their traditional lands, their economic weakness combined with their 
propensity to avoid confrontation, saw some indigenes vacate lands they regarded 
as traditionally theirs and move to more isolated regions of the Province, before 
the process repeated itself, leaving many landless – an irony, given that one of the 
objectives of resettlement was to ameliorate the condition of landlessness. 
 
Definition of Terms 
 Acculturation – the adaptation to or adoption of a different culture (AOD 
2004: 9). The DREC (2003: 1-2) is rather more ambivalent as to the 
meaning; on the one hand it suggests that “the term ‘acculturation’ 
indicates that processes of transformation and adaptation which takes 
place when two or more groups…enter into relations with one another.” At 
a further level it suggests that ‘acculturation’ results from a conflict 
between different cultures, which may result from migrations, and / or the 
globalisation phenomena facilitated by mass communication. The 
acquisition of a new culture by an individual or group may occur 
asymmetrically or reciprocally. ‘Reciprocal acculturation’ refers to a bi-
directional cultural transfer, rather in the vein of the concept 
‘transculturation’ as coined by Ortiz. This give-and-take phenomenon 
contrasts with ‘asymmetrical acculturation’ a process in which a ‘superior’ 
and ‘inferior’ culture interact, rather in the manner of the dominant 
colonial / neo-colonial context.
28
 
 
 Assimilation – the acceptance by indigenous and immigrant minorities of 
prevailing cultural values and the integration of such minorities into a 
society (AOD: 73). How this is supposed to occur is fraught with 
contradictions. In the Palawan context, where several indigenous groups 
outnumbered the early settlers (themselves ethnically divided) who was 
going to assimilate to whom was a moot proposition.
29
 Assimilation 
                                                                                                                                     
identity, but does suggest the likelihood of a power imbalance in milieux where the sophisticated 
and the unsophisticated shared a contact zone. 
28
 For an in-depth analysis of both the ‘acculturation’ and ‘assimilation’ phenomena refer to Teske 
and Nelson (1974). In Palawan it is the indigenous Batak, Tagbanua and Pala’wan who are 
modifying their cultures and adopting the cultural traits of their transmigrant neighbours, despite 
their (at times) numerical superiority (Lopez 1986, Brown 1991, Eder 1992, Veloro 1995). 
29
 In the Palawan resettlement milieux, as it is throughout the Philippines, the Archipelago, and 
world at large, assimilation is a fraught proposition. Numerical dominance does not necessarily 
reflect ‘civilisational’ dominance. Just as the small numbers of Europeans who ventured to Africa, 
the Americas or Australasia did not assimilate into the numerically dominant societies they 
encountered, so too in the Philippines is assimilation generally a unidirectional process. Indigene 
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assumes a unidirectional process of inclusion into a dominant society. 
Assimilation has been described as “…a precise political strategy which 
intends to keep the national community as homogenous as possible by 
endeavouring to ensure that the same basic values are shared by the whole 
population” (DREC: 19). The term ‘assimilation’ has been much maligned 
in recent years, as a willingness developed to adopt reciprocal aspects of 
cultural difference, and the less value-charged concepts of ‘integration’, 
‘multiculturalism’ and ‘cosmopolitanism’ have been adopted to refer to 
new realities. 
 
 Cosmopolitanism – reflects several conditions. It may indicate “of or from 
or knowing many parts of the world… [or denote those] free from national 
limitations… [as well as representing] people from many parts of the 
world (AOD: 286). First theorised in the fourth century BC by the cynics 
who rejected the notion of the restrictiveness of individual states (DREC: 
50), in the context of this thesis I suggest that cosmopolitanism might be 
regarded as the ultimate condition possible for individuals who transcend 
the constraints of an ethnic identity and its progeny, national identity. Only 
one respondent in the Narra / Palawan case study volunteered that they had 
transcended the constraints of both the ethnic / regional and national 
identities. I suggest this could only be possible if transcultural adjustments 
and modifications were experienced. Unlike acculturation and 
assimilation, which may be either an individual or group process (Teske 
and Nelson 1974), the progression to a status of cosmopolitanism appears 
to be an individual experience. 
 
 Deculturation – in essence denotes the loss or abandonment of cultural 
practices, yet it intersects with the requirements of the transculturation 
process. For transculturation to occur a partial deculturation and associated 
neoculturation is required. Used pejoratively, ‘to deculturate’ connotes that 
one party is causing another party to lose or abandon cultural 
characteristics, yet in the give-and-take model of cultural exchange 
(transculturation) some aspect of a former lifeway will always be forfeit – 
                                                                                                                                     
groups in Palawan exposed to the migrant world, adopted first aspects of Muslim culture, when 
that culture was dominant and latterly Christian culture when the political power balance shifted, 
especially with the accession of American power, early in the twentieth century. 
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though this loss will be compensated by a neocultural accretion.
30
 
Furthermore in some psychological contexts deculturation may imply that 
an absence of cultural anchors has resulted from the loss of some cultural 
particularity. However, Del Pilar and Udasco (2004) suggest that one 
cannot be cultureless. Even the marginalised, for example alienated youth, 
will be deemed to belong to at least a sub-culture. Likewise, whatever the 
cultural loss an individual experiences, his ethnocultural identity will 
continue to exist, albeit in an altered form.  
 
 Enculturation – the gradual acquisition of the norms of a culture or group 
(AOD: 412). Individual agency or the ability to determine one’s own 
future or lifeway is constrained by the fact that from birth – whether in 
retrospect we like it or not – we mimic and adopt the cultural practices we 
see about us. Our religion, formative education, language and dress code 
are all determined by our accident of birth. Differing enculturation 
experiences continue to confront transmigrants once they come into 
contact with those ethnoculturally dissimilar to themselves. Some 
enculturation facets are easier to reconcile than others, and this has 
implications for the mutual or reciprocal cultural exchange that features so 
prominently in the Narra / Palawan milieu. Altering language use and diet, 
for example, appear to be less problematic than accepting the religious 
beliefs of others. 
 
 Indigene – a term loaded with connotations in polyethnic milieux. The 
term is commonly substituted by ‘native’, ‘autochthon’ and ‘aborigine’, 
implying a sense of ‘firstness’ (DREC: 202). Within the meaning there is 
an implication that the ‘indigene’ is somehow ‘less sophisticated’, or 
‘developed’, and thus – in the modern age – in need of protection or 
tutelage. In a wider sense ‘indigene / indigenous’ may be equated with the 
idea of being ‘already-resident’ in a given geographical space (native of 
Finland or France), that is, a condition differentiating an ‘already-resident’ 
group from those that may want to migrate and resettle among them. In 
                                                 
30
 In On the Road to Tribal Extinction: the Depopulation, Deculturation and Adaptive Well-Being 
among the Batak of the Philippines, James Eder (1992) intimates that deculturation is synonymous 
with ethnic demise. However, looked at in a further context it might be suggested that if an 
indigenous Tagbanua (Palawan) swidden-agriculturalist turns to wet-rice cultivation, he is 
transforming an aspect of his culture. Nevertheless he can continue to ascribe to and no doubt 
continues to be ascribed by others as a Tagbanua despite his partial deculturation. 
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this gist there is no implication that there is a ‘civilisational’ difference 
between the two cohorts.  
 Using the term ‘indigene’ to characterise those originating in a 
given country, the innateness or naturalness of a group to a specific place, 
a recognition that they are the earliest known inhabitants of a given region, 
or that they constitute those resident before colonising took place, does not 
fully represent how I wish to employ the term ‘indigene’. The 
transmigration of settlers in the Philippine context usually meant that the 
migrant came into contact with those already-resident – the indigenes. The 
loaded-ness of the term ‘indigene’ comes about when the settler identifies 
those ‘already-resident’ in the resettlement zone as somehow inferior to 
himself – indigenous persons (IPs).31 In the absence of a less loaded term I 
utilise the term ‘indigene’ to represent the ‘already-resident’ in 
contradistinction to the transmigrant settler, but use it with reservation 
nevertheless. Despite the ambivalent interpretation and usage of the terms 
‘indigene / indigenous’, context will make it clear how the term is being 
applied. In most instances it will infer the status of ‘already-resident’. 
 
 Integration – the intermixing of persons previously segregated (AOD: 
649). “The concept of integration indicates the sociological process by 
which divisions and heterogeneous factors within a society are overcome 
in order to create a new, balanced whole. Integration, therefore, is an 
essential dynamic factor in the creation of a society based on cooperation 
between individuals and groups” (DREC: 151). The process is dependent 
on regulation and interiorization of cultural and value models, which 
allows the fostering of social cohesion in the formation of national states.
32
 
Existing in contradistinction to ‘assimilation’ where minorities have had to 
give way to majorities, early nationalists in the Archipelago were very 
conscious of the need to balance integrative needs with dominant 
                                                 
31
 In the Philippines the settler is usually a ‘lowland Christian’ and, representing the majority 
culture, is able to view those who are either Animist of Muslim as indigenous. In that sense the 
term ‘indigene’ is used similarly to the term ‘ethnic’ in ‘ethnic minority’. That is, the Bicolano, 
Cebuano, or Ilocano settler does not regard himself as an IP of the Bicol, Ilocos, or Cebu region. 
He is neither indigene nor ethnic minority, that nomenclature being reserved for those he settles 
amongst. 
32
 The heterogeneity of the Philippines requires the formation of a model with which diverse 
groups can identify. In the transmigration context, the settler and the indigene or autochthon 
groups among whom they settle need to compare and exchange values and behavioural models, 
that is, a process of adaptation, for nation-state formation to occur, and be sustained. 
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impulses. Equilibrium eventually returns to altered social systems, where 
social cohesion has been disrupted (DREC: 151-3), but as witnessed in 
both the Philippines and Indonesia, not before separatist anxieties can be 
addressed.
33
 
 
 Multiculturalism – a term that “refers to the coexistence of a range of 
different cultural experiences within a group or society” (DREC: 183-7). 
At times multiculturalism might be used interchangeably with the term 
pluriculturalism or ‘cultural pluralism’ added to which the further terms 
‘interculturalism’ and ‘transculturalism’ cloud the issue. In a political 
sense “multiculturalism may be [viewed as] the sociocultural 
manifestations of a multiethnicity” (DREC: 184). Again the term is 
encumbered. In much of the world ethnocultural groups have lived in 
proximity without political injunction. However, in recent years, in a more 
generous ‘affluent world’ the multiculturalism concept was introduced to 
acknowledge cultural diversity and diminish the pressure of cultural 
imperialism. In that sense multiculturalism imagines cultures living side-
by-side in harmony. The tolerance entailed therewith, I suggest, ignores 
the premise that cultures are not static, and that their imagined stasis is an 
unrealistic time warp imagining. 
 
 Pluriculturalism – might be “seen as a model of society where different 
cultural groups interact with each other and therefore create multiple 
cultural and religious points of reference” (DREC: 219). I suggest that this 
state more generally represents what has transpired in the Narra / Palawan 
model of sociocultural interaction. Rather than the coexistence of groups 
within society as implied by the ‘multicultural’ label, I feel that 
pluriculturalism provides competencies that facilitate transculturative 
processes. 
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 Witness the pragmatic choice of Malay (Bahasa Melayu) as Indonesia’s national language 
despite the fact that Javanese speakers numerically constituted as many as the next fourteen 
ethnolinguistic cohorts combined. A further pragmatic act, in a country that was overwhelmingly 
Muslim, was to decline the adoption of a national religion, thereby allowing minority faith 
adherents to feel included in the new nation-state. The Philippines facing similar centrifugal 
tendencies has shown pragmatism in the area of language adoption. While the national language, 
Tagalog, is the home language of possibly a quarter of the population, the colonial language – 
English – has been retained as a link language.  
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 Transculturation34 – is a possible product of the migrant experience. It 
encompasses a process in which ethnocultural or ethnolinguistic 
interactions contribute to altered worldviews or cultural transformations. 
The merging and converging (ethnoconvergence) of cultures in this 
paradigm, allows the possibility for altered identities to evolve. The 
harmonious integration into a new society is dependent upon how 
individuals engage with situational variables. Transculturation differs from 
the acculturation or assimilation model of integration into a host society in 
a number of ways. Unlike the latter it is not predicated on the subsuming 
of one’s identity within the dominant or majority culture in one’s midst. 
Transculturation encompasses the notion that all coexistence is predicated 
on a give-and-take model of cultural exchange.
35
 
 That is, the attendant processes of partial deculturation and 
neoculturation need not be viewed from the standpoint that cultural change 
is a one-way street.
36
 The degree of transculturation may eventually reflect 
the degree of coexistence possible on the resettlement frontiers. It was to 
replace expressions such as ‘cultural exchange’, ‘diffusion’ and ‘osmosis 
of culture’ that Ortiz (1881-1969) coined the neologism ‘transculturation’ 
which he deemed better represented the reality of identity change than the 
term ‘acculturation’ which he viewed as having ethnocentric and moral 
connotations. 
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 The neologism ‘transculturation’, coined by the Cuban social scientist Fernando Ortiz in Havana 
circa 1939, was given cachet after its acceptance by the ‘ethnic’ Polish anthropologist Bronisław 
Malinowski who penned an introduction and explanatory detail on the use of the term 
‘transculturation’ for Ortiz’s 1940 text Cuban Counterpoint: Tobacco and Sugar (Contrapunteo 
cubano del tabaco y el azúcar). Seeking a term that better described Cuba’s complex assimilatory 
history of indigene, European settler and African slave, Ortiz (1995) began to eschew the term 
‘acculturation’ for ‘transculturation’ which he deemed better expressed the interaction and 
modification of cultural norms that various ethnicities had contributed to his country. “I am of the 
opinion that the word transculturation better expresses the different phases of the process of 
transition from one culture to another because this does not consist merely in acquiring another 
culture, which is what the English word acculturation really implies” (pp. 102-103). 
35
 The ‘transculturation’ concept is variously linked with the notion of ‘hybridity’ or 
‘homogeneity’, which reflects the consequence of ethno-convergence. I suggest that 
‘transculturation’ better reflects the processes of cultural exchange that this thesis investigates, in 
that it imagines an ongoing process, in contradistinction to the ‘hybridity’ / ‘homogeneity’ 
imagining which implies a completed or announced product. 
36
 Neoculturation encompasses the creation and establishment of new cultural forms, particularly 
as a consequence of the transculturation phenomenon. In the case of Narra / Palawan, an individual 
who identifies as a Palaweño, does so not because he spurns his Cebuano or Ilocano cultural 
heritage, but because via his interaction with other ethnocultural traditions in the settlement zone 
he has adopted or adapted cultural elements that differentiate him from the co-ethnics he left 
behind in the region-of-origin. 
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 Transmigration – an internal (inter-island / inter-provincial) rural-to-rural 
migration and resettlement of peoples as variously effected in the 
Philippines and its near neighbour, Indonesia. Variously termed ‘land 
colonisation’ (not to be confused with Euro-American imperialist 
colonisation), ‘resettlement’, ‘land development’, the Indonesian term 
transmigrasi (transmigration) best epitomises the processes of resettlement 
involved. Initially conceived of as attempts to alleviate the negative social 
ramifications of densely populated regions of both polities, by both 
American and Dutch colonial regimes respectively, the newly independent 
states inherited extant programs and greatly expanded them to address the 
issue of landlessness in burgeoning agrarian economies. Several million 
families were relocated from densely populated to relatively thinly 
populated parts of their respective countries under the auspices of at first 
state-sponsored resettlement programs. State-initiated programs often 
acted as a catalyst for further spontaneous settlers to follow in the 
pioneer’s footsteps and in some regions came to outnumber those resettled 
by the state. Not only were the national aims and objectives of land 
resettlement programs varied and complex; their emphasis, as noted by 
Bahrin (1988: 1-2) differed from one country to another, from era to era, 
and within the same country. Simply stated motivations and priorities for 
resettlement might be categorised as developmental, redistributive, and 
economic. 
 
Research Design 
Choice of Study Area 
The choice of study area was constrained by a variety of factors. Mindanao in the 
Philippines – where an ongoing separatist movement continues to create a fragile 
security environment – is the transmigrant / resettlement region par excellence in 
that country. However, the continuing insurgency, law-and-order issues such as 
the sporadic KFR (Kidnap for Ransom) issue and inter-clan political violence as 
witnessed by the 2009 Maguindanao Massacre, as well as being cause for anxiety, 
made the obtaining of institutional support for a field-study problematical. The 
Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) warnings that 
continue to delineate Mindanao as a Level 5 security risk also stymied that 
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region’s research potential.37 This is unfortunate as the earliest, and longest-
standing state-sponsored resettlements projects, such as Glan (1917) in Sarangani 
Province, Dadiangas (1939) in South Cotabato, and Santo Tomas (1955) in Davao 
del Norte would make ideal research locations, given the longer time frame for the 
occurrence of any potential transculturation. A private visit in mid-2010 to the 
aforementioned region gleaned that – given the proposed theme of ethnic identity 
scrutiny – local institutional support and encouragement was forthcoming. 
However, given current conditions, research in these potential sites must needs 
wait. 
 An alternative choice of site in the Philippines (though no less significant 
as a model for the intended study) turned out to be the former state-sponsored 
resettlement project centred on the Municipality of Narra in Palawan Province. 
The Narra project was begun in 1949 under the auspices of the Rice and Corn 
Production Administration (RCPA), though greatly expanded (post-1956) under a 
new management agency, the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation 
Administration (NARRA). Several thousand families from the Visayas and Luzon 
were resettled. Though previous studies (Fernandez 1975, James 1979, 1983) 
have dealt with the socio-economic and cost-benefit aspects of this particular 
resettlement project, a sociocultural analysis, to the best of my knowledge had not 
yet been attempted. A short, preliminary visit to Narra – where settlers are still 
being aided by the guidance of the current implementing authority, the 
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) – showed that scope existed to further the 
thesis. 
 
Fieldwork circumstances 
Access to the settler cohorts in this study was contingent upon the good offices of 
several regional and local institutions and organisations. Although the Philippines 
did not – at the national level – demand validation before fieldwork could be 
undertaken, legitimacy and authority were given credence by affiliation and 
interaction with tertiary institutions, in the first instance Palawan State University 
whose primary campus is in Puerto Princesa, the provincial capital. Ancillary 
roles were provided by individuals at the University of the Philippines (Diliman) 
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 While the security situation is of concern it should not be construed that research in the region is 
impossible. Lois Hall’s (2010) ethnographic study of Christian / Muslim social relations in 
General Santos City (Mindanao) is testament to the fact that despite the separatist upheavals and 
the so-called ‘War on Terror’ it is possible to conduct research, albeit within security parameters. 
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in the national capital Manila, as well as Ateneo de Manila University. While the 
original resettlement authorities that settled the Narra transmigrants are no longer 
extant, a national Ministry, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), charged 
with improving material living standards of those settled, continues to exercise 
oversight for some Narra farmer-beneficiaries. 
 In consequence of this, permission to proceed with fieldwork among their 
charges was sought prior to arrival in the Philippines. The DAR provincial office 
in Puerto Princesa and their municipal office in Narra extended me their support. 
At the local government level, the Municipality of Narra as well as the various 
Barangays (local government unit) within the Municipality provided both their 
imprimatur for my presence and statistical information as required.
38
 During the 
course of the fieldwork I decided – in light of the fact that migration to the 
settlement zone was not and continues not to be confined to farmer-settlers – that 
the thesis contentions would be better served by widening the scope of the study 
to include a wider cohort of respondents, one that better mirrored the social, 
employment, gender, and generational realities of past and continuing 
resettlement processes. 
 In a region where communication infrastructure is challenged by the 
‘tyranny of distance’, frequent interruptions to power supply and a generally low 
level of connectivity, I was greatly assisted by the staff of a local conservation 
NGO – the Katala Foundation (KF). Not only did the KF provide local advice, 
their office was a ‘tech’ refuge when required. Whilst most research participants 
had some knowledge of English (it being a medium of instruction at university 
and high school) the occasional lack of nuance necessitated the support of a 
translator. As a retired former manager of the Narra resettlement project Marcial 
Dela Cruz was engaged to fill that role. As well having ready access to individuals 
and organisations within the study area, Marcial was an invaluable asset in the 
data-gathering process, playing a facilitating role, as well as being translator. 
Having arrived in the resettlement zone in the 1960s he was also a source of local 
knowledge and historical background. 
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 In the Philippines a barangay is a local government unit subordinate to the municipality. The 
administrative structure is: national / provincial / municipal / barangay. They might be compared 
with that of a ward, district, or village. The approximately 42,000 barangays play a role in service-
delivery that is more intimate, than that of the municipality. For example, the Barangay Health 
Volunteer (or Barangay Health Worker) is able to provide primary health care, nutrition advice, 
and may assist midwives. 
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Limitations in Research Design 
The potential for skewed data gathering was ever-present, given the necessity to 
use local officials as intermediaries. For example, access to some farmer-
beneficiaries was facilitated by the DAR. However, no restrictions or 
impediments were put in the way of information gathering. My inability to 
converse in the range of languages extant in the Narra resettlement zone meant 
that there were occasions when translations were not quite exact enough to convey 
a theme. In such instances rephrasing resolved the communication impasse. 
Furthermore, the hierarchal nature of a society in which there may be a perception 
that a ‘correct answer’ might be sought or solicited, required that vigilant 
evaluation of garnered data be undertaken. 
 A corollary of the above was the potential for the cooperating local 
officials to suggest interviews with those transmigrants that had achieved more 
success in the resettlement process. After all, self-congratulation is possible only 
in the shadow of a project’s success, not in its shortcomings. Viewed from this 
perspective socio-economic disadvantage had the potential to skew sociocultural 
data. Those less successful economically might be working off-farm and out of 
the Municipality – one of the respondents was about to leave for the Persian Gulf 
in an OFW capacity at time of interview. As interviews would occur with those 
participants residing in the settlement at the time of the fieldwork, it might appear 
that the community has an appearance of being more amenable to cultural change 
and interaction than was the reality. 
 A potential weakness might be perceived in the fact that the land for the 
settlement project was acquired by a state that deemed it ‘public domain’ despite 
indigene and ‘squatter’ occupancy. While lowland Christian squatters might have 
been included in the project many indigenes forsook the region for parts more 
isolated, though one Tagbanua group interviewed remained resident within the 
Municipality, living in communal proximity rather than on individual farmsteads. 
 For an understanding of transculturation in practice, as broad a cross-
section of participants as possible needed to be included. The affirmative action 
nature of state-sponsored resettlement initiatives meant that the weakest 
economically, sometimes the least educated and the most marginalised were 
representative of those that forsook their regions-of-origin. Ignoring for the 
moment that the transmigration / resettlement experience had possible levelling 
effects, one needs to reflect on whether the weakest in society have more or less 
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capacity for coexistence. Might a cohort of more affluent or educated 
transmigrants have been better equipped and more amenable to a changing world 
and the resettlement reality? In theory, the educated world at large (health 
professionals for example) are able to resettle in milieux where their educated 
status is valorised more than their ethnic status. 
 This has implications for carrying out any sociocultural study in a site such 
as Narra. In an era of rapidly growing educational opportunities, the settler 
offspring might not be as well represented in the interview cohort, because their 
upward mobility might have removed them from the Municipality. A second or 
third generation son / daughter, whose altered circumstances see them employed 
as nurse or ship’s engineer in the provincial capital or distant shipping company 
respectively, have in theory a greater propensity to change their lifeways and 
degree of ethnic self-identification. In such circumstances the missing cohort has 
the possibility of skewing the participant responses by not being included in the 
sample. 
 
Research Methodology 
While this study was undertaken in a single setting – the Narra Municipality in 
Palawan, a Philippines zone of resettlement – the methodology envisaged was one 
of triangulation: the questionnaire / interview of individuals, engagement with key 
informants, and recourse to several focus groups. In reality the data was collected 
by way of individual questionnaire / interviews (Appendix A), as well as 
discussion with key informants and participant observation. Focus group 
discussions proved to be impractical, though several situations (religious 
fellowship and service club meetings) allowed interaction on a group basis. The 
processes necessitated the assistance of a translator and facilitator. While some 
interviews were possible in English, the multiplicity of languages used in 
heterogeneous settlement models precluded the acquisition of a working 
knowledge of them for the purposes of this research. 
 In the Narra / Palawan field context, liaison with a third party, the 
municipal office of DAR, was required to facilitate the interview of some of the 
farmer-beneficiaries. While the original settling authority for the majority of those 
residing in the Municipality, the former NARRA, is no longer extant, records of 
the early settlement are still maintained. To identify the ethnocultural heritage of 
potential research participants, recourse to DAR records was necessary. The 
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engagement of Marcial Dela Cruz (retired resettlement authority functionary as 
outlined above) to act as interpreter / research assistant greatly facilitated the 
fieldwork process. Not only was Dela Cruz central in acting as intermediary with 
the current DAR administration, he also knew personally many of the settlers – 
both farmer and non-farmer and their descendants. 
Data collection entailed a process of contacting potential informants either in 
their homes or workplaces to gauge if they were amenable to a questionnaire / 
interview. A total of ninety-one (91) individual interviews were conducted. The 
questioning was aimed at ascertaining the following: 
 The transmigrants’ ethnocultural identity, core language, religion, and 
region-of-origin prior to resettlement; as well as their ethnocultural self-
ascription  
 The transmigrants’ ages and year of arrival in the Municipality; and for the 
second and third generations, their birth-year 
 The transmigrants’ principal language use, notwithstanding their everyday 
interaction with other ethnolinguistic cohorts, and in view of national 
language dictates 
 What links transmigrants maintained with their region-of-origin 
 The extent to which transmigrants participated in cultural activities 
specific to their region-of-origin, and what aspects of other cultures they 
valorised 
 Whether the degree of identification with the ethnocultural origin – when 
juxtaposed against the expectation of an expanded civic nationalism – has 
been diluted or reified 
 The transmigrants’ perception of relations with other ethnocultural settler 
cohorts  
 To what degree intercultural social interaction and / or intermarriage has 
impacted on the way transmigrants identify with their own ethnolinguistic 
/ ethnocultural group 
 Whether altered cultural practices (agricultural, religious, language and so 
forth) have impacted on sociocultural outlooks of the Other 
 Whether changed socio-economic conditions have impacted on personal / 
community sociocultural adaptation 
 Whether as a consequence of the resettlement process transmigrants have 
experienced feelings of cultural loss or gain. 
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Organisation of the Thesis 
In its attempt to determine what sociocultural processes take place among 
heterogeneous populations disrupted by resettlement, and furthermore in which 
circumstances these cohorts modify their sociocultural behaviour to reflect altered 
ethnocultural identities, this thesis is arranged in a thematic way. The chapters 
reflect themes that aim to convey the background, the process, and interpretation 
of data gathered in such a way as to allow an understanding of the complexities of 
the resettlement process. The employ of Narra / Palawan as a model and entry 
point into the resettlement process writ large, allows for further juxtapositions 
with internal and external resettlement processes. It is next to this model that 
additional analysis and speculation, both in internal and increasingly external 
migrant-settler movements, are possible. 
 The present chapter begins with a scene-setting exercise that foregrounds 
the migrancy phenomenon as it exists in the contemporary world and the 
implications thereof – the necessity for interethnic and intercultural interaction. It 
then introduces the Philippine focus of the study and explains the background to 
the transmigration / resettlement experience, before suggesting the potential 
sociocultural ramifications of resettlement. Factors that contributed to the need for 
rural resettlement, such as the crucial demographic imperative, are outlined. The 
chapter introduces the theoretical framework that underpins the project, before 
defining several key thesis-specific terms. It also sets down the technical notes 
associated with the thesis progression, including research design, methodological 
approaches taken, and reasons for choosing Narra / Palawan as the study area. A 
brief survey of previous transmigration / resettlement research is canvassed. When 
making a point, reiteration of themes may overlap. 
 Chapter Two comprises a literature review that provides an overview of 
the texts that have contributed to the thesis formation. The first set of texts reflects 
the transmigration / resettlement phenomenon, dealing in turn with those texts that 
are Archipelago-specific, those that are Philippines-specific, and those that are 
site-specific, that is pertaining to Narra / Palawan. The second set of texts deals 
with the notion of identity, specifically ethnic identity. The third group of texts 
represents those that illumine the complex nature of cultural identity, a necessary 
precursor to making sense of the Ortizian theoretical concept ‘transculturation’, 
which represents the balance of the literature investigated. 
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 Chapter Three presents the theoretical underpinnings of the thesis. Before 
proceeding to position the ‘transculturation’ concept the chapter investigates the 
salience of both ethnic identity and cultural identity for an understanding of that 
concept. As well as defining the term ‘ethnic’, the notions of ‘primordialism’ and 
‘ethnic group boundaries’ are investigated. The cultural baggage inherent in an 
ethnic identity is unpacked to guide our understanding of what it is that 
individuals and groups are consciously or unconsciously expected to compromise 
in the transculturation process. To illuminate the trajectory of identity 
modification transculturational change as a normative outcome of sociocultural 
interaction will be canvassed. An analysis of the differing worldviews of key 
thinkers in the field of identity politics, ethnicity, and sociocultural paradigms is 
central to this thesis. Before it can be established what sociocultural divergences 
have occurred in resettlement areas, the chapter addresses the reasons these 
changes have manifested. After justifying the relevance of ‘transculturation-as-
theory’ the theory is juxtaposed against several possible alternative models of 
cultural coexistence, namely those of acculturation, multiculturalism, and 
cosmopolitanism.  
 Chapter Four is an overview of transmigration as a concept and process. It 
introduces the resettlement phenomenon as a variable in the escalation of 
ethnocultural interactions. Aspects of rural resettlement (the demographic 
imperative, policy and organisation, resettlement objectives) are explicated in a 
general archipelagic sense before drilling down to the Philippine context. The 
historical background, rationale, and implementation of phases of Philippine 
resettlement programs are revealed. While most previous transmigration 
scholarship reflects on the socio-economic ramifications of resettlement, this 
thesis is concerned with the sociocultural implications of the process. Themes 
such as settler-settler and indigene-settler cultural coexistence are investigated. In 
defining the implications for intercultural interaction the chapter speculates on the 
contentious role that transmigration has played in national unity aspirations. 
 Chapter Five introduces Narra / Palawan as a case study of Philippine rural 
resettlement. While in reality Narra continues to be a magnet for spontaneous 
migrants from across the Philippine Archipelago, the historical antecedents of 
Narra as a state-sponsored resettlement project continue to influence 
contemporary perspectives of the community. The chapter begins with an 
overview of Palawan as a zone of resettlement and reveals the factors that have 
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impacted on the choice of that Province as a transmigrant destination. It next 
introduces the Municipality of Narra in which the data was gathered. As well as 
an historical overview of the state-sponsored genesis of Narra, the chapter 
introduces the ethnolinguistic diversity of the Municipality’s settlers. An 
additional section on ‘defining the methodology’ is inserted to clarify some of the 
difficulties encountered in delineating themes such as region-of-origin, identity 
triangulation parameters, and identity ascription. 
 Chapter Six begins the analysis of transculturation in practice. In the 
context of the Narra interviews the chapter forms the qualitative enquiry of the 
thesis by delving into the day-to-day social interactions of Narrans. It begins by 
identifying the ethnically diverse settler cohort by comparing self-ascriptions with 
ethnolinguistic heritages. Given the centrality of language in the construction of 
Philippine ethnic identity the chapter then investigates the migrant’s language use 
modification. Further issues to be investigated are those of educational status and 
identity maintenance, the generational change exposed by offspring conviction, 
and whether Narrans experience a sense of cultural loss and concomitant sense of 
ethnic dilution as a consequence of their transculturative exposure. 
 Chapter Seven probes the transculturative catalysts that impact upon 
Narrans as members of an ethnic cohort or as individuals. It demonstrates that 
correlations exist between the degree of cultural exchanges possible and / or 
probable among the transmigrants, and their ongoing links with the region-of-
origin. A further catalyst investigated is that of intermarriage, a development that 
has the capacity to undermine ethnocultural particularities as interethnic 
compromises are accorded. The chapter also considers the importance of 
resettlement zone socialisation and cross-cultural cooperation in facilitating the 
mutual exchange of cultural practices and customs. After an analysis of the factors 
that facilitate transculturative developments, the chapter juxtaposes the ease with 
which Narrans appear to be able to adapt or adopt the cultural norms of ethnically 
diverse settlement-mates
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 against the concept ‘primordialism of culture’, which 
suggests that such cultural exchanges should be less straightforward. 
 Chapter Eight represents the conclusion of the thesis. A brief interpretation 
of the findings posits why there have been disparities in resettlement program 
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 Nomenclatures including the suffix ‘mate’ are not limited to the Philippines – witness the wide 
use of words such as classmate, running mate, soulmate. In the Philippine context however it is not 
unusual for the suffix ‘mate’ to be appended to a wider range of terms to form collective nouns 
such as town-mates, province-mates, batch-mates, party-mates and the like. 
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outcomes.Given the finiteness of the land inventory in the Philippine settlement 
frontier the limited applicability for futher resettlement is considered. Under the 
rubric of intercultural interaction a discussion of the alternatives to rural-to-rural 
resettlement (industrialisation, international labour arrangements, urbanisation, 
and permanent emigration) is mooted. The thesis concludes with the suggestion 
that whatever the initial rationale for transmigration, the lessons learned from a 
study of the Narra / Palawan transculturation model continues to be applicable in 
future and differing settings. 
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CHAPTER II – LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This review of literature is divided into three key sections: (1) transmigration / 
resettlement, (2) the notion of identity and (3) transculturation theory. Texts 
pertaining to transmigration and resettlement processes are discussed first, this 
being the starting point for the cultural interaction in the ‘contact zone’. In light of 
the polyethnicity of the archipelagic and resettlement world, the second group of 
texts deals with transmigrant identity, specifically ethnocultural identity. The third 
set of texts addresses the theoretical underpinning of the thesis, namely the 
concept of transculturation. Several subsets of texts (universal, archipelagic, and 
site-specific) will help flesh out the main themes. 
 The second half of the twentieth century was the heyday of archipelagic 
transmigration, the incidence of which spawned a proliferation of academic 
writing dealing with all aspects of the resettlement phenomenon. Agencies such as 
the Philippines’ National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Authority (NARRA), 
Indonesia’s Transmigration Ministry, or Malaysia’s Federal Land Development 
Authority (FELDA), despite differing modi operandi, faced similar scrutiny by 
academics and researchers. Much of the discourse, however, focused on the 
economic potential of programs, their administrative shortcomings, impacts on the 
environment, marginalisation of the indigene, and sociopolitical impacts. 
 Although research on the sociocultural impacts on host and settler 
communities was not neglected by academe, this area was given a low priority. A 
long-term assessment would have been premature in view of the time-delay 
required for social interaction to manifest. While an understanding of 
ethnocultural identity lies at the heart of this project, the focus of the investigation 
revolves around the degree of transculturational change that is possible (or 
required) for harmonious ‘resettlement frontier’ relations to exist. Recognising 
that degrees of ethnocultural reification, diminution, or rejection are possible, the 
selected texts reveal under what circumstances the processes, renegotiations, and 
reconstruction of identity takes place. 
 
Transmigration / Resettlement Texts 
This section reviews the range of transmigration / resettlement texts. To overview 
the transmigration phenomenon the texts are broad-based, looking at rural-to-rural 
resettlement on an Archipelago-wide basis: defining transmigration, highlighting 
its objectives, and salient issues such as demographic and ethnocultural 
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imperatives. The second group of texts is Philippines-specific, unpacking issues 
such as the rationale for resettlement, the process, the ethnocultural dimension, 
and the tribulation experienced in some resettlement zones. The third group will 
be site-specific, looking at Narra / Palawan as a zone of resettlement and what 
others have already contributed to the discourse. 
 
Transmigration: Archipelago Specific 
The seminal text contributing to any understanding of the transmigration 
phenomenon is Karl Pelzer’s (1945) monograph Pioneer Settlements in the Asiatic 
Tropics: Studies in Land Utilization and Agricultural Colonization in 
Southeastern Asia. This is a foundational work on which many others have built. 
Pelzer’s starting point was the maldistribution of populations and concomitant 
social repercussions. While providing an overview of pre-WW2 Philippine and 
Dutch East Indies state attempts at rural-to-rural population transfers, the text has 
wider resonance. Though his research (1940-1941) on the eve of the Japanese 
interregnum in the Archipelago was curtailed, we nevertheless have an opus that 
is at once a document detailing the modus operandi of the colonial 
administration’s resettlement initiatives, and a blueprint for what lay ahead for 
newly independent successor states. 
 Agricultural Expansion and Pioneer Settlement in the Humid Tropics 
edited by Walter Manshard and William Morgan (1988), in the vein of Pelzer 
(1945), is an attempt to make comparisons between the programs of individual 
countries. Contributors raise issues including the social ramifications of large-
scale rural resettlement, such as the anthropological question of whether settler 
lives have been improved or whether they are merely the ‘new’ peasants. The 
emergence of social hierarchies among the settler cohort is also addressed, as well 
as the phenomenon of how settlers cope with new agricultural systems.
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 Rural 
Development and the State: Contradictions and Dilemmas in Developing 
Countries, edited by Lea and Chaudhri (1983), profiles the involvement of the 
state in the arena of land development. It suggests that whatever the contrast in 
cultural, historical, or ideological backgrounds “…the state plays a necessary and 
vital role in stimulating or inhibiting rural development” (p. xv).  
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 How did agriculturalists steeped in sawah (wet-rice) cultivation learn to cope with alien farming 
concepts? The case of tidal irrigation as practised in several Indonesian regions is a case in point; 
the precision required to institute this form of agriculture relied heavily on local knowledge. 
Newly cleared areas often needed to be farmed in an interim fashion (with reversion to swidden 
agriculture) whilst irrigation infrastructure was implemented. 
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 Amarjit Oberai’s (1988) edited text Land Settlement Policies and 
Population Redistribution Policies in Developing Countries: Achievements, 
Problems, and Prospects canvasses the similarities and differences in resettlement 
project implementations In his introductory chapter, Oberai (1988a: 7-47) 
critiques in turn the performance of projects, their economic and social 
constraints, the factors impacting on success or failure, and whether rural 
resettlement is in fact an appropriate response to deal with the social dilemma of 
poverty and national development. Population redistribution, provision of land for 
the landless, promotion of regional development, agricultural development and 
improved welfare have all had mixed outcomes that appear to be dependent upon 
the vagaries of suitable planning and project implementation. The success of 
settlement programs can be measured by the degree of settler abandonment of 
projects, lack of off-farm employment, social tensions, land concentration, 
ecological problems, and the cost of resettlement. 
 In Spontaneous and Planned Settlement in Southeast Asia, Harald Uhlig 
(1984) suggests that, although the state-sponsored resettlement paradigm is well 
documented, the role played by spontaneous transmigration in the ASEAN states 
of Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand is less well defined.
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 Uhlig 
begins by stating that the challenge faced by a rapidly growing population and 
concomitant landless or ‘underlanded’ element was to clear new land for food 
production, in essence to increase the availability of more ‘rice-bowls’.42 He 
broaches the disconnection between what state planners imagined for land 
development and resettlement, and what actually transpired on the settlement 
frontier. Existing technocratic bias favoured wet-rice cultivation. “…the published 
‘textbook’ examples of neatly cleared, levelled and carefully tended wet-rice 
plains or irrigated terraces!” (p. 17) dominate the rural development discourse, 
without reflecting on the reality of what is possible on the frontier.  
 Other texts that highlight the complex social, economic, and political 
dimensions of the rural resettlement phenomenon in the Archipelago include 
Jones and Richter’s (1982) edited overview Population Resettlement Programs in 
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 Spontaneous migrants are those who through their own initiative, and at their own expense, re-
locate to the settlement frontier. In some instances they may be absorbed into state schemes, but 
often they buy land from indigenes or act as squatters until the state regularises their situation. In 
the Philippine scenario the numbers of those deemed spontaneous transmigrants came to exceed 
manyfold those that the state resettled. 
42
 The land-hunger that drove this ‘pioneer settlement’ momentum he suggests resembled the scale 
of land clearing that took place in medieval Central Europe and the later push west in North 
America (Uhlig 1984: xiii). 
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Southeast Asia. In their introductory chapter they raise an issue central to this 
thesis: the ramifications of resettling heterogeneous ethnoreligious transmigrants 
among culturally dissimilar autochthonous groups (pp. 5-6). The ramifications of 
resettlement are canvassed in Shamsul Bahrin’s (1988a) edited work Beyond 
Resettlement: A Comparative Study of the Impact of Resettlement Programmes in 
Southeast Asia. His chapter ‘Rural resettlement in the ASEAN region: An 
overview’ (1988b) raises the issue of the ‘methodological’ difficulties inherent in 
the settlement process, where political dictates may drive resettlement bureaucrats 
to make decisions on an ad-hoc and short-term basis (p: 26). In such political 
climates the implementation of pilot projects, sociological and economic studies, 
and settler-specific training was usually forfeit. Rural Migration Policies and 
Development edited by Paiva and Bahrin (1984) conflates the aims of rural 
resettlement with that of stemming the rural-urban flows that accelerated 
following Independence.
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 Individual authors examining the parallels of the various archipelagic 
processes of resettlement are too numerous to mention; here I highlight several 
who have contributed to the discourse. Although some of the authors cited engage 
exclusively with their countries of expertise, their insights are of a wider 
relevance.  
 The first is Joan Hardjono. Having written extensively on the matter of 
Indonesia’s Transmigrasi (Transmigration) program, two texts have immediacy 
for the integration issues dealt with in this thesis. As an adjunct to Pelzer, 
Hardjono’s ground-breaking text Transmigration in Indonesia (1977), as well as 
being an overview, provides an insight into the integration issues faced in 
resettlement zones. 
 A further exposé on the sociocultural ramification of resettlement is 
provided by Willem Wertheim (1959) in ‘Sociological aspects of inter-island 
migration in Indonesia’. He noted the difficulty involved in indigene-settler 
integration in situations where one cohort felt superior to the other. Gloria Davis’ 
(1976) study A Social History of the Balinese Movement to Central Sulawesi, 
1907-1974 also deals with integrational issues. She demonstrated that integration 
is situationally dependent; that is, integration and the associated cultural 
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 With the benefit of hindsight, it can now be seen that despite the resettlement of several millions 
of transmigrant families – specificity with actual numbers is difficult given the over-lap of 
statistics for state-sponsored and spontaneous migrants – a number to the magnitude of ten (10) 
has made the rural-urban move. 
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transformation is a hesitant process. The Balinese in her transmigration study area 
readily acculturated into their host community; however, when their numbers 
increased, acculturation halted, and was in some instances undone.  
 Heinz Arndt, writing from an economist’s perspective, was somewhat 
sceptical about the economic rationale for state-sponsored, rural-to-rural 
resettlement. In ‘Transmigration: Achievements, problems, prospects’ (1983) and 
‘Transmigration in Indonesia’ (1988) Arndt critiques the spending of scarce 
resources by the newly-independent states on programs that, he suggests, could 
have been self-funded. In his view, integration was more likely in urban settings 
where intermarriage was a less fraught proposition than in rural ethnic enclaves. 
The enclave nature of resettlement is apparent in Ria Gondowarsito’s (1986) 
research Transmigrasi Bedol Desa: An Empirical Case Study of Inter-Island 
Village Resettlement in Indonesia, in which she investigates the social impact of 
resettlement as a consequence of displacement by a dam construction. The 
‘plucking up’ of thousands of Javanese families and ‘replanting’ them in far-away 
Bengkulu, while comforting in a co-ethnic sense,
44
 nevertheless failed to realise 
state imaginings that transmigration would privilege a national character over an 
ethnic one.  
 Transmigration’s nation-building capacity was one theme that resonated in 
nation-states inheriting polyethnic populations. Brian Hoey’s (2003) paper 
‘Nationalism in Indonesia: Building imagined and intentional communities 
through transmigration’, describes the process and critiques the ‘imagining’. 
Riwanto Tirtosudarmo’s (2001) essay ‘Demography and security: Transmigration 
policy in Indonesia’, posits that state resettlement objectives encompassed those 
of national security and national unity. The politico-social engineering aspects of 
resettlement should not, however, be over-emphasised; rapidly increasing 
populations in all the Malay Archipelago states dictated policy. It is this 
population pressure that de Koninck and Déry (1997) have in mind in their essay 
‘Agricultural expansion as a tool of population redistribution in Southeast Asia’. 
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 What I mean by ‘comforting’ is the security associated with group solidarity – one’s kin and 
ethnic group would be sharing in the unknown. For many folk, reluctant to separate from their 
families, regions-of-origin, and co-ethnics, sharing the new environment provided some 
psychological anchor with the past. The state and resettlement authorities were caught in a double-
bind. While imagining the potential for smooth interethnic (or supraethnic) coexistences, they at 
the same time wanted to facilitate a smooth resettlement process. Redding (2002) demonstrates the 
lengths the state bureaucracy in Indonesia went to facilitate the resettlement of ethnic Balinese in 
far-flung transmigrant zones. These cohorts were provided with traditional gamelan musical 
instruments – either accompanying the migrants or being provided at a later time. 
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As Dutch and American resettlement initiatives had demonstrated, the dilemma of 
population pressure in the region was not confined to the postwar era. Clifford 
Geertz (1963) had already noted the ramifications of worsening land: man ratios 
in Agricultural Involution: The Process of Ecological Change in Indonesia. 
 The longevity of archipelagic rural resettlement initiatives and their social 
impacts in much of the twentieth century are best encompassed by two papers. In 
‘From emigratie to transmigrasi: Continuity and change in migration policies in 
Indonesia’, Tirtosudarmo (1997) outlines the rationale for, and trajectory of, the 
resettlement project in his country. A decade later his ‘Population, ethnicity and 
violent conflict’ (2006) highlights the difficulties that are being faced in 
environments in which culturally diverse peoples have been compelled to reside. 
Notwithstanding the perception that resettlements constituted “a valuable multi-
purpose instrument that have led to a belief that they are a panacea, a cure-all for 
many social and economic ills” (1997: 19), integration and coexistence 
engendered by resettlement is, in his view, an unfinished, a negotiable, an 
unfinishable phenomenon. 
 
Transmigration: Philippines Specific 
Pelzer’s (1945) Pioneer Settlement in the Asiatic Tropics is also the seminal text 
introducing the Philippine state’s role in rural-to-rural resettlement. He outlines 
the rationale for settlement, its objectives, achievements, and shortcomings up to 
the eve of the Asia-Pacific War (1941-1945). Academics have referred to his 
outline of the National Land Settlement Authority (NLSA) in Mindanao as a 
blueprint for subsequent studies. Wernstedt and Simkin’s (1965) article 
‘Migrations and settlement of Mindanao’ describes the increased tempo of the 
postwar movement of settlers from densely populated areas of Luzon and the 
Visayas to Mindanao, the ‘Land of Promise’. For an understanding of the milieu 
in which the postwar scramble for land occurred, a close reading of Wernstedt and 
Spencer’s (1978) The Philippine Island World: A Physical, Cultural, and 
Regional Geography provides a starting point. Robert Huke’s (1963) Shadows on 
the Land: An Economic Geography of the Philippines adds to this discourse. 
 Cayetano Paderanga Jr., in Land Settlements in the Philippines (1988) and 
A Review of Land Settlements in the Philippines (1995) provides an overview of 
the resettlement phenomenon in the Philippines from an economist's perspective. 
He canvasses the historical trajectory of resettlement in the twentieth century, 
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discusses the implementation of specific programs, and suggests policy 
recommendations. A further overview is Leticia Postrado’s (1984) Migration and 
Rural Resettlement in the Philippines in which she adds to an understanding of the 
different ways settlement programs impact on the socio-economic status of state-
sponsored as compared with spontaneous migrants. Rey Crystal (1982: 102) in 
‘Overview of land settlement schemes in the Philippines’ adds his observation 
that as the land inventory has diminished consequent to migration, plot sizes have 
been greatly reduced, so that livelihoods often mirror those of the donor areas, 
thereby undermining the ‘social uplift’ objectives of resettlement initiatives. 
 Whereas landlessness and tenant poverty were the catalyst for rural unrest, 
a key rationale for state-sponsored resettlement was to undermine peasant 
resistance. In A Captive Land: The Politics of Agrarian Reform in the Philippines, 
Putzel (1992) discusses the objective of improvement in living standards and 
raises the issue of rural poverty, tenancy and landlessness – all push factors for 
transmigrants. Andrea Campado (2005) in ‘Pioneering in the Cotabato frontier: 
The Koronadal Valley Project during the pre-war years’, demonstrates the 
national unity expectations of the earliest state resettlement programs where, as 
demonstrated by her study of the 1939 NLSA settlement in Mindanao, there was a 
perception that Visayan settlers and Muslim families could live side by side. The 
theme of national unity is continued by Putzel (1992) who discusses resettlement 
as a panacea for the peasant-HUK insurgency. 
 From the perspective of national security Benedict Kerkvliet’s (1990) The 
Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines illustrates how the 
state – under the auspices of the Economic Development Corps (EDCOR) – 
promised to address the landlessness grievance of the HUKs, and was able to win 
a psychological advantage in undermining the rebellion by resettling surrendered 
insurgents. Abinales (2004), in Making Mindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the 
Formation of the Philippine Nation-State, suggests that the pre-war 
Commonwealth administration of President Quezon was motivated to settle 
Mindanao with Northerners as a bulwark to the successful 1920s-1930s Japanese 
colonisation of the abacá (Manila hemp)-producing regions of Davao. 
 The Philippines settlement process was hampered by intermittent 
reorganisations of the state-funded resettlement agencies. When reflecting on the 
relatively small numbers (when compared with spontaneous settlers) that were 
resettled, Abinales points to the shortcomings of state resettlement agencies. 
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Spontaneous transmigration as a consequence came to dominate the resettlement 
process, though in the Philippines (just as in Indonesia) an intersection of the two 
paradigms was inevitable. In Philippine Migration: The Settlement of the Digos-
Padada Valley, Davao Province, Simkins and Wernstedt (1971) demonstrate the 
dynamics of spontaneous migration with a case study. Central to their study is the 
role played in the settlement of the Valley by networking and the chain migration 
of kin and those of similar ethnic background. 
 The expected social uplift of improved living standards promised by 
resettlement soon evaporated. The struggle for resources in the donor areas was 
replicated in the settlement zone as the ‘land of promise’ (Mindanao) also became 
crowded. In ‘Peasant colonization in Mindanao’, Peter Krinks (1970) illumines 
the reality faced in the frontier as the land: man ratio declined from 6.7 hectares in 
1939, 5.4 hectares in 1948, to 2.2 hectares in 1960. In ‘Old wine in a new bottle: 
Land settlement and agrarian problems in the Philippines’ Krinks (1974) suggests 
that the rationale and good intentions of resettlement for landless tenants was 
undermined by the replication in the settlement zones of agricultural systems and 
practices that reflected those of the donor regions, that is, land consolidation, 
tenancy and patronage. He adds to this discourse by suggesting in ‘Changing land 
use on a Philippine frontier’ (Krinks 1975) that cultural inertia was a contributing 
factor in this reversion to the understood modi vivendi. However, in ‘Rectifying 
inequality or favouring the few? Image and reality in Philippine development’ 
(1983) he alludes to the reality that increasing attention was paid to export-
generating agriculture; advantaging agribusiness at the expense of individual 
settlers, who at worst were dispossessed of lands, or otherwise relegated to 
subsistence livelihoods. 
 William James’ (1983) essay ‘Settler selection and land settlement 
alternatives: New evidence from the Philippines’ points out that self-financed 
settlers are more successful than government-supported ones. He suggested that a 
central factor in this success was the progression to owning land afforded by 
agricultural contracts, that is, a spontaneous settler arrives on the frontier, works 
as a tenant for an already established settler, then progresses to own his own farm. 
Acknowledging the state’s ‘uplift’ motive for the weakest in society, James 
suggested that economically, spontaneous migration provided a greater net benefit 
and involved many more settlers, and was thereby more likely to ease peasant 
landlessness grievances.  
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 Early twentieth century resettlement programs in the then sparsely 
populated Mindanao and Palawan fared reasonably well in integrating diverse 
ethnolinguistic elements, but the realisation by the indigenous peoples in 
Mindanao that their traditional lands were under threat induced a reaction as 
evidenced by Concepción et al. (2003) in Breaking the Links Between Economics 
and Conflict in Mindanao. Hayami et al. (1993) in Toward an Alternative Land 
Reform Paradigm: A Philippine Perspective suggest that social harmony was not 
achieved in the settler or donor areas – in the latter because too little could be 
achieved without systemic change and in the former because a reaction to domain 
loss was acute. In Tuazon’s (ed.) (2008) The Moro Reader: History and 
Contemporary Struggles of the Bangsamoro People various contributors have 
provided analyses for why indigene-settler relations deteriorated over time, a 
central theme being concerns over the diminution of ‘ancestral domain’. Gutierrez 
and Borras, Jr. (eds.) (2004) in The Moro Conflict: Landlessness and Misdirected 
State Policies add to this interpretation. 
 In ‘Migration and violent conflict in Mindanao’, Jorge Tigno (2006) views 
the indigene-settler imbroglio through a clearer lens, suggesting that the current 
insurgency among elements of the Muslim population in parts of Mindanao is 
symptomatic of an older anti-colonial struggle that has morphed into one of 
resistance to a state that has failed to provide adequately for – and indeed has 
discriminated against – a cohort of its citizens since their minoritisation as a result 
of resettlement, by both state-sponsored and spontaneous migrants. Myrthena 
Fianza (2004) in ‘Contesting land and identity in the periphery: The Moro 
indigenous people of southern Philippines’ agrees that the resistance is deeply 
rooted in colonial times, but adds that with the coming of the American, and then 
the Philippine state, an intersection of concepts such as traditional tenurial 
systems, the ‘Regalian Doctrine’ and ‘Torrens titling’ have conspired to 
undermine the nascent state’s equilibrium. 
 A text that synthesises many of the elements in the resettlement / 
coexistence paradigm is Rudy Rodil’s (2004) overview The Minoritization of the 
Indigenous Communities of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. The salience of 
this text is his introduction of the term ‘indigenous cultural communities’ (ICC). 
As a snapshot of the historical trajectory of the Mindanao imbroglio the text 
provides a model antithetical to what has transpired in the Narra resettlement 
model. Elements of the Philippine state, well aware of the fragmentary nature of 
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its geographical inheritance, made efforts to be more inclusive for cultural 
minorities, but as Eder and McKenna’s (2004) chapter ‘Minorities in the 
Philippines: Ancestral lands and autonomy in theory and practice’ demonstrates, 
policy was guided by contradictory forces. The polyethnicity of the Philippines, 
while not in itself a factor precluding coexistence, seems nevertheless via the 
‘cultural conundrum’ to have stymied national cohesion; in Mindanao 
Austronesian-ness appears not to have been a sufficient bond to accommodate 
cultural particularisms, and thwart centrifugal tendencies. 
 
Transmigration: Site Specific – Narra / Palawan 
Narra and Palawan, despite their peripheral location vis-à-vis the Philippine body 
politic, have attracted considerable academic attention. Regarded as the country’s 
last ‘ecological frontier’, interest in Palawan has centred on concern for the 
environment; and as a consequence of extensive transmigration to the Province, 
the position of the autochthonous peoples. Several composite texts allow a broad 
entrée into the resettlement world and Palawan-as-place. First I mention the edited 
overview by James Eder and Janet Fernandez (1996) titled Palawan at the 
Crossroads: Development and the Environment on a Philippine Frontier, which 
uncovers the historical background, the migration phenomenon, and its impact on 
both the indigenous ethnic groups and the environment. 
 Further insight into a cross-section of Palawan’s migration history, 
economy, ethnography and environment is provided by edited versions of the 
Palawan State University University Journal (Evangelista 2008, Docto 2010). 
Oscar Evangelista’s (2008a) essay ‘Constructing Palawan as an immigrant 
province’, as well as outlining the diversity of ethnicities that the Island / Province 
now supports, also reveals that cultural interchange (language and conservation 
practices) continue to be experienced by both indigene Pala’wan and Ilonggo 
settlers (p. 38). The interchange is viewed by some observers to be one of 
asymmetrical acculturation, that is, one predicated on a dominant / dominated 
paradigm. In On the Road to Tribal Extinction: Depopulation, Deculturation, and 
Adaptive Well-Being among the Batak of the Philippines Eder (1992) makes the 
case that for some ethnic groups cultural interchange is no guarantee of survival 
for a given ethnocultural group, especially where the adoption or adaptation of 
new cultural values is problematic. 
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 Elaine Brown’s (1991) Tribal Peoples and Land Settlement: The Effects of 
Philippine Capitalist Development on the Palawan [sic] explores the role of the 
transmigration phenomenon in altering the sociocultural landscape of southern 
Palawan.
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 She suggests that the state, by championing the progressive migrant 
whose industry leaves a grain surplus that supports the capitalist ethos, plays a 
role in the deculturation of the indigene Pala’wan. Brown makes the case that in 
this cultural interchange the Animist indigene, practising subsistence swidden 
agriculture (while a Filipino citizen), is disadvantaged, economically, socially and 
politically. The resettlement process, as it affects indigenous groups’ lifeways, is 
further addressed by Maria Lopez (1986) in The Palaw’an [sic]: Land, Ethnic 
Relations and Political Process in a Philippine Frontier System. The Pala’wan, 
Lopez posits, needed to negotiate their identity with former Muslim suzerains, the 
encroaching Philippine state, and the modernity project that introduced settlers to 
their world. Although numerically dominant, the indigenes deferred to a settler 
minority politically more powerful. 
 The perception of settler success on the resettlement frontier is canvassed 
by Carmelita Veloro (1995) in Pioneering, Livelihood, and Everyday Success in 
Palawan. The determinants of success vary, but the pioneer settler experience is 
shown to metamorphose into a folk construct in which the status of the migrant 
pioneer increases with the antiquity of his arrival. Loneliness, isolation, and 
deprivation contribute to a mythology that takes no account of the indigene. In her 
essay ‘Frontier colonization and legitimation in a Palawan coastal settlement’, 
Veloro (1996) makes the point that archipelagic nations such as the Philippines 
and Indonesia have the propensity to promote mobility, contact with other peoples 
and the concomitant exchange of ideas. However, this does not preclude the need 
for newcomers to a settlement area to construct a mythology of the pioneering 
experience and the seeking of solace among ethnic kin. Settler success comes at a 
price. In her study of migrant adaptation to a frontier settlement, Celeste Lacuna-
Richman (2006) in The use of non-wood forest products by migrants in a new 
settlement: Experiences of a Visayan community in Palawan, Philippines suggests 
that lack of knowledge regarding their new environment forced a greater 
interaction between migrant and indigene (in this instance the Tagbanua); ill-
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 While Brown uses the spelling ‘Palawan’ for the ethnic group that she was studying, modern 
convention dictates the spelling for the group as ‘Pala’wan’. The term ‘Palawan’ is now generally 
confined to denote the Province of Palawan, or Palawan Island, the largest island of the Province. 
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equipped for frontier life the migrants gained from the indigene the knowledge 
essential for survival. 
 In many cases those ill-equipped to cope with pioneering were forced to 
seek livelihoods in unsustainable ways. In the absence of state support, 
individuals were pitted against the environment, a factor that has generated 
academic interest. While peripheral to this thesis, environmental issues are tied to 
the increasing population consequent to the transmigrant influx. Texts such as 
Wolfram Dressler’s (2009) study Old Thoughts in New Ideas: State Conservation 
Measures, Development and Livelihood on Palawan Island, and his collaborative 
work with Sarah Turner (2008) ‘The persistence of social differentiation in the 
Philippine Uplands’, show not only the pressure on the environment, but have as a 
starting point the population increase occasioned by resettlement. Eder’s (2009) 
Migrants to the Coast: Livelihood, Resource Management and Global Change in 
the Philippines, and his earlier A Generation Later: Household Strategies and 
Economic Change in the Rural Philippines (2000) both have as their starting point 
the effects of migration. 
 I turn now to the Narra Municipality, the site of the field-study for this 
thesis. An entry point is the comprehensive historical oversight of Leonardo Suyat 
and Pamela Tejada-Suyat’s (2005) text Narra, Palawan: Its History and Success. 
Their description of the development of Narra as a state resettlement initiative 
comes from the perspective of the individuals involved, giving a human 
dimension to both the privation encountered by the pioneers and the subsequent 
development of local institutions. The progression of pioneering is critiqued by 
Carlos Fernandez (1975) in ‘Adaptive processes and development policies in a 
frontier resettlement community’, in which he outlines the trajectory of the Narra 
resettlement project that had its genesis under the auspices of The Rice and Corn 
Production Administration (RCPA) in 1949. He outlines the resettlement 
‘blueprint’ before juxtaposing the ensuing ‘reality’ of the project, and the 
vicissitudes encountered – for example, the high settler abandonment rate. 
 The economic efficacy of state-sponsored resettlement is undertaken by 
James’ (1979) thesis An Economic Analysis of Public Land Settlement 
Alternatives in the Philippines. His research was premised on Narra as a model of 
state initiative, and read in conjunction with texts already referred to in this 
section provides a fascinating overview of Narra-as-social-laboratory. Not all state 
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initiatives had rural-to-rural resettlement as their rationale, however.
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 America’s 
Legacy to Palawan: Culion Leper Colony and Iwahig Penal Colony edited by 
Evangelista (2005) highlights that the Province’s peripherality inadvertently put it 
on the resettlement radar. Many state functionaries associated with these 
institutions, and the inmates themselves, chose to remain in Palawan, adding to 
the ethnocultural diversity of the transmigrant cohort. 
 
Ethnic Identity 
The Archipelago is one of great ethnic diversity. When considered in the 
resettlement context this diversity has implications for harmonious migrant 
coexistences. Successful integration has in some instances (Mindanao for 
example) been stymied when modi vivendi have been slow to develop among 
settler cohorts, or between indigene and settler groups. By extrapolation it 
becomes apparent that in the absence of such ethnic diversity the sociocultural 
ramifications of the archipelagic transmigration phenomenon would be less 
fraught. Amin Maalouf (2003) posits in In the Name of Identity: Violence and the 
Need to Belong that identity is far more complex than alignment with this or other 
ethnic affiliation; however, a principle is required to differentiate groups of 
people, and for people to differentiate themselves, and this is most often premised 
on ethnicity. Ethnicity therefore, and the cultural baggage underpinning ethnicity, 
is central to this thesis. 
 Before being able to investigate how, whether, or what transcultural 
changes (and its concomitant potentiality for integration in the resettlement 
milieu) take place, it is necessary to understand how ethnocultural difference 
manifests, is created, and in what circumstances reification or diminution take 
place. A starting point in this process is the unpacking of what constitutes the 
ethnocultural reality. A range of ethnicity-specific texts has been drawn upon to 
decode the complexity of archipelagic diversity. They extend from overview 
anthologies dealing with an array of ethno-identity issues to texts dealing with 
specifics such as language and religion. They have formed a framework for 
further investigation into the role that ethnicity plays in underpinning individual 
and group existences, and in the factors that have the capacity to divide or unify 
heterogeneous societies. 
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 Two such state initiatives – the Culion Leper Colony and the Iwahig Penal Colony – pre-date the 
modern era of migration to Palawan. While both institutions were not inaugurated to facilitate 
rural-to-rural migration, patients and inmates were nonetheless drawn into agricultural pursuits. 
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 A contemporary introductory text that unpacks the various discourses 
surrounding the concept of ethnicity and its theorists is Steve Fenton’s (2008) 
Ethnicity. He addresses the race / ethnicity divide, how and when ethnicity 
becomes important, when individuals or groups need to invoke their ethnic 
identity, how it is mobilised in the context of migration, and the role it plays in 
‘precarious states’. Pre-dating Fenton’s overview was the edited work of Glazer 
and Moynihan (1975) Ethnicity: Theory and Experience. The text allows a 
representative cohort of theorists, by way of case studies, to illustrate an 
understanding of ethnicity’s diverse ramifications, be it in the realm of regional 
language demands, social stratification, or national security. In their ‘Introduction’ 
to the text they suggest that ethnicity seemed to be a ‘new’ term, and questioned 
how useful a marker this ‘new’ term was. In essence did it mean something new 
or was it simply a way of saying something old? Further, they question whether a 
single term has the capacity to describe the psychological differences of groups 
within the United States, Soviet Union, Belgium, Canada, China, Peru or parts of 
Africa, or whether the varied phenomena might not be better described as, 
“…linguistic, religious, tribal, racial…depending on their nature.” (Glazer and 
Moynihan 1975a: 2). 
 Two further texts are Hutchinson and Smith (eds.) (1996) Ethnicity and 
Guibernau and Rex (eds.) (1997) The Ethnicity Reader: Nationalism, 
Multiculturalism, and Migration. The first introduces the concept of ethnicity, 
unpacking the history of ethnicity, the majority / minority paradigm of ethnicities 
and the ethnicity, race, class and nation discourse. Subsequent sections deal with 
the theories of ethnicity, how ethnicity manifests in the modern world, the 
correlation between nationalism and ethnic conflict and whether / if / how ethnic 
identity might be transcended by notions of changed reality such as civic 
nationalism – an observation relevant to any study of transcultural change in an 
archipelagic resettlement setting. Guibernau and Rex introduce their text by 
unpacking the ‘concept of ethnicity’ beginning with Max Weber’s, ‘What is an 
ethnic group?’ (1997). Other sections examine the correlation between ethnicity 
and nationalism, ethnicity and violence, ethnicity and self-determination, the 
concept of multiculturalism, how increased migration converges with the realities 
of xenophobia and racism, which culminates in the notion of diasporas. 
 While primordiality (more of which later) attempts to explain why 
individuals and groups act in a certain way, the notion of what defines these 
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groups and individuals is addressed by Fredrik Barth (1998a) in his ‘Introduction’ 
to Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference. 
He posits that involvement in any ethnicity is premised on the notion that one is a 
member of a culture-bearing unit. One of the features that define ethnic groups is 
that it “has a membership which identifies itself, and is identified by others, as 
constituting a category distinguishable from other categories of the same order” 
(p. 11). However, ascription by others or self-ascription is not necessarily enough 
to maintain an ethnic boundary. In polyethnic states (as depicted in this study) the 
boundaries between ethnicities are the social boundaries that defines the ethnic 
group and it is the “ethnic ‘boundary’ that defines the group, not the cultural stuff 
that it encloses” (p.15). As Fenton (2008: 106) avers “ethnic identity is sustained 
by the maintenance of what [Barth] calls ‘boundaries’, the lines which mark off 
one group against another”. 
 As well as providing an entrée into the term ‘ethnicity’, Richard 
Schermerhorn (1970) in Comparative Ethnic Relations: A Framework for Theory 
and Research introduces the notion of how plural societies cope in the aftermath 
of migration. His exploration of models of integration is premised on what he 
interprets as the ‘sociology of intergroup relations’. Henri Tajfel’s (1981) text 
Human Groups and Social Categories: Studies in Social Psychology also raises 
the difficulties faced by the interaction of diverse groups of people. Especially 
pertinent is his chapter ‘The social psychology of minorities’. In his paper 
‘Definitions and dimensions of ethnicity: A theoretical framework’, Wsevolod 
Isajiw (1993), speaking from a Canadian perspective of ethnoplurality, suggests 
that defining ethnicity is problematical, as a range of options (primordial, 
situational, and subjective) are open to interpretation.  
 Joshua Fishman’s edited (2001) Handbook of Language and Ethnic 
Identity introduces the role that language plays in ethnicity discourse. The 
thematic approach includes the education of minorities, second-language learning, 
and the salience of language to both ethnic and national identity, which has a 
particular resonance in the resettlement milieu. The decisions a transmigrant 
needs to make with regards to the juggling of his use of language – a birth 
language, a national language (or two in the case of the Philippines) or a dominant 
local language – necessitates a need for identity compromise in some cases. A 
further text dealing with aspects of language is The Language, Ethnicity, and Race 
Reader, edited by Roxy Harris and Ben Rampton (2003). Themes such as cross-
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cultural communication, the destabilisation of ethnicity by youth, and the impact 
of nationalism on language planning were of particular salience. Language 
diminution among youth has also featured in Pamela Allen’s (2011) paper 
‘Javanese cultural traditions in Suriname’, in which it is revealed that the 
descendants of Javanese migrants increasingly maintain an ethnic identity without 
recourse to a pre-migration language. A text useful to the diversity of language in 
the Philippines is Ethnologue: Languages of the World edited by Paul Lewis. 
 The role of religion in identity maintenance is a significant boundary 
marker; it is complicated by the fact that faiths may encompass various 
ethnicities. Several useful texts helped me to elucidate the identity / religion 
diarchy. Cynthia Enloe (1996) in ‘Religion and ethnicity’ suggests that, while 
there is no consensus on what constitutes ethnicity, religion may be a marker of 
ethnic identity; however, like language, it is not sufficient to sustain an ethnic 
group. She posits that the form of religion and the degree of devotion are 
important factors in determining an individual’s or group’s ability to withstand 
assimilation or the maintenance of ethnic solidarity. Craig Prentiss’ (2003) edited 
text Religion and the Creation of Race and Ethnicity illumines how identity is 
shaped by religion. Examples are provided in Michael Sells’ (2003) ‘Sacral ruins 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Mapping ethnoreligious nationalism’ and S. P. Harish’s 
(2006) ‘Ethnic or religious cleavage? Investigating the nature of the conflict in 
Southern Thailand’. 
 Religion aside, politics and the state also impact on the way ethnic identity 
is valorised, contained or repressed. The political dimension, suppression of 
difference, or marginalisation is addressed in Vered Amit-Talai and Caroline 
Knowles (1996) edited work Re-Situating Identities: The Politics of Race, 
Ethnicity, and Culture. Should the term race be used in a time when ethnicity is 
less value-laden? What role does the idea of home play in the production of 
identity? Anthony Synott and David Howes’ (1996) essay ‘Canada’s visible 
minorities: Identity and representation’ makes the case for questioning who is 
designated as ‘minority’ or indigenous may influence how specific groups are 
viewed or treated. In his essay ‘Ethnicity and politics’, Abner Cohen (1996: 83) 
suggests that “contemporary ethnicity is the result of intensive interaction between 
ethnic groupings and not the result of complete separation.” He further suggests 
that recourse to ethnic politics in the postcolonial period has resulted from the fact 
that during the colonial era some groups were included and were able to avail 
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themselves of privileges while others remained marginalised, leading to current 
realities of ethnic disharmony. 
 Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin 
and Spread of Nationalism (2006) has as its rationale the formation of nationalism 
and the potential nation-state; many of his observations are also pertinent to an 
understanding of ethnic identity formation and contestation. Addressing themes 
such as ‘cultural roots’, ‘the angel of history’ and ‘memory and forgetting’ allows 
insights into how transitory ethnic identity may at times appear. Witness an 
imaginary Balinese slave taken to Melaka in the seventeenth century; what is he 
now? Most probably not Hindu and definitely not Indonesian as the descendants 
of his former Balinese co-ethnics will be.
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 Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger’s 
(1992) text The Invention of Tradition, while Eurocentric, nevertheless provides a 
background for the discourse of identity by suggesting several features of the 
promulgation of identity tradition: legitimising institutions, establishing social 
cohesion or group membership, and the inculcation of beliefs, value systems and 
conventions of behaviour (p. 9). Stephen Cornell and Douglas Hartmann (1998) in 
Ethnicity and Race: Making Identities in a Changing World raise the issue of a 
constructionist approach to identity, one in which the problem of authenticity is 
raised. 
 Rethinking Ethnicity and Nation-Building: Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Fiji in 
Comparative Perspective edited by Abdul Rahman Embong (2007) raises the 
complexities of subsuming ethnic difference into that of race. How does the term 
‘Malay’ sit as ethnic when it encompasses various groups, such as Minangkabau 
and Javanese as well as the ‘ethnic’ Malay? The Indian and Chinese likewise are 
‘labelled’ as a group by institutions of the state, when clearly they encompass 
diverse ethnicities, languages, and religions. Anthony Milner (2004), in his 
‘Afterword: A history of Malay ethnicity’, adds to this ethnic identity imagining 
discourse. 
 The process of ethnogenesis – a matter of some relevance in milieux 
where the coexistence of diverse ethnocultural groups is at stake – has been 
addressed by several scholars. Daniel Doeppers and Peter Xenos’ (2000) edited 
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 That is not to say that such an individual is necessarily proscribed from all former ethnocultural 
markers, but in the absence of a similar group, he will likely integrate into his host community via 
a process of acculturation. An example of group cohesion being maintained might be that of the 
Ladino (Judaeo-Spanish) – Jewish expellees from Spain after the fall of Granada in 1492. Though 
dispersed as far afield as Morocco, the Netherlands and the Ottoman Empire, they were able to 
maintain a separate identity – speaking Spanish, worshipping Judaism. 
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work Population and History: The Demographic Origins of the Modern 
Philippines and James Scott’s (2009) The Art of Not Being Governed: An 
Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia both raise the prospect of ethnic 
formation as a ramification of the colonising and slaving process. Both those 
fleeing the state and those incorporated by the state were subject to interactions 
with heterogeneous others, unwittingly becoming the progenitors of new 
ethnocultural groups. Conversely, schisms in groups also contributed to the 
formation of new ethnicities. Two useful texts informing this process in the 
Philippines are Rolando Esteban’s (2002) The Kalibugans: Moros of Zamboanga 
Peninsula: An Enquiry into Social Fission, Hybridity and Ethnicity and Charles 
Macdonald’s (2001) paper ‘Concerning the identity of some ethnic categories in 
southern Palawan’. 
 The salience of intermarriage in the construction of new hybrid identities 
is evident in many studies of the migration world. The dichotomy between 
identity maintenance and ethnocultural ‘slippage’ might be of some importance in 
societies where, as Eriksen (1997) suggests, ethnicity is a very important criterion 
for ordering the social world of individuals. His case study ‘Mauritian society 
between the ethnic and the non-ethnic’ points to the difficulties encountered by 
cohorts attempting to straddle the ethnocultural divide. Lois Hall (2010) makes a 
similar observation for Mindanao in Gensan is Halu-Halo: A study of Muslim / 
Christian Social Relations in a Regional City of the Southern Philippines. 
 That not all migrations end with clear-cut identity paradigms is cause for 
concern in some circles. Saidatulakmal Mohd’s (2010) paper ‘Ethnic identity 
dilemma – A case study of the Indian Muslims in Penang, Malaysia’, raises the 
issue of the situational recourse to what matters ethnically. It appears that the 
interplay of group psychology and individual agency is required when coming to 
grips with what Saidatulakmal calls the ‘ethnic identity dilemma’. In a society 
where religion is supposed to neatly denote a racial / ethnic divide, the case of  
Indian Muslims is complicated by their adherence to a religion that is supposed to 
delineate Malaysia’s Malay population – hence an ethnic identity dilemma. Judith 
Nagata’s (1974) ‘What is a Malay? Situational selection of ethnic identity in a 
plural society’, also critiques the same identity paradigm, that of polyethnic 
George Town, Penang. She notes that ethnic self-identification often fails to 
correspond with bureaucratic or official ethnic delineation as practiced in 
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Malaysia. If an Indian Muslim can situationally identify as ‘Malay’ why cannot a 
Chinese Muslim? 
 Glazer and Moynihan’s (1970) Beyond the Melting Pot: the Negroes, 
Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians and Irish of New York City was the quintessential 
text dealing with the challenges faced by groups maintaining ethnic identity in a 
multicultural milieu. When Glazer and Moynihan introduced their concept of 
ethnicity in 1963 the United States was in a state of flux. The term ‘ethnicity’ 
emerged as a corollary of an era in which the African-Americans (Negroes) began 
asserting themselves and demanding their constitutionally mandated rights. 
However, the ‘ethnic’ label came to differentiate various groups of European 
immigrants to the United States. Italians, Irish (nationalities) and Jews (religion) 
were viewed as separate ethnic identities, while the Negro was in essence ethnic-
less. 
 Tony Waters (1995), in ‘Towards a theory of identity and migration: The 
formation of ethnic enclaves by migrant Germans in Russia and North America’, 
raises the issue of what it means to be a member of an ethnic cohort. He questions 
what it means to be ethnically German, and in what circumstance ethnic German-
ness is maintained, diluted, or assimilated into a larger settler-nation amalgam. 
Peter Weinreich (1992) in ‘Social change, ethnic and national identity: Theory 
and practice’ conversely looks at the survival / revival of ethnic identities 
marginalised or suppressed during periods of authoritarian rule, in for example, 
the former Soviet Union.
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 Linda Soroff (1995), in The Maintenance and Transmission of Ethnic 
Identity: A Study of Four Ethnic Groups of Religious Jews in Israel, exposes a 
different conundrum faced by the immigrants to a settler-nation, in this case 
Israel. The integration of the Beta Israel Jews from Ethiopia (phenotypically 
African) has not gone unchallenged. The state may have been founded on the 
basis of religion, though cultural boundaries and political dominance of one ethnic 
cohort over another determined the state’s coherence. European Jews have 
assumed dominance, thereby blurring the boundaries about who is, or who is not, 
a potential member of any particular ethnic group.  
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 Waters’ case study mirrors the reality of ethnic identification during Indonesia’s Orde Baru 
(New Order – 1966-1998) when ethnocultural stereotypicalities could be theme-parked in Taman 
Mini (Jakarta) whilst meaningful discourses about religion and ethnic difference were suppressed 
by press censorship laws, only to resurface with a vengeance following the New Order’s collapse 
in 1998. Tanasaldy’s (2012) highlights this period of political and ethnic realignment – in his case 
the process of Dayak resurgence or reification. 
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 A timely text for understanding the ethnic dilemma is Lola Romanucci-
Ross et al.’s (2006) edited work Ethnic Identity: Problems and Prospects for the 
Twenty-first Century. Section headings including: ‘Changing ethnic and national 
identities’, ‘Migration and ethnic minorities’, ‘Ethnic ascription versus self-
definitions’, and ‘Shifting ethnic identities: The Realpolitik of cultural control’, 
introduce a number of ethnocultural case studies that demonstrate the difficulty 
involved in attempting simplistic interpretations of ethnic valorisation. 
 Any analysis of the degree of identity maintenance in the archipelagic 
setting needs to take cognisance of how or why some groups have organised 
politically in recent times. Jamie Davidson (2008) in ‘The study of political 
ethnicity in Southeast Asia’ suggests that an unravelling of postcolonial inherited 
political realities has played a part in recourse to political ethnicity. Primordial 
sentiment was as likely as not to galvanise one constituent cohort or other to 
political activism where a perception of advantage / disadvantage was observed. 
Taufiq Tanasaldy (2012) in Regime Change and Ethnic Politics in Indonesia: 
Dayak Politics of West Kalimantan highlights how political actors and strategies 
manifested following the lifting of statist proscriptions in Indonesia. Anne 
Schiller’s (2007) article ‘Activism and identities in an East Kalimantan Dayak 
organization’ adds to this discourse. Tirtosudarmo (2006) in ‘Population, 
ethnicity, and violent conflict’, overviews the difficulties faced in polyethnic 
milieux. He suggests that one of the factors contributing to the ethnic violence that 
has transpired on the resettlement frontier was the short-sightedness of state 
planners when projecting the long-term nation-building expectations for 
transmigration. 
 Still being analysed is the imbroglio created by the movement south of 
Christian settlers to Muslim / Lumad Mindanao. Cultural exchange 
(transculturation) has not occurred at a sufficient rate to allow for ethnic 
coexistence. Jorge Tigno’s (2006) essay ‘Migration and violent conflict in 
Mindanao’ suggests that the ‘minoritisation’ of the Moros and Lumads occurred 
at a pace and in a manner that precluded accommodatable change. Patricio Diaz 
(2003) in Understanding Mindanao Conflict suggests that the Muslim south, 
before the arrival of the Spanish, had the superior culture and civilisation (p. 3) 
but resisting colonial subjection occurred in tandem with resistance to change and 
innovation. Concepción et al. (2003) in Breaking the Links Between Economics 
and Conflict in Mindanao, and Schiavo-Campo and Judd (2005) in ‘The 
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Mindanao conflict in the Philippines: Roots, costs and potential peace dividend’, 
attempt to rationalise why Mindanao was not able to peacefully accommodate an 
influx of outsiders. 
 Hardjono’s (2001) ILO paper ‘Ethnic identity and the utilization of land: 
A case study in Riau, Indonesia’, demonstrates the longevity of such issues as 
indigene-transmigrant ambivalence. She addresses the reality of ethnolinguistic 
detachment between migrants and an already domiciled population. Despite there 
not being a religious divide, intermarriage between groups failed to occur, which 
points to factors other than the faith ‘boundary’ as a stymie to integration. While 
the state’s best intentions are to uplift and provide for its citizens, Sandra Panel 
(1999) in ‘Did the earth move for you? The social seismology of a natural disaster 
in Maluku, Eastern Indonesia’, shows that factors such as attachment to a given 
lifeway and territory may preclude a successful relocation into the territory of 
another ethnic group. 
 Using Somalia as a model, Anna Simons (1997) in ‘Democratisation and 
ethnic conflict: The kin connection’, posits that weak states unable to provide 
social security for their citizens force citizens to rely on those they can trust, those 
who, outside their families are their ethnic kin. This then guarantees a reification 
of ethnicity. In their essay ‘The immigration dilemma: The role of perceived 
group competition, ethnic prejudice, and national identity’, Victoria Esses et al. 
(2001) provide an explanation of why groups feel anxiety about their position in 
society. Their study has resonance on the resettlement ‘frontier’; that of trying to 
understand how the competition for resources results in the negative stereotyping 
of migrants in relatively affluent countries like Australia, Canada, and the United 
States. Antipathies that are sometimes generated as a consequence of archipelagic 
transmigration is not adequately explained by ethnic difference per se, but may be 
better explained by recourse to ethnicity consciousness-raising if a perceived 
grievance or advantage is visible. 
 Agency is a further complication that impacts upon the decisions 
individuals make with regard to their ethnic affiliation. Donald Horowitz (2000) 
in Ethnic Groups in Conflict suggests that there exists a birth identity that runs 
parallel with a choice identity. Phenotype, religion, language can both advantage, 
and disadvantage the birth / choice continuum. While some transcend boundaries 
to adopt a new ethnocultural identity, these attempts may just as easily be 
thwarted. In his essay ‘The civil war in Yugoslavia: Do ostensibly high rates of 
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intermarriage obviate ethnic hatreds as a cause?' Andrei Simic (1994) posits that 
conservative rural patriarchal values meant that wives would generally support 
their husbands, even when the wives’ ethnoreligious cohort was being targeted. 
 The cultural dimension to ethnic conflict is further developed by Jack 
Eller’s (1999) text From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict: An Anthropological 
Perspective on International Ethnic Conflict. He suggests that modern conflicts, 
rather than being ideological, are manifesting as interethnic ones. However, it is 
not the cultural difference that is the cause of interethnic misunderstanding, but 
the co-option and magnification of any difference where advantage of a given 
ethnic-political position perceived. Ernest Gellner (2008) in Nations and 
Nationalism adds to the ethnicity discourse by suggesting that the nation-state is 
more easily premised on homogeneity; which in the age of mobility and 
modernity is a rather moot premise. 
 Existing degrees of difference between ethnic groups, that is, what divides 
people (cultural practice, religion, language and so forth) rather than what groups 
have in common (historical links, lifestyles, cuisines and so forth), has implication 
for how the wider world is viewed. The amelioration of interethnic disagreements 
is often constrained by the valorisation of ethnocultural differences over a 
reflection of shared values. For this thesis a starting point in the imagining of 
similarities rather than difference is provided by Charles Robequain (1959). His 
text Malaya, Indonesia, Borneo, and the Philippines: A Geographical, Economic, 
and Political Description of Malaya, the East Indies and the Philippines allows 
for an envisioning of an archipelagic world in which cultural similarities provide 
interethnic linkages. 
 Before addressing the cultural differences or boundaries that might prevent 
or retard archipelagic peoples from interacting freely and be in a position to 
mutually exchange cultural norms, cognisance of the connaturality of an 
Austronesian cultural-linguistic heritage needs to be acknowledged. Several texts 
attest to this connaturality. Adelaar and Himmelmann’s (2005) edited work The 
Austronesian Languages of Asia and Madagascar, and Peter Bellwood’s (2006) 
The Austronesians: Historical and Comparative Perspectives, facilitate a broader 
understanding of a shared archipelagic heritage. Bellwood et al. (2007) in 
Prehistory of the Indo-Malaysian Archipelago continue with the theme of 
common origins and diverse transformations. Why did Austronesian expansion 
occur, Bellwood asks? 
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 Once on the move, archipelagic people were caught up in the process of 
maintaining, modifying, or rejecting identities. Representative of this process is 
the corpus of texts that attempt to put in context what it means to belong to a 
specific ethnic group – mobility and intercultural relations notwithstanding. 
Timothy Barnard’s (2004) edited work Contesting Malayness: Malay Identity 
Across Boundaries is the first of these. However, the contributors are no more 
convinced than Nagata (1974) about what it means to be Malay in a modern 
context. The very term ‘Malay’ is contested by Zeus Salazar (1998) The Malayan 
Connection: Ang Pilipinas sa Dunia Melayu, in which he equates ‘Malay-ness’ 
with the broader Austronesian world, while Barnard et al. seem to confine 
‘Malay-ness’ to the Muslim-dominant areas of the Archipelago. 
 Illustrative of ethnocultural adaptation in action is the case of the various 
settlers that have found their way to the Malay Peninsula. In a sense, state-
sponsored population movements are not new phenomena. Pre-colonial and 
colonial migrants have been absorbed and are politically identified as majority 
Malay whether their origin be Javanese, Minangkabau, or Balinese. Koji 
Miyazaki (2000) raises this in ‘Javanese-Malay: Between adaptation and 
alienation’. Spaan et al. (2002) in ‘Re-Imagining borders: Malay identity and 
Indonesian migrants in Malaysia’, and Tunku Shamsul Bahrin’s (1967) ‘The 
growth and distribution of the Indonesian population in Malaya’ add to this 
discourse. 
 The modernity project, increased mobility, and resettlement have created 
new coexistence and integration paradigms. While ethnic identities are 
transportable to some extent, the greater the generational distance and time from 
region-of-origin, the greater the impact on the degree of ethnic affiliation 
maintained, or the rationale for maintaining one. That is not to suggest that ‘the 
rational’ is always involved in identity valorisation; witness the divergence in 
sentiment between the Ulster Orange parades and the maintenance of Irish 
dancing in the diaspora. Several texts have informed the questioning of the fixity 
of ethnic identity. The first I mention is Mary Waters’ (1990) Ethnic Options: 
Choosing Identities in America, in which she demonstrates that in the U.S. settler-
nation, choices about ethnic affiliation (and degree of affiliation) are dependent on 
factors such as intermarriage, transmutable surnames, the viability of retaining 
vestiges of cultural practices in heterogeneous milieux, and the neighbourhood 
one chooses to live in, as well as socio-economic and class realities. 
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 In a partial academic postscript to Glazer and Moynihan’s (1970) Beyond 
the Melting Pot, Stephen Steinberg’s (2001) The Ethnic Myth: Race, Ethnicity, 
and Class in America, makes the case that the ‘ethnic revival’ of the 1960’s 
among the ‘white ethnics’ was predicated on an emotional desire among some 
European-Americans to “affirm a right to a separate identity within the framework 
of a pluralist nation” (p. 3). Factors influencing the revival hinged on the myth of 
discrimination that new migrants had encountered; the discrimination was factual, 
but by the time the revival occurred class was obliterating ethnic particularities; 
the suburb was the new leveller. 
 Miri Song’s (2003) Choosing Ethnic Identity also questions in which 
circumstances individuals valorise their difference. Choices among descending 
generations, be it via the process of acculturation, or the increasing notion of 
intermarriage (which has the capacity to accelerate the choice principle), and the 
globalisation processes afforded by media-influenced cultural exchange, are all 
influenced by circumstance. Chinese in Amsterdam or ethnic Japanese Brazilians 
only able to speak Dutch and Portuguese respectively (while phenotypically 
conforming to type) may not be regarded as Chinese or Japanese when returning 
to region-of-origin. David Hollinger (2005), in Postethnic America: Beyond 
Multiculturalism, adds to the identity dilemma by suggesting that postethnic 
perspectives acknowledge “that most individuals live in many circles 
simultaneously…” (p. 106). The more circles one lives in (dentist, Rotarian, 
thespian, stamp-collector and so forth) the more likely it will be that ethnic 
identity will be transmuted for the cosmopolitan – a position in which the 
individual may juggle a diversity of cultural attributes (cuisines, dress, dance, 
speech and so forth). 
 Having outlined the complex nature of ethnic identity imagining, I now 
present a range of texts that are culture-specific, an awareness of which will 
provide a basis for an appreciation of what cultural exchange (transculturation) 
impacts upon. Although some overlap occurs between the themes identity, 
ethnicity and culture, this section will position some culture-specific texts 
informing this thesis’ claims. 
 
Culture 
Among texts useful for an understanding of culture’s complexity are Garrick 
Bailey and James Peoples’ (1999) Introduction to Cultural Anthropology, and 
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Eller’s (2009) Cultural Anthropology: Global Forces, Local Lives. Of particular 
salience for this thesis were chapters dealing with continuity and change, kinship 
and non-kin organisation, as well as individuals and identity. Edward Tylor’s 
(1891) Primitive Culture: Researches into the Development, of Mythology, 
Philosophy, Religion, Language, Art, and Custom introduced the notion of the 
development of culture, as well as the formation of mythology and the 
development of Animist practice. In Race, Language and Culture, Franz Boas’ 
chapters dealing with the diffusion and evolution of culture, and the questioning 
of social groupings as closed societies appeared relevant for the transmigration / 
transculturation discourse. Marvin Harris’ (1979) text Cultural Materialism: The 
Struggle for a Science of Culture, while deviating from the transculturation 
premise, nevertheless introduces several interesting phenomena for understanding 
the Filipino integration and coexistence trends – those relating to ‘varieties of pre-
state village societies’ and ‘the emergence of the state’. In The Location of 
Culture, Homi Bhabha (1995) makes the point that the complexity of culture is 
that it cannot be easily defined or compartmentalised, which brings into question 
the validity of the ‘othering’ phenomena taking place in a polyethnic, 
transmigratory world. 
 The precursor to the concept ‘transculturation’ – acculturation – is a term 
often confused with assimilation. The text I found most useful in grounding the 
‘acculturation’ dilemma was Raymond Teske and Bardin Nelson’s (1974) essay 
‘Acculturation and assimilation: A clarification’. They make the case that a person 
can acculturate, that is, adopt the cultural mores of the ‘Other’ without necessarily 
being assimilated, a significant factor in view of the world’s increasing migrancy, 
and its corollary, the ethnocultural ‘contact zone’. Nikos Papastergiadis (2007), in 
The Turbulence of Migration: Globalization, Deterritorialization and Hybridity, 
addresses this conundrum by suggesting there is a limit to cultural translation. 
That is, should the deterritorialisation of culture be seen as contributing to the 
contamination of it, a transformation of it, or the construction of a third identity. 
 Any investigation of the transculturation tendency is confronted with the 
imagined stability of, and historic antecedence for, culture groups and their 
practices, a phenomenon regarded as ‘primordialism’ – a concept under strain 
given the subjectiveness of ethnocultural fixity. In his essay ‘Primordial, personal, 
sacred, and civil ties’, Edward Shils (1957) recounts how his study of prisoners-
of-war led him to question how the concept of ‘esprit de corps’ was able to 
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transcend intersecting allegiances. His contention was that individuals had broader 
loyalties than the self, the family, and deeper loyalties than the state. Thus, the 
questioning of ‘what is the basis of social cohesion?’ led to a contested discourse 
about the concept of ‘primordialism’, that is, whether there is an inherent feeling 
of social obligation when seen and measured against a group attachment. 
Following on from Shils’ observations, Geertz (2000), recognising the potential 
for the disintegration of the polyethnic, postcolonial archipelagic nation-state 
suggests in The Interpretation of Cultures, that an inculcation of civic nationalism 
could only be a long-term project, and in the meantime recourse to the security of 
ethnicity, or as Geertz describes it ‘primary attachment’, would continue. People 
in new states may find it difficult to subordinate their known loyalties for a new 
imagined civil order and as a consequence the new state is “…abnormally 
susceptible to serious disaffection based on primordial attachments” (p. 259). 
 In their essay ‘The poverty of primordialism’ Eller and Coghlan (1996) 
attempt to dismiss the centrality of ‘primordiality’ by suggesting it to be “a 
bankrupt concept for the analysis and description of ethnicity” (p. 50). By way of 
explanation they contend that ethnicity is an ‘affect issue’ that is more readily 
explained by the social origins of ethnic attachments. If societal structures are 
being created and re-created through fission, hybridity, or transculturation, then 
the cultural accretions they absorb could hardly be regarded as primordial. 
 Jean-François Bayart’s (2005) The Illusion of Cultural Identity calls for a 
reappraisal of the late twentieth century phenomenon of the resurgence and re-
identification with cultural identity – the ‘battle for identity’ (p. 252) as he terms 
it. His example of the Chinese in Indonesia, many of whom had become Muslim 
in the Javanese society between the thirteenth and eighteenth centuries (p. 93), is 
illustrative of his point. Their re-Sinification during the late Manchu / early 
Chinese Republic caused them to become an ethnic minority (p. 94).
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 In other 
words, their cultural identity was far from stable. Kate Crehan, in her biography, 
Gramsci, Culture and Anthropology (2002: 52-67) raises the notions of ‘tradition’ 
as a cultural underpinning, and the reality of ‘hybridity’. Divergent traditions 
become the ‘socially learned’ cultural markers of ethnic identity that permit 
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 Bayart (2005) suggests (a sentiment supported by Anderson (2006: 163-170) that late colonial 
scientific ordering or classification also played a role in undermining former indigenised identities. 
In the Dutch case “…the application of Article 109 of the Fundamental Statute of the Dutch Indies 
(1854), which drew a distinction between ‘oriental foreigners’ (Vreemde Oosterlingen) and 
‘natives’ (Inlanders)…” (p. 94) helped create divisions or exacerbate divisions that had previously 
been absent. 
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Filipinos, whatever their faith or ethnicity, to discount the commonalities of their 
ethnocultural Austronesian heritage. 
 In both The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth Century Ethnography, 
Literature, and Art (1988) and Routes: Travel and Translation in the Late 
Twentieth Century, James Clifford raises the issue of the changing nature of 
culture, which presages what I suggest is the outcome of transcultural change. He 
asks: Who has the authority to speak for a group’s identity and authenticity? 
(1988: 8). In his ‘Prologue’ to Routes Clifford illustrates how the migrancy / 
culture interplay has multifaceted outcomes. Cultural exposure may be rejected, 
embraced, or partly embraced but rarely are the migrants not influenced. Kwame 
Appiah concurs with this sentiment in Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of 
Strangers (2006). “Cultures are made of continuities and changes, and the identity 
of a society can survive through these changes” he suggests (p. 107). 
 Gerd Baumann’s (2003) Contesting Culture: Discourses of Identity in 
Multiethnic London epitomises well the cultural exchange that takes place in 
multicultural milieux; and the role played by generational change, environment 
and distance from region-of-origin. Stuart Hall and Paul du Gay’s (1996) edited 
work Questions of Cultural Identity also raises the interesting conundrum of 
culture in a rapidly interdependent world. The examples of Turkey, attempting to 
straddle two major cultural traditions, and the ‘partial cultures’ emerging as a 
consequence of the contemporary migrations are of relevance to the intercultural 
interactions this thesis investigates. 
 Whether the contemporary world is on a rollercoaster ride of acculturation, 
transculturation, multiculturation, or cosmopolitanation, there appear situations in 
which the discomfort of having to choose pathways manifests in a sentiment of 
ambivalence. Zygmunt Baumann (1991) addresses this phenomenon in Modernity 
and Ambivalence. He suggests that much modernity is concerned with “the effort 
to exterminate ambivalence: an effort to define precisely – and to suppress or 
eliminate everything that could not or would not be precisely defined” (pp. 7-8). 
Transculturation at least is creating sociocultural persona that are not easily 
definable. That a state of cultural ambivalence exists (and shows no sign of 
abating) is highlighted by the contributors in Mike Featherstone’s (1990) edited 
volume Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity. He asks: Is 
there a global culture or a globalisation of culture? He then goes on to suggest that 
“there may be emerging sets of ‘third cultures’…” (p. 1). Ulf Hannerz’s (1990) 
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essay ‘Cosmopolitans and locals in the world culture’ is more dogmatic on the 
question of a world culture – there is one. It is created “through the increasing 
interconnectedness of varied local cultures, as well as through the development of 
cultures without a clear anchorage in any one territory” (p. 235). 
 The notion of a rapidly changing sociocultural world has repercussions, 
however. For some the reaction is one of anxiety, for others that of 
accommodation. Samuel Huntington’s (2002) The Clash of Civilizations and the 
Remaking of World Order puts him into the former category. He imagines a future 
where cultures rather than ideologies or imperial interests are arrayed against each 
other. Immanuel Wallerstein (1991) is much more sanguine. In Geopolitics and 
Geoculture: Essays on the Changing World-System he infers that whatever the 
shape of the nation-state or the political world, nothing stands in the way of 
cultural interactions; in fact they are essential for survival. Marshall Sahlins 
(1987) in Islands of History, stresses that while cultures may have their own logic 
or structure, the human “social experience is the appropriation of specific percepts 
by general concepts: an ordering of men and the objects of their existence 
according to a scheme of cultural categories which is never the only one 
possible…” (p. 145). That is, cultures, like ethnicities, are malleable, have finite 
lives, and are thus amenable to retooling or transculturation. 
 Texts informing the cultural underpinning of Filipino society include the 
following. The first is Fernando Zialcita’s (2006) Authentic Though not Exotic: 
Essays on Filipino Identity, which raises the issue of a community broader than 
the narrow base of one’s kin. He represents Southeast Asia as a collage on which 
are pasted many groupings of cultures with differing languages, ecosystems and 
traditions. The Philippines, through the Hispanisation process, was more 
culturally influenced by the colonial experience than were other zones of the 
Archipelago by their colonial experience. In Building the National Community: 
Problems and Prospects and Other Historical Essays, Evangelista (2002) adds to 
the diversity discourse by questioning the struggle between an imagined Filipino 
identity that tries to transcend ones of kinship, ethnic and regional identity and 
their attendant cultural particularities. 
 Belen Medina’s (2009) The Filipino Family touches on the cultural aspects 
impacting on family and the wider society. In the context of the considerable 
interethnic marriage that has taken place in the study area, Medina makes the 
point that in the Philippines “who marries whom is governed by the norms of each 
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society” (p. 98). Violations may range from subtle censure to expulsion from the 
group. A further informative text dealing with the cultural particularities of 
Filipinos is Yengoyan and Makil’s (2004) edited work Philippine Society and the 
Individual: Selected Essays of Frank Lynch, especially those sections dealing with 
belief systems and practice, and the essay suggesting that what appears authentic, 
quintessentially Filipino, may be something shared more widely, that is, today’s 
native cultural trait may have been yesterday’s visitor. Cracks in the Parchment 
Curtain: and other Essays in Philippine History by William Henry Scott (1998) 
and Francisco Sionil José’s (2005) Termites in the Sala, Heroes in the Attic: Why 
we are Poor also helped inform on aspects of Philippine cultural development. 
 
Transculturation 
Before outlining the texts that have shaped the theoretical underpinning of this 
thesis I briefly state what I mean by the term transculturation. The previous 
section dealt with the notion of culture “that complex whole which includes 
knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, customs, and any other capabilities and habits 
acquired by man as a member of a society” (Tylor 1891: 1). Simply stated, 
transculturation is the mutual exchange of any features that are characteristic of a 
culture; a process that takes place when two or more ethnic groups meet and share 
the same geographical space. 
 A seminal text, indeed the key text on which this thesis is predicated, is 
Fernando Ortiz’s (1995) parabolic tale Cuban Counterpoint: Tobacco and Sugar. 
First published in 1940, Ortiz uses these two crops in allegory to describe both 
their domination of the Cuban economy and the sociocultural implications of their 
evolution. Midway through his treatise Ortiz introduces a passage ‘On the social 
phenomenon of Transculturation and its importance in Cuba’ (p. 95) in which he 
presents the term ‘transculturation’ and outlines its intended use. He imagines it as 
a replacement for the term ‘acculturation’ which he deems inadequate to explain 
the cultural exchanges that have taken place among the diverse cohorts of 
immigrants to Cuba. 
 As of much salience as Ortiz’s ruminations in Cuban Counterpoint is 
Bronisław Malinowski’s 1940 ‘Introduction’ to Ortiz’s text, in which he explains 
Ortiz’s intention of conceiving the term. By giving it his imprimatur, Malinowski 
ensured the term’s survival. Fernando Coronil’s introductory essay 
‘Transculturation and the politics of theory: Countering the centre, Cuban 
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counterpoint’, in the 1995 Duke University Press edition, is also of relevance. In it 
he provides a retrospective view on where Ortiz, multicultural Cuba, the 
realpolitik, and the term ‘transculturation’ fit into the ethnographic milieu of the 
twentieth century. Drawing many of the strands of Ortiz’s ethnographic work 
together is the Mauricio Font et al.’s (2005) edited work Cuban Counterpoints: 
The Legacy of Fernando Ortiz. Chapters titled ‘Transculturation and nationalism’, 
‘Transcultural anthropology in the Américas’, and ‘Transculturation à la Ajiaco: 
A recipe for modernity’ all help flesh out the central message of culture flows and 
/ or cultural exchange.
50
 
 An array of observers and social scientists has delved into the 
transculturation discourse and the concomitant cultural interface that mobility and 
migration afford. In Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation Mary 
Louise Pratt (1992) coined the term ‘contact zone’ to represent the social space 
where cultures meet, clash and grapple with each other. Her assumptions rely on 
asymmetrical cultural relations of domination and subordination that were 
inherent in former colonial milieux. However, as Michael Schudson (1994) 
suggests in ‘Culture and the integration of national societies’, current realities that 
reflect the intertwinings of local, regional, national, and global cultures have 
altered the pressures previously felt by immigrants to acculturate to a dominant 
interlocutor. Where they might previously have been subsumed, mobility allows 
for a continuance of connections and ethnic identity maintenances. Astrid 
Hamburger (2009) in ‘Immigrant integration: Acculturation and social 
integration’, when discussing the dimension of migrant integration, suggests that 
there are four aspects of the process: cultural, social, economic and political. To a 
greater or lesser degree transculturation forms part of this process. 
 Interpretations of the concept ‘transculturation’ have altered over time. It 
has functioned in turn as a tool of mestizaje studies and literary criticism. 
Negotiating this maze of alternating emphases, my aim is to return to what Ortiz 
and Malinowski imagined for transculturation – a process of mutual cultural 
exchange. These facts notwithstanding, those who have perceived, critiqued, and 
countered the efficacy of the term have influenced my thinking. One such is Mark 
Millington’s (2005) assessment ‘Transculturation: Taking stock’. In his opinion 
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 Patricia Catoira (2005: 181) suggests that Ortiz often used as metaphor the well-known Cuban 
dish ajiaco to represent the cultural processes that had shaped Cuban society since colonisation. 
Ajiaco she explains is “a Creole stew that incorporates American, European, and African 
ingredients.” 
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both the prefix ‘trans-’ and the notion of a new term failed to represent the Ortiz / 
Malinowski premise that transculturation envisaged a reciprocal or mutual 
exchange of cultural practices. Millington suggests that later misrepresentation 
and misuse of the term ‘transculturation’ might have been precluded had Ortiz 
more fully developed a coherence for his neologism. After expounding on the 
term’s chequered history Millington does acknowledge its relevance in the field of 
migration studies. 
 Alberto Moreiras (2001) in The Exhaustion of Difference: The Politics of 
Latin American Cultural Studies also notes that the term ‘transculturation’ has 
been used to represent different sociocultural phenomena. In one sense it has been 
used to describe the transformation of society via a process of cultural mixing, 
while in another it was used as a tool to critique the status quo of intercultural 
flows, be it literary, architectural, musical or whatever. In ‘Freedom from 
transculturation: A response to Priscilla Archibald’, Moreiras (2007) demonstrates 
how far the use of the term has deviated from the Ortiz / Malinowski thought 
processes, and possibly why its cachet has been undermined en route. 
 Several papers demonstrate how transculturation theory is being 
interpreted. In ‘Reclaiming ‘roots’ for Cape Verde: Representation of Tabanka 
festivals as sites of cultural contestation’ Christina McMahon (2004) makes the 
case that indigenous cultures have the capacity to influence and alter the foreign, 
and vice-versa: cultural exchange is not a one-way process.
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 In his essay ‘From 
cultural exchange to transculturation: A review and reconceptualization of cultural 
appropriation’, Richard Rogers (2006) begins by suggesting that a three-way 
pattern of cultural exchange: either one of cultural exploitation, one of cultural 
dominance, or one of reciprocal cultural exchange, is possible; the latter model he 
regards as transculturation’ and / or the creation of hybrid forms (p. 474). 
 Manju Jaidka (2010), in ‘India is my country but the world is my home: 
Transculturality through literature’, makes the case that while Ortiz’s worldview 
was premised on the validating of Afro-Cuban culture, an understanding of his 
transculturation concept (in the face of increased mobility and cultural interaction) 
is of increasing relevance. Cultural exchange is a composite act involving partial 
deculturation, enculturation, reinvention, redefinition, and so forth. A case study 
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 The notion of ‘indigenous’ and ‘foreign’ viewed in McMahon’s context is open to interpretation. 
In Cape Verde, I guess, the ‘foreign’ is anything that enters the Cape Verdian cultural sphere. 
Were ‘indigenous’ aspects of the Cape Verde culture to surface in Portugal or Poland they would 
be regarded as ‘foreign’ in those milieux.  
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of a migrant cohort influenced by cultural ambivalence is provided by Janet Naidu 
(2007) in ‘Retention and transculturation of Hinduism in the Caribbean’. Naidu 
suggests that as well as retaining much of their Indian culture, indentured migrant 
exposure to a diversity of existing cultures has resulted in a transculturation of 
Hindu religious beliefs and practices. 
 However, transculturation does not go unchallenged. In ‘Transculturating 
transculturation’, Diana Taylor (1991) suggests that cultural reciprocity is 
influenced by the dominant / subordinate paradigm. Those already socially and 
economically advantaged have fewer reasons to be open to change. Two texts 
illustrate this dilemma. In Who Are We?: The Challenges to America’s National 
Identity Huntington (2005) identifies an anxiety about encroaching cultures 
altering the existing status quo. In ‘Drain from the bottom: Individual ethnic 
identity change in southern Ecuador’, Linda and Jim Belote (1984) explain how 
the dominant / subordinate cultural paradigm is challenged by some subordinate 
groups in that country. 
 Transculturation theory has been analysed, critiqued, and in some cases 
dismissed. Abril Trigo (2000), in ‘Shifting paradigms: From transculturation to 
hybridity: A theoretical critique’, is of the opinion that ‘transculturation’ is a 
worn-out, nostalgic term, better replaced by concepts such as ‘hybridity’ or 
‘heterogeneity’. Yet, in light of the Narra / Palawan fieldwork, I suggest – for 
reasons that will be elaborated on in the next chapter – that the Ortiz / Malinowski 
imaginings best represents the findings of this thesis. 
 
Summary 
In a world of increasing migrancy, more people than ever – both migrant and 
those already-resident – are called upon to interact with others with whom they 
have little or nothing in common. This lack of knowledge of the Other may be 
mediated by ignorance, yet in a more connected world is less excusable. Appiah 
(2006: xviii-xix) suggests that “(t)horoughgoing ignorance about the ways of 
others is largely a privilege of the powerful [yet nonetheless] we need to develop 
habits of coexistence: conversation in its older meaning, of living together, 
association.” The powerful or dominant party in any intercultural encounter may 
have reasons for displaying dominance (economic anxiety, feeling of cultural 
superiority or xenophobia) yet whether this stance can be sustained for all time is 
a moot point. As Appiah advocates: “A creed that disdains the partialities of 
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kinfolk and community may have a past, but it has no future” (p. xix).52 And it is 
with this sentiment in mind that the thesis investigates the potential for 
intercultural modi vivendi to occur; where disdain is suppressed and ethnocultural 
interactions result in cultural exchanges (transculturation) that facilitate the 
process of coexistence. 
 In light of the interaction with the above identity theory texts it is the 
intention of this thesis to use transculturation as the framing theory to make sense 
of the cultural changes – and cultural exchanges – that have taken place within a 
specific transmigrant cohort centred on Narra / Palawan. Though various 
strategies might have been employed to thwart a modus vivendi in the Narra 
resettlement – ethnic reification, enclavism, rejection of the Other – this appears 
not to have happened. While the thesis acknowledges that other options – 
acculturation to a dominant culture, or the coexistence of multiple cultures in the 
vein of multiculturalism – were possible in resettlement scenarios such as Narra, 
they did not ensue in this particular case. While I acknowledge that the Narra 
investigation investigates transmigrant cultural interaction, rather than 
transmigrant-indigene (or already-resident) interactions, transculturation is as 
valid a concept in either scenario. 
Gaps in the literature, while not calculated, exist nevertheless. Although 
transculturation-as-theory had its genesis in the Ortiz / Malinowski deliberations 
of the 1930s, the subsequent limiting utilisation of the transculturation concept to 
sustain Latin American literary studies has thwarted its potential. In consequence 
of this a concept or tool capable of dealing with the sociocultural ramifications of 
intercultural encounters in a holistic manner was in effect sidelined. That is, the 
reciprocity implied in the Ortiz / Malinowski term, was eschewed in favour of a 
them-and-us interpretation of contact. In such scenarios the interpretation usually 
involves an exposé of what is lost when ethnocultural encounters occur, that is, a 
negative stance. If I have interpreted correctly the Ortiz / Malinowski intent for 
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 Appiah appears to envisage a rosy future for mankind. Many recent – and continuing – examples 
abound (Bhutan, Northern Ireland, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia, among others) attest to the 
fact that finding modi vivendi amongst diverse peoples is still a fraught proposition. Whatever the 
criteria are that best facilitate the notion of coexistence, the variables determining such outcomes 
are legion (religion, class, race, struggle for resources, and so forth). That is not to acknowledge 
that under certain circumstances man may overcome, manipulate, or suppress those criteria that 
divide him from others. Homi Bhabha in conversation with Jonathan Rutherford (1990: 210-211) 
suggests that a common ground (or third space) in which the “possibility of articulating different, 
even incommensurable cultural practices and priorities” is possible. But a rider hints that despite 
how rational man may be in certain situations “it is actually very difficult, even impossible and 
counterproductive, to try and fit together different forms of culture and to pretend that they can 
actually coexist” (p. 209). Transculturation, I suggest, is a window into what is possible. 
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the transculturation neologism– and I think I have – then the give-and-take of 
cultural exchange (mutually contracted) should not be cause for anxiety. Aspects 
of certain cultures may indeed be invalidated, but that does not need to be 
interpreted as a negative; what needs to be juxtaposed in such cases is what 
cultural gains have ensued. 
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CHAPTER III – TOWARDS A THEORY OF TRANSCULTURATION 
 
This chapter aims to unpack the theoretical underpinnings contributing to this 
thesis’ rationale – that is, to understand the social and political outcomes that have 
transpired in the wake of the resettlement of several thousand families in Narra / 
Palawan following their transmigration from across the Philippines. That there 
have been uneven social and political outcomes as a consequence of the resettling 
of a heterogeneity of ethnocultural groups across the Archipelago is a given.
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 By 
inference, among the millions of archipelagic transmigrants – and the host 
communities in which they have settled – there are groups and individuals who 
have been unable to establish modi vivendi that facilitate their coexistence and / or 
integration within new pluricultural settings. 
 As witnessed in several parts of the Archipelago, this has resulted in the 
breakdown of social harmony leading to ethnic / communal tension, and at times 
violence and the fleeing of many thousands from their homes.
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 Conversely, a 
diversity of ethnic groups may achieve a modus vivendi if certain criteria are met. 
Foremost among these is the minimum position of cultural interaction between 
individuals and groups – a development that brings the possibility of altering 
perceptions of ‘fixed’ or limited ethnocultural worldviews. Cultural interaction 
has the capacity to promote mutual cultural exchanges – a process I deem to be 
represented by the concept ‘transculturation’ – the concept which I aim to employ 
as a framing theory to comprehend and reference the social outcomes possible in 
migrant-settler milieux. 
  After introducing the transculturation concept, the chapter will address the 
notion of ethnic identity; it is ethnicity after all (and the cultural attributes it 
supports) that is a primary marker of division among groups of people in 
polyethnic milieux. It will then attempt to analyse more closely the notion of how 
culture underpins ethnocultural realities; how its diminution, maintenance, or 
reification impacts on intercultural and interethnic relations. The relevance of 
cultures as systems, their boundedness, and transmissionability, is examined 
before progressing to the concept ‘transculturation’. Subsequent to that concept’s 
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 Acting independently of each other, the Archipelago nation-states, implementing a range of 
resettlement initiatives, experienced similar uneven outcomes for their pains. In consequence, 
issues such as integration, interethnic discord, and the attainment (or otherwise) of resettlement 
objectives resonate more widely than might be imagined. 
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 As previously mentioned, Mindanao in the Philippines and several regions of post-New Order 
Indonesia have been wracked by ethnic violence, which has left tens of thousands dead and at 
times an IDP population of more than a million in each polity.  
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definition and etymology, an outline of its historical applicability, and an 
explication of what key theorists have brought to the transculturation-as-theory 
debate, the chapter will position transculturation by considering intercultural 
models (acculturation, multiculturalism, and cosmopolitanism) that are 
antithetical to it. The chapter concludes with an explanation of how and why I 
intend to apply the transculturation concept. 
 The term ‘transculturation’ – as envisaged by Ortiz circa 1940 – is at once 
a process (mutual cultural exchange), and the effect of that process. As such it 
might be paraphrased as the product of the compromises required for 
heterogeneous populations to find modi vivendi in the resettlement zone, and as 
such a precursor to positive integrational outcomes. Unlike the fraught processes 
of ‘asymmetrical acculturation’, with its attendant actual or perceived sense of 
cultural loss vis-à-vis dominant groups, transculturation envisages the creation of 
altered or new identities premised on a partial deculturation, and a concomitant 
neoculturation paradigm, which allows individuals and groups to adopt or adapt 
the cultural practices of those amongst whom they live (Ortiz 1995: 103). The 
term ‘transculturation’ has proved to be contentious in the sense that social 
theorists have both assailed and defended its worth. In the context of this thesis 
‘transculturation’ as a framing theory will be applied to signify the trajectory and 
effect of cultural interaction in the resettlement zone. 
 Before proceeding with a fuller analysis of the ‘transculturation’ concept, 
that is, its critique and its relevance to the issue of cultural certainties in a 
globalised world, I shall outline other facets of the identity paradigm that will be 
raised in this chapter. Simply stated, a cyclical discourse is possible at this stage. 
Before being able to ground the potential inherent in transculturation-as-theory 
something must be made of that which is to be transculturated, or impacted upon 
– culture. Culture does not exist in a vacuum; it constitutes part and parcel of the 
makeup of every individual, family, sub-group, ethnolinguistic group, and nation-
state. Even the cosmopolitan, who imagines they are free of national limitations or 
prejudices, is not free of culture (Hannerz 1990).
55
 While culture is an integral 
component of identity, what is central to this thesis is the way in which the 
cultural particularities are imbedded in ‘ethnic identity’. It is ethnic identity after 
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 What Hannerz (1990) has in mind is that whatever exposure the cosmopolitan has to cultures not 
his own, the way he interprets his interaction with other cultures, is dependent (to some extent) on 
how embedded he is in his own culture. “…the principle is that the more clearly the alien culture 
contrasts with the culture of origin, …the more conspicuously is surrender abroad a form of 
mastery at home” (p. 240). 
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all that has the capacity to be manipulated, it being ethnicity that can undergo 
reification, diminution, or modification. Reflecting on the reification model, 
Horowitz (2000: xvi) ponders on whether it is cultural difference, ignorance, or a 
realistic divergence of interest that drives ethnic groups into conflict. He posits 
that it is ethnic affiliations or the way individuals and groups manipulate these 
affiliations that are so potentially destructive, and are the sources for conflict or 
misapprehension. 
 A necessary starting point for any understanding of what it is that 
individuals and groups have to contend with in the resettlement frontier, when 
faced with an ethnically heterogeneous settler cohort, is the actuality of difference. 
Difference however, only becomes contentious on leaving the isolation of 
relatively homogeneous regions-of-origin. Ethnic identity (and its cultural 
baggage) gains salience only when two or more groups come into contact. 
Gregory Bateson (1979: 68) averred that “it takes at least two somethings to 
create a difference… Clearly each alone is – for the mind and perception – a non-
entity, a non-being. Not different from being, and not different from non-being. 
An unknowable, a Ding an sich [a thing unto itself], a sound from one hand 
clapping.” That is, ethnocultural interaction, whether in the Narra / Philippine 
context (or the wider world) results only when the happenstance of ethnic 
diversity is juxtaposed with the migrancy phenomenon. 
 
Ethnic Identity 
In this section I engage with the scholarship of key thinkers who have contributed 
to my understanding of the complexity of the ethnic state-of-being. After defining 
what is meant by the term ethnicity, its salience will be discussed. The relevance 
of concepts such as ‘primordial’ and the ‘ethnic boundary’ will be included, 
though some overlap with the ‘culture’ section may be obvious. A further concept 
to be addressed is that of ‘ethnic identity dilemma’. It will be asked whether as a 
consequence of transmigration and interaction with ethnically diverse migrants in 
the resettlement zone, individuals and groups continue to see themselves (and be 
viewed by others) in the same way as they had been pre-migration. In a migration 
milieu, influenced by cultural interaction, socio-economic mobility, and the 
inquietude of generational change, ethnic identity self-ascription or ascription by 
others has the potential to be undermined. 
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Eriksen (2010: 5) suggests that as a starting point “ethnicity has something 
to do with the classification of people and group relationships …[and] refers to 
aspects of relationships between groups which consider themselves, and are 
regarded by others as being culturally distinctive.” However, ethnicity is more 
than a shared culture, it is a factor in negotiating identity, and is especially salient 
in plural societies emanating from the decolonisation process. In polyethnic (or 
pluricultural) states such as the Philippines ethnic affiliation is a basis for self-
identification and the identification of others, irrespective of shared values and 
similar cultural practices.
56
 It is the differences between groups however – 
different histories, language, religion, customs, and traditions – that is a starting 
point for either the phenomenon of self-ascription, or the ascription of others. 
Anthony Smith (cited Eller 1999: 13) suggests the ethnic group is ‘a type of 
cultural collectivity’ though this fails to explain the overlapping of cultural values 
between groups. 
 Although positioning the terms ‘ethnic’ and ‘ethnicity’ is fraught with 
difficulty, an understanding of its fundamentals is required before labels such as 
‘ethnolinguistic’, or ‘ethnocultural may be employed as identity markers. Fenton 
(2008: 25) suggests: “Just how ethnicity is discussed is very much contextual… [a 
starting point being the]… three milieux within which the terminology of ethnic 
(and race and nation) is used. These are the scholarly; the political, civic, and 
public; and the popular or ‘everyday’ discourse.” Broaching the term ‘ethnicity’ in 
some academic and political settings in the Philippines elicited responses 
indicating that the term referred only to the so-called indigenous or autochthonous 
groups, rather than Filipinos at large. Conversely, defining the ‘ethnicity’ term is 
similarly fraught in the wider world. In societies as diverse as Malaysia, United 
Kingdom, and the United States the concept ‘ethnicity’ is employed in a variety of 
contexts. ‘Ethnicity’ may be conflated with ‘race’; it might be employed to 
designate differences between races, or might be applied to one societal cohort, 
but not to others (Fenton 2008: 25-50).
 57
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 The existence of collectivities such as lowland Christian, Muslim, Animist or IP, does not 
preclude individuals and groups within those collectivities self-ascribing respectively (or being 
ascribed as such by others) as Ilocano, Maguindanao, Pala’wan or Batak, for example. 
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 To paraphrase Fenton’s observations; in the case of the United States ‘race’ is employed to 
designate colour difference, while ethnicity is employed to differentiate between a 
conglomerations of white immigrants. Hence, the label African-American, but not European-
American is employed. White Europeans (but not the Anglo-Saxons) are more finely 
distinguished: Germans, Irish, Italians, and Polish and so forth, while African-American does not 
distinguish between Hausa, Ibo, or Akan. Fenton suggests that the black-white certainties of the 
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Defining Ethnicity 
The Oxford Dictionary of Sociology (ODS 2005: 226) defines ‘ethnicity’ – or the 
ethnic group – as representing “individuals who consider themselves, or are 
considered by others, to share common characteristics that differentiate them from 
the other collectivities in a society, and from which they develop their distinctive 
cultural behaviour… [and which should be viewed] in contradistinction to race 
which is often seen in biological terms... Ethnic groups are… fluid in composition 
and subject to changes in definition.” Edgar and Sedgwick (1999: 114) suggest 
that as well as denoting a self-awareness and cultural distinctiveness on the part of 
a particular group, the label ‘ethnic’ is prone to be used to define minority groups 
within larger polities. They further observe that “the assertion of ethnic identity 
can be unifying or divisive in equal measure – often depending on who is 
asserting it, of whom, and in which context” (p. 115). 
 Unlike ‘race’ which may differentiate people on the basis of physiognomy, 
‘ethnicity’ in Ashcroft et al.’s (2007: 80-84) opinion “refers to a fusion of many 
traits that belong to the nature of any ethnic group: a composite of shared values, 
beliefs, norms, tastes, behaviours, experiences, consciousness of kind, memories 
and loyalties.” They add that so long as an individual chooses to identify as a 
member of an ethnic group, this identity cannot be taken away, rejected, or denied 
by others. In a migration or post-migration context ‘ethnicity’ is often evoked to 
distinguish minority groups from the existing, dominant majority.
58
 Schermerhorn 
                                                                                                                                     
several centuries of statistics have been unbalanced by the recognition of further categories, for 
example – Hispanic and Asian. Lebanon is in Asia, as is Sri Lanka and Taiwan, so usage of the 
term ‘Asian’ is rather nebulous. The term ‘Hispanic’ refers to the language Spanish, but as a 
category it contradicts former certainties. Hispanics may be white, black, Amerindian, or any 
shading thereof – making an ethnic division à la Irish, or Italian moot. The United States I suggest 
– mirroring the world at large – will find it evermore difficult to label groups ethnically, racially, 
or linguistically, given an increasing level of intermarriage. 
 In the United Kingdom, Fenton (2008) suggests, the label ‘ethnic’ is sometimes used 
interchangeably with ‘race’, but is usually employed to designate minority groups, among recent 
immigrants, rather than the ethnic divisions of English, Irish, Manx, Scot, or Welsh. In Malaysia 
‘race’ is used as a starting-point to differentiate Chinese, Indian, and Malay. ‘Ethnicity’ in the 
Malaysian context is complicated by the political status that belonging entails. Malay-as-ethnicity 
is often conflated as something more resonant, which creates a degree of opacity when juxtaposed 
against labels such as ras (race or racial), rakyat (the people or folk), warga (family or people), 
kaum (lineage group or community), orang (people), or bangsa (descent – in a primordial sense) 
(pp. 44-45). 
58
 Ashcroft et al. suggest that in settler-societies such as the Australia, Canada, and the United 
States, a self-constructed mythology of national identity absolves the (numerically and politically 
dominant) Anglo-Saxon group from identifying as an ethnicity. This worldview is not unique to 
settler-societies however; increased immigration from the ‘periphery’ to the postcolonial 
‘metropole’ continues to view the minority arrivals as ethnic, while the extant population is ethnic-
less. This is not to infer that ethnicity is the refuge of the weak; indeed if extant populations faced 
zeitgeist realities they would flaunt their ethnic particularities. 
58
 To cite an example we might 
choose the case of the United Kingdom. In spite of centuries of close political and economic 
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(1970: 12) posits a more comprehensive definition, by suggesting that an ethnic 
group is: 
a collectivity within a larger society having real or putative common ancestry, 
memories of a shared historical past, and a cultural focus on one or more 
symbolic elements defined as the epitome of their peoplehood… kinship patterns, 
physical contiguity, religious affiliation, language or dialect form, tribal 
affiliation, nationality, phenotypical features, or a combination of these. 
59
 
 
 I am less convinced than Schermerhorn (1970), Isajiw (1993), and others 
who claim that people movements (colonisation, immigration, invasion, or 
slavery) alone are facilitators of minority or ethnic status in a wider world or 
polity. Taking the Philippines or the Archipelago as a model, I suggest that 
ethnicity would still be of salience in the absence of the aforementioned events. It 
is not only that each island represented an ethnolinguistic grouping; mountain 
ranges on the one island could divide people who would identify with a contracted 
view of belonging. However, even when those mountain ranges are broached, or 
the islands colonised, invaded, or raided for slaves, the resulting sociocultural 
recalibration of a geographical space may yet allow for the coexisting of ethnic 
identities. Whether these ethnic groups share cultural indicia or not, so long as 
individuals or groups are regarded as ‘different’ or regard themselves as 
‘different’, they are in essence ‘different’. While the indicia can be calibrated to 
suit an individual’s (or group’s) needs, the inherited (from birth) ethnic persona is 
less malleable. As evidenced by the Roma and Jews in a Europe, or the Sorbs and 
Wends in Germany, the tenacity of ethnic differentiation may be sustained for 
millennia.
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interdependence, the Irish, Scots, and Welsh flaunt their ethnic particularities by clawing back 
languages from extinction, flying flags, and even maintaining inflections in their English-language 
pronunciations. The other half of the Kingdom – England – is still trying to deny ethnic self-
ascription, by assuming that England and the United Kingdom are terms interchangeable. 
59
 That said, no group is completely unified, and if identifying as a member of a particular 
ethnicity in the diaspora, may essentialise some features relevant to a perceived notion of what that 
ethnicity is supposed to represent. Is a diasporic Japanese emigrant returning from Brazil any less 
Japanese for not visiting temples on high holidays, partaking of horse, dog, or whale-meat, despite 
what others may claim about him? 
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 The case of the Sorbs and Wends is instructive in a migration, colonisation and invasion sense. 
From before the 10
th
 century there had been a West Slav / ethnic German interaction, and with the 
continuing eastward migration of Germans most of these Slavs acculturated and were assimilated 
into German society. However, the Sorb / Wend pocket of Slavs – due to their geographic isolation 
– were able to maintain enough traditions and customs to be able to survive and be considered as 
an ethnic enclave. They now exist within the UNESCO-inspired Spreewald Biosphere Reserve 
southeast of Berlin. As an example of the way in which the vagaries of history contribute to the 
formation or maintenance of identities such as ethnic identity, the case of the Spreewald Wends is 
enlightening. In the current Germany this cohort of West Slavs is able to identify ethnically as 
Wends. Had the 1945 postwar border been drawn a little further west this cohort would now be 
regarded ethnically as Poles. 
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The Relevance of Ethnicity 
“Ethnicity and ethnic affiliations… were expected to decline and even disappear 
with the homogenization associated with modernization and the French model of 
civic nationalism” suggest Bennett et al. (2005: 112-114). They observe however, 
that the opposite has occurred. Ethnicities (or the manifestation thereof) have 
proliferated. Removing former repressive constraints has in some cases led to 
ethnic mobilisation, or ethnonationalism, which has produced a conundrum of 
sorts. While former relatively homogenous states; Denmark, Éire (Ireland) and 
Japan for example, are hosting an increasingly heterogeneous migrant arrival, 
there are other states in which little potential for ethnic pluralism (let alone 
transculturation) exists, and where conversely ethnic advantaging, purity, and in 
some cases ethnic cleansing have occurred (or continue to occur): Bhutan, Bosnia, 
and Burundi, being examples. 
 Bolaffi et al. in DREC (2003: 94-95) suggest that “the problem of 
‘belonging’ is a constant in the modern world, where belonging to an ethnic group 
is no longer defined in religious and cultural terms, but is structured around 
political and economic factors… [or] an alternative form of social class 
organization…” That is, ethnicity in some situations is employed as an alternative 
to class-consciousness, while in others it is utilised for economic or political 
advantage (Nagata 1974, Saidatulakmal Mohd. 2010). While ‘belonging’ has 
more salience than providing political or economic advantage, these advantages 
may be subliminal.  
 However, for some groups – the ‘Negroes’ of Glazer and Moynihan’s 
(1970: xxxi-xlii) New York for example – economic and racial discrimination 
acting in tandem have had a complicating effect on how other societal groups now 
see themselves. They observe that the resurgence of ethnic identity in New York 
(replicable on a wider canvas) has come about because of affirmative action 
programs implemented to advantage African-Americans. The perception that 
those belonging to other groups would thereby be ‘less advantaged’ created some 
recourse for self-reflection, which resulted in reinvigorated self-assertions among 
hitherto waning ethnic identities. 
 In an archipelagic setting (and the wider world) ethnic identity, and its 
deployment, are only meaningful in geographical spaces in which more than one 
self-ascribed group exists. Without the other, the ‘ethnic’ reference point is 
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meaningless (Eriksen 2010: 41).
61
 Whether isolated on an island in the 
Archipelago (in a Philippine sense), or relegated to the periphery of an island (as 
is the case for the Welsh and Scottish), ethnic nomenclature is fraught with 
ambiguity.
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 Bolaffi et al. (2003: 95) raise this issue of proximity as a precursor to 
ethnic identity ascription in this manner: 
The modern debate focuses on the relational and dialogic aspects of ethnicity 
which lead to ethnic characteristics, that is, each ‘us’ is created in relation to a 
‘them’. Membership of a group implies the designation of ‘others’ who are 
excluded from that group. Ethnicity asserts a collective ego to the exclusion of 
others (Comaroff 1987). Each ethnic group perceives the greatest differences in 
its nearest neighbours (Alber 1992) according to mobilizationists; separation and 
interaction are the building blocks of ethnicity, and competition and conflict 
between ethnic groups are of particular importance. Thus ethnicity is not a 
situation of isolation, but one of dynamic exchange and conflict with others… 
 
 The perception of ethnic groups as units sometimes obscures the position 
played by the individual. While the notion of individual agency in-theory exists 
for most, the reality of choosing not to belong is less fraught within the modernity 
project. Fear of being rejected or expelled from this or that group, has been a 
motivator for clinging to inclusiveness, whatever the motivation for group 
recourse to ethnic mobilisation. In essence, continued interaction and social 
inclusion may dampen the individual’s capacity to separate individual from group 
interest. Bolaffi et al. (2003: 95) add the claim:  
These three basic theories [primordialist, modernist, and mobilizationist] have 
created two opposing camps; for some, ethnicity is a tool for the fulfilment of 
needs and the struggle for power, while others claim it is manifest in the 
continuous rebuilding – often symbolically – of social relationships. Barth does 
not see ethnic groups as developers of cultural structures, but as coolly 
calculating operators intent on promoting their own material interests. Common 
values are important not because they contribute to an ethnic identity, but because 
they necessitate the formation of roles and interactions. 
  
 The markers of identity are more complex than those of ethnicity alone, 
but ethnicity – alongside family, clan, community, religious community, and 
nation-state – is sometimes called upon to make sense of belonging to an entity 
larger than the self (Maalouf 2003). Why this is so is open to conjecture. One line 
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 Eriksen (2010: 41) states: “If a setting is wholly monoethnic, there is effectively no ethnicity, 
since there is nobody there to communicate cultural difference to.” In an age of increasing 
mobility, and the spread of technology, ethnocultural isolation is rapidly receding. 
62
 The case of the Welsh is instructive; in their language Cymraeg they know themselves as Cymru 
(fellow countrymen) which is a rather vague label. Historically their dominant neighbour the 
Anglo-Saxon referred to them as Waelisc (foreigner) and their country Weales (Wales – foreign 
land). The Welsh case might be juxtaposed with that of the Austronesian or Malay world. As 
members of a larger Celtic family they have things in common with other Celts, just as the 
Austronesian world shares commonalities that transcend the cultural baggage of individual ethnic 
groups. 
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of reasoning suggests that ethnic identity is innate, that is, hard-wired into a 
person’s persona, beyond one’s control and in essence ‘primordial’, while others 
are more circumspect regarding primordiality. What can be claimed is that 
enculturation – “the gradual acquisition of the norms of a culture or group” (AOD 
2004: 412) – plays an important role in ethnic identity deliberations. In the face of 
this, agency – or the ability to influence one’s ethnic future – is constrained by the 
fact that from birth we mimic and adopt the cultural practices we see about us. 
One’s religion, formative education, language, dress code, agriculture, food 
culture are all determined by one’s accident of birth (one’s ethnicity), and play an 
important role in how one ascribes ethnically, or is ascribed by others.
63
 
 
Primordialism 
Often without analysing their place in a wider society, individuals continue to 
identify not with the big-picture obligations that bind them to the nation-state, but 
to non-civic ties which derive from their birthplace: family, community, religion, 
or language – the cultural baggage that binds them to some ethnic group or other. 
This continued recourse to the familiar or as Fenton (2008: 88-90) describes it 
“…the powerful influence of familiarity, and customariness of social life, and the 
diffuse sense of attachment that flows from circumstances of birth and 
socialisation, use of language and ingrained habits of thought and social 
practice…” are what we may deem to be recourse to primordial influences. An 
understanding of primordialism would thus seem an important precursor to any 
imagining of the Ortizian transcultural potential. 
 Whether there are inherent markers that define an individual’s trajectory to 
belonging to an ethnic group is open to scrutiny. To test the ‘primordiality’ thesis 
we might use a single ethnolinguistic marker (language) to show that reliance on 
primordiality as a basis for group difference and / or solidarity is fraught with 
conjecture. For example, the Proto-Celtic speaking people of two and a half 
millennia BP have been divided by various nation-state delineations. We might 
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 The DREC (2003: 87-88) states: “The term ‘enculturation’ derives from the world ‘culture’ and 
indicates the assimilation of the contents, practices and values of the cultural traditions of a group 
by the individuals belonging to the group.” That is not to say that the passed on cultural models are 
neatly replicated between generations. Margaret Mead (1970) defined this dissonance which is 
emphasised in industrial societies as the ‘generation gap’. Whether conscious or unconscious the 
enculturation process should be viewed as a lifetime project. Though as DREC sees it, broken into 
time-frames “…making it necessary to distinguish between the infancy stage (where enculturation 
is enforced and arbitrary), the adolescent stage (in which it is oriented toward social integration… 
and the adult stage (when it is an aware and critical form of acceptance or refusal of the values and 
choices of the person’s group” (p. 88). 
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see a Celt (reference to Celt in this context is meant to delineate a former reality) 
in Wales speaking Welsh, a Celt in Anatolia speaking Turkish, or a Celt in 
Bavaria speaking German.
64
 
 Any analysis of the primordialism debate, suggests Fenton (2008: 73-90), 
needs to take cognisance of two questions: (1) ‘Are groups real (or socially 
constructed)?’ (2) ‘Are group attachments affective (guided by sentiment) or 
instrumental (guided by rational calculation)?’ There are voices; Tishkov, Weber, 
Eller and Coghlan states Fenton, who suggest that ethnicity is rationally 
‘constructed’ or ‘instrumental’ in the sense that rather than the ‘blind loyalty’ of 
primordiality, ethnic attachments may be seen to be serving some individual or 
collective political or economic goal. Shils (1957) was less assertive. He surmised 
that primary and civil ties could exist in the same social order, but that the latter 
was acquired – an abstract called upon from time to time – while the former was 
essentially a given, had a sacredness about it and was acted out on a daily basis.  
  Concerned with the social and political stability of the 1960s postcolonial 
state, Clifford Geertz (2000) was another commentator on the primordialism 
debate. Ethnocultural subtleties had not been factored into the colonial project and 
consequently the archipelagic successor-states inherited a diversity of ethnicities, 
cultures, and languages. Acknowledging the potential for national disintegration, 
states attempted strong centralising policies and the inculcation of national values 
by promoting integrative markers as exemplified by the establishment of national 
languages: Filipino (based on Tagalog) in the Philippines, Bahasa Indonesia 
(based on Malay) in Indonesia. However, the infusing of a civic nationalism could 
only be a long-term project, and in the meantime recourse to the security of 
ethnicity or, as Geertz describes it, ‘primary attachment’ would continue. People 
in new states find it difficult to subordinate their known loyalties for a new 
imagined civil order and as a consequence the new state is “…abnormally 
susceptible to serious disaffection based on primordial attachments” (p. 259). 
Elaborating on Shils’ (1957) conception of ‘primordialism’, Geertz explains that: 
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 To these examples we might add the Galicians of Spain, the Bretons of France the Irish of 
Ireland and the Scots of Scotland. It is difficult to extrapolate that there exists some Celtic 
‘primordiality’ that transcends this ethnolinguistic marker? For the same groups, language might 
be substituted for religion, in which case Protestantism, Islam and, Catholicism would be a further 
defining marker. Whether each of these groups feels any primordial attachment to the other is 
unlikely given subsequent and recent histories and experiences. Illustrative might be the Turkic-
speaking peoples of Asia. While linguistically there are connections that link the Uyghur of 
Xinjiang with Turkic cohorts in Russia and Turkey, there are great cultural differences between the 
Ottomans who besieged Vienna and the Uyghurs living in China’s west – between Istanbul in the 
west and Ürümqi in the east. 
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By a primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the ‘givens’ – or, more 
precisely, as culture is inevitably involved in such matters, the assumed ‘givens’ 
– of social existence: immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly, but 
beyond them the givenness that stems from being born into a particular religious 
community, speaking a particular language, or even a dialect of a language, and 
following particular social practices. These congruities of blood, speech, custom 
and so on, are seen to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness 
in and of themselves (p. 259). 
  
 As Geertz interpreted it, primordial attachment requires “…a sense of 
obligation to others which is rather taken for granted, and is not a matter of 
calculation, nor is it a kind of obligation upon which we reflect very much – it is a 
kind of given, just there” (Fenton 2008: 82).65 Yet, it would be difficult to assess 
to what degree a migrant in the resettlement (or wider) world accepts his 
difference as a primordial given. Davis’s (1976) study showing that Balinese 
ethnocultural identity could be recovered as readily as it had been shed would 
indicate that either Balinese primordial attachments are weak, or that 
primordiality might be more inclusive in ‘like-cultured’ peoples; here I suggest 
the Austronesian connection.
66
 
 In contradistinction, in their essay ‘The poverty of primordialism’, Eller 
and Coghlan (1996: 45-51) advocated that Geertz had conceptualised ‘ethnic ties’ 
as almost pre-social, fixed, biological, purely ‘emotional’ and unreasoning. They 
posited that that the primordial component of ethnicity should be reviewed in 
favour of the notion that ethnic mobilisation occurred in either a ‘circumstantial’, 
‘situational’, or ‘instrumental’ manner.67 Judith Nagata (1974) illustrates this in 
her paper ‘What is a Malay?: Situational selection of ethnic identity in a plural 
society’. She acknowledges that while primordiality (as a central element in ethnic 
identity) is in theory shaped by cultural attributes such as: language, place of 
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 Geertz (2000: 259) adds that “(o)ne is bound to one’s kinsman, one’s neighbour, one’s fellow 
believer, ipso facto; as the result not merely of personal affection, practical necessity, common 
interest, or incurred obligation, but at least in great part by virtue of some unaccountable absolute 
import attributed to the very tie itself.” In itself this all makes collective sense. However, in the 
absence of group solidarity – following migration for example – the aforementioned attributes 
would appear to be somewhat moot. Once removed from region-of-origin, which aspects of one’s 
ethnicity are sustained or sustainable is far from clear. 
66
 I posit that were a Balinese to settle in Finland ethno-reversion would be more problematic. In 
the absence of the mirrored similar lifeways – as was the case in Davis’s ethno-reversion 
observation among Balinese transmigrants in Central Sulawesi – the Finnish environment would 
require greater cultural adjustments that might be less easily reversed. 
67
 Fenton (2008: 84) paraphrases the options thus: 
Circumstantial: that ethnic identity is important in some contexts and not others: the identity is 
constant but circumstances determine whether it matters; 
Situational: that the actual identity deployed or made relevant changes according to the social 
situations of the individual: the situation changes, the relevant identity changes; 
Instrumental: that the deployment of the identity can be seen to serve a material or political end 
and is calculated thus. 
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origin and ancestry, recourse to primordiality often hinges on the circumstantial, 
situational or instrumental application of ethnicity.
68
 Her example of Malay 
speakers illustrates how language is used in this process. In proximity to many 
non-Malays, Nagata suggests a Malay might feel significantly Malay. In other 
situations – unassailed by non-Malays – Malays might differentiate between those 
hailing from the Peninsula and Sumatra. 
 The notion of primordialism is fraught with incongruity. For migrants 
resisting ethnocultural diminution, harking back to an imagined primordial past 
may provide solace in periods of social uncertainty, but how realistic are those 
pasts? The Archipelago abounds with examples of disconnectedness between 
what is imagined as primordial and what might be more realistically regarded as 
primordial. Religion (Christianity and Islam) and languages (Tagalog and Malay) 
are regarded as primordial, yet this disregards both the primordiality of Animist 
and proto-Austronesian antecedents. Whether deeply inculcated or not, primordial 
markers (attachment, obligation, and given-ness) are not easily ignored; their 
exploitation in a polyethnic world has the potential for anarchic repercussions. 
Recourse to primordial vectors has, I suggest, the latency to influence or impede 
any acculturative or transculturative adaptations, but will fail to prevail over the 
longer term.
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 As a sociological concept ‘primordial’ has no exclusive connection to an 
understanding of the term ethnicity, but should rather be seen as (one) aspect of 
how we might interpret the impact and reach of ethnicity (Fenton 2008: 76). If we 
ask ‘What is the basis for social cohesion?’ we may elicit the concept of 
primordialism as providing an explanation of how or why ethnic ties and identities 
are maintained. Bellwood’s (2007) assertion that the peoples of the Archipelago 
‘demonstrate a certain unity in human terms’ does not explicate how peoples view 
themselves when seen alongside others who appear culturally analogous. In this 
sense the degree of (or potential for) transculturational change needs to take 
cognisance of the cultural ‘boundaries’ that often subtly, but sometimes markedly, 
divide ethnic groups.
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 This might be reflected in the mental process of deciding that ‘I am a Malay speaker, I feel at 
home speaking Malay’, or ‘We Malay speakers must stick together…’, or ‘sometimes being a 
Malay is important, sometimes it is not’. 
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 The disappearance of former primordial markers (religions, languages, and cultural practices) is 
legion. The disappearance of Baal, Zoroastrianism, Nordic and the Greek and Roman pantheon of 
gods, does not impinge on the descendants of those for whom the aforementioned were central. 
70
 Exemplars of a boundary include that of religion. 250 million ethnolinguistic Bengalis are 
separated ostensibly along religious lines that reflect Bengal’s division by colonial fiat at India’s 
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Ethnic Group Boundaries 
In his ‘Introduction’ to Ethnic Groups and Boundaries Fredrik Barth (1998a) sets 
out to show the importance of what he terms ‘the boundaries of ethnic groups’. 
That is, ethnic identity is determined and maintained by systems of social 
boundaries (however tenuous) that differentiate peoples, whatever general 
similarities they may share (p. 15). Barth suggests that it is fallacy to claim that 
social and geographical isolation have been the central contributors to ethnic 
boundary maintenance. In an increasingly globalised and migratory world groups 
are no longer geographically isolated and yet may continue to maintain ethnic 
distinction in the face of mobility, contact, and information exposure (pp. 9-10). 
Yet ethnocultural distinctions can be modified. Central to identification with a 
particular ethnicity is the sense that ascription is by individuals themselves, that is, 
an individual has the capacity to alter his situation in society.
71
 However, 
ascription by others or self-ascription is not necessarily enough to maintain an 
ethnic boundary. 
 Barth (pp. 10-11) suggests that an ethnic group might be defined as such if 
in a given group of people the group:  
(1) is largely biologically self-perpetuating, 
(2) shares fundamental cultural values, realized in overt unity in cultural forms, 
(3) makes up a field of communication and interaction, 
(4) has a membership which identifies itself, and is identified by others, as 
constituting a category distinguishable from other categories of the same order. 
 
Identification with a given ethnicity is premised on the notion that one is a 
member of a culture-bearing unit. Whether the cultural traits vary greatly from 
other group identities is not as relevant as the notion of self-ascription or 
ascription by others. Group A might share a language with Group B but differ in 
religion.
72
 Group C might share a religion and language with Group B but be 
ethnically distinct because their culture adheres to a matrilineal form of social 
organisation, and so forth (pp. 11-15). However, as Barth suggests “the features 
                                                                                                                                     
Independence (1948) into Muslim East Bengal (now Bangladesh) with the rump Hindu West 
Bengal remaining in India. They might just as well have been excised from the India project along 
linguistic lines. Religion need not be a boundary between peoples; Germans whether Catholic or 
Protestant, are nevertheless ethnically linked. 
71
 The status of former Balinese slaves in British Malaya is illustrative. Conversion to Islam and 
adoption of the Malay language would appear to meet the criterion for being regarded as ethnically 
Malay, whatever the former region-of-origin ethnic identity. 
72
 Referring again to the Bengali example, we see that they are illustrative of this point. Touted as 
the world’ second-largest ethnic group they are religiously divided: with approximately 170+ 
million Muslim adherents (residing principally in Bangladesh) and 70+ million Hindus (residing 
principally in India). 
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that are taken into account are not the sum of ‘objective’ differences, but only 
those which the actors regard as significant” (p. 14). A combination of overt 
signals / signs and basic value orientations may be drawn upon for a sense of 
belonging: dress, language, house-form, lifestyle, sense of morality e.g. 
hospitableness, and so forth.  
 In polyethnic states such as the Philippines the boundaries between 
ethnicities are the social boundaries that define the ethnic group or, as Barth sees 
it, it is the “ethnic ‘boundary’ that defines the group, not the cultural stuff that it 
encloses” (p. 15). Extrapolated on an archipelagic canvas Group A (the Ilocano 
for argument’s sake) might practice the same religion as Group B (Cebuano), but 
be distinguished by a linguistic boundary. Groups C and D might share a language 
(for argument’s sake Malay), yet C might be patriarchal while D leans to the 
matriarchal. The fact that A, B, C, and D share other cultural stuff (wet-rice 
culture, universal male circumcision, or codes of hospitality) does not mitigate 
each group’s self-ascription or ascription by others. Barth further suggests that 
ethnic boundaries have a tendency to ‘canalise social life’ and for internal 
harmony needs those self-ascribing ‘to play the same game’. Yet this 
‘canalisation’ is not necessarily sacrosanct. Boundary maintenance in ethnic 
identity at times fails to conform strictly to cultural parameters. Not only does this 
allude to the difference between culture and ethnicity, it also takes cognisance of 
the fact that both concepts are in states of flux.
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 Barth posits that ethnic identity and tangible assets may play a co-
dependent role (p. 25). That is, if there is an economic advantage, especially in 
pre-social safety-net societies where the struggle for resources is of paramount 
importance, then individuals will seize the opportunity to redefine themselves.
74
 
The aforementioned notwithstanding, “…ethnic boundaries are maintained…by a 
limited set of cultural features. The persistence of the unit then depends on the 
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 For example, the cultural practice in which Catholics consumed fish in lieu of meat has been 
greatly reduced. That does not mean that those claiming Catholicity have been compromised, it 
merely means that for many a cultural practice or ritual has been replaced or is less valued. Even 
members of one ethnicity may observe differing cultural practices. North and South Koreans are 
both ethnic Koreans, but male circumcision is a widespread cultural practice in the South, and less 
so in the North (WHO 2007). 
74
 Barth’s reference to the Fur and Baggara contestation of grazing land in the Darfur region of the 
Sudan could as easily be transferred to the Archipelago. The Philippine struggle for land resources 
is not dissimilar to the Fur / Baggara example. With the promulgation and expansion of the 
Ancestral Domain (AD) in which traditional lands were to be protected for the social and 
economic benefit of Indigenous Persons (IP), the number of Filipinos identifying as IP has 
increased. Whatever cultural traits a group might share, a perceived economic advantage, or 
disadvantage, has the potential to reinforce other minor differences that divide. 
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persistence of these cultural differentiae, while continuity can also be specified 
through the changes of the unit brought about by changes in boundary-defining 
cultural differentiae” (pp. 37-38). Ethnic group boundaries, it would appear, are 
not static, and a group’s continuity is dependent on the acceptance of altering and 
new realities. 
 
The Dilemma of (Ethnic) Identity 
Before concepts such as ‘culture boundaries’, ‘primordialism’, or ethnic ascription 
may be positioned, an understanding of how ethnicity is ‘imagined’, who is to be 
included or excluded, and what cultural markers will constitute a minimal position 
for ascription, will need to be understood. The ‘imagining’ and the ‘reality’ of 
ethnicity are fraught concepts. The salience of identifying (or labelling) appears to 
hinge on economic, political, and social mobility imperatives. Which is not to 
imply that ethnic identity once ascribed is fixed for all time. That is, in all 
societies there exists social fluidity, whether viewed from an individual or group 
level. Several illustrations might help demonstrate the magnitude and 
consequence of ‘labelling’; how ethnic identity is reinforced, negotiated, 
manipulated, or rejected to suit the imperatives listed above. 
 “Identity simultaneously includes and excludes. To define yourself as part 
of a group is to distance yourself from those who are outside it” suggest Hall and 
Gay (cited Zialcita 2006: 3-4). But from whom is one to be distanced? Although 
the ‘global village’ is supposed to be the new reality, the nation-state continues to 
be a great definer of identity. Zialcita suggests that while educated Filipinos have 
intensified their preoccupation with a national identity since independence in 
1946, their perceived individualism – which manifests in an identification with 
kin-based loyalties – precludes some to think of a common good for their 
province, city, or nation. That is, choices are made putting ‘kin-based community’ 
before ‘community broader than kin’ (pp. 5, 19). There are reasons for continuing 
‘kin’ attachments as I explain elsewhere, but the formation of kin identities in the 
first place, or subsequent larger ethnic identities, are more difficult to pin down, 
though geography (complicated by former isolation), economic opportunity, and 
the inability for one group to form a polity powerful enough to subdue others 
might be factors that contributed to the construction of a plethora of archipelagic 
ethnocultural realities. 
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Cultural Identity 
Transculturation – or the (re)negotiating of ascribed identities – presupposes that a 
cultural identity, or cultural difference between groups exists in the first place. 
Diana Taylor (1991: 90) suggests that “(t)ransculturation affects the entire culture; 
it involves the shifting of sociopolitical, not just aesthetic, borders; it modifies 
collective and individual identity…Therefore, before discussing transculturation, 
it is necessary to clarify what we mean by ‘culture’.” It is culture after all – its 
practice and complexity – that defines the ethnic group, and acts as a marker of 
group difference. Cultural particularities may be imbibed by youthful 
enculturation in the socialisation process, or by acculturation at a later date. 
However acquired, the cultural practices that define ethnic identity have the 
capacity to weld together members of a group, and provide its adherents with a 
solidarity and gravitas that is difficult to explain objectively. 
 At this point positioning culture in the identity paradigm might be abetted 
by a contrapuntal assessment of the terms ‘ethnicity and ‘culture’. Fenton (2008), 
while acknowledging that there are areas of overlap, warns against a superficial 
interchangeability of the two terms. Ethnic groups, he suggests: 
have strong connotations of two attributes: ‘descent and culture’… [and as such] 
may be regarded as ‘descent and culture communities’… They are all forms of 
social identity, forms of inclusion and exclusion, forms of social classification, 
and modes of social interaction in which culture and descent are always 
implicated (p. 109). 
 
However, these culture communities or groups should not be regarded as 
coterminous with a particular ethnicity given that such groups (whether religious 
or linguistic) might either be limited to a single ethnicity or encompass a 
multiplicity of ethnicities (p. 20).
75
 Yet the confusion remains. Danielle Conversi 
(cited Fenton 2008: 21) suggests: “In the literature… the terms ethnic and culture 
are often confused… By ethnicity we refer to a belief in putative descent… 
Culture is instead based on tradition and continuity; it is often confused with 
ethnicity.”76 
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 Adherence to Christianity, for example, might be a cultural practice for many groups in the 
Philippines, but that in no way implies they are a single identity group or ethnicity. In the matter of 
language it is obvious that a representative sample: Australia, Belize, Ireland, Liberia, Trinidad 
and Zimbabwe, indicates a linguistic culture community but having (English) as an official (or 
dominant) language fails to diminish ethnic difference. 
76
 The cultural practice of dog-eating may be relevant to both some Han Chinese and some 
Ilocanos of Northern Luzon, but this in no way implies an associated putative descent. That said I 
shall overlook in this instance, the supposed trajectory of the Austronesian migration out of 
mainland Asia as posited by Bellwood (2007) and others. 
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 In this thesis I acknowledge the crucial interactive roles played by both 
culture and ethnicity. If the customs and traditions underpinning cultural identity 
help to define ethnic identity then a diminution or adaptation of those cultural 
practices would contribute to a (re)evaluation of ethnic certainties. In the face of 
the putative descent claim of ethnic groups, cultural adaptation (transculturation), 
I suggest, facilitates the undermining of ethnic particularities. I see this as a 
circular process. Cultural adaptation diminishes the prescriptiveness of cultural 
identity, which in turn questions the centrality of the ethnic group as a basis for 
identity. Thus, any discourse concerning the trajectory of transculturation needs 
an understanding of both the ethnic group as ‘culture-bearing unit’ and what 
constitutes the culture therein. Having clarified the culture / ethnicity dichotomy 
allows the following observations to be made on what is important about culture 
itself.
77
 
 
Defining Culture 
Raymond Williams (1983: 87) states that the term ‘culture’ is “one of the two or 
three most complicated words in the English language… because it has now come 
to be used for important concepts in several distinct intellectual disciplines and in 
several distinct and incompatible systems of thought.”78 Notwithstanding the 
difficulty in defining ‘culture’, a collage of interpretations may help to illuminate 
the concept’s elusiveness. Eller (2009: 25) opens his deliberations by suggesting 
that there is no single definition of culture. He goes on to posit a three-way 
analysis by suggesting culture as encompassing: (1) the ideas and beliefs of a 
group, (2) a set of real facts, albeit ‘social facts’, regarding observable behaviour, 
and (3) the material aspects – dress, housing, cuisine and so forth – that help 
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 The culture / ethnicity dichotomy is well demonstrated in both a Philippine setting and the wider 
world. The cultural phenomenon ‘religion’ is a useful tool when viewing the disconnection. Using 
pre-unification Germany as a model, it is obvious that ethnolinguistically the people were one; 
culturally however, the population was separated by the Catholic / Protestant divide. In essence, 
there was one ethnicity and two cultures. In the Philippines the reality is more complex. Using 
Mindanao as a model, it appears that two religious traditions – Christianity and Islam – divide 
people. However, unlike a single German ethnolinguistic heritage, Mindanaons (both Christian 
and Muslim) are divided into numerous ethnolinguistic groups. Thus, while some ethnic groups 
share some cultural values (religion for example), they may be divided linguistically and culturally 
in other ways. 
78
 An early positioning of the ‘culture’ concept was in juxtaposing it with the concept ‘civilisation’ 
a view consistent with a time when European tradition posited that they [Europeans] stood at the 
apogee of human development in a hierarchal system. This was challenged in the age of European 
Romanticism when Johann Herder’s (1744-1803) advanced the notion that rather than a single 
universal ‘culture’ that every human being would strive to be part of , disparate people’s ways of 
life should be seen as ‘cultures’ in plural. In this context of multiplicity – and whatever the culture 
– each was deemed to include the “knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom and any other 
capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of a society” (Crehan 2002: 39-41). 
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define groups. Peoples and Bailey (2009: 23) attempt a further definition: “The 
culture [sic] of a group consists of shared, socially learned knowledge and 
patterns of behaviour.” 
 
Cultures as Systems 
In Gramsci, Culture and Anthropology Kate Crehan (2002: 37) draws attention to 
certain assumptions about the nature of culture that have confounded its analysis. 
As she sees it, these assumptions are: 
firstly, that cultures are in some sense systems, not necessarily homogenous and 
conflict-free ones, but ones that nonetheless constitute patterned wholes of some 
kind; secondly, that ‘cultures’, again in some sense, constitute discrete and 
bounded entities; and thirdly that societies around whose studies anthropology 
emerged as a discipline (in modern parlance, societies of the South) are 
characterized by a fundamental opposition between ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’. 
  
 Roger Keesing (cited Crehan 2002: 42) “argues that the many different, 
and often conflicting, recent thinkings of ‘culture’ can be seen as falling into four 
broad types: cultures as adaptive systems, cultures as cognitive systems, culture as 
structural systems, and cultures as symbolic systems… Marvin Harris, Claude 
Lévi-Strauss and Clifford Geertz, all apparently agree that cultures are in some 
sense systems.” However, while cultures may indeed be regarded as systems, they 
are at best porous systems that are easily penetrated and modified, despite their 
apparent boundedness, and this becomes evermore apparent in a globalised, 
connected, and mobile world.
79
 Marshall Sahlins (1985: 145) stresses that while 
cultures may have their own logic, or structure: “Human social experience is the 
appropriation of specific percepts by general concepts: an ordering of men and the 
objects of their existence according to a scheme of cultural categories which is 
never the only one possible…” That is, cultures, like ethnicities are malleable, 
have finite lives, and are thus amenable to retooling or transculturation. 
 
Cultures as Bounded Entities? 
The idea that culture(s) are bounded entities is a product of post-Enlightenment 
discourses. No longer was culture envisioned as a universal concept that all 
peoples could aspire to – as had previously been imagined. Rather a multiplicity 
of cultures, premised on geographical (and at times political) spaces was 
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 Individuals and groups do not need to leave their regions-of-origin to experience the penetration 
of ‘known’ cultures. For example much of the affluent world now embraces dance styles which 
did not originate in Europe; there is occurring a generational shift in musical tastes; clothing 
preferences are altering, despite conservatism in some quarters; the list is endless. Suffice to say 
that no place on earth is beyond the reach of cultural accretion. 
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recognised. Crehan (2002: 45-46) states: “A culture, like a nationality, tended for 
example, to be seen as referring to a specific people, often associated with a 
specific territory, and who were characterized by a particular worldview, 
expressed through a common language.” Congruent with this former limited 
worldview was the notion of cultural traits centred on ‘tradition’, aspects of 
culture that were seen as primordial, central to the essence of a cultural identity. 
 The AOD (2004: 1357) explains ‘tradition’ as “a custom, opinions, or 
belief handed down to posterity especially orally or by practice; or an established 
practice or custom.”80 This coinage fails to take cognisance of ‘invented 
traditions’ as revealed by Hobsbawn and Ranger (1992).81 However, whether 
‘invented’ or ‘real’, traditions are tenuous. An example might be male 
circumcision; in the Austronesian world it would be regarded as a ‘real’ tradition, 
while in South Korea it is a phenomenon that appeared with the postwar 
infiltration of U.S. cultural influence and spread of Christianity (which does not 
demand circumcision). In South Korea therefore the practice has evolved into an 
‘invented tradition’ or cultural practice. 
 This dovetails neatly with what Bailey and Peoples (1999: 16) suggest is a 
useful and popular way to define culture, being that “the culture of a group 
consists of shared, socially learned knowledge and patterns of behaviour.” They 
envision culture as a collective enterprise shared by a particular group of people, 
who may be few in number, or geographically dispersed and numerous. By 
‘sharing culture’ is meant that people are able to interact and communicate 
without needing to be conscious of their actions and sensitive to those around 
them understanding their actions. A further contention is that those sharing a 
                                                 
80
 Crehan (2002: 53) makes a salient point regarding cultural traditions, one which has 
implications in a globalising world in which disparate groups are forced or choose to live in 
proximity. “It is worth noting how the notion that people have a ‘right’ to their culture draws on a 
universalist discourse of ‘rights’. The discourse of ‘tradition and culture’ emerged very much out 
of the shadows cast by its apparent opposite, the discourse of ‘rationalism, secularism and 
equality’, and the two discourses have always had an uneasy dependence on each other, with each 
being defined in part by reference to not being its opposite.” I mention this in the wider migrant-
settler context; which I address in the concluding chapters. 
81
 In The Invention of Tradition, Hobsbawn and Ranger (1992) proffer further examples of 
‘invented traditions’ which suggest the fickleness of cultural practices at large. The ritual 
associated with Boy Scout movement has evolved into a set of practices observed across much of 
the world, but were non-existent until invented by Baden-Powell (1857-1941) early in the 
twentieth century. National flags, anthems and emblems also allude to past imagined greatnesses, 
though given the recentness of most nation-state creations, the use of such symbols are predicated 
on invention. 
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common cultural identity become aware of the distinction between their own 
cultural traditions, when juxtaposed against those of others. 
 
Transmission of Culture 
The ‘socially learned’ aspect of culture precludes the notion of culture being 
transmitted between generations genetically (by biological reproduction), posit 
Bailey and Peoples (1999: 17-18). Those born into a group acquire their cultural 
particularities by way of enculturation, and the attendant knowledge and 
behaviour acquired is passed on to succeeding generations who may modify 
aspects of cultural practice, but generally continue to live by its dictates. Aside 
from the intra-group transmission of culture values, what is more salient for this 
thesis is the intergroup transmission – the sharing, borrowing, adaptation, and 
cultural asymmetry that informs a globalised world. Population movements and 
technological wizardry have an ever-greater capacity (when compared with the 
trading dhows of old) to influence, cajole, and proscribe cultural practices that 
once were bounded. The theorists above show that while culture is a complicated 
morass, varying influences and emphases emerge to position a meaningful 
discourse on cultural change or transformation – a process that I prefer to call 
transculturation – but which others, including Crehan (2002) prefer to denote as 
hybridity.
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 In light of the changed realities occasioned by the impact of the modernity 
project (in which increased mobility is a corollary), the boundedness of culture 
and degree of its transmissibility is under scrutiny. In Routes Clifford (1997: 2-3) 
makes the case that his earlier perception that culture’s “propensity to assert 
holism and aesthetic form, its tendency to privilege value, hierarchy, and 
historical continuity in notions of ‘common life’” had included the repression of 
impure cultural accretions. He suggests that in a world riven by ethnic absolutism, 
identity claims needed to be coherent. There are those that reject cultural 
incursions, while others embrace it. Reaction for some may result in the 
“articulation of homelands, safe spaces where the traffic across [cultural] borders 
                                                 
82 To check our understanding of how existent or bounded contemporary, globalised cultures are in 
actuality, Crehan (2002: 58-67) introduces several notions of innovative transcultural realities. 
How Kanak is a Kanak in New Caledonia when he worships a ‘hybrid’ form of Christianity? – the 
original form emanating from the coloniser? How Hutu is a Hutu in a refugee camp in Tanzania 
who has a hut full of texts including Stendhal’s The Red and the Black – a critique of the power 
structures of nineteenth-century France? And how Arabic is the Iraqi whose copy of Salinger’s 
The Catcher in the Rye was found in the rubble of a bombed out building in Baghdad? 
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can be controlled” (p. 7) but whether the reconfiguring of ethnic identities can 
realistically be thwarted is debatable. 
 In an age of international contract labour, overseas study and tourism, the 
capacity for human cultural systems to remain static is inconceivable. For the 
Philippines in particular (and the archipelagic Malay world in general) the notion 
of cultural holism has particular relevance. Cultural certainties and differences are 
in theory easier to maintain in geographical environments such as archipelagos or 
rugged mountain terrains, but in a century of mass mobility millions of 
archipelagic settlers have been exposed to both international and intranational 
migration, a process that has had the propensity to speed up ethnic identity re-
evaluations. 
 I feel that a less doctrinaire attitude to culture / place than Clifford’s is 
warranted. Migration, for example, is one phenomenon that has the potential to 
both isolate and transform cultures. Crehan (2002: 61) states that “(w)hat Clifford 
appears anxious to deny is any assertion of absolute cultural difference, but he 
does, it seems, want to hold on to the notion of different cultures rooted in 
particular geographical locations.” The transnational or intranational migrant may 
retain an image of what he thinks his culture or identity stands for, but whether it 
is a realistic image is a moot point.
83
 That said, Clifford (1997: 7) does make a 
compelling point when he introduces (without expressly using that nomenclature) 
the notion of transculturation by stating: 
The new paradigms begin with historical contact, with entanglements at 
intersecting regional, national, and transnational levels. Contact approaches 
presuppose not sociocultural wholes subsequently brought into relationship, but 
rather systems already constituted relationally, entering new relations through 
historical processes of displacement. 
 
 And yet as Jaidka (2010: 4) posits: “Societies today are neither monolithic 
nor static… There is cultural change going on at every moment, leading to new 
cultural formations.” This creates its own challenges, but what might be suggested 
is that liminal spaces have emerged in which reciprocal cultural exchange occurs, 
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 Even in a more mobile world the migrant-settler may be caught up in a time warp. He has 
arrived in a new environment and continues cultural practices that may be subtly changing or 
being dispersed entirely in the region-of-origin. The German spoken by fifth-generation settlers in 
Puerto Montt (Chile), or the Barossa Valley (Australia) appears quaint to a modern German 
speaker, which indicates that language, like other cultural practices are impacted upon by outside 
stimuli. Greek migration to Australia in the 1960s affords a further time warp experience. While 
the worldview of dressing conservatively in black by elderly women was transferred in the 
migration process; the intervening two generations has seen that practice less prevalent in a Greece 
that is more connected to a wider Europe, via migration and media. 
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often without conscious deliberation being a part of the process. And as a 
consequence of new sociocultural realities occasioned by the technology / 
migration phenomenon, McMahon (2004) is able to observe that “globalization is 
quickly rendering the idea of asserting cultural ‘roots’ untenable, academics are 
inescapably entangled with the question of how to develop a vocabulary for 
discussing culture that avoids origins.” 
 The issue of cultural boundedness, origins, and transmissibility is 
challenged in a more dramatic way by Rogers’ (2006) article ‘From cultural 
exchange to transculturation’. “If the history of a cultural practice is traced far 
enough, its hybridity (impurity) will almost inevitably be demonstrated,” he 
suggests (p. 496). Using the Navajo tribe of the southwestern United States as a 
model, Rogers unravels the perceived cultural practice of intricate weaving for 
which the Navajo are renowned. He points out that this now quintessential Navajo 
practice was only made possible with the introduction of sheep by the Spanish. In 
this sense “(t)ransculturation [might be viewed as] an ‘always already’ of cultural 
existence” (p. 495). In other words that which is perceived to be a sacrosanct 
cultural practice, and defended as such, may be of recent provenance or may 
indeed be an invented tradition.
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 Clifford (1988) makes the case for the capriciousness of cultural practice 
and tradition in the construction and maintenance of an identity, or rather group 
identity such as the ethnic. He posits that while internal diversity may be 
accommodated within culture communities, they may not survive sharp 
contradictions or mutations. “Groups negotiating their identity in contexts of 
domination and exchange persist, patch themselves together in ways different 
from a living organism” (p. 338). He adds: 
A community, unlike a body, can lose a central ‘organ’ and not die. All the 
critical elements of identity are in specific conditions replaceable: language, land, 
blood, leadership, religion. Metaphors of continuity and ‘survival’ do not account 
for complex historical processes of appropriation, compromise, subversion, 
masking, invention, and revival (p. 338). 
 
 In view of Clifford’s pronouncement it would seem that identity groups 
have great scope for (re)invention given certain and favourable circumstances. If 
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 The Welsh eisteddfod neatly exemplifies this assessment. In ‘From a death to a view: The hunt 
for the Welsh past in the Romantic Period’, Prys Morgan (2010: 56-62) posits that although not a 
deliberate invention, the eisteddfod was nevertheless an aberration of its former self. However, it is 
this (re)-invention of tradition that has followed the colonial route to various English-speaking 
countries, with the result that the modern eisteddfodau are regarded as a quintessentially Welsh 
tradition. 
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we acknowledge Rogers (2006: 497) speculation that “(t)he view of culture 
embedded in transculturation also focuses on processes and relationships; culture 
is never fixed, never fully seen in its totality, and always changing because it is a 
network of relations, not an entity” then it should not be a wild revelation that 
transculturation has a role to play in an intercultural, interethnic world.
85
 
I interpret culture to be those elements of the human condition – language, 
religion, and other customs and traditions – that are learned or inculcated via a 
process of enculturation, that is, passed on socially and not acquired biologically. 
While the diverse groups that have transmigrated to the resettlement frontier are 
defined ethnically, it is the cultural permutations of those groups that differentiate 
one from the other. Individual cultural traits are not exclusively the preserve of 
any one ethnic group, but in combination they define how a group’s ascription by 
others, or self-ascription is managed. By extrapolation, if cultural values are 
learned (rather than inherited), they also have the propensity to be unlearned, or 
renegotiated. This may occur by a process of force majeure as in the progression 
of asymmetrical acculturation, or by a more mutual course of cultural exchange as 
envisaged under transculturation rubric. 
 Furthermore I see culture traits not as isolated aspects of ethnocultural 
identifiers, but rather as qualities that have always had the propensity to change, 
given the coalescing of certain circumstances. Even the most isolated people have 
historically been far from atomistic, meaning that cultural exchanges have always 
been possible. The original concept of a universal culture that might be aspired to 
in pre-Enlightenment times has given way to a less dogmatic notion of cultural 
reality. In an increasingly mobile and modernising world, culture is an even less 
fixed, bounded and unchanging phenomenon. I suggest that, in theory, cultural 
exchange is a less fraught process than was once thought possible. Though I 
acknowledge that the individual infant cannot escape its enculturation in the first 
instance, once grown he will be better equipped than were his forbears to 
renegotiate his cultural identity. 
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 The bounded (primordial) sense of culture, Eller (2009: 33-34) suggests, is produced, practiced 
and circulated and in this sense is less bounded, or primordial than some suggest. Humanity, as 
evidenced by indigenous groups such as the Australian Aborigines, has the capacity to adopt a 
cultural worldview by adapting to an environment, but without further ongoing cultural contact a 
stasis occurs which eventually disadvantages such isolated groups vis-à-vis groups that have been 
able to maintain ongoing cultural contacts. 
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Locating Transculturation 
Just as defining the term ‘culture’ is fraught with ambiguity, so too is the concept 
‘transculturation’ open to interpretation. Simply stated, ‘transculturation’ is a 
process in which an interchange of cultural practices occurs between peoples 
representing the values of diverse cultures, or rather ethnocultural groups. Unlike 
the concept ‘acculturation’ – which implies a trajectory to an assimilatory 
integration into one or other (usually a dominant) culture – ‘transculturation’ 
implies a process of reciprocity, one in which there is a mutual exchange, by way 
of adoption, adaptation or accretion of other’s cultural practices and customs. 
While theorised to involve a two-stream flow – core-periphery, colony-metropole, 
and north-south – I suggest, that in view of the polyethnicity of societies such as 
the Philippines, a broader conceptualisation of the term is warranted. Rather than 
a two-stream cultural flow, in polyethnic milieux permutations of a greater 
complexity and magnitude are required.  
 Transculturation cannot occur in a vacuum, however. Its manifestation is 
dependent upon the interaction of diverse ethnocultural groups, occurring 
primarily in the context of population movements, or migrations, be they 
international, or intranational. In The Turbulence of Migration Papastergiadis 
(2007) acknowledges the cultural transformation and population movement 
juxtaposition. He goes on to assert that the salience of cultural identity in a 
globalising / migratory world (where identities are being renegotiated) is under 
increasing scrutiny (p. 5). Transculturation – where the potential exists for 
ethnocultural differences to be minimised, and new identities (re)imagined – is but 
one scenario resulting from migration and mingling.
86
 The space in which these 
intercultural exchanges take place has been deemed by Pratt (1992) as the ‘contact 
zone’ and it is such a space that is the focus of this thesis. In the next pages I will 
define in more detail the concept ‘transculturation’ before outlining its etymology 
and historical roots. 
 
Defining Transculturation 
The term ‘transculturation’ is a neologism coined in Havana circa 1939 by 
Fernando Ortiz (1881-1969). Seeking a term that better described Cuba’s complex 
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 Other scenarios (which I discuss below) include those of acculturation, assimilation, 
multiculturalism, and cosmopolitanism. Migration and mingling can also create frictions that result 
in certain ethnocultural groups trying to either limit their exposure to the modernity project or on a 
further level feel the need to reify their cultural particularities, in order to valorise their identities 
that appear to be threatened. 
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history of indigene, European settler and African slave integration, Ortiz began to 
eschew the term ‘acculturation’ for ‘transculturation’ which he deemed better 
expressed the interaction and modification of cultural norms that various 
ethnicities had contributed to his country. “I am of the opinion that the word 
transculturation better expresses the different phases of the process of transition 
from one culture to another because this does not consist merely in acquiring 
another culture, which is what the English word acculturation really implies…” 
(Ortiz 1995: 102-103). 
 Moreiras (2001: 185) suggests that there are two main uses of the word 
‘transculturation’ “…in a loosely anthropological sense, it is used to describe any 
kind of cultural mixing (some acquisition, some loss, and some creation are 
always ingredients in it). And then it is used to refer to a critical concept, that is, 
an active, self-conscious cultural combination that is a tool for aesthetic or critical 
production.” It is in a socio-anthropological sense that I intend to use the concept 
in this thesis although it is in literary criticism that the term ‘transculturation’ 
gained cachet, specifically in the field of mestizaje studies, by proponents 
including the literary critic Ángel Rama (1926-1983). 
 It is in the literary field also that Pratt (1992) locates ‘transculturation’. 
She posits that “(e)thnographers have used this term [transculturation] to describe 
how subordinated or marginal groups select and invent from materials transmitted 
to them by a dominant or metropolitan culture” (p. 6). Her popularisation of the 
notion of the ‘contact zone’ as “social spaces where cultures meet, clash, and 
grapple with each other, often in highly asymmetrical relations of domination and 
subordination – like colonialism, slavery, or their aftermaths as they are lived out 
across the globe today” (p. 4) presupposes a classic model of social interaction. 
While I concur with her observation that ‘transculturation’ is a phenomenon of the 
‘contact zone’ I am less convinced that the asymmetrical, dominated, and 
subordinated model of transculturation is the only one possible. In view of this 
thesis’ fieldwork, I suggest that the process of transculturation is also possible in 
the absence of a dominant / subordinate dichotomy. That is, a transculturative 
process is possible in milieux where a heterogeneity of peoples co-reside – where 
the possibility of a broader (mutual) cultural exchange occurs in the absence of a 
dominant group. 
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History / Etymology 
The term ‘transculturation’ was given standing after its acceptance by the ‘ethnic’ 
Polish anthropologist Bronisław Malinowski who in 1940 penned an introduction 
to Ortiz’s text Contrapunteo cubano del tabaco y el azúcar (Cuban Counterpoint: 
Tobacco and Sugar). It was in this text that Ortiz used Cuba’s two dominant 
exports (sugar and tobacco) to allegorise the complexities of the sociocultural 
exchanges that had occurred in the wake of the various Cuban immigrations.
87
 
While it was Cuban Counterpoint that launched Ortiz’s ‘transculturation’ concept 
(1995: 97-103), it was Malinowski (1995: lvii-lxiv) who furnished the explanatory 
detail that helped flesh out the nuances of the term. It was he who made a succinct 
case for the term’s introduction by first suggesting that ‘transculturation’ might 
replace an alternate nomenclature then in use: cultural exchange, acculturation, 
diffusion, and migration or osmosis of culture. 
 Defending the need to replace the use of inappropriate terminology from 
scientific work, Malinowski suggested that the word ‘acculturation’ – one he 
deemed ethnocentric and loaded with moral connotation – be replaced by 
‘transculturation’. “The immigrant has to acculturate himself; so do the natives, 
pagan or heathen, barbarian or savage, who enjoy the benefits of being under the 
sway of our great Western culture…it is he who must change and become 
converted into ‘one of us’” (p. lviii). Malinowski thus poses an important 
challenge.
88
 Any group of immigrants, he suggests “provokes a change in the 
[mould] of the culture that receives them…and when they transmigrate… 
something of their own culture, their own eating habits, their folk melodies, their 
musical taste, their language, superstitions, ideas and temperament [arrives with 
them]” (p. lviii). This ensuing change of culture, Malinowski intended to call (in 
the spirit of Ortiz’s ruminations) ‘transculturation’, a term eschewing any moral, 
normative, or evaluative concepts implied by the term ‘acculturation’. As 
imagined, the ‘transculturation’ process was to be one premised on a give and take 
model of cultural exchange, resulting in a modified cultural reality, one “that is 
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 It should be noted that Malinowski’s ‘Introduction’ appeared in the original / first Spanish 
edition in 1940, Contrapunteo cubano del tabaco y el azúcar. The first English translation was 
published by A.A. Knopf Inc. in 1947, by which time Malinowski had already died. 
88
 Malinowski (1995: lix) makes the centrality of mutuality in the cultural exchange process very 
succinctly: “To describe this process the word trans-culturation, stemming from Latin roots, 
provides us with a term that does not contain the implication of one certain culture toward which 
the other must tend, but an exchange between two cultures, both of them active, both contributing 
their share, and both co-operating to bring about a new reality of civilisation.” 
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not a mechanical agglomeration of traits, nor even a mosaic, but a new 
phenomenon, original and independent” (p. lix). 
 There might indeed have been, as Malinowski suggests, an ethnocentric 
and moral connotation associated with the usage of the term ‘acculturation’; 
however, its replacement by the term ‘transculturation’ was no more likely to take 
cognisance of the role played by class, civilisational development (modernity), 
and intellectual capital, in determining the trajectory of sociocultural diversity. 
That said, one suspects that a reciprocal exchange of cultural practices might more 
readily occur in a milieu where the immigrant and host (or migrant and migrant) 
already shared some overarching cultural traits: monotheism, class, educational 
level, for example. This observation notwithstanding, what Ortiz / Malinowski 
imagined for the term ‘transculturation’ – that of reciprocal cultural exchange, 
which had the capacity to create new, transformed identities – was in principle a 
sound one to promulgate. 
 Mark Millington (2005: 223) is sceptical, however. In ‘Transculturation: 
Taking stock’, he suggests: “One aspect of the difficulties with Ortiz’s theory of 
transculturation is the etymology of the term itself.” The question is whether the 
prefix ‘trans’ – which may indicate movement across, beyond or through, is in 
any way an advantage over the prefix ‘a’ or ‘ad’ that precedes ‘culture’ to form 
the term ‘acculturation’. In Millington’s opinion “there is no clear relation with 
reciprocity or a movement back and forth” (pp. 223-224) implied by the ‘trans’ 
prefix as envisaged by Ortiz / Malinowski.
89
 
 
Transculturation: Perceptions and Critiques 
In her 2004 Cape Verde study, McMahon puts forward the notion that 
“(t)ransculturation theory seeks to replace diffusionism [mid-century term] with 
the concept of ‘mutual borrowing’, which recognizes that the ‘indigenous’ culture 
alters the ‘foreign’ just as the ‘foreign’ alters the ‘indigenous’.” She thereby 
makes the case that cultural exchange is not a one-way process. This theme is 
enhanced by Rogers (2006: 474) when he suggests that three models of cultural 
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 Millington (2005) illustrates his difficulty with accepting the ‘trans’ prefix as a facilitator 
implying the notion of ‘mutual exchange’ or reciprocity in the cultural milieu, by undermining 
Malinowski’s critique that ‘ad’ or ‘ac’-culturation was an inadequate representation of the cultural 
processes that Ortiz imagined were taking place in Cuba. He adds: “One might look at other words 
which contain the same prefix… A ‘transition’ [my emphasis] is a passage from one place, state, 
stage, style, subject, or musical key to another… Ortiz himself uses the word ‘transmigrate’ to 
refer to the bringing into Cuba of a new population of Europeans and Africans… but makes no 
reference to return journeys… Even the word ‘translate’… is concerned with shifting from one 
language into another” (p. 224).  
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exchange are possible: cultural exploitation, cultural dominance, and reciprocal 
cultural exchange, the latter being the creation of hybrid forms and / or 
transculturation. Having made the point, he nevertheless remains ambivalent as to 
the trajectory, degree or provenance of any cultural appropriation. Rogers goes on 
to state that “(t)ransculturation involves cultural elements created through 
appropriations from and by multiple cultures such that identification of a single 
originating culture is problematic. Transculturation involves ongoing, circular 
appropriations of elements of multiple cultures, including elements that are 
themselves transcultural” (p. 491). That is, the permutations are endless and the 
process is open-ended. James Lull (cited Rogers 2006: 491) posits that 
transculturation represented: 
a process whereby cultural forms literally move through time and space where 
they interact with other cultural forms and settings, influence each other, produce 
new forms, and change the cultural settings… Transculturation produces cultural 
hybrids – the fusing of cultural forms… but hybrids such as these never develop 
from ‘pure’ cultural forms in the first place. 90  
  
 As Jaidka (2010) points out, although Ortiz was primarily concerned with 
Afro-Cuban culture, his concepts are just as relevant to intercultural interactions 
in a wider world. “What he meant by transculturation involved the need to change 
with the times, to give up obsolete ideas and seek new yardsticks more suited to 
the present. He argued, in the first place, in favour of the need for a de-culturation 
of the past, and second, a re-invention, or re-definition of fresh cultures based on 
the new realities of the world in flux” (p. 3). Given this assessment, the reality of 
cultural repositioning, be it in the transmigratory ‘contact zone’, or in the contact 
zones of the affluent world (France, Germany, the U.S.) should not be regarded as 
anything but an organic process. Rather than being able to remain anchored in 
time-defined ethnocultural certainties, exposure to the Other, technology, and a 
world on the move all conspire to transform identities. Jaidka adds: “Identity, 
according to [Ortiz] is not strictly one-dimensional [but] recognised in rapport 
with the Other. It is not singular but multiple. Each person is a mosaic… [around 
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 The case of the Navajo, mentioned earlier, exemplifies this impurity sentiment, although the 
Archipelago abounds with examples in which the provenance of a cultural practice is difficult to 
isolate. The syncretic nature of both Christianity and Islam is indicative of the way in which 
elements of both have been appropriated, and fused with elements of pre-colonial belief structures. 
Speculation on why dog-eating was a practice on the Ilocos coast of Luzon, might suggest that as 
this region is the most proximate part of the Philippines to China, that this cultural appropriation 
was effected in that region, rather than another. Further examples abound. While maize culture 
from the Americas became widespread in the Archipelago, chilli culture did not. The area now 
represented by Indonesia embraced the chilli, while the Philippines did not, despite it being the 
conduit for its transmission to Indonesia from the Americas. 
 101 
whom] transculturation takes place at all levels of geography, that is, national, 
local, and increasingly virtual” (p. 3). 
 What others in the section above have made of the term ‘transculturation’ 
– the complex and diverse ways it has been interpreted – is aptly summed up by 
Millington (2005).
91
 He questions the intent of Ortiz’s promulgation of the term 
‘transculturation’, by suggesting that he [Ortiz] had thrown the term into the 
socio-anthropological cauldron without fully developing a coherence for it, which 
might have given rise to its misinterpretation or misuse by later proponents.
92
 
Millington begins by suggesting that the term ‘transculturation’ “has been bandied 
about a considerable amount in certain areas of Latin American studies in the last 
fifteen to twenty years” (p. 204). While it is true that Ortiz’s ethnography was 
grounded in the Cuba he knew, there is no sense that Latin America needed to be 
the sole focus for the ‘transculturation’ hypothesis. On the contrary, I suggest that 
the universality of sociocultural change precludes its attenuation to represent only 
Latin America. Millington states that despite Malinowski’s imprimatur, the term, 
rather than becoming de rigueur in the anthropological field, drifted to become 
representational for Latin American literary theorists. And this was accentuated 
following the theorisation of the concept ‘transculturation’ by the Uruguayan 
academician and literary critic Ángel Rama (p. 205). 
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 In this section I refer heavily to Millington. Not only does he critique the Ortiz / Malinowski 
transculturation concept, his critique introduces those in academe who have contributed to 
interpretations of the concept. While his article appears to undermine the legitimacy of the Ortiz / 
Malinowski imagining, in the process I feel that Millington is playing the role of devil’s advocate 
for the term’s interpretation. 
92
 To paraphrase Millington’s concern with the way in which others have exploited the term 
‘transculturation’ I insert his ‘Abstract’ (2005: 204) which grounds the issues he raises about the 
(mis)representation of the term: 
This essay considers the recent vogue for the term transculturation and critiques a 
selection of its numerous and divergent uses. That critique enables a return to and a 
reassessment of Ortiz’s theorisation and historical analyses in Contrapunteo cubano 
[contraction of the original 1940 Spanish title for Ortiz’s work]. While it is important that 
the term continue to adapt to changing circumstances, many bland and gestural 
invocations of it have paid insufficient attention to the detail of Ortiz’s thinking, which 
illuminates the whole gamut of different stages and processes involved in cultural 
encounters and interaction. Without losing sight of Ortiz’s strong emphasis on historical 
analysis, the essay explores why a cultural phenomenon which is universal was theorised 
and named within Latin America. It also considers the extent to which transculturation 
can constitute a political position from which in the contemporary world to challenge the 
hold of global modernisation, which some recent readings have proposed. It concludes 
that , since the colonial era, in which transculturation already has a strong presence in one 
form or another, the idea that it might now bring about democratic interchanges between 
Latin America and other cultures seems overly optimistic. The kind of analysis which 
Ortiz brilliantly demonstrates in Contrapunteo cubano may illuminate the imbalances and 
asymmetries of global (inter)exchanges but it is unlikely to do more than that. 
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 Rama influenced a generation of followers who, in a self-asserting 
postcolonial world, wanted to empower the marginal majority in the Latin 
American milieu via the literary narrative. Millington (p. 209) adds that: 
In line with the context to which Rama refers, the cultural elements and their 
dynamic are different from the ones with which Ortiz deals. Where Ortiz was 
concerned with the effects of multiple cultures all being introduced into Cuba 
more or less simultaneously without an established local culture, Rama is 
concerned with defined national situations in which there are well-established 
internal structures and divisions which come into contact with external 
practices… 
 
  Millington contends that rather than accept Ortiz’s limited ambit claim for 
the ‘transculturation’ concept, Rama was putting his own gloss on the term by 
inserting it in place of the notion of ‘transformation’, in this case the modernising 
process, which cultural theorists imagined was required to revolutionise their 
conservative, moribund, and divided societies.
93
 
 Alluding to Pratt’s (1992) Imperial Eyes, Millington (2005: 211-212) 
intimates that while highlighting the concept of ‘transculturation’ in its title, in 
reality Pratt does not invoke it substantially within the text. He further posits that 
Pratt’s assertion – wherein subordinated and marginal groups ‘in the periphery’ 
select and invent cultural phenomena from materials transmitted to them by a 
‘dominant or metropolitan culture’ – is not exactly what Ortiz had in mind when 
he was raising the theme of transculturation. When Ortiz was envisioning 
transculturation in action, he was thinking of society at large; he was interested in 
the effects of ‘mutual exchange’ encounters on both sets of cultures – the 
metropolitan and the periphery. That mutuality can realistically occur where a 
power imbalance (such as dominant / subordinate cultures) exists appears 
problematic.
94
 
 In an attempt to disentangle Ortiz’s thinking on transculturation from later 
accretions Millington turns his gaze onto the Ortiz text itself.
95
 He observes that 
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 The difference in context is summed up thus: “All Ortiz refers to are ‘the process of transition’ 
and ‘the consequent creation of new cultural phenomena’ (neither of which necessarily implies 
transformation, that is, the mutation of already existing cultural forms or practices)” (Millington 
2005: 210). 
94
 It is difficult to imagine – and the literature fails to take cognisance of the fact – what impact 
class-consciousness played in Ortiz’s conceptualisation of his ‘transculturation’ paradigm. The 
Cuba of the 1930s – interracial miscegenation notwithstanding – would have mirrored a wider 
world, one in which colour impacted on class. Cultural reciprocity, in such a class-based milieu, 
one suspects would have been stymied somewhat. 
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 Millington (2005) references one edition of Ortiz’s work (1978), over others in the panoply. 
That is, he cites Ortiz as: Ortiz, Fernando (1978 [1940]) Contrapunteo cubano del tabaco y del 
azúcar (Caracas: Biblioteca Ayacucho). He goes on to reveal the further editions thus: “There are 
several notable editions of the work. The first was: Havana: J. Montero, 1940, with a prologue by 
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despite its grand size Contrapunteo cubano (Cuban Counterpoint) gives less than 
ten pages to theorise the term ‘transculturation’ “but he [Ortiz] is also rather 
apologetic about his neologism, craving the reader’s indulgence and excusing his 
‘daring’ in proposing this new term…in order to replace the well-established 
‘acculturation’, which he defines as meaning the process of transit from one 
culture to another more powerful one and the social repercussions resulting from 
that movement” (p. 215). How mutuality is supposed to exist where there is 
‘another more powerful culture’ is less easy to define. Ortiz, Millington adds, 
highlights the complex transmutations that have resulted in “the evolution of a 
Cuban people in key areas of social life: the economic, institutional, juridical, 
ethical, religious, artistic, linguistic, psychological, sexual, and so on” (p. 215); 
yet when the case of Cuba’s indigenous Taíno is broached, it appears that rather 
than an intercultural ‘transmutation’ occurring, the reality was one of cultural 
destruction. 
 Aside from challenging others’ interpretation of Ortiz’s ‘transculturation’ 
concept, Millington (pp. 215-222) also impugns the premise of Ortiz’s neologism; 
at least in the sense that it was originally intended to be used. Beginning with the 
notion that humans are culture-bearers, Ortiz depicts a Cuba in which both the 
Spanish and African cultures were transplanted, via the ‘sporadic waves’ and 
‘continuous flows’ of population movement; and finishes his dialectic by 
summarising the cultural trajectories he has in mind. “…every immigrant [is] like 
one uprooted from their native land in a double, critical movement of disjunction 
and realignment, of deculturation or exculturation and of acculturation or 
inculturation, and in sum, of transculturation” (p. 217). While acknowledging 
Ortiz’s encapsulation of both the cultural processes involved and the human 
dimension thereof, Millington challenges the sentiments expressed by averring 
that the use of the prefix ‘trans’ to create a master-term under which to bunch 
other terms clouds the issue. 
 Additionally, Millington suggests, the use of a master-term to explain the 
processes of radical loss (deculturation or exculturation) and movement to another 
                                                                                                                                     
Herminio Portell Vilá and an introduction by Bronislaw Malinowski. Among subsequent revised 
and enlarged editions are: Las Villas: Universidad Central de Las Villas, 1963; Caracas: Biblioteca 
Ayacucho, 1978, with a Prologue and Chronology by Julio Le Riverend; Madrid: Cátedra, 2002, 
edited and introduced by Enrico Mario Santi. The English translation is: Cuban Counterpoint. 
Tobacco and Sugar, translated by Harriet de Onís, New York: A.A. Knopf, 1947 [republished: 
Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1995]. This translation abridges the 1940 edition; it 
goes without saying that it does not include the revisions and enlargements of the 1963 edition” 
(Millington 2005: 232-233). 
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culture (acculturation or inculturation) appears to neglect “the vital, later 
‘neoculturation’, a term that indicates the potentially creative aspect of cultural 
encounters” (p. 217). Viewed thus, the master-term gives the impression that it 
connotes nothing more than the movement into another culture, or acculturation, 
the term that Ortiz claimed should be eschewed, or, as Millington expresses it, “it 
seems that ‘transculturation’ does not so much replace ‘acculturation’ as subsume 
it” (p. 217).  
 While Millington appears to substantiate the subsuming of the 
‘acculturation’ term by a ‘transculturation’ one, he suggests that in a later 
reflection Ortiz advocates “that ‘transculturation’ goes beyond the mere 
acquisition of a different culture to embrace other elements …the loss or 
uprooting of a previous culture, which could be called partial deculturation, and, 
in addition, it signifies the consequent creation of new cultural phenomena which 
could be called neoculturation” (p. 219). This revelation contradicts the 
subsumation analogy, but more importantly Millington suggests: “Ortiz sees 
acculturation as involving the complete loss of a previous culture and assimilation 
to another, already existing one (no creative, new phenomena here apparently)” 
(p. 219). Such a criticism notwithstanding, Millington adds that Ortiz, having 
pitched the ‘complete loss’ scenario, ends his definition of transculturation by 
introducing the rhetorical expression abrazo (embrace).
96
 The sense in which the 
term abrazo is to be understood is that of a reciprocal ‘cultural embrace’. What is 
imagined here is that just as individual offspring inherit something of both 
progenitors (yet remain distinct from them) so the interactees in any cultural 
embrace inherit or absorb characteristics of a given cultural embrace. 
 After summarising Ortiz’s shortcomings, Millington (2005: 223) concedes 
that the difficulties the author faced may have been taxonomic. “It is evident that 
there are problematic elements in Ortiz’s theorisation and his linking of the theory 
with historical realities: a certain lack of specificity, at times a sketchiness about 
the cultural processes and at others a less than clear fit between theory and 
circumstance.” And yet it appears that Millington’s scepticism and cynicism are 
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 The term ‘embrace’, as outlined by Millington (2005: 219-220), is best viewed in an ambivalent 
sense to avoid its misconstruction. That is, neither a positive or negative connotation is intended. It 
should be noted that it was the 1963 translation of the Ortiz text that Millington was 
deconstructing. In both the Harriet de Onís (1947) English translation and the 1995 Duke 
University edition the term ‘embrace’ (abrazo) has been substituted for the term ‘union’, which 
Millington suggests captures the idea a sexual union rather than a coming together, or the 
embracing of one culture by another. 
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tempered by his acknowledging that there might exist a space – outside the Latin 
American site of contestation – for the term ‘transculturation’, one where 
contemporary examples are able to demonstrate the likelihood or degree of 
reciprocity claims implied in the neoculturation assertion. Even where 
transculturation connotes cultural interaction, Millington concedes that interaction 
“may not imply equality and mutuality… Influences may operate back and forth 
between cultures but be asymmetrical in quantity and quality” (p. 230).97 As an 
aside he posits that whatever the claims made for transculturation, whatever 
impact it may aspire to, the arena in which this would appear to be relevant is in 
the field of migration (p. 227). It is under the transmigration rubric that I position 
the transculturation claim. 
 It would appear that perception and an interpretive zeitgeist play a role in 
the response to new ways of interpreting social phenomena. In his 1995 essay 
Coronil states: “…my sense is that, given the conditions shaping its international 
reception, Ortiz’s book has been read in ways that have overlooked aspects of its 
significance and have left its critical potential undeveloped” (p. x). Just as Marx 
(1977: 15) stated: “Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as 
they please,” so too does Coronil suggest that we necessarily read “not just as we 
please, but under circumstances not chosen by ourselves” (1995: x). Thereby 
hangs a conundrum. Millington’s (2005) discourse has challenged both the Ortiz / 
Malinowski etymological genesis of the ‘transculturation’ concept, as well as the 
interpretations and usage the term was subjected to by later Latin Americanists 
and their acolytes. Rather than quibble over the purity or usefulness of the term I 
suggest that in a globalising / migratory world, its application fits the parameters 
of the Ortiz / Malinowski imagining more than ever.
98
 
 Despite an increasing globalising / migration reality however, the potential 
of reciprocal cultural exchange between groups (à la Ortiz) is at times stymied by 
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 Silvia Spitta (cited Millington 2005: 227) in raising the term ‘counterpoint’ used by Ortiz’s 
allegory, suggests that in the realm of music the term denotes equality between melodic lines, in 
which case she feels it is less than appropriate to use the term in the context of the cultural equality 
imagined. In hindsight of the thesis fieldwork I would caution a more hesitant view. 
98
 This thesis posits that an exchange of cultural phenomena in a ‘give and take’ reciprocal 
manner, without the pressure of a dominance factor, is consistent with the Ortiz / Malinowski 
intention that the term ‘acculturation’ be replaced by ‘transculturation’. Reflecting momentarily on 
the Marxian dilemma – Leninism, Trotskyism, Stalinism and Maoism all contain elements of 
Marxian theory. While possibly the application of the theory does not fit with what Marx had 
imagined, the above models are nevertheless regarded as Marxian. In the same vein, I suggest that 
whether used by ethnographer / anthropologists or Latin American literary critic / theorists, the 
fact remains that ‘transculturation’ is Ortizian. The rooting of the concept in Cuba and its Latin 
American neighbourhood appears to have constrained its potential, yet that does not preclude its 
applicability in contemporary times, and a wider world. 
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social impediments: cultural dominance, ethnic chauvinism, racism, nationalism, 
struggle for resources and so forth. In her 1991 essay, Taylor – reflecting on the 
asymmetry of dominant / subordinate relations – suggests that dominant groups 
have little interest in cultural exchange reciprocity; they fear the erosion of a sense 
of entitlement that reciprocity demands. Ignoring the sense of cultural loss that 
acculturating groups might feel, the dominant groups require the migrant to adjust 
while they themselves “resist losing what they see as their rightful place at the 
economic, historic and cultural centre of things” (p. 103).99 She adds that “our 
deepest generational emotion is that of loss… country, class, language, etc. [as 
well as our] ideological meta-horizons” (p. 102).100  
 That is why in the majority of ‘contact zones’ the acculturation and 
assimilation of immigrants is the norm – an ongoing though fraught process. To 
what degree a Kurd in Germany, a Guatemalan in the United States or a Lebanese 
in Australia can discard, or modify his ethnocultural baggage however, for 
whatever it means to become a German, an American, or an Australian, is subject 
to critique. Dominant cultures in the longer established nation-states, such as the 
United States (and many European countries) have the luxury of debating the 
worth or otherwise of promoting the integration of immigrants using the 
assimilatory tool of acculturation. Conversely, in polyethnic states such as the 
Philippines, where there is often no dominant ethnocultural group, the anxietal 
acculturation argument remains somewhat moot.
101
  
 Unlike acculturational integration, which is predicated on the subsuming 
of one’s identity to a majority culture, transculturation suggests the notion that 
coexistence be predicated on a give-and-take of cultural practices, be they 
linguistic, religious, agricultural, and so forth. That is, transculturation might be 
perceived as a process rejecting a unidirectional mode of cultural exchange. 
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 These sentiments are voiced vociferously by Samuel Huntington (2005) in Who Are We?: The 
Challenges to America’s National Identity, in which he outlines his concern that immigration from 
the Hispanic world has the potential to undermine the dominance of Anglo-Protestant heritage and 
institutions. There is no perception in this discourse that Hispanic immigration could have positive 
or neutral implications. 
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 Putting a U.S. context in perspective Taylor (1991: 102) states: “While most people may like 
jazz or so-called Mexican food, political struggles indicate how hostile the dominant culture is to 
the presence of ‘minorities’, especially when they seem to be competing for the same resources. 
The term used to discuss the interaction between, and among these cultures are not usually the 
celebratory ones used in hegemonic spheres to describe transculturation, that is, their acquisition, 
adoption and embrace of the foreign.” 
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 In the Philippines, if we use the debatable indicator language as a marker of ethnicity, then the 
numerically largest cohort - the Tagalogs - would encompass at best 25% of the population. While 
the Javanese might be the most numerous ethnocultural group in Indonesia, they do not with 
41.71% representation [2000 Census] form a national majority (Suryadinata et al. 2003: 6-11). 
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Furthermore, the degree of coexistence possible in some societies may eventually 
be reflected in the degree of possible transculturation. 
 
The Relevance of Transculturation 
The importance of transculturation as a modifier of identity is of relevance on 
several levels. In an age of increased migrancy (both international and 
intranational) integrational dictates demand that locating modi vivendi for 
culturally diverse peoples becomes evermore pressing. “The twin processes of 
globalization and migration have shifted the question of cultural identity from the 
margins to the centre of contemporary debates” suggests Papastergiadis (2007: 5). 
These debates are occurring in an epoch where democratic demands undermine 
the former realities of immigrant integration; the acculturation and assimilation 
paradigm is no longer as acceptable as it once was. In such milieux, an exchange 
of cultural values and practices (transculturation) has the capacity to play a greater 
integrative role in post-migration scenarios. Migration on a global level (labour, 
political refugee, and ecological migration) creates, I suggest, similar uncertainties 
and anxieties as those of intrastate migrations in polyethnic, postcolonial states. 
The issue for the state is one of national unity or cohesion, and the concern for 
displaced people is one of integration. 
 Integration is a term that continues to be misconstrued, and is often 
represented as the acculturation and assimilation of a minority to majority norms. 
“The intermixing of persons previously segregated” (AOD 2004: 649) would 
appear to be a more reasonable explanation, as it does not imply identity 
diminution or accretion. Further clarification may be gleaned from the DREC 
(2003: 151) which states: “The concept of integration indicates the sociological 
process by which divisions and heterogeneous factors within a society are 
overcome in order to create a new, balanced whole. Integration, therefore, is an 
essential dynamic factor in the creation of a society based on cooperation between 
individuals and groups.” In light of this, the formation and sustaining of national 
states in polyethnic milieux is dependent to some extent on state regulation and 
the self-interiorisation of cultural values. The fostering of social cohesion in such 
circumstances is abetted by the transculturation process. 
 There appear to be several scenarios possible in the integration stakes: (1) 
situations in which there are difficulties in maintaining ethnocultural equilibrium 
– the Former Yugoslavia (FYu), Somalia, and Sri Lanka, (2) situations in which 
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regions of cultural dominance within states are maintained – Belgium, Canada, 
and Switzerland, (3) situations in which no ethnocultural group is numerically 
dominant, with each community maintaining its distinction in the national sphere 
– Israel, Malaysia, and Trinidad, (4) situations in which the ‘modernity project’ 
tolerates a plethora of cultural diversity under the rubric of ‘multiculturalism’, and 
often under the tutelage of a dominant ethnocultural group – Australia, France, 
and the United States, and (5) situations in which ethnocultural differences are 
diminished by a process of cultural interchange (transculturation) which imagines 
new conglomerate cultural identities – exemplified in Narra / Palawan and among 
some urban elites, and cosmopolitans. 
 No migrant has the capacity to imagine the challenges his culture will 
experience on leaving his region-of-origin. He may attempt to resist change, be 
equivocal about change or embrace change; though whatever decision he makes, 
he has no ultimate control over the cultural milieu he will live amongst, what 
further global changes will occur, or whether his progeny will embrace other 
identity realities. Papastergiadis (2007: 110) handily illustrates the notion of 
unpredictability, a scenario in which transculturation is as likely to play a role as 
not, when he states: 
The idea that there can be a neat synthesis or equivalent translation between 
different cultures has been rejected in favour of views that stress the 
discrepancies, incommensurabilities and surpluses between cultures. This 
attention to slippage and non-correspondence between cultural codes does not 
suggest that the process of exchange is undermined by difference, but rather that 
the remainder of a difference stimulates reach towards unexpected horizons. 
  
 The ‘reach towards unexpected horizons’ becomes a significant factor in 
the interethnic or intercultural, post-migration milieu, and especially so in the 
context of the formation, continuance, and sustainability of the modern nation-
state. I do not imply that the nation-state is necessarily the epitome of the way in 
which man must organise his political existence. Rather, I suggest that at this 
postcolonial point of time, the nation-state as conceived in the shadows of 
European Enlightenment and Romantic era discourses appears to be a model 
suitable for an interim organisational harmony. 
 In a polyethnic Archipelago supporting possibly one thousand cultural or 
ethnolinguistic identities the need to coexist is paramount if the nation-state – as 
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formulated – is to survive.102 In lieu of each ethnocultural group having the 
capacity to form their own individual nation-state (as parts of Europe formerly 
typified) it is imperative that a state of being in which all citizens feel at ease 
develops. For national union and unity to flourish in states supporting 
heterogeneous populations, the need to be amenable to difference, a willingness to 
coexist in a state of diversity, or undergo a process of transculturation – in which 
differences are eroded, minimised, or new composite identities (ethnogenesis) 
created – would appear to be of significance. While environments aiming to 
obviate intolerance and antipathy are the precursor to intercultural harmony, the 
unlevel playing field of cultural exchange needs to take cognisance of the fact that 
there is “no neat synthesis or equivalent translation between cultures” suggests 
Papastergiadis (2007: 110). 
 Yet the success or otherwise of the evermore diverse nation-state is 
dependent on more than a general coexistence, or state-legislated tolerance edicts. 
As a microcosm of the resettlement world at large I suggest that Narra / Palawan 
provides an alternate model to one premised on a general coexistence, but rather 
one premised on cultural transformation, or ‘transculturation’; that is, a model in 
which there is no sense that the migrant needs to acculturate to an existing or 
dominant resident population. Rather, via a process of give-and-take, a mutual 
modus vivendi materialises, resulting in the formation of a distinct new society, 
one in which most citizens feel they have a stake, resulting rather from an organic 
development than one mandated by any state. 
Homi Bhabha alludes to the potential for this ‘organic development’ with 
his concept of the ‘third space’ (Rutherford 1990: 207-221). By this Bhabha 
means that there exists in the ethnocultural environment a liminal position in 
which alleged ethnocultural essentialism may be challenged or negotiated. The 
starting premise for this ‘third space’ hinges on the interpretation of what Bhabha 
refers to as the insecurity of the ‘originary’ – an imagined essentialist 
interpretation of a given cultural position. Whether an original can ever exist, or 
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 By nation-state I mean a geographical space with defined borders within which live citizens 
that accept the rules and regulations required to live with others, rather than an alternate definition 
which is predicated on the ‘nation’ as representing a specific group, or ethnicity. The AOD (2004: 
852) suggests that the nation-state is “a sovereign state of which most of the citizens or subjects 
are united by factors such as language, common descent and suchlike which define a nation.” 
However it is Anderson’s (2006) Imagined Communities, and Gellner’s (2008) interpretation of 
the modern nation-state – resulting from the inculcation of ideas, mythologies, and customs – that 
I choose to valorise. This civic ideal of nation is a legally and constitutionally defined entity rather 
than an ethnic one (Fenton 2008: 109). 
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continue to exist, is a moot point.
103
 Because the original “can be simulated, 
copied, transferred, transformed, made into a simulacrum and so on: the ‘original’ 
is never finished or complete in itself” (Rutherford 1990: 210). Under this rubric, 
not only does culture evolve, but it also revolves, by which I mean that while two 
or more groups may claim to be observing a particular cultural practice, its to and 
fro exchange can make it more accessible, which would further undermine its 
essentialism.
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 Bhabha affirms: 
...then we see that all forms of culture are continually in a process of hybridity… 
But for me the importance of hybridity is not to be able to trace two original 
moments from which the third emerges, rather hybridity to me is the ‘third space’ 
which enables other positions to emerge (Rutherford 1990: 211). 
 
 Thus when two or more cultures find themselves in an integrative 
embrace, it is the trajectory of the ‘third space’ that determines how that embrace 
will evolve. In Bhabha’s opinion, what takes place is that the ‘third space’ 
“displaces the histories that constitute it, and sets up new structures of authority, 
new political initiatives, which are inadequately understood through received 
wisdom” (p. 211). What Bhabha (1994: 39) does concede for the ‘third space’ 
abstraction is that by any exploration of the ‘third space’ we “may elude the 
politics of polarity and emerge as the others of ourselves” – a position of some 
significance for understanding the sociocultural consequences of resettling diverse 
groups of people in new locales. Mutual cultural exchanges (transculturation) are 
facilitated where the notion of the ‘third space’ exists, because the ‘originary’ is 
under challenge or renegotiation. 
  
Other Discourses of Cultural Exchange 
While the Definition of Terms in Chapter 1 outlines the concepts presented below, 
a review and opening-out of the terms – as they relate to the above analysis of the 
concept ‘transculturation’– is warranted. Here I have demonstrated the reasons 
why the Ortiz / Malinowski cultural neologism is relevant in an understanding of 
the sociocultural changes that have occurred in various ‘contact zones’. I intend to 
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 What is important is Bhabha’s (1994: 37) contention that though the ‘third space’ is 
unrepresentable in itself it “constitutes the discursive conditions of enunciation that ensure that the 
meaning and symbols of culture have no primordial unity or fixity; that even the same signs can be 
appropriated, translated, rehistoricized and read anew.” 
104
 An example might be the use of the bowler hat. On the streets of London it was once a fashion 
accessory that has long been displaced from common usage. While true that some individuals wear 
it to define their status in the business or banking world, their behaviour could be regarded as 
aberrant. In the Andean states the bowler continues to be worn by Quechua and Aymara rural 
women. The same cultural practice (hat-wearing) has transcended ethnicity, class and gender – 
undermining the notion of primordial fixity alluded to in the previous footnote. 
 111 
utilise the term despite some academic discourse that raises, critiques, and in some 
cases dismisses ‘transculturation’ as less than relevant. As Trigo (2000: 85-86) 
bluntly puts it: “In a word, transculturation’s popularity is based on its caducity. 
Such a worn-out and nostalgic use is aided by the term’s rich allusiveness… 
transculturation continues to be a theory of the 70s… a surrogate hegemony” in 
the employ of mestizaje ideologies. Such criticism raises the spectre of 
misinterpretation of the concept ‘transculturation’ as I intend to use it; therefore it 
might be useful to proffer a counter-discourse – one that underscores why 
‘transculturation’ better reflects the cultural changes that my fieldwork revealed. 
 The following are three concepts I shall use to illustrate what 
‘transculturation’ is not. (1) The ‘acculturation’ (or ‘melting pot’) model – 
incorporating the twin concepts acculturation and assimilation – which while also 
being an integrative force akin to transculturation, differs from it in application. 
Transculturation envisages a mutual cultural exchange while acculturation 
involves an asymmetric cultural exchange. (2) ‘Multiculturalism’, a concept in 
which diverse others live separate, but tolerated existences in one another’s orbits, 
has the potential for cultural interchange, but also the potential for reification of 
ethnocultural identity. (3) ‘Postethnicity’ and / or an ancillary experience, namely 
‘cosmopolitanism’, a state of being in which the limitations of ethnic identity are 
(in theory) able to be transcended. 
 
The Acculturation Model 
The metaphor ‘melting pot’ – coined to reflect an imagined homogenisation 
among a heterogeneous immigrant population in the United States – has been 
discredited in recent years, and especially so since the ‘ethnic revival’ of the 
1960s and 1970s.
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 Its demise transpired when the wishful thinking of some 
(Crèvecouer, Zangwill, Emerson, and Weber) that ethnic groups would diminish 
in importance or eventually disappear failed to materialise (Eriksen 2010: 25). An 
empirical flaw with the ‘melting pot’ model rested with the racist assumption that 
Native Americans, African-Americans and Asian-Americans were elided from the 
‘melting pot’ imagination – it being consonant with white (European) America. 
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 Glazer and Moynihan (1975: 288) suggest that the notion of the ‘melting pot’ is as old as the 
Republic itself. But in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, with an accelerated and 
diverse immigration, the term gained added salience. The fusion of a heterogeneous group of 
immigrants to create a ‘new American man’ “was an idea close to the heart of the American self-
image,” and yet in reality this has not materialised. One reason for the failure to ‘melt’ is that the 
project was premised on a foundation of inequality. Nativist attitudes imagined that one group (the 
WASP) was to be the sociocultural model for the state. 
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Yet some ‘melting’ did occur. Most groups gave up their languages, for a national 
one, the values of the dominant group came to represent the values of the many, 
cuisines altered to reflect the immigrant diversity, and a sense of nationhood 
emerged from a heterogeneous (though skewed) immigration. 
 In an age of mass communication and the rapid expansion of diverse 
migration streams the discrediting of the ‘melting pot’ might appear to diminish 
its relevance to other aeons. Yet one has not far to look so see former ‘melting 
pot’ realities in a pre-globalisation / migration age (China, England, France, 
Germany). An Englishman cannot tell what part of his DNA reflects former 
immigrations from Saxony, Jutland, Norway, or Normandy. Similarly Germans 
rarely reflect on their Celtic, Slavic, or Huguenot (French) ethnic components. 
Thus former ethnocultural groups were subsumed, and disappeared, with the 
formation of new ethnocultural identities. The ‘melting pot’ nature of these 
societies may be attributed to two related processes – acculturation and 
assimilation – which are in effect premised on the will of the dominant group at 
any given time.   
 According to the AOD (2004: 9) ‘acculturation’ is “the adaptation to, or 
adoption of, a different culture.” The DREC (2003: 1-2) is rather ambivalent as to 
the meaning; on the one hand it suggests that “the term ‘acculturation’ indicates 
that processes of transformation and adaptation which takes place when two or 
more groups…enter into relations with one another.”106 At a further level it 
suggests that ‘acculturation’ results from a conflict between different cultures, 
which may result from migrations, and / or the globalisation phenomena 
facilitated by mass communication. The acquisition of a new culture or cultural 
traits by an individual or group may occur asymmetrically or reciprocally. 
‘Reciprocal acculturation’ refers to a bi-directional cultural transfer, rather in the 
vein of ‘transculturation’ as imagined by Ortiz. This give-and-take phenomenon 
contrasts with ‘asymmetrical acculturation’ a process in which a ‘superior’ and 
‘inferior’ culture interact, rather in the manner of the dominant / subordinate 
paradigm in the colonial context.   
 Teske and Nelson (1974) after raising the issue of ‘direction’ of cultural 
flows, once contact between two or more groups has been made, set great store by 
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 In this sense there is no cognisance that the process be one of mutuality as imagined in the 
transculturation process. In the case of the England and Germany, it is not that cultural features of 
various defeated, and incorporated peoples are absent from the body politic, but rather that it was 
the dominant group who decided to incorporate what. 
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the issue of ‘dominance’ in that contact milieu. They differentiate between the 
individual and group in the determining of degree and direction of acculturative 
processes. Political dominance, in which one cultural group is in a position of 
power, or normative dominance, in which a process of acquiescence places one 
group in a position of superiority, have similar outcomes – asymmetrical cultural 
exchanges. In the acquiescence exemplar, they suggest, the condition of 
dominance is not contingent upon a state of numerical superiority.
107
 The degree 
and direction of acculturation for the individual was also contingent upon which 
cultural group was the dominant group (pp. 354-355). In summary Teske and 
Nelson assert that several salient characteristics may be attributed to the 
acculturation phenomenon, the principal one being that it is a process, and not an 
end result. As well as the issue of dominance they also posit that acculturation is 
not necessarily contingent on positive orientations existing between ‘out-groups’ 
and the acculturating ‘in groups’ (p. 358). 
 Assimilation is “the acceptance by indigenous and immigrant minorities of 
prevailing cultural values” – of a dominant host or immigrant community one 
supposes – and / or “the integration of such minorities into a society” (AOD 2004: 
73). How this is supposed to occur is fraught with contradictions. Assimilation 
assumes a unidirectional process of inclusion into a dominant society. I suggest 
that ‘dominant’ rather than ‘host’ society has more traction. For example, the 
weaker, though numerically superior Aboriginal Australian cultures did not 
assimilate the numerically inferior European settlers.
108
 Power relations rather 
than numerical realities dictated the assimilation process. Thus, ‘integration’, or 
‘assimilation’ – the acceptance of prevailing cultural values – in the mode of the 
‘melting pot’ would appear to be more dependent upon asymmetrical cultural 
exchanges, an antithesis of what the process of transculturation represents. 
 ‘Assimilation’ and ‘acculturation’, suggest Teske and Nelson (1974), are 
distinctly separate processes. While acknowledging that these processes may be 
interrelated, they deny the interdependence of the two concepts. They also deny 
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 The imperial project well illustrates both the political and acquiescence models of dominance. 
England, Holland, and Spain held onto most colonial possessions with token bureaucratic forces. 
Cultural dominance in the Philippines for example hinged on political domination in the first 
instance, followed by the acquiescence of those who felt that their best interests lay in further 
acculturation. 
108
 The reversal of the numerical dominance – as a consequence of the mid-nineteenth century 
Australian gold rushes – made no difference to the Aboriginal / European assimilation paradigm. 
Aboriginal, European and Asian ethnic groups essentially maintained separate multicultural 
existences, whatever their numerical strengths.  
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that assimilation can be conceived of as the end result of the acculturation process, 
although I take issue with this notion. In my opinion an acculturative process 
would need to take place for an individual to become assimilated into a new 
society, but let us hear Teske and Nelson’s testament. 
 The first stipulation they make is that assimilation needs to take 
cognisance of, and requires acceptance by the out-group. Whatever cultural 
baggage migrants continue to mind, to be assimilated they need to undergo “a 
process in which persons and groups acquire memories, sentiments, and attitudes 
of other persons or groups; and by sharing in their experience and history, are 
incorporated with them in a common cultural life” (p. 359).109 To have a role in a 
new community presupposes acceptance by that community, although interaction 
with a community may occur even without being accepted. Furthermore, 
exclusion from a community does not preclude the process of acculturation 
occurring (p. 359). To demonstrate the interdependence of acculturation and 
assimilation (as well as their dissimilarities) Teske and Nelson cite the example of 
the Eurasian Anglo-Indian community (p. 364). As a group they were highly 
acculturated in terms of British culture, yet were denied assimilation into the 
British community. 
 Assimilation has been further described as “…a precise political strategy 
which intends to keep the national community as homogenous as possible by 
endeavouring to ensure that the same basic values are shared by the whole 
population” (DREC 2003: 19). Whether the cultural homogeneity à la England, or 
Sweden that evolved in a past, more isolated world, is achievable in a globalised 
world is a moot point. The imagined ‘melding’ (or homogenisation) of 
ethnocultural differences in the United States was premised not on a reciprocal 
exchange of cultural values between ‘equals’ but at times in a climate of 
xenophobia (Waters 1990, Steinberg 2001).
110
 Those newly arrived would 
integrate into their new domicile by being assimilated (via an asymmetrical 
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 To give an example, Teske and Nelson (1974: 359) suggest that “in the United States an 
immigrant is considered assimilated as soon as he has acquired the language and social ritual of 
the native community and can participate, without encountering prejudice, in the common life, 
economic and political.”  
110
 Waters (1990) well illustrates how different waves of immigrants to the U.S. were despised. 
Italians, Poles, Slavs faced prejudice in employment and education, and following WW1 Asian 
immigration was halted. When Harvard President Lowell attempted to impose quotas to Jewish 
admissions in the 1920s, he used cultural particularism in his defence to deflect public reaction. “It 
is the duty of Harvard to receive just as many boys who have come… to this country without our 
[WASP] background as we can effectively educate; including in education the imparting, not only 
of book knowledge, but of the ideas and traditions of our people” Steinberg (2001: 241).  
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acculturation) into the WASP (white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant) United States host 
culture; and this in spite of their Catholicism, Jewishness and / or Italian, Polish or 
German ethnic heritages.
111
 Impacting upon the assimilational model were 
degrees of ethnocultural difference. For example, although Germans immigrants 
were white they were not monolithic, being divided by faith: Catholic, Protestant, 
Jewish. The English, Irish and Scottish might also be divided along confessional 
lines. 
 There is / was no blueprint to guide the imagined ‘melting pot’ process. 
The perceived differences in ‘civilisational development’ between peoples played 
an important role in determining what cultural interchange would take place in a 
diverse range of ‘contact zones’. The degree of change required to reach a 
‘melting pot’ modus vivendi may be more traumatic for some than others. 
Economic and class disparities aside, it is in situations in which one party 
perceives they are ‘civilisationally dominant’ (for example the metropole 
colonialist, white Euro-American, and often the migrant-settler) where decisions 
can be made to excuse oneself from exchanging culture with those one deems 
inferior.
112
 That is not to say that the indigene or migrant will forever be in an 
inferior cultural position vis-à-vis the dominant party. Yet it may take many 
generations, or centuries before race and class structures are modified enough for 
intercultural dialogue, and intermarriage to be validated. 
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 Becoming an American citizen meant the dilution or discarding of former cultural values and 
the acquiring of new ways, especially that of learning the English language, the primary, though 
not only, glue that held this ‘melting pot’ together. In essence it was imagined that this 
acculturation would be a one-way process, the new arrivals would adopt the ways of the already 
established ‘older’ European culture, that of the English-speaking. Whether the immigrants 
collectively outnumbered the dominant WASP culture was irrelevant; the single determinant, 
language, not only reinforced the status quo, but contributed greatly to the ‘melting pot’ mentality.  
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  ‘Civilisationally dominant’ comes across as both a biased and manipulative concept. In a 
former age of racial hierarchy in which white Europeans saw themselves – and regarded their 
cultural achievements – as having reached a civilisational apogee, it might be imagined that any 
intercultural encounter would advantage those deeming themselves to have reached that state. In 
the twenty-first century – post-slavery, post-National Socialism, and postcolonial – it might be 
imagined that an attitudinal change would have occurred. And yet, I posit that while the reviled 
rhetoric that underpinned those former zeitgeists has been submerged in an environment of 
political correctness, the reality of ‘civilisational dominance’ remains. Thus, the lowland Christian 
settler in the Philippines, the Javanese transmigrant to Papua, and the Euro-American migrant to 
wherever will assume that it will be the Animist or ‘other’ – among whom he now resides – who 
will be expected to make the cultural sacrifices. The ‘Pilgrim Fathers’ in America, just as the 
Spanish in the Archipelago, did not integrate into the societies they encountered; the reverse was 
the reality. The modern transmigrant (or migrant-settler on the world stage) continues to be 
confronted with the difficulty of deciding how to integrate into his new society. It is possible that 
increased economic equality, educational opportunity, and ‘class unconsciousness’ will gradually 
diminish the gap between the ‘civilisationally dominant’ and those they perceive to be less so, but 
in the meantime, I suggest, the differences will impact negatively on the potential for a mutual 
cultural exchange, as imagined possible under an Ortizian transculturational paradigm. 
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 In Beyond the Melting Pot, Glazer and Moynihan’s (1970) discourse on 
the continuance of ethnic diversity in New York City, the resilience of ethnic 
identities becomes evident. While acknowledging the non-materialisation of a 
‘smelted’ American man, they add the rider that the national project has 
progressed despite manifest ethnic divisions. They suggest: “Religion and race 
define the next stage in the evolution of the American peoples. But the American 
nationality is still forming: its processes are mysterious, and its final form, if there 
is ever to be a final form is as yet unknown” (p. viii). 
 If the ‘melting pot’ acculturation model of integration is an antithesis of 
the ‘transculturation’ model, so too is that of ‘multiculturalism’. 
 
Multiculturalism 
The AOD (2004: 839) suggests that multiculturalism denotes both “the existence 
of many distinct groups within a society… [and / or] a theory or policy supporting 
this.” A multicultural society then is “characterised by cultural pluralism… As an 
ideal, multiculturalism celebrates cultural variety (for example linguistic and 
religious diversity), and may be contrasted with the assimilationist ideal assumed 
in many early studies of race, ethnicity and immigration” (Scott and Marshall 
2005: 493). While the assimilationist model of society has been metaphorised as 
the ‘melting pot’, multiculturalism may be regarded as a ‘mosaic’ or ‘salad bowl’ 
version of society in which individuals and groups maintain their enculturated 
positions, in the face of others, and society at large (Jaidka 2010: 2). This does not 
reflect whether equality necessarily exists between groups – as imagined in 
Sweden or Switzerland (before recent immigrations) – or whether one group 
remains dominant as in Australia, England, and the United States. 
 As a corollary to an increasingly globalised and migratory world, 
multiculturalism is a term that has become established to address a sociocultural 
way forward; one that aims to encompass, rather than exclude the Other. That is 
not to say that past political structures were ever monocultural, rather the opposite 
was true.
113
 Modern nation-states, however, in the process of inculcating a ‘civic 
identity’, increasingly try to avoid treating citizens unequally, the result of which 
                                                 
113
 Austria, Britain, Canada, and France have historically been multicultural states, despite the 
recent protestations by right-wing groups to the contrary. For centuries France has accommodated 
the ethnic Bretons in the west and ethnic Germans in the east (Alsace), and the Basques in the 
south. Britain has encompassed the Irish, Manx, Scots, and Welsh among others. Austria-Hungary 
was possibly one of the most diverse polities prior to 1918, while Canada, aside from the First 
Nations, supported two European cultural traditions. 
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is a revaluation of dominance. The DREC (2003: 184) posits that the term 
multiculturalism is “generally used with reference to those societies, or segments 
of societies, in which – for political, economic, or social reasons – groups of 
different cultures, originally formed independently of each other owing to 
historical or geographical factors, have come to cohabit.” In essence then 
multiculturalism may be viewed as a possible sociocultural manifestation of 
polyethnicity.  
 In the sense that multicultural policies have been promulgated to create a 
less fraught integration into a wider society and create more level ethnocultural 
playing fields, the term multicultural might be viewed as value-free. However it is 
the implementation of policies that in theory aim to preserve and promote cultural 
diversity where some evolving multiethnic or rather multicultural societies have 
difficulty in juggling the theoretical with the practical aspects of multiculturalism. 
In some cases policies meant to advance tolerance and integration may not be 
discerned as such by all. The DREC (2003: 184) suggests that “there is a danger 
that such policies could in fact prove an obstacle to true multiculturalism and 
integration, as the cultural fabric may become woven in such a way that different 
groups and cultures do not truly interact with each other, possibly depriving some 
groups of social mobility.” 
 In theory, tolerating ethnocultural difference in society is assumed to 
advance social harmony, yet recent debates in locales as diverse as Australia, 
Egypt, and the United States demonstrate that the discourse of the imagined 
democracy of multiculturalism often fails to reflect the lived reality. Speaking for 
the United States, Eller (2009: 146) cites a single institution (education) as 
representing a zone of contention in which the democracy of difference is 
challenged. The multiculturalist charge that the educational curriculum reflected a 
Eurocentric bias has not yet been resolved. The anti-multiculturalists – fearing the 
diminution of Platonic and Shakespearian contributions to the educational canon – 
couch their reaction in tropes of angst: ‘the end of American civilisation’, or a 
‘disuniting of America’. The ensuing ‘culture wars’, or as Huntington (2005) 
attests, the reaction to the perceived challenge to the core culture, draws attention 
to the fact that the multiculturalist rhetoric and imagining fails to resonate among 
many, especially among the core culture.
114
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 In Who Are We?: Challenges to America’s National Identity, Huntington (2005) makes no 
secret of the fact that multiculturalism is something that should be feared and resisted. The 
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 A further example of the disparagement of multiculturalism has occurred 
in Australia, where a former Minister for Immigration and Citizenship mandated a 
reduction in the arrivals of Sudanese refugees on the basis that they had not 
successfully embraced the Australian ‘way of life’ (Jacobs 2011: 47). He adds that 
the former Prime Minister of Australia had condemned multiculturalism for 
promoting a ‘federation of cultures’ – a reality that many nation-states in a 
postcolonial era need to take cognisance of. Jayasuriya (cited Jacobs 2011: 50) 
posits that one of the reasons for “the loss of confidence in multiculturalism stems 
from… the ‘paradox of pluralism’, wherein the expectation of treating people 
equally is incompatible with the demand of some groups to maintain separate 
forms of identity... the celebration of difference, of culture and ethnic identity, sits 
uneasily alongside the universalism promoted by common citizenship.” 
 I cite the above examples to demonstrate that multiculturalism is the 
antithesis of the Ortizian transculturation paradigm. Unlike transculturation, 
which Ortiz deemed was a process of converging cultures or ‘ethnoconvergence’, 
multiculturalism in essence reflects an imagined stasis that precludes an 
ethnogenesis as occasioned in, for example, a Malta, or an England (before the 
current wave of immigrants). And yet the intersecting processes of migration, 
modernity, and globalisation continue apace. While Papastergiadis (2007: 167) 
acknowledges that the process of modernity encompasses the moral dilemma of 
cultural difference, he also recognises that “the complexity of radical difference 
has also revealed that we lack a general theory of culture.” And it is in this context 
that Slavoj Zizek (cited Papastergiadis 2007: 157) makes the bold claim that 
“multiculturalism reduces the sign of cultural difference to a spectacle that 
satisfies the liberal gaze.” 
 
Cosmopolitanism 
Cosmopolitanism may be understood as “a concept which considers all human 
beings to be the citizens of one nation, implying a spirit of universal fellowship 
which goes beyond differences in nationality” (DREC 2003: 50); in essence 
imagining a transcendence of national limitations and prejudices. While in theory 
cosmopolitanism is a mitigator of what Paul Gilroy (2005: 11) terms ‘absolute 
                                                                                                                                     
American state in his eyes is premised on the arrival of the Pilgrim Fathers and those Anglo-
Americans that followed. The Spaniards who had been in the region for a century previously 
(Florida), the First Nations, or fusions thereof (the Hispanic) are in Huntington’s opinion to be 
challenging the ‘natural order’ of things. 
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ethnicity’, it differs from transculturation in a holistic sense. Transculturation 
imagines an exchange of cultural baggage (possibly a precursor to the formation 
of a new ethnic identity – ethnogenesis), while cosmopolitanism imagines the 
maintenance of existing ethnocultural identities, albeit with the essentialist 
elements of those identities diffused. Whereas the cosmopolitan may imbibe 
aspects of other cultures, he nevertheless remains aloof from aligning strongly 
with any particular ethnic identity. The transculturant, whether he feels strongly 
about his ascribed ethnic identity or not, nonetheless subscribes to a particular 
identity, even if it is one that is evolving (ethnogenesis) from the one he once 
ascribed to. 
 In essence it is ‘degree of estrangement’ that is problematical for the 
cosmopolitanism-transculturation dichotomy. Unlike the transculturant who 
moves through and around cultural certainties, the cosmopolitan has the luxury to 
determine how much of his own culture and history he is willing to valorise. As a 
socially mobile and relatively affluent individual, he may also determine how 
tolerant he will be, and what aspects of other cultures he will acknowledge.  
 If as Max Boehm (cited Jaidka 2010: 5) suggests, cosmopolitanism is “a 
mental attitude prompting the individual to substitute for his attachments to his 
more immediate homeland an analogous relationship towards the whole world, 
which he comes to regard as a greater and higher fatherland” then he differs from 
the transculturant in the degree of agency that allows him to make that value-
judgement. In that regard it could be argued that a cosmopolitan does not put high 
regard on the minutiae of what it means to belong to this or that ethnicity or 
culture group. Unlike the transethnic, who may feel strongly about aspects of his 
lived culture, the cosmopolitan is comfortable in various cultural milieux. 
Cosmopolitanism then is “a doctrine that advocates the transcendence of parochial 
and narrow nationalistic considerations for the sake of the larger interests of 
mankind” (p. 5). 
 Gilroy (2005: 67) makes a further suggestion that cosmopolitanism is an 
analogous, worthy alternative to the notion of the multiculturalism, though it 
could be argued that while the “cosmopolitan attachment finds civic and ethical 
value in the process of otherness”, the multiculturalism model was premised on 
the maintenance of flanking identities. Gilroy intimates that individual-agency 
induced cosmopolitanism has the potential to meet the expectations that 
multiculturalism failed to achieve. “Recalibrating approaches to culture and 
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identity so that they are less easily reified and consequently less amenable to these 
misappropriations seems a worthwhile short-term ambition that is compatible with 
the long-term aims of a reworked and politicized multiculturalism” (p. 5-6).115 As 
Hannerz (1990: 240) observes: 
The cosmopolitan’s surrender to the alien culture implies personal autonomy vis-
à-vis the culture where he originated. He has his obvious competence with regard 
to it, but he can choose to disengage with it. He possesses it, it does not possess 
him. In the long term, this is likely to be the way a cosmopolitan constructs his 
own unique personal perspective out of an idiosyncratic collection of 
experiences. 
  
 The transculturant conversely is less likely to be able to disengage from 
his cultural surroundings. As a migrant he may be deterritorialised in the sense 
that he has left behind a familiar lifeworld. He may relocate his cultural baggage, 
but in the company of diverse ethnocultural neighbours he will / may not be in a 
position to unpack all that baggage, and thus his mutual exchange of cultural 
attributes (transculturation) – or in some instances where a dominant culture 
exists, his asymmetrical acculturation – will proceed. 
 
Transculturation in the Context of this Thesis 
My interpretation of transculturation is that it is a multifaceted concept whereby 
individuals and groups exchange, appropriate or reject the cultural practices and 
values of those amongst whom they live – groups belonging to ethnocultural 
cohorts dissimilar from themselves.
116
 The process of cultural exchange may be 
deliberate (as in the case of language inculcation or religious conversion) or 
inadvertent (as in the case of dietary reorientation or altered musicality). Whether 
deliberate or inadvertent, some aspects of the process may be discernible within a 
lifetime, while others may rely on generational change. Some cultural aspects 
translate readily across cultures – witness the legacy of Portuguese musical 
influence in parts of the Archipelago (Indonesia and Malaysia) despite the several 
centuries that the Portuguese have been displaced – while others (such as the 
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 Gilroy (2005: 67) I sense, is not writing-off the state-supported notion of multiculturalism, but 
rather acknowledging its limitations in view of its politicisation when he states that “(t)he 
challenge of being in the same present, of synchronizing difference and articulating cosmopolitan 
hope upward from below rather than imposing it downward from on high provides some help in 
seeing how we might invent conceptions of humanity that allow for the presumption of equal 
value and go beyond the issue of tolerance into a more active engagement with the irreducible 
value of diversity within sameness.” 
116
 While I acknowledge that no ethnicity or culture remains in a state of stasis, the migrant 
experience has the effect of fast-tracking cultural change, which can be accommodated or rejected, 
depending on the perception or reality of those who feel they are being expected to modify their 
cultural lifeways. 
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failure of the chilli to gain wide appreciation in the Philippines) fail to make an 
impression.
117
 No matter what the momentum of cultural exchange, its outcome is 
never a completed project; its trajectory is uncertain, unknowable. 
 Although circumstances and the degree (and momentum) of change 
challenge existing ethnic identity certainties, the potential exists for everyone to 
modify some cultural practices without losing at least the symbolism of their 
ethnocultural identity. However, in situations where the perception (or reality) is 
that one party feels they are making all the compromises in the cultural exchange 
process, a reaction, involving the rejection of unlike cultural baggage may result. 
Reification of the known does not hinge on degree of difference per se, but may 
be complicated by economic or political advantageousness. What is of more 
salience to the reification paradigm, I suggest, is the degree of diversity in any 
given zone of cultural exchange, whether there are two or many groups, or 
whether one group is advantaged by being numerically dominant. 
 The diminution of a given ethnocultural identity need not be a moment for 
hand-wringing; after all, ethnocultural identities have always been amenable to 
change (albeit manageable change) – their stasis questionable.118 What has 
changed is the measure – as a consequence of migrancy in a globalised world – of 
necessary intercultural contact. Whether the diversity of ethnic identities is 
sustainable is questionable. While multiculturalism – as imagined by some – is an 
egalitarian attempt to cushion the disappointment of having to live among diverse 
ethnocultural groups, transculturation offers an alternative possibility for 
coexistence. Inherent in the transculturative process may be a sense of loss, but 
the contrapuntal notion of gain is often underestimated. In a globalised world it 
appears that the sense of loss seems to outweigh any sense of cultural gain. This, I 
suggest, hinges on the asymmetrical nature of cultural exchange in the ‘contact 
zone’, a development that may be typical, but not mandatory. 
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 Zialcita (2006: 239-242) makes the case that although the Manila-Acapulco galleon trade 
introduced Asia to numerous American products and cultural practices, the uptake of these was 
sporadic. The chilli is one example of how there were regional variations in those uptakes. It 
transited the Philippines to become important in Indonesian and Korean cuisines, but remained 
peripheral to Filipino cuisines, and abhorred by the Japanese. 
118
 The development of Balinese dance is a case in point. While there may be elements of the arts 
steeped in antiquity, outside influences have been able to subtly or strongly influence such arts in 
many societies. The Balinese Kecak Dance exemplifies the cultural fusions that can occur when 
cultures collide. The Kecak is a symbiosis of what Europeans (such as Walter Spies) in the 1930s 
imagined dance might be, fused onto the Balinese lived reality. In this context it is difficult to 
separate those aspects of the arts of Bali that are purely Balinese, purely European or a 
transculturated form of both. 
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 The alternative transculturation paradigm – one which may be perceived 
as a process of cultural compromise in which the migrant / transmigrant 
experiences changes to previous ethnocultural / ethnolinguistic certainties – offers 
a way forward that validates change as gain rather than loss. Transculturation that 
is, envisages the evolving of altered identities as a consequence of the 
intercultural interaction of diverse ethnocultural groups, with the proviso that such 
identities not be regarded negatively. As a facilitator of harmonious integration 
into new societies the embrace of other cultural worldviews is dependent upon 
situational variables (degree of difference, social and economic security, 
numerical dominance and so forth) and the resolve of individual agency. It is the 
Ortizian concept of transculturation, one incorporating the notion of mutual 
cultural exchange, which I choose to apply as a theoretical model to justify why 
some migrant / transmigrant experiences have had positive outcomes while others 
have engendered tribulation. 
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MAP 3 – THE PHILIPPINES: POPULATION DENSITY 
 
 Source: Google Image / <http://alturl.com/f3kyx>  
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MAP 4 – THE PHILIPPINES: ETHNOLINGUISTIC DIVERSITY 
 
 Source: Google Image / <http://alturl.com/urwvx> 
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CHAPTER IV – TRANSMIGRATON IN CONTEXT 
 
The aim of this chapter is to foreground the concept of ‘transmigration’ and locate 
its relevance to the previous discussion of the concept of ‘transculturation’. 
Transculturation only becomes meaningful when people of diverse ethnocultural 
backgrounds come into contact as a consequence of migration. After defining 
what is meant by the term ‘transmigration’ I explain the rationale for its existence, 
the history and trajectory of its development, the objectives of various state-
sponsored resettlement programs, and the social reality that ensued from the 
implementation of those schemes. To better position the Narra / Palawan 
resettlement experience I draw on the transmigration phenomenon as it has 
impacted on a national Filipino level and a broader archipelagic level. While state 
planners imagined the socio-economic benefits of transmigration, they were less 
able to foresee its sociocultural ramifications. The chapter will conclude with the 
contrasting of the apparent positive outcome of Narra as a zone of intercultural 
accommodation when juxtaposed with the ethnocultural violence that has ensued 
as a consequence of resettlement initiatives in Mindanao and other archipelagic 
locales. 
 Transmigration (or intrastate rural resettlement) became a phenomenon of 
some salience to Southeast Asia in the twentieth century.
119
 This migration 
process contributed to a reality in which a heterogeneity of ethnocultural groups – 
sharing the same spatial setting, facing similar resettlement experiences – have 
had to acknowledge the different lifeworlds of their neighbours. The extent of 
Filipino polyethnicity coalescing with the inclusive nature of the former state-
sponsored resettlement projects, led to the development of liminal intercultural 
meeting-places. However, migration theory reveals to us that different social 
interaction trajectories are possible. At one end of the spectrum would be the 
rejection of interaction with others, and reification of lived cultures; at the other 
end an embrace of others’ cultures, by either the impacts of acculturation or 
transculturation. For the millions across the Archipelago who have experienced 
transmigration, the hurdle of interethnic coexistence in new domains has not 
proved insurmountable. However, not all resettlement has proceeded as 
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 Rural resettlement in Southeast Asia – in contrast to the general urbanisation taking place 
during the same period – has been a feature of states re-ordering their postcolonial socio-economic 
realities. While rural-to-rural population movements had been attempted during the late imperial 
period, the zenith of rural resettlement (transmigration) was achieved following independence. 
Including the Philippines, the process has involved many millions of migrants in Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam.  
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anticipated. The aspirations of state planners have not gone unchallenged in both 
the Philippines and the wider resettlement world. 
 
Defining Transmigration 
In this thesis transmigration is the inter-provincial, inter-island migration of 
people from more densely populated areas of the nation to areas of less density. 
The underlying rationale for this people transfer is the amelioration of socio-
economic deprivation. Primarily the process envisioned the rural-to-rural 
resettlement of the landless (Huke 1963, Krinks 1974, Fernandez 1975, Hardjono 
1978a, James 1979, Uhlig 1984a, Gondowarsito 1986, Tirtosudarmo 1997, Bahrin 
1988b) though the vision has widened to include a general internal movement of 
peoples to less populated areas where socio-economic opportunities are premised 
on more than a general landlessness. This internal rural-to-rural migration should 
not be confused with a paralleling rural-to-urban migration and the increasing 
phenomenon of external migration.
120
 
 ‘Migration theory,’ according to the DREC (2003: 178), is generally 
concerned with the political and economic push / pull factors that influence the 
movement of peoples. Meanwhile, the broader social ramifications of those 
movements: alienation, marginalisation, discrimination, social exclusion, and 
adaptation have the capacity to impact upon the identity of the individual. The 
DREC suggests that “the word ‘migration’ is derived from the Latin word 
migratio, which means to move, to wander… [and] pertains to individual 
mobility… is purposeful and instrumental” (p. 178). As well as taking place 
across state boundaries (external or international migration) migration also occurs 
within the boundaries of a state (internal migration), but whatever the model there 
are repercussions for individuals and societies:  
Receiving regions will experience the establishment of ‘new’ ethnic minorities, 
ethnic tensions, and problems of social cohesion. On the individual level, moving 
from one’s home town or village means being cut off from social networks, 
associations and social structure… Changes of this kind occasioned by migration 
will inevitably affect migrant identities… (p. 178). 
 
 The AOD (2004: 1369) states that the prefix ‘trans’ may be employed to 
denote: (1) the notion of ‘across or beyond’, and (2) the circumstance ‘on or to the 
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 The Philippines (and increasingly Indonesia) are cases in point. The resettlement across the 
Archipelago of millions of rural-to-rural transmigrants has not daunted two further migration 
patterns; that of the rural-to-urban migrant, and the outflow of international migrant-labour, which 
in combination have possibly encompassed numbers of the magnitude of 10-1 vis-à-vis the 
internal transmigrant movements. 
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other side of’. When juxtaposed with the term ‘migration’ the concept ‘trans-
migration’– signifying a movement of peoples across or to the other side of a 
country, namely an internal migration – is forged. The term ‘transmigration’ 
(transmigrasi) gained cachet when used in the Indonesian resettlement context, 
and best represents what I deem to be analogous population movements in the 
Philippine context. The sense in which I use ‘trans-migration’ is to imply a 
general rural-to-rural movement of peoples across the country. Despite the 
abandonment of most state-sponsored resettlement initiatives, intrastate migration 
to settlement zones such as Palawan – albeit spontaneous in nature – continues.121 
Increasingly, as the ‘frontier’ becomes more settled agriculturally, ongoing 
migration becomes less dependent on rural pursuits, and more dependent on 
tertiary pursuits: commerce, education and the bureaucracy. 
 Throughout the Archipelago and across time the nomenclature to denote 
like processes has varied between administrations (colonial and independent) and 
with the era. In the Philippines the process has been known as ‘land colonisation’, 
‘new settlements’, and ‘resettlement’; in Malaysia as ‘land settlement’ and ‘land 
development’; in Indonesia as ‘land colonisation’ (during the Dutch era) and 
transmigrasi (transmigration) following Independence (Bahrin 1988a: 1). My 
intention to use the Indonesian term ‘transmigrasi / transmigration’ over 
alternatives is to avoid confusion.
122
 Though some interchangeable usage of the 
terms may occur, ‘transmigration’ is utilised to refer to the concept or overarching 
process of moving peoples across the nation-state, while the result of that process 
is the ‘resettlement’ of those people.123 
 In multiethnic societies such as the Philippines, the salience of internal 
migration is the role it plays in the necessary interaction between diverse 
ethnolinguistic, cultural, and religious groups, an interaction that necessitates a 
process of adjustment to new social realities. That is to say, transmigration is a 
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 The population of Palawan in general and Narra in particular has increased many-fold in recent 
generations and yet Palawan Province – despite this influx – continues to be the 79th least densely 
populated province out of 80 in the Philippines. This is possibly a factor in the continuing 
attraction of Palawan as a migrant destination.  
122
 It should be noted that in Indonesia the term ‘transmigrasi / transmigration’, denotes more than 
the concept and process of resettlement. It is also the nomenclature used to represent the state’s 
resettlement agency. In its various guises it has been a single Ministry of Transmigration, or has 
formed parts of other ministries. Currently, with its role much reduced, it forms part of the 
Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration. 
123
 Pre-WW2 resettlements in the U.S. administered Philippines were also termed ‘agricultural 
colonies’, while in the Dutch Indies the term ‘emigration’ was used interchangeably with [land] 
colonisation, not to be confused with the general condition of ‘colonisation’ or colonialism (after 
Pelzer 1945).  
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facilitating agent contributing to new realities in which the identity of individuals 
and groups, following departure from the security of their ethnic region-of-origin, 
is challenged. Once in the resettlement zone, individuals and groups employ 
various strategies to manage the adjustment required to share geographical spaces 
with others of differing ethnocultural worldviews. Cursorily stated these are: 
(1) the tolerance of other’s lifeworlds (rather in the sense of multiculturalism), 
(2) the embrace of other’s lifeworlds (rather in the sense of acculturation), and  
(3) the mutual adoption or adaptation of others’ cultural baggage (via the process 
of transculturation). The trajectory adopted has implications for identity 
determinedness; or rather the way in which identities in the resettlement milieu 
are renegotiated. The ramifications of these deliberations impacts on the way the 
polyethnic nation-state will be able to view itself in posterity.  
 The contention of state bureaucrats that the resettlement of the landless in 
peripheral, pioneer areas would benefit the state in various ways (Bahrin 1988, 
Campado 2005, Lea and Chaudhri 1983a, Oberai 1988a, Paderanga Jr. 1988) 
often failed to take cognisance of three factors. Firstly, the peripheral lands were 
not terra nullius (land belonging to no-one). Secondly, when the land was already 
in occupation by others, those others and the transmigrants might be culturally 
incompatible. Thirdly, the ethnolinguistic or ethnocultural diversity of the 
transmigrants themselves might prove to be an obstacle to resettlement success 
and stability. Manila or Jakarta (in the case of Indonesia) initiated programs that 
also failed to be mindful of the disconnect between cosmopolitan and rural 
realities; rurality after all implies conservatism, fixed worldviews and in some 
instances mutual suspicion.
124
 
 Transmigration – in both the colonial and postcolonial state (Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and the Philippines) – began as a state-initiated enterprise. It was the 
state that encouraged and sponsored resettlement programs, dictating their 
location and scope. While in the intervening years the phenomenon of the 
spontaneous or self-funded migrant came to outnumber the state-funded migrant, 
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 In his chapter ‘Toward a community broader than the kin’ Zialcita (2006) well illustrates that 
the rural reality – rather than being one in which the spirit of bayanihan (mutual cooperation) 
exudes to encompass a rural idyll – is often predicated on mutual suspicion. While 
interconnectedness with a wider world is eroding isolation “…suspiciousness toward outsiders, 
even of the same ethnicity and language…” is a widespread phenomenon. He states: When I 
would mention wanting to visit, say, another hamlet a few kilometres down the road, friends 
would warn me that it harboured sorcerers [mannamay]. However, in that hamlet-down-the-road, 
friends there would be concerned that I had been staying in that hamlet-up-the-road. They feared it 
for its sorcerers!” (p. 37). 
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the significance of the state schemes – which acted as catalysts for subsequent 
spontaneous migration – should not be overlooked. Spontaneous migration in 
some instances aggravated the integrative process on the resettlement frontier 
(Crystal 1982, Krinks 1975, Lopez 1986, Sage 1996, Wertheim 1959). In the 
absence of state supervision, amicable indigene-transmigrant relations at times 
deteriorated. Nonetheless, processes of integration and accommodation have taken 
place, though there have been differential degrees of success when viewed in an 
indigene-settler or settler-settler context. 
 Rather than focus on the state-funded / spontaneous dichotomy this thesis 
relies on an overarching concept of transmigration; that is, as a facilitator of 
intrastate movement of heterogeneous cohorts of people. In the resettlement 
‘contact zone’ these ethnically diverse groups were faced with, and needed to 
address, the dilemma of how they viewed themselves in relation to a range of 
ethnocultural groups unlike themselves, and how they would manage their 
coexistence. If the resettlement ‘contact zone’ is perceived as the world-at-large in 
microcosm, then transmigration might be viewed as the catalyst that has hastened 
the process of intercultural exposure. 
 
Transmigration: Archipelagic Overview 
Since their mid-twentieth century decolonisation, the Malay Archipelago states – 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines – ramped up earlier colonial-initiated 
programs of transferring populations from densely populated to thinly populated 
parts of their domains. The motivation for intensifying previous resettlement 
initiatives stemmed partly from the reality of rapidly growing populations in 
essentially agrarian economies. That is, in the absence of secondary or tertiary 
industries – manufacturing having by and large been the preserve of the metropole 
of the imperial states – the ex-colonies were faced with accommodating and 
sustaining increased populations for whom land: man ratios were deteriorating. It 
was reasoned that the exploitation of peripheral or frontier lands would have the 
capacity to absorb rapidly increasing populations from areas of already high 
density and ameliorate the dilemma of landlessness and the attendant economic, 
social, and political disruption that stemmed therefrom.
125
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 At the beginning of the twentieth century when the U.S. began to encourage Philippine land 
colonisation and homesteading projects the population of their colony supported less than 10 
million (after Pelzer 1945), one-tenth of what it was a century on. Concomitantly, when the 
earliest Dutch East Indies emigration / colonisation programs were attempting to alleviate 
overcrowding in Java / Madura were initiated in 1905, the population of Java stood at 30 million 
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 Using Indonesia’s Transmigration Program as representative it has been 
suggested that land settlement schemes have been “a valuable multi-purpose 
instrument that have led to a belief that they are a panacea, a cure-all for many 
social and economic ills” (Tirtosudarmo 1997: 19). (Oberai 1988: xiii) posits an 
alternative perspective stating that land settlement schemes: 
have often been presented as potentially tidy solutions to a number of problems, 
including the need to increase agricultural production, correct spatial imbalances 
in the distribution of population, exploit frontier lands for reasons of national 
security, and defuse potentially serious political problems resulting from the 
existing agrarian structure, poverty, rising landlessness and unemployment. 
 
Not only were the national aims and objectives of land resettlement 
programs varied and complex, their emphasis differed from one country to 
another and, from era to era, within the same country (Bahrin 1988a: 1-2). 
Elaborating further, Bahrin (cited Jones and Richter 1982: 3-4) suggests that 
generally speaking, state-directed land settlement program objectives may be 
classified as: (i) redistributive, that is moving people from heavily populated 
areas, (ii) economic, increasing rural opportunities, production and concomitant 
food security, (iii) social, alleviating poverty and addressing the mayhem caused 
by natural disasters such as volcanoes, dislocation due to infrastructure projects 
such as dam construction or homelessness as a result of regional insurgency, and 
(iv) political, to settle the ‘frontier’ for ‘pacification’ of minorities or to avoid land 
confiscation needs by states attempting rural land reform. 
 The postwar stimuli for new lands resulted from the push-pull factors of 
population pressure and the concomitant palliative, or ‘safety-valve’ theory of 
resettlement. However, a more nuanced understanding of the varying objectives of 
these transmigration initiatives helps pinpoint the success or otherwise of these 
movements in hindsight. Tirtosudarmo (2001: 214) states that Indonesia’s 
Presidential Transmigration Law of 1972 mandated seven policy goals: (1) 
improvements in living standards, (2) regional development, (3) balanced 
population distribution, (4) equitably distributed development throughout 
Indonesia, (5) utilization of human and natural resources, (6) national union and 
unity, and (7) strengthening of national defence and security. While these appear 
laudable goals, Uhlig (1984: xiii, 1984a: 11) posits that what drove resettlement 
initiatives was much more fundamental, that is, the need to find more ‘rice-bowls’ 
                                                                                                                                     
(after Wertheim 1962). A century on the Java / Madura population stands at approximately 140 
million, despite the implementation of redistributive resettlement programs. 
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and concomitant lebensraum (room for development or expansion) for citizens of 
essentially agricultural economies with rapidly rising populations, beset with an 
increasing landless and ‘underlanded’ cohort. 
 
The Demographic Imperative 
Regardless of individual state or bureaucratic rationales for resettlement, the 
underlying factor that dictated the transmigration or resettlement phenomenon in 
the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia, was the continuance of relatively high 
birth rates occurring in tandem with decreasing mortalities. If archipelagic 
populations had remained stable – as happened in the affluent Euro-American 
world following World War 2 – much of the rationale for resettlement would have 
been moot. However, as alluded to in the ‘Introduction’, unprecedented 
population increases (consequent to sanitation and health initiatives) had doubled 
archipelagic populations several times over. The data (Table 4.1) bears repeating 
as it illustrates the population surge. And it is the surge that had implications for 
the decisions made to facilitate and implement transmigration from densely 
populated to less populated regions. 
 The Philippines at the time of the United States accession at the beginning 
of the twentieth century supported a population estimated to be 8 million, while 
the British Malay territories (now Malaysia) supported 3 million and Indonesia 
(then the Dutch East Indies) 43 million (after Pelzer 1945: 81, 185, 254). At 
century’s end those figures were 76 million, 23 million and 206 million 
respectively.
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 The scale of the population increase – representing a historical 
aberration – should not be underestimated. In the absence of suitable alternatives, 
predominantly agricultural economies had little choice but to extend the territory 
under cultivation and this meant the alienation and exploitation of evermore 
peripheral areas of their respective states. 
 The island of Cebu is illustrative of the demographic imbalances that have 
occurred. In the period 1939-1960 Cebu had an out-migration of 475,356 persons 
(Wernstedt and Spencer 1978: 637). Notwithstanding Cebu’s status as the leading 
out-migration province, its population nevertheless increased from 1 million to 1.3 
million in the period referred to. Today it supports nearly 4 million, the result of 
                                                 
126
 Projections for the year 2020 are the Philippine population will have reached 111 million, 
Indonesia 262 million and Malaysia 32 million (EBYB 2012: 774-779). Statistics indicate that if 
fertility trends continue the Philippines will be supporting half as many people as Indonesia by 
mid-century, whereas at the beginning of the twentieth century Indonesia supported five times the 
population of the Philippines. 
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Philippine birth rates that outstrip its archipelagic neighbours. Put in perspective, 
Cebu, despite having contributed greatly to the transmigration flow, has witnessed 
a seven-fold increase in its population during the period 1930-2010. 
Table 4.1 – Comparative Archipelagic Populations and Densities 
 1930 1950 1980 2010 
     
Java / Madura 42 million - - 137 million 
 316 km²   1055 km² 
     
Indonesia 61 million 80 million 150 million 238 million 
 32 km² 41 km² 81 km² 124 km² 
     
Malaysia 4 million 6 million 14 million 28 million 
 12 km² 18 km² 42 km² 85 km² 
     
Philippines 13 million 20 million 50 million 92 million 
 43 km² 67 km² 167 km² 306 km² 
     
Cebu 0.6 million (1903) 
1.2 million 
(1960) 
- 4.2 million 
 121 km² 243 km²  810 km² 
Source: EBYB 2012 / NSO website / Wernstedt and Spencer 1978 
 
The Ethnocultural Imperative 
If archipelagic nation-state populations had been monoethnic, and all other factors 
in the transmigration imperative (population increase, landlessness, poverty, and 
social unrest) had remained extant, resettlement integration would have been less 
fraught. Notwithstanding the matter of religious difference, issues such as 
minoritisation, marginalisation, regionalism, and secession would not have 
become the dilemmas they have in resettlement zones as distant as Mindanao and 
the Moluccas (Ananta 2006a, 2006b, Tirtosudarmo 2006). In the absence of 
population increase transmigration would have been less likely, each ethnocultural 
group might have remained in its region-of-origin and not been confronted with 
the need for intercultural dialogue. Transmigration in a monoethnic milieu might 
have meant a struggle for resources at worst, but that struggle would not have 
been exacerbated by the additional complication resulting from the ethnocultural 
diversity of a plural society. 
 A single ethnicity, language and a shared set of cultural markers would 
have precluded the need for the individual or group to confront the identity 
choices that needed to be made in the resettlement zone of a polyethnic state; 
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issues such as ethnic reification, acculturation to another’s culture or the 
compromises associated with transculturation would have been moot. In some 
resettlement situations – especially in situations where only two or three 
ethnocultural cohorts were resettled, the identity dilemma was less fraught. 
Depending on the percentage size of the cohort, each group might either reify its 
identity or in instances where numbers were small, members of the smaller cohort 
might compromise their identity by acculturating into a larger or more dominant 
group.
127
 In this regard transmigration in Indonesia (for example) is at once less 
fraught and more fraught. It is less fraught in the sense that the transmigrant 
cohort consists of fewer ethnic groups (primarily Javanese, Madurese, and 
Balinese) and more fraught in the sense that wherever they are resettled these 
cohorts have a tendency to be the numerically dominant group within a particular 
project, thus inhibiting the potential for reciprocal cultural exchange. 
 Resettlement scenarios exhibiting greater ethnocultural diversity – 
exemplified by the Narra / Palawan model – have the potential for greater 
intercultural exchange, but this is not necessarily guaranteed. Diversity does not 
preclude there being a dominant group. Mindanao is a case in point on two levels. 
On one level the Cebuano language is illustrative. Migration to Mindanao from 
the north encompassed more than ethnic Cebuanos, yet the Cebuano language 
became lingua franca for many of the settlers and some indigenes. On a further 
level the Christian-Muslim cultural divide has thwarted a more broad-based 
intercultural exchange. The ethnic diversity in the Narra resettlement project has 
contributed to a situation in which no ethnic group is dominant. Potential 
chauvinism has been further stymied by the adoption and diffusion of the national 
language Filipino / Tagalog, the high incidence of intermarriage between ethnic 
groups and possibly the relative ethnoreligious homogeneity (lowland Christian) 
of the majority in the community.
128
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 An example of the acculturation model might be the initial Balinese resettlement in Parigi 
(Sulawesi) as outlined by Davis (1976). In this model, Balinese acculturation to the host 
community appeared unproblematic; it was neither coerced nor sanctioned, was asymmetrical 
rather than reciprocal, but seemingly randomly negotiated via individual agency. Examples of 
reification, or minimal positions of coexistence (hesitance), abound. An unofficial visit to the 
resettlement zone of Baturaja (Sumatra) revealed that the two migrant cohorts – Javanese and 
Balinese – continued to maintain separate identities; and along with the indigene Ogan in this 
particular project, each retained some geographical space within the overall project. 
128
 I am not suggesting that the divergence of religion or language per se is instrumental in 
determining whether interculturality will flourish or not. Examples abound (Hardjono 2001, 
Wertheim 1959) of instances in which indigene-settler antipathy manifested in spite of a faith in 
common. 
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Transmigration: Philippine Overview 
Analyses of Philippine land settlement policy and programs are not possible 
outside the framework of the country’s recurrent land reform agendas, the catalyst 
for which has been intermittent rural unrest and insurrection. Historically, land 
ownership has not necessarily been in the hands of those Filipinos who tilled the 
land.
129
 Spain’s sovereignty in the Archipelago differed markedly from her 
colonial rivals. In British Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies land tenure – 
apart from the plantation-system developed during the late colonial period – 
continued to be based on the pre-colonial traditional village, usufruct system of 
agriculture. Spain, however, usurped the traditional barangay (village-based) land 
tenure arrangements, based on communal ownership, and replaced them with the 
latifundia or hacienda system of landed estates (Kuhnen 1982, Putzel 1992, 
Zialcita 2006).
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 The pervasiveness of this policy has been difficult to undermine, 
and contributes in part to continued rural poverty that is aggravated by ongoing 
landlessness and the conditionality of tenancy.
 131
 It was in this context that the 
transmigration of landless Filipinos to less populated areas was mooted. However, 
the programs that have been variously promoted to ameliorate the condition of 
landlessness and its attendant social ills have been contingent upon the political 
climate. 
 When the United States replaced Spain as the colonial power, their 
administration – in an effort to cultivate collaboration among the Philippine elite – 
decided to respect the land ownership status quo by ignoring the radical land 
reform program that had been proposed by the nascent Philippine Republic’s 
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 This holds true for those areas of the Philippines that were dominated by Spanish colonial rule. 
Other regions of the Philippines retained traditional pre-colonial land tenure arrangements based 
on the usufruct dictates of the community, swidden agriculture, or a combination of both. 
130
 Kuhnen (1982: 26-27) suggests that the latifundia or hacienda “are overdimensional pieces of 
landed property similar to a small state [which as an] economic and social entity… tied together 
through labour relations… Cash is used as little as possible. The patron receives work from the 
labourers, tenants, management…” and rules his domain in an autarkic manner. Putzel (1992: 45) 
states that by 1612, much of the original land that had formed part of the grants to the 
conquistadores and early settlers had been reduced to 34 estancias, much of it controlled by the 
Friar Orders (Augustinians, Dominicans Jesuits, and Recollects). Zialcita (2006: 81-102) makes 
the case that in the pre-colonial Philippines the barangay (village which varied in size, and to 
some extent kin-based) land tenure was loosely defined, as it was still plentiful. The concept of 
communal ownership prevailed for land itself while labour to work a given piece of land was of 
more value, hence the concept of debt-bondage and slave-raids. 
131
 The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) in the late 1980s suggested that 20 percent of the 
population owned 80 percent of the land. However, the government’s land registration programme 
in 1988 demonstrated that not more than 5 percent of all families owned 83 percent of farmland: 
indicating the ‘rubbery’ nature of statistics in such a contentious environment (Putzel 1992: 27). 
Land concentration of this magnitude is a legacy of Spain’s three centuries of colonisation in the 
Archipelago, and the subsequent reluctance of U.S. administrators to effect any meaningful land 
reforms during their period of ‘tutelage’. 
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Malolos Constitution. Rather than effect agrarian reform by returning the land to 
the tiller, the Insular Government (early U.S. Administration) attempted 
amelioration of landlessness and peasant unrest by opening up for settlement 
‘public lands’ in less populated areas, such as Mindanao and the Cagayan Valley 
in Luzon, for homesteading (McLennan 2001: 76).
132
 However, the historical 
anxieties of potential northern lowland Christian migrants, with regard to the 
Muslim and pagan south, thwarted resettlement expectations.
133
 In view of the 
reluctance to move south, the colonial administration aimed to encourage 
migration by inaugurating several state-sponsored resettlement programs. While 
the scope and effectiveness of these projects were limited, they presaged 
subsequent spontaneous migration into regions that had hitherto been regarded as 
inaccessible, and were thus a necessary precursor in generating interest in the 
south by giving official sanction to the region’s safety.134 
 The ‘public lands’ however were not unsettled, and in this sense were 
‘public’ only in the eyes of regimes that recognised land ownership premised on 
individual written title. The postcolonial Philippine state inherited from both 
Spain and the United States an antipathy to the usufruct system of land tenure that 
was common in the non-Christian Philippines. Both colonialisms had recognised 
the untitled lands as theoretically ‘unused’ and therefore open to alienation and 
exploitation. In this respect they were regarded as ‘crown lands’ during the 
Spanish era by the fiat of Regalian Doctrine, and as ‘public lands’ during the 
American era (Fianza 2004: 4). It was these public lands that were to play a 
central role in attracting the mass migration of spontaneous settlers post the Asia-
Pacific War. Spontaneous transmigration in the Philippines however occurred 
only after the various state-sponsored land-settlement schemes, had demonstrated 
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 McLennan (2001: 76) suggests that with the passing of the Public Land Act (1903) the U.S. 
administration hoped to encourage the homesteading model of land alienation recently 
successfully implemented in a westward expanding America. The homestead model envisaged 
dispersed owner-operated farmsteads, but as McLennan observes: “The American homestead 
system had been developed among a people accustomed to a pattern of dispersed settlement, but 
lowland Christian Filipinos were more gregarious.” 
133
 The nomenclature ‘pagan’ is used with some reservation. While in use during colonial times it 
is in essence a pejorative that has been in some sense replaced by other epithets:  native, indigene, 
Animist, Lumad, which while viewed as less pejorative do not necessarily address or alter these 
cohort’s power-relationships vis-à-vis the dominant lowland Christian and Muslim sociocultural 
groups in Philippine society.  
134
 Encouragement to move to the frontier was not limited to the publicity generated by the 
introduction of state-sponsored settlement projects. Campado (2005) affirms that early attempts at 
homesteading in Mindanao failed in part due to disorganisation. When General Pershing (1911) 
called for the relocation of peasants from congested areas of the Philippines to Mindanao “the 
government forthwith paraded around Cebu a corn stalk, thirteen feet tall… to convince the 
Cebuanos of the fertility of the soil in Cotabato (Mindanao)” (p. 8). 
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that security, health and logistics obstacles could be overcome. In essence state 
resettlement initiatives (even if unsuccessful) acted as a catalyst for the 
spontaneous migrations that followed. 
 
Resettlement Policy and Organisation 
While there were similarities in the objectives of the various archipelagic 
resettlement programs, the political imperatives driving the processes, and the 
state-sponsored versus spontaneous migration dichotomy varied from state to 
state. Types of land settlement, and the rationales for resettlement: disaster relief, 
poverty amelioration, regional development and the pacification of ‘minorities’ 
for example, impacted on what could reasonably be achieved. Whereas 
resettlement policy in Indonesia and Malaysia was by and large managed by a 
single major facilitator, the Transmigration Ministry and the Federal Land 
Development Authority (FELDA) respectively, Philippine land settlement policies 
and programs have not enjoyed the same continuities. Unlike its archipelagic 
neighbours, the Philippines appeared to alter policy, structure and acronym almost 
at the behest of each presidential election result. Thus, entities such as the 
National Land Settlement Administration (NLSA) were replaced by the Land 
Settlement Development Corporation (LASEDECO), the Economic Development 
Corps of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (EDCOR), which were in turn 
replaced by the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration 
(NARRA) and so forth.
135
 American colonial resettlement and land-use policy had 
also vacillated, with priorities dictated by whoever had the ear of the U.S. 
Congress at any given moment. Congressional Democrats were more amenable to 
acknowledging Filipino sensibilities whereas the more imperialist elements in 
Congress sided with the agribusiness lobby whose minimum position was the 
retention of Mindanao as their fiefdom. The agribusiness / imperialist lobby tried 
unsuccessfully to have Mindanao excised from the Philippines body politic, citing 
religious difference as a reason for the need for separation.
136
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 This list is not exhaustive, but is illustrative of the discontinuities inherent in the Filipino 
transmigration / resettlement paradigm. While Indonesia’s resettlement has been wound back, a 
limited resettlement program continues under the auspices of the now merged Ministry of 
Manpower and Transmigration. FELDA has metamorphosed into a successful agribusiness and 
vertically integrated corporation. 
136
 The Bacon Bill (1926) had as its backers those interests – including rubber planters – who were 
incensed that American investors were to have their landholdings limited to 1,024 hectares (Pelzer 
1945: 129). As it transpired, the Bacon Bill failed, but the potential for separation continued to 
exist. Krinks (1983) reveals that the 1,024 hectare restrictions were subsequently able to be 
breached by creative accounting and political fiat. 
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 The early American colonial administration had the power to dictate land 
policy in the Philippines and with the passing of the Public Land Act (1903) 
encouraged the introduction of the ‘homestead’ system of land alienation. This 
system of dispersed, isolated farmsteads was alien to the Filipino, who, even if 
landless, was reluctant to live away from the security of a village. Consequently 
the concept of homesteading failed to draw the expected numbers to Mindanao. 
Those who did arrive were often thwarted in their homesteading quest by ‘land-
grabbers’ – usually influential folk who had been pre-informed about certain road 
constructions allowing access to alienable lands (Pelzer 1945: 104-114). The 
Philippines Insular Government, in an effort to bind Mindanao more firmly to the 
Christian north, aimed to increase the movement of settlers from the congested 
Visayan provinces. However, as mentioned previously, their attempts at 
promoting state-sponsored agricultural colonies in the period 1913-1917 proved to 
be less than successful. While some American interests thought that development 
lay in large estates, and even contemplated importing coolie labour if Filipinos 
could not be induced to move in sufficient numbers, the embryonic Philippines 
administration concentrated on the provision of land for smallholders, both in 
state-sponsored and spontaneous resettlements (Huke 1963: 205, Pelzer 1945, 
Krinks, 1983).
137
  
 Philippine rural policy and settlement programs had a further political, if 
not geo-strategic, dimension to them. At the close of the Asia-Pacific War – with 
the United States in the ascendancy – a window of opportunity existed for a 
meaningful restructuring of rural society in the Philippines. In Japan, South 
Korea, and Taiwan a coalescing of retribution against powerful landed interests 
and an increasing fear of communism came to dominate U.S. occupation policy 
towards rural restructuring. This anxiety caused action to be taken to effect land 
reform in those states. In their own colony (the Philippines) a tussle ensued 
between those U.S. interests promulgating reform, and those who were against 
rural redistributive policies. This inability to implement land reform ensured the 
ongoing mechanism of land resettlement policy as a central fallback position 
(Putzel 1992: 67-112). The timing of independence in 1946, before the gravity of 
Cold War rivalry had manifested itself, ‘saved’ the Philippines from restructuring 
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 While the focus of state rhetoric and action appears to have been (and continues to be) the well-
being of owner-operated farms, the state has nevertheless facilitated the growth of agribusinesses 
that for economies of scale require large holdings. In tandem with this is the difficulty in matching 
state rhetoric and action (as represented by the DAR) with the continuance of some historically 
large personal land-holdings. 
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in the short-term, though with the benefit of hindsight only put off the inevitable 
reform and modernization of the rural sector, which Japan, Korea and Taiwan 
achieved in less traumatic circumstances.
138
 
 
Resettlement Objectives 
When viewed from a sociocultural perspective, some of the resettlement 
objectives have more salience than others for the contention of this thesis. One 
such is the issue of ‘national union and unity’. Because of the inability to locate an 
indigene-settler modus vivendi in the Mindanao contact zone for example, the 
national unity objective has been compromised. Increased transmigration might 
even be deemed to have exacerbated fragile coexistences. While some of the other 
objectives might more generally fall under the rubric of socio-economic 
expectations, I suggest that the overall need to fulfil the objectives had potential 
repercussions for intercultural modi vivendi in the resettlement contact zone. 
Failed expectations might undermine the interculturality trust hypothesis 
advanced by Simons (1997) as a prerequisite for further social interaction. A brief 
outline of the objectives that motivated resettlement initiatives will help in an 
understanding of why and how transmigration was advanced. Transmigrants were 
encouraged, cajoled and sometimes coerced to leave the security of their 
ethnocultural heartlands to live precarious existences (at least during the 
pioneering years) amongst a heterogeneity of ethnocultural neighbours.
139
 
 
Improvements in Living Standards 
In the absence of mass industrialization the Philippines was dependant on an 
agricultural sector that lagged in its ability to provide adequate livelihoods for 
many Filipinos. For a century the country struggled to implement a meaningful 
land reform that might address the chronic poverty with which a sizeable segment 
of the population was burdened. Economic factors such as “land-tenure systems, 
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 I am not suggesting that Japan, Korea and Taiwan were not assailed by political and military 
problems as a consequence of the fall-out from postwar ‘re-imaginings’, rather that in the 
Philippines, the fall-out of peasant insurrection occurred as a consequence of not effecting the 
reforms that had been impressed upon the aforementioned states. Had the lame-duck colonial 
government forced through appropriate reforms, it is debatable whether the HUK rebellion 
(Kerkvliet 1990), and subsequent rural-social insurrections would have gained traction. 
139
 Guiam (cited Tigno 2006: 28) addresses the issue of coercion by suggesting that “…many of 
the volunteers to become the beneficiaries of government-sponsored migrations to Mindanao were 
the ‘undesirables’ and tough guys in some Luzon and Visayas communities… Mindanao is the 
promised land of the undesirables.” Veloro (1995, 1996) addresses the matter of the precariousness 
of frontier life, by relating reminiscences of isolation, homesickness, illness, and hunger among 
Palawan transmigrants. 
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widespread tenancy, usury, poverty combined with indebtedness, and 
uneconomical farm sizes” (Pelzer 1945: 86) contributed to poor living standards. 
The American colonial administration inherited a latifundia (landed estate) system 
of agriculture dominated by a coterie of wealthy families and the Church. The 
‘Friar Lands’ – a source of great peasant grievance and deprivation – were 
alienated, but not to the tenants who worked the land. Putzel (1992: 20-23) 
suggests that while landed property and other rural assets remained in the hands of 
a small number of powerful families, landlessness would continue to plague those 
relying on agricultural livelihoods; those unable to meet the basic survival needs 
of their families. State-sponsored resettlement programs, as well as encouraging 
migration from densely populated areas to sparsely populated ones, had as one of 
its objectives the improving of living standards of the rural impoverished 
(Postrado 1984: 307, 314).  
 
Balanced Population Distribution 
As previously mentioned, Pelzer (1945: 81) had observed that “(t)he population in 
all the countries of Southeastern Asia is distributed very unevenly.” His 
observation – made in the last years of the colonial era – occurred at a time when 
archipelagic states were already cognisant of the ramifications of population 
maldistribution. High population densities exacerbated the occurrence of 
landlessness which both colonial-era and independent administrations recognised 
as contributing to social instability. It was reasoned by policy-makers that the 
addressing of the population maldistribution issue would help ameliorate wider 
societal ills such as poverty, class struggle, and insurrection.
140
 Population 
pressure, exacerbated by maldistribution therefore came to influence state 
resettlement policy. 
 Philippine land settlement often had multiple objectives, though a concern 
over an equitable distribution of population per se has not always been at the 
forefront of planners’ visions. “Development of the frontier areas […], growth of 
agricultural output, alleviation of agrarian problems in agricultural regions, 
pacification, and assimilation of minority groups, and decongestion of over 
crowded cities…” (Paderanga Jr. 1988: 142) are objectives that in some way were 
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 In The Huk Rebellion, Kerkvliet (1990) highlights complexities of one such insurrection faced 
by the state. The plight of the peasantry, millenarianism, political machinations and foreign 
interventions, are all factors that contributed to the scenario in which insurrections occurred. 
Transmigration was often seen as a response in diffusing and dispersing the threat, although the 
underlying conditions of increased populations and landlessness were not adequately addressed. 
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predicated on the grander notion of a more balanced population distribution. The 
American colonial administration and the nascent Filipino Republic, reflecting on 
the aforementioned anxieties, viewed the amelioration of the maldistribution of 
population not as a problem in itself, but as a potential solution to ancillary issues. 
For example, peasant unrest might be stymied by the ‘safety-valve’ of alienating 
less-populated frontier lands where unruly peasants might be resettled. 
 The potential for population redistribution must have appeared apparent. 
The 1903 Philippines census determined the population at 7.5 million. The MPM 
islands (Mindanao, Palawan, and Mindoro), encompassing nearly 40 percent of 
Philippine land area, supported – if we disregard Pelzer’s charge of under-
enumeration – 7 percent of the population (Pelzer 1945: 81, Wernstedt and 
Spencer 1978: 600). The 1939 census revealed that the population of the MPM 
islands accounted for 12.5 percent of the nation’s total; revealing to state planners 
that the potential for a more balanced population continued to exist.
141
 
 
Regional Development 
If the heartland of Philippine agriculture has been Central Luzon, then the centre 
of industrial capacity and administration has been Metro Manila. At least one-
third of Filipinos live within a 100km radius of Manila. Historically, Spanish rule 
emanated from Manila and as is the case with other colonial administrative 
centres, in a postcolonial era, these centres of power continued to act as 
administrative centres and population magnets once the post-independence move 
to urban areas accelerated. Some state planners had in mind that resettlement 
programs might stem the flow to urban areas in general and Metro Manila in 
particular (Laquian 1975: 242). The nature of the skewed regional development 
was apparent to both the American colonial administration and Filipino politicians 
in the early part of the century, although rationales for settling the less developed 
regions, such as Mindanao, diverged. 
 For Commonwealth President Quezon, the priority was to settle the 
frontier so that the Philippines might inherit the whole of the Spanish patrimony, 
at a time in which some American interests were intent on developing regions (in 
particular Mindanao) that might be exploited for agribusinesses. Sugar, rubber, 
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 By 1960 MPM supported 22 percent of the Philippine population, with Mindanao the greatest 
recipient. The inter-census period 1903-1960 saw a ten-fold increase while 1960-2007 has seen a 
further four-fold increase. Data from the 2010 census suggests that transmigration toward the 
MPM continues; the region now supporting 29 percent of the country’s population. (after NSO) 
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abacá, coconuts and later pineapple and bananas had ready markets in the United 
States. Quezon’s anxiety was well-founded, given that moves existed to separate 
Mindanao from the rest of the colony (Abinales 2004: 17-44). Both dynamics – 
Commonwealth and American agribusiness interests – needed an influx of settlers 
to make them viable. The nationalists needed Filipino settlers to transmigrate to 
the regions to tie these to Manila, while the agribusiness / imperialist lobby 
needed an influx of settlers to work in the plantations. In later years regional 
development still had land resettlement in its mix of state initiatives. Having the 
least population density of any province, Palawan continued to be touted as a 
frontier.
142
  
 
Equitably Distributed Development 
While the majority of Filipinos worked in the rural sector it behoved the state to 
devote more resources to uplift a cohort who were not sharing equitably in the 
country’s development. Putzel (1992: 15-17) stated that poverty in the Philippines 
was endemic and most widespread in the rural areas. It was thought that providing 
land to the landless would be a proactive move likely to benefit those not sharing 
in development. Given that land is a finite resource and given that the Philippines 
continues to have one of the highest population growth rates in Asia, it appears 
that further strategies to ameliorate poverty and share in development (such as 
industrialization, progressive taxation and suchlike) need to be put in place. 
Whether or not resettlement can contribute to the objective of a more equitably 
distributed development throughout the Philippines remains to be seen. Because 
of the institutional continuities (tenancy, patron-client relationships) mentioned 
elsewhere, resettlement programs may not necessarily deliver the expected 
development for many in the rural sector. The increasing cohort of Filipinos 
working overseas – estimates vary from 10 percent of the working-age population 
to 10 percent of the overall population (Camroux 2009) – suggests the limitations 
of equitable development despite resettlement programs. 
 
Utilisation of Human and Natural Resources 
The potential of Mindanao, Palawan and other less exploited areas of the 
Philippines has always been in the forefront of the minds of entrepreneurs and 
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 The ‘last frontier’ mentality which was instrumental in attracting agricultural resettlement is 
being re-packaged to reflect the new realities of the Province’s tourist industry. The Provincial 
Government of Palawan’s website now touts the epithet ‘last ecological frontier’. 
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politicians (Gutierrez and Borras Jr. 2004, Hayami et al. 1993, Fianza 2004). 
Following the subjugation of those resisting the American occupation in the early 
1900s, Mindanao in particular was deemed “the land of promise and unlimited 
opportunity” (Pelzer 1945: 127). A relatively small population, vast forested 
areas, undeveloped agricultural land and undiscovered minerals all demanded that 
settlement take place. In fact, in view of impending independence, one of the 
NLSA objectives had been “(t)o develop new money crops to take the place of the 
present export crops, which may suffer from the loss of preferences which they 
enjoy in the American market” (p. 138). Concomitant with the underlying anxiety 
of peasant unrest that stemmed from landlessness and associated poverty there 
existed a situation of great underemployment in the Philippine rural economy. 
 Better health delivery outcomes early in the twentieth century decreased 
mortality rates, which meant that in the old settled agricultural areas, the available 
land needed to be shared by more mouths. As a consequence, due to landlessness 
and usurious practices, poverty and tenancy increased. Putzel (1992: 55) suggests 
that during the American colonial period tenancy rates increased markedly. In the 
Province of Nueva Ecija for example tenancy rates were 38 percent in 1903 but 
had risen to 60 percent in 1948. Generally tenants have less interest in improving 
the land they farm than do landowner-farmers, the result being that agricultural 
productivity was one of the lowest in Southeast Asia. Underemployment, in 
conjunction with the vagaries of tenancy, contributed to this inefficiency and poor 
utilization of human resources. Resettlement programs or spontaneous movement 
to the frontier suggested an alternative.  
 
National Union and Unity 
One of the objectives of earlier state-sponsored resettlement was to foster national 
union and unity. Pelzer’s (1945) account of the Philippine Commonwealth’s 
NLSA settlement program just prior to the outbreak of the Asia-Pacific War, 
declared one of the state objectives thus: “To encourage migration to sparsely 
populated regions, and facilitate the amalgamation of the people in different 
sections of the Philippines” (p. 138). Campado (2005: 8-9) suggests that earlier 
American agricultural colonisation schemes had similar objectives in that “(t)he 
aim is the amalgamation of the Mohammedan and the Christian native population 
into a homogenous Filipino people.” While the Department of Mindanao and Sulu 
(a regional American-created administrative entity) could show that 427 Visayan 
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and 347 Muslim families could live side by side in harmony, the reality was that 
discrimination that favoured the newcomers slowly began to undermine the aim of 
national unity. Discrimination was not the only reason for Moro reluctance to 
accept the inevitable rule of Manila in the 1920s and 1930s. Some Muslims felt 
that their best interests would be served by a continuance of American rule in 
Mindanao. Hence when the Commonwealth administration headed by President 
Quezon hurriedly enacted legislation for the NLSA formation (1938) he was 
acting to strengthen Manila’s claim to all of the territory of the Spanish / 
American patrimony. By settling Mindanao he hoped to legitimise Manila’s claim 
in the face of Muslim and American objections. 
 Abinales (2004:17-23) suggests that Quezon and other Filipino nationalists 
had every reason to have anxieties about national unity. As the administration in 
Manila was being indigenized, Mindanao continued to be ruled as a separate 
fiefdom of the U.S. Army. As Abinales explains it, American rule in the south 
represented a ‘regime within a regime’. Ethnoreligious difference and ‘Moro 
backwardness’ were touted by the Americans as reasons for continuing the 
separate development of Mindanao. Quezon and Manila did everything in their 
power to increase their influence in the region.
143
 American resolve was not 
monolithic however; one faction wanted a unified Philippine state with minimal 
interference by the colonial ruler, while a further faction – supported by business 
interests, Washington lobbyists, and those buoyed by the mantra of the ‘white 
man’s burden’ – endeavoured to treat Mindanao as a potential separate state, to be 
settled by Europeans, supporting plantations that would augment the American 
economy. 
 The reality turned out somewhat differently, but Filipino anxiety about 
national unity in the context of (some) American intentions was well-founded. 
The plantation sector had mixed success; abacá (Manila hemp) production 
attracted several thousand Americans. Expertise in abacá production and 
                                                 
143
 In the nascent Filipino state, power (both economic and political) emanated from the Manila 
and the ‘Tagalog belt’. Power-brokers such as Quezon, imagining their decolonised patrimony as 
reflecting the entire Spanish / American bailiwick, took little cognisance of the aspirations of the 
silent majority who lived outside the ‘Tagalog belt’; a situation construed by some as a form of 
internal colonialism. In Internal Colonialism Hechter (1998), examining the British / Celtic divide, 
demonstrates how the psychology of power works between the centre and periphery. “[The] 
argument holds that the lack of sovereignty characteristic of internal colonies fostered a dependent 
kind of development which limited their economic welfare and threatened their cultural 
integrity…” (p. xiv). It could be argued that the core / periphery theorisation in the Philippines has 
had a bearing on how the transmigration / social interaction philosophy has played out in the 
regions. 
 144 
marketing saw the settlement of 20,000 Japanese in Mindanao by the eve of the 
Asia-Pacific War (Abinales 2004: 78-87). At the same time this community 
showed the economic potential of Mindanao, and (like the American separatists 
before them) highlighted to Quezon and others the spectre that Manila might lose 
control over one third of its imagined patrimony. As a facilitator of national union 
and unity the state-sponsored NLSA might thus be viewed as a response to Moro 
regionalism, American imperial intentions, and the uncertainty of hosting a 
growing Japanese community on Philippine soil. 
 
Strengthening of National Defence and Security 
National security objectives in land settlement programs have at times been 
implicit, at other times deliberate. It might be argued that all social reform stems 
from varying combinations of altruism and self-preservation. In a Philippine 
society in which land ownership was increasingly concentrated – resulting in an 
expansion of tenancy and landlessness – the mantra ‘land to the tiller’ came to 
dominate the debate on land reform. Land reform ‘intent’ could be blocked by 
legislators who were by and large the landowner class. State sponsored land 
settlement programs such as the NLSA were thus inaugurated as palliatives – in 
an effort to aid an increasingly landless peasantry – in lieu of meaningful land 
reform. Landlessness and the inequities of tenancy, in an essentially agrarian 
society with a rising population, contributed to peasant unrest and the threat of 
general rebellion in the 1930s, culminating in political and social upheaval during 
the Japanese interregnum (Putzel 1992: 58). 
 The return of the Americans to the Philippines and the onset of the Cold 
War saw a state reaction to the gains made during the Asia-Pacific War by peasant 
organizations that had at once combated the Japanese and the landlords, especially 
in Central Luzon. Where at the instigation of the HUKs (Hukbalahap – Hukbong 
Bayan Laban sa mga Hapon – People’s Army Against the Japanese – formed in 
1942) estates had been broken up and land redistribution had taken place; at 
War’s end a return to the status quo was sought by the landlord, and supported by 
the U.S. Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) (Kerkvliet 1990). Peasant land 
redistribution was viewed as part of a general advance of communism in the 
region, and unlike American coercive land reform efforts in occupied Japan and 
Korea, the Philippines was allowed to return to the status quo of pre-war land 
ownership arrangements (Putzel 1992: 75). Landlordism actually increased its 
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power, with a combination of private armies and the support of the American-
backed administration imbued with anti-communist credentials. The HUKs 
(which morphed into the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan – People’s Liberation 
Army in 1946) were not able to prevail against the odds and by 1954 were a spent 
force.  
 The formation of EDCOR in 1950 was an ostensible attempt to woo 
insurgents away from their power-base in Luzon. The promise to defecting HUK 
activists of resettlement on their own land proved an effective psychological 
warfare ploy, even if the numbers resettled were insignificant (Putzel 1992: 88-
91). Like previous state-sponsored resettlement programs, Mindanao was chosen 
as a suitable (and distant) destination for resettlement. While national defence and 
security objectives may have been achieved in the interim, the spectre of peasant 
discontent did not disappear. 
 
Philippine Resettlement Histories 
Resettlement – as experienced in late colonial and independent Philippines – 
should not be regarded as a radical innovation. Spanish rule, in spite of the 
relatively small numbers of Peninsulares (Spanish-born) or Criollos (locally-born 
Spaniards), was managed by the innovative system of reducciones (reduction).
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The process entailed the closer settlement (or resettlement) of scattered 
communities, so that they could be managed politically, taxed appropriately, 
availed for corvée labour, and reprogrammed religiously – in effect, incorporated 
into the economic orbit of colonial demands. Since missionaries were few, a more 
concentrated population could be more effectively ministered to. Evangelista 
(2002: 6) suggests that the reducción (resettlement) policy placed the natives 
within hearing distance of the pealing of the church bells, a process that came to 
be euphemistically termed as bajo de la campaña (under the bells). 
 A corollary of this policy was that of flight. To escape taxation, corvée and 
other colonial impositions, many indigenes put themselves outside the reach of 
Spanish rule, thereby contributing to the continuance of a greater ethnic diversity. 
James Scott (2009) highlights how this flight from colonial subordination – in 
essence a further migration, or resettlement – had the effect of creating new ethnic 
identities. To stay out of the colonial orbit necessitated mobility and mobility 
required the abandonment or altering of former lifeways, which in turn played a 
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 A closer understanding might be gleaned by the transitive use of the verb ‘reduce’: subdue; 
bring back to obedience (AOD 2004: 1082). 
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role in the ethnogenesis of new groups.
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 Scott posits that “the cordillera of 
northern Luzon was populated almost entirely by lowland Filipinos fleeing Malay 
slave raids and the Spanish reducciones” (p. 25). Adaptation to new upland 
ecologies altered the lifeways of these groups; mobility necessitated a 
simplification of social structures and subsistence routines. Viewed in this 
context, the Philippine dichotomy that divides society into lowland Christian and 
‘minoritised’ upland peoples loses some of its resonance. 
 
Resettlement: Pre-Independence 
The American colonial administration inherited a moribund land tenure system 
based on the Spanish duopoly of latifundia and religious caste system in which 
tenancy, indebtedness and usury prevailed.
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 Changed colonial management 
failed to ameliorate these conditions directly. Following a compensation package 
of some $US 7 million (1903-1905), vast tracts of Friar and Church lands held by 
Dominicans, Augustinian and Recollects were relinquished (Pelzer 1945: 85-91). 
Yet despite these resumptions the United States felt unable to return these lands to 
those who had originally been deprived of their lands with the imposition of 
colonial control. The 165,000 hectares of appropriated ‘Friar Lands’ were to be 
redistributed to the 60,000 tenants, but in a commercial world the peasant-
cultivators had no capacity to pay for the land they tilled. So, in order for the U.S. 
to recoup the $US 7 million Vatican recompense, the land ended up in the hands 
of the already-landed class. As a corollary it is estimated that in the period 1903-
1940 tenancy among the rural population increased from 16 to 35 percent. A 
vicious cycle of debt, landlessness, usury, and excessive rents kept the peasantry 
in a state of debt peonage (Putzel 1992: 51-58). 
 Although the American administration largely left the Philippine land 
tenure system intact they acknowledged the needs of a growing population, and 
one beset by increased landlessness. Their answer was to exploit the so-called 
‘public lands’, that is, lands that appeared to be unused or unowned. Imbued with 
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 The case of the escaped slave in the ‘New World’ colonial plantation milieux mirrors this 
trajectory. Allen (2011: 200) states that in the case of Suriname these escaped slaves (now 
identified as Maroon) “established an Afro-American culture with sociopolitical systems based on 
those of their original West African homelands.” Their ethnogenesis distinguishes the ‘Maroon’ 
from other Surinamese African-Americans. 
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 This is not to single out Spain for criticism. The world at large at the turn of the twentieth 
century – even the majority rural populations in the coloniser nations – lived precariously. We 
need only reflect on the accelerated immigration to settler-nations such as Australia, Canada, and 
the United States; and the death toll of the tenantry in mid-century Ireland, to realise that the 
Filipino situation was not exceptional. 
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the recent success of the westward expansion and associated land settlement in the 
U.S., policy-makers imagined a similar role for ‘homesteading’ in the Philippines, 
especially in the south where the population was sparse. In the late 1930s – when 
Pelzer was researching Pioneer Settlements in the Asiatic Tropics – the southern 
Philippine Islands of Mindanao and Palawan, constituting nearly 36% of the 
national territory, still only supported 12% of the national population (Pelzer 
1945: 81-85). 
 The Public Land Act of 1903 was the instrument that demonstrated the 
state’s ability to control and regulate land inventories. The Act allowed disposal 
of ‘public lands’ and these lands were to be exploited via a two-tier system – by 
individual owner-operated farms on the one hand, and corporations on the other. 
Individuals were limited to 16 ha. (although this varied from time to time), while 
corporations were allowed 1024 ha. Given the traditional propensity of Malay 
societies – be they Christian Filipino, Muslim, or Animist – to reside within the 
security of a village, the uptake of homestead lands was slower than expected by 
the American framers of the Act. Expectations were further undermined when the 
encroachment by state-sanctioned homesteaders onto traditional lands sometimes 
led to violent reactions, which slowed the further exploitation of ‘public lands’ 
(Pelzer 1945: 104-114). 
 As already observed, Mindanao, with 19 persons per square km., was 
sparsely populated when compared with the Visayan Islands of Cebu (214), Leyte 
(115), Panay (112) and Negros (95). To ameliorate congestion on these inner 
islands, and to address landlessness and agrarian unrest caused by suffering the 
negative impacts of the inquilino (tenancy) system, the Administration aimed to 
introduce large-scale settlement into Mindanao. At the same time, in an effort to 
thwart potential separatist tendencies, it was hoped that this movement south 
would facilitate the ‘Filipinization’ of the Moros and pagans (sic). To this end, in 
1913, the government adopted a policy of actively encouraging migration south 
by establishing agricultural colonies (Pelzer 1945: 127-129). Lack of funding, ill 
choice of site and settler, lax administration and marketing and transport 
deficiencies precluded the success of these early attempts at colonisation. The 
attempts by provincial governments to establish colonies were even less 
successful than those of the Insular Government in Manila (Pelzer 1945: 132). 
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The NLSA Resettlement Model 
While ultimately not living up to its expected potential (Abinales 2004: 119-123, 
Paderanga Jr. 1995: 1) the NLSA (National Land Settlement Administration) 
model nevertheless epitomises the imagined benefits expected by the 
implementation of state-initiated resettlement programs. Filipino politicians, state 
planners, and bureaucrats may have had diverging and intersecting expectations 
for furthering resettlement, but there was a general realisation that something 
needed to be done to ameliorate the plight of the tenants, exploit ‘empty’ lands, 
and advance the national interest. In spite of its inability to meet expectations the 
eventual liquidation of the NLSA did not diminish the enthusiasm for the 
transmigration concept. 
 The Quirino-Recto Colonization Act (1935) acknowledged previous 
shortcomings in state-sponsored agricultural colonisation attempts in Mindanao. 
The interim Commonwealth Government (1936) decided that infrastructure, 
especially road access, was needed before settlement would be viable. At the same 
time it was recognised that a more integrated colonisation procedure, as advanced 
by the advisors Hilarion Silayan and Frederico Howe, was warranted if settlement 
was to succeed. As a result of a report by Chair of the National Economic Council 
Manuel Roxas to President Quezon, a new entity, the National Land Settlement 
Administration (NLSA), was inaugurated. Pelzer (1945: 138) states that Roxas 
proposed the adoption of four key objectives; which when formulated into law 
read thus: 
(a) To facilitate the acquisition, settlement and cultivation of lands whether acquired 
from the Government or from private parties; 
(b) To afford opportunity to own farms to tenant farmers and small farmers from 
congested areas, and to trainees who have completed the prescribed military 
service; 
(c) To encourage migration to sparsely populated regions, and facilitate the 
amalgamation of the people in different sections of the Philippines; 
(d) To develop new money crops to take the place of the present export crops, which 
may suffer from the loss of preferences which they enjoy in the American 
market. 
  
 As with later Filipino land settlement programs the NLSA stipulated 
settler requirements based on age, health, agricultural experience, and number of 
dependents. A contract between the NLSA and settler was signed. The settler had 
to cultivate land allocated to him, plant prescribed crops, and deliver all surplus 
produce to Administration warehouses for sale. The obligation of the 
Administration was to assign 12 ha. (later amended to 6 ha.) of land, provide for 
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relocation to the settlement area, supply daily necessities until settlers were self-
sufficient and market surplus produce. The latter was critical given the recognition 
that many settlers had experienced the ‘sharp business practices’ of predatory 
merchants and produce buyers (Pelzer 1945: 139-140). 
 
Resettlement: Post-Independence 
The Asia-Pacific War was a watershed for Philippine population mobility. While 
it initially halted the NLSA state-sponsored migration to Mindanao, it was 
disruptive enough to make the populace more mobile, thus when peace returned 
many more eyed the frontier lands as their salvation from landlessness and 
deprivation. While during the Commonwealth period there had been a reluctance 
to stray far from homes in the Visayas, Ilocos, and other regions, government 
propaganda and the dissemination by word-of-mouth information from relatives 
already in Mindanao promoted a rush south as shipping became available. It is 
estimated that in the twelve year period 1948-1960 Mindanao attracted 1.25 
million migrants (Wernstedt and Simkins 1965: 92). 
 Independence in 1946 ended the interim Commonwealth period and 
ushered in a new optimism. A factor facilitating this new optimism was the 
previous success of the Japanese-developed abacá-growing industry in the Davao 
region.
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 With the confiscation of their assets, and postwar repatriation to 
Okinawa and the Japanese mainland, their lands were available for further arrivals 
of Filipino settlers. The Japanese legacy was an encouragement to those who saw 
no reason not to replicate their success (Abinales 2004: 80-93, 99). As mentioned 
in the introduction, failure or inability to effect land reforms encouraged state 
leaders to use the fallback position of encouraging migration to the less developed 
lands, and especially to Mindanao, which between 1939 and 1948 still had a low 
population density. More succinctly put: 
State leaders saw the chance to offer a discontented Filipino peasantry the 
opportunity to  become owner-cultivators without changing existing tenancy 
arrangements. Migration to Mindanao was at once expected to accomplish 
peasant aspirations, dissipate the predilection to rebel, and ease population 
pressure in other parts of the Philippines (Abinales 2004: 96). 
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 The Japanese numbered 20,000 on the eve of World War 2. They had begun arriving in the 
Philippines to work on infrastructure projects at the beginning of the American occupation, and 
gradually drifted south to open up, and control the abacá-growing industry. As word of Japanese 
success spread beyond Davao, spontaneous Filipino migrants came south to labour on their 
plantations, and it was these pioneers whose relations followed them once the War was over. 
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While the NLSA (which managed to resettle about 8,300 families during 
its tenure) was resurrected at War’s end the government began expanding its 
settlement horizon with the introduction of mechanization in the resettlement 
projects. The entity charged with this initiative was the Agricultural Machinery 
and Equipment Corporation (AMEC). At this time the Rice and Corn Production 
Administration (RCPA) was, as its title suggests, entrusted to promote and 
stimulate the nation’s staples of rice and corn, as well as taking over NLSA’s role 
as the government’s official resettlement agency. In this capacity it settled about 
3,000 families, but failed overall in its large-scale farming venture (Postrado 
1984: 308-309).  
 In 1950 in an effort to re-energize resettlement efforts a single agency, the 
Land Settlement and Development Corporation (LASEDECO) was set up with a 
view to replacing the moribund existing agencies with a more effective 
administration able to improve the implementation and coordination of policy. 
While the flow of spontaneous migrants to Mindanao increased, the government 
effort was minimal, with a mere 1,530 farming families being resettled (Postrado 
1984: 309). Contemporaneously with LASEDECO, but under military auspices, 
the state formed EDCOR (alluded to above) to address the continuing HUK 
insurgency. Unable to undermine the insurgency by effecting meaningful agrarian 
reform, the government opted to win ‘hearts and minds’ by resettling and 
rehabilitating surrendered rebels on the Mindanao frontier. On a larger scale, 
Abinales (2004: 122) states that a rat plague in the 1950s destroyed settlement 
crops and before the government gained control, starvation forced 11,000 families 
“with despair and disillusionment on their faces” to desert their lands.  
 In 1954 LASEDECO was replaced by a new entity, the National 
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Administration (NARRA). In the eight years of 
its existence it was able to resettle 30,640 families (Postrado 1984: 309). By the 
time it was replaced by the Land Authority (LA) in 1963 NARRA was 
administering more than half a million acres in six projects supporting 69,000 
individuals in Mindanao alone. Wernstedt and Simkins (1965: 92) postulate that 
“(i)t is difficult to evaluate the degree to which NARRA and its predecessors 
stimulated the large postwar population migration to Mindanao.” Less than 10 
percent of migrants can be said to have been settlers in state-sponsored projects, 
yet it cannot be overlooked that government publicity had effects on those 
determined or able to migrate spontaneously. State expenditure on roads greatly 
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facilitated settlement options, but it was in the area of health, especially in malaria 
control, that the greatest impetus to migration occurred. However, the rush to the 
‘frontier’ was creating anxiety and hostility among both the already-resident 
indigenes – whether Muslims or Animist. As a result of ongoing land disputes, the 
military were increasingly called upon to defend the NARRA and EDCOR 
settlements. A decade later it was in the state-sponsored colonies that the most 
intense confrontation occurred between the settler-paramilitaries (supported by the 
Philippine Army) and the separatist Muslim rebels (Abinales 2004: 123). 
 A turnabout of resettlement objectives occurred when the LA replaced 
NARRA in 1963. The allocation of public lands for large scale production of 
export and domestic commercial crops increased. The previous priority of 
providing settlement lands for landless farmers and tenants being thus set aside, 
the LA in the period 1963-1971 only resettled 2,855 families. While President 
Macapagal (1961-1965) enacted the Republic Act (RA) No. 3844 (Agricultural 
Land Reform Code) foreshadowing the current organizational structure that deals 
with land settlement policy, it was President Marcos (1965-1986) who in 1971 
gave teeth to the Land Reform Code, and inaugurated the Department of Agrarian 
Reform (DAR)
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 an arm of which, the Bureau of Resettlement, continued the 
government’s resettlement policies. In the early 1980s an area of about 700,000 
hectares in 43 resettlement projects supported an estimated 50,000 families 
(Postrado 1984: 309). These figures not only reflected a state inability to deliver 
relief to the landless at a fast enough pace, but when observed against the 
increased need – especially in view of the violence and destruction in Mindanao – 
objectives fell short of the mark (Uhlig 1984a: 69). Perspective needs to be kept 
however. Just as in Indonesia and Malaysia, the easiest lands had already been 
developed, in the case of Mindanao, the ‘frontier’ can be said to have been settled.  
 
Transmigration: Sociocultural Implications 
Whatever the objectives – developmental, redistributive, economic, or social – 
imagined by the instigators of transmigration or resettlement programs, one 
ramification of their deliberations was the meeting in the resettlement zone of a 
diverse cohort of ethnic groups, a diversity that encompassed linguistic, religious, 
cultural, and class difference. I suggest that while political and bureaucratic 
decision-makers were motivated to act by the above concerns they paid scant 
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 At times known as the Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR). 
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attention to the sociocultural implications of their transmigration initiatives. With 
regard to the autochthonous residents, they imagined that the ‘pacification’ and 
assimilation of those minorities would ensue by settling the frontier (De Jesus 
2001: 451, Paderanga Jr. 1995: 49). With regard to the heterogeneous settler 
cohort itself, they probably imagined a future coexistence, one in which ethnically 
diverse groups continued to maintain their ethnocultural particularities whilst 
living amidst their migrant neighbours – rather in the manner of a multicultural 
society. The sociocultural product of transmigration has been an inconsistent one, 
the outcome in large measure dependent upon circumstance. In the Philippines a 
propensity for transcending ethnocultural particularities has occurred in Narra / 
Palawan for example, while in Mindanao (and archipelagic resettlement regions 
such as Kalimantan, Moluccas, Papua, and Sulawesi) ethno-particularities have 
been reified, resulting in chauvinism and discord (Ananta 2006, 2006a, Gutierrez 
and Borras Jr. 2004, Tirtosudarmo 2006).  
 Two strands to the settler-integration dilemma might be discerned. Firstly 
it might be asked how the settlers themselves accommodate each others’ 
differences, whether among them there is a propensity for ethnic reification, 
ambivalence, or the transcending (transculturation) of ethnocultural identities. 
Secondly, it should be revealed whether (and how) the transmigrant and the 
indigene have reached a modus vivendi.
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 Obviously, this ‘modus’ is complicated 
by the fact that the migrant is encroaching on the indigene’s former ancestral 
domain, a domain that has been deemed not sufficiently or effectively occupied. 
In the Philippine context the cultural boundary of belief structure / religion – be it 
Animism, Christianity, or Islam – has been touted as a factor influencing 
indigene-settler coexistence; however, archipelagic examples illustrating the 
limitations of the religious boundary in isolation abound.
150
 Complicating the 
integrative impulse has been the issue of the role played by the state. In state-
initiated transmigration projects, even ‘weak states’ continue to exert some power 
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 I use the nomenclature ‘indigene’ and ‘indigenous’ with the full realisation that it is a value-
laden term. In some instances it might be replaced by the ‘autochthonous’, but this is also 
problematic. How ‘native’ is the native? The settlers after all are indigenous to their region-of-
origin – or are they? Discourse in the Philippines surrounding the rights of the IP (indigenous 
person), and relationships to the ancestral domain (AD) are complex. It appears that the lowland 
Christian is exempt from indigenous-ness and ‘ancestral domain-ness’, while those labels are more 
liable to apply to the Muslim or Animist, whether he be upland or lowland. Swidden agriculture 
appears to play a role in defining the indigenousness or otherwise of an individual’s identity. To 
appreciate the dilemma one needs only reverse the transmigration trajectory, in imagination. 
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 Indigene and settler Muslims in Lampung (Sumatra), or indigene and settler Christians in Papua 
are two salient examples of how other cultural factors, class, or ‘civilisational’ development 
hamper the integration of the settler, or at least complicate coexistence. 
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among settler-beneficiaries to control disintegrative social forces. Conversely 
spontaneous transmigrants have proved less amenable to submit to the dictates of 
the state. 
 
Transmigration: Planned v. Spontaneous 
The Philippines – as did its neighbours Indonesia and Malaysia – faced great 
fiscal constraints when implementing its resettlement strategies.
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 Given the 
increasing costs, which these recently independent states could ill afford, it might 
be asked why the state involved itself in funding resettlement in the first place, 
given the later increase in spontaneous migration. If spontaneous migrants were 
ready to follow in the wake of relatives already settled in a given area why did the 
state persist in its efforts? One explanation is that spontaneous or self-funded 
migrants possessed some resources. In contradistinction the state-sponsored 
migrant was resource poor and thus a beneficiary of affirmative action initiatives. 
Reacting to the charge that the ill-afforded funds sustaining Indonesia’s 
Transmigrasi initiatives might be better used to fund infrastructure projects 
Hardjono (1978) argued that the transmigration program was instrumental in 
getting the ball rolling with regards to population mobility and relocation. It acted 
as a catalyst for the spontaneity that followed.  
 State-sponsored land settlement programs in Malaysia and Indonesia not 
only acted as catalyst for later spontaneous migration, but in terms of percentage 
of people relocated, essentially dominated the rural-to-rural resettlement 
demographic. This has not been the case in the Philippines. The stop-start nature 
of state-sponsored programs such as the NLSA and NARRA (as well as preceding 
and later programs) meant that Philippine state resettlement numbers never 
mirrored the percentages achieved in Malaysia and Indonesia. In the Philippines it 
was the spontaneous settler that was to vastly outnumber the sponsored migrant 
(Wernstedt and Simkins 1965: 91-93).
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 Krinks’ 1974 study of land settlement in 
Mawab Municipality in Mindanao suggests that much of the land ‘settled’ by 
spontaneous movers was in fact occupied by squatting (p. 7). Whereas state-
sponsored resettlement could be carried out in an orderly fashion, with regard for 
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 At the time Indonesia was ramping up its transmigration program it had the ‘windfall’ of petro-
dollars to fund the expansion. Malaysia likewise had a strong plantation sector based on rubber 
and other tropical export crops to help fund its resettlement expansion.  
152
 Wernstedt and Simkins (1965: 91-93) suggest that all the state-sponsored programs combined 
contributed to at most 10 percent of the population inflow into Mindanao. The twelve-year period 
1948-1960 witnessed the greatest net migration into Mindanao: 1,252,000 or some 100,000 per 
annum. The period 1903-1939 averaged 19,000 per annum and totalled 700,000. 
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indigene sensibilities, and infrastructure and service demands, spontaneous 
settlers often had little regard for indigene land-use arrangements. For many, the 
land appeared not to be cultivated and that meant it was empty and available to be 
exploited. As migration numbers increased, violence, especially violence over 
land resources, ensued. 
 
Indigene-Transmigrant Social Tensions 
Social tensions in the wake of migration is not confined to the Archipelago, but 
has gained salience as a result of the ethnic violence that has beset several regions 
of both the Philippines and Indonesia. There is no defined trajectory for the 
breakdown of community cohesion in resettlement areas, but it is possible to 
speculate which factors have contributed (or continue to contribute) to difficult 
coexistences, or worse still to the outbreak of violence and the associated 
phenomenon of ethnic cleansing. That said, it should be stated that tension may 
exist without recourse to violence; coexistence in some instances might be 
predicated on tolerance at best. In some instances – as exemplified by Palawan – 
where extant resettlement was scant, tension was minimised because the indigene 
could absent himself from the settlement zone by retreating into the hinterland, 
where swidden agriculture could continue to be practised (Lopez 1986, Brown 
1991). Once the frontier was more densely settled, the withdrawal option 
disappeared, as was the case in Mindanao. 
 To illustrate the range of anxieties that contribute to social tension in the 
settlement zone I shall juxtapose the Philippine experience with that of Indonesia. 
No one experience fits all criteria but some themes that added to social tension 
were predicated on the loss of habitat and associated resources, inadequate 
compensation when it was offered, indigene disdain for the migrant (or vice-
versa), a fear of being ‘swamped’, reaction to chauvinism, and so forth. 
 Social tensions in the principal Philippine resettlement zone, Mindanao, 
have been due to a litany of grievances: loss of ancestral domain, minoritisation, 
and discrimination, which have been magnified over the years. Received wisdom 
suggests that the religio-cultural boundary dividing the Muslim and Animist 
indigenes from a lowland Christian settler cohort underpins the social tension in 
the region (Diaz 2003, Eder and McKenna 2004, Liow 2006).
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 Conversely, 
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 Whilst often portrayed as an internecine Christian-Muslim struggle the Moro insurgency might 
more realistically be regarded as one in which recourse to religion masks the temporal concerns of 
the protagonists, or as Roy (1994: 212) asserts, the employment of transcendental symbols to act 
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Campado (2005) suggests that the failure of the Commonwealth and subsequent 
Filipino administrations to protect indigenous land rights greatly contributed to 
regional tension. The appearance that there was minimal tension during early 
resettlement efforts may have had less to do with tolerance than it had with a 
relative abundance of land to be exploited – a socio-economic imperative. 
 In light of this socio-economic revelation, a note of caution needs to be 
tendered as regards to what explanation is proffered for any potential 
ethnocultural division. Following the American Administration’s ‘pacification’ of 
Mindanao in the first decade of the twentieth century, the U.S. advanced the 
concept of private property, which led to the commodification of lands that had 
hitherto been communally managed. For peoples practising swidden agriculture, 
or abiding by usufruct land tenure, this was an alien concept. The introduction of 
the concomitant Torrens system of land titling and delineation disadvantaged the 
indigene. Land grabbing by literate outsiders who availed themselves of Torrens 
titling legalities saw indigenous land usage usurped.
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 Exploitation, attempted 
assimilation, and the driving of some into the jungle contributed to social tension 
(Crystal 1982: 101, Fianza 2004: 5-6). 
 Disdain of the Other was a further contributing aspect of interethnic 
tensions in the resettlement zone. This worked on a number of levels; disdain by 
the transmigrant for the indigene among whom he had been settled, disdain by the 
indigene for the settler, and disdain among migrants for each others’ cultures. 
Transmigrant disdain for the indigene is evidenced in the Palawan contact zone by 
the marginalisation of the indigene (Lopez 1986, Brown 1991). As they attest, the 
                                                                                                                                     
as convenient covers for mundane interests. The temporal concerns in many Philippine 
resettlement zones have been the unease created by the necessary absorption of millions of 
Hispanicised / Christianised transmigrants into ancestral lands. Roy adds: “Clever and often 
cynical manipulation of religious symbols for the purposes of social mobilisation by both religious 
and secular elites” contributes to the masking of the temporal. In the Mindanao context, both sides 
of the conflict – the advocates for Bangsamoro and settler interests – might be viewed as having 
mobilised the sociocultural divide to advance their causes. 
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 The Torrens system of land titling was the brainchild of Robert Torrens (1814-1884), third 
governor of South Australia, who recognised the need to establish a register of lands that would 
preclude constant litigation over ownership. The Torrens system was introduced into the 
Philippines by the U.S. to replace less defensible systems that had evolved under the Spanish 
Crown. Iyer and Maurer (2009) from the Harvard Business School make a compelling case for the 
shortcomings of the land titling regime that the American colonial administration attempted to 
introduce. The expense of complying with the Torrens titling legalities was estimated at 10 % of 
the value of the land in question (p. 18). So onerous was the cost that the first two decades of 
American occupation witnessed an increase in squatting from 2.4 % to 7.5 %. Those most 
educated, already-landed, and better connected were able to avail themselves of the titling regime. 
Local irreverence for bureaucratic processes involved in the U.S. colonial developmental drive 
meant that many Mindanaons forfeited their lands. The settlers, loggers, the literate and the 
corporations better understood the legal requirements and contributed to indigene dispossession. 
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lowland Christian immigrant often had general contempt for the primordial 
lifeways of the indigenous Pala’wan, for example. In this case the indigene’s 
swidden agriculture, Animist beliefs, and more equalitarian gender relations were 
at odds with the wet-rice agriculture, Christianity, and patriarchality of the 
transmigrant.
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 Conversely, in some situations disdain for transmigrants was 
evidenced by their perceived lower social standing in society, given their general 
recruitment from society’s indigent (Arndt 1983: 64, Tigno 2006: 28).156 
 There is a further level at which disdain works against intercultural 
harmony. Intermarriage, as will be demonstrated in the Narra / Palawan model of 
resettlement, is an important factor contributing to cultural accommodation 
(transculturation); that is, in breaking down barriers that impede sociocultural 
accommodation. However, there are instances where intermarriage is voluntarily 
restricted, thus precluding the potential for cultural exchange. The rural milieu, 
where everyone is ‘in view’, may be more of an impediment to intercultural 
relationships than would be the case in an urban setting. In her Riau (Sumatra) 
land-use study Hardjono (2001) demonstrates the salience of disdain. In her 
particular resettlement zone only four (4) men from the second generation were 
married to indigenous women, while one transmigrant woman was married to a 
local man. While in this instance exogamy was rare it was not premised on any 
sense of prohibitive injunction. 
 There is no vast cultural gulf between the Javanese migrants and the 
resident indigenes in Hardjono’s study. Both indigene and migrant are of the same 
faith, Islam. A potential issue impacting on indigene-settler relations in Riau 
might be the outward display of religious practice. The ‘outer island’ Muslim 
often regards himself as more devout and ‘pure’ than his Javanese fellow-Muslim 
who is regarded as partly religio-mystic (Tjondronegoro 1988: 43-44). In 
receiving societies such as the Minangkabau of Sumatra, where religion is more 
than mere faith but an extension of adat (superseding the individual), the degree 
of religiosity evidenced in the santri / abangan divide may impact on integration 
outcomes (Oey 1982: 47-48). However, not all intergroup disengagements are as 
overt as those between people of different faiths. The case of the Hindu Balinese 
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 Brown (1991: 171) states: “In general, Palawan [sic] have more eqalitarian [sic] relations 
between women and men than Christian and Muslim Filipinos. They do not perceive the house as 
the women’s domain and the farm as the man’s domain. Instead, they see the house and fields as 
one unit that is maintained by all household members.”  
156
 This assertion pertains more to those recruited by state-sponsored programs, which had as their 
raisons d’être the affirmative action of uplifting the indigent and landless. 
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transmigrant is clearly one predicated on differences in religion, custom, and 
culture. Likewise, the three-way disconnect between Animist, lowland Christian, 
and Muslim in the Philippines is complicated by other cultural markers: language, 
agricultural practice, and diet for example. 
 Despite the ostensible national union and unity objective of transmigration 
initiatives, which imagined a coalescing of diverse ethnocultural groups into an 
enhanced national identity, too little effort was made to promote integration 
between newcomers and the already-resident local people. The ideal of an 
indigene-settler rapprochement and coexistence could not realistically succeed 
without the implementation of equitable laws.
157
 Even in instances when 
ethnically diverse groups were included in a particular project the likelihood of 
intercultural adaptation was stymied by settling ethnicities apart. The ensuing 
enclave nature of resettlement allowed each cultural group to maintain its values 
intact and was a further instance of policy defeating the potential for ethnic 
dilution and the potential for re-identifications.
158
  
 A further irritant to indigene-settler harmony (in both Philippines and 
Indonesia) hinged on the perception that the migrant, allocated several hectares of 
‘free’ land, a house, and sustenance during a period of establishment, was 
perceived as economically advantaged.
159
 
 The degree of social tension between migrant and the indigene was 
sometimes influenced by the magnitude of resettlement initiatives. The bigger the 
size of the transmigrant settlement, the greater was the propensity for in-group 
identification and the need not to go outside the settlement, except perhaps to 
trade in the market or visit nearby towns (Oey and Astika 1978: 135). The 
formation of ethnic enclaves had the propensity to isolate groups, thwarting both 
community integration and diminishing spaces for intercultural dialogue. Davis’ 
(1976) study of the Balinese migration to Sulawesi – alluded to above – candidly 
illustrates this position. During the period of intermittent migration from Bali, the 
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 The inequitable treatment is neatly exemplified by the implementation of various Public Land 
Acts which allowed Christians larger land-holdings than Muslims. For example, Public Land Act 
926 / 2874 limited Muslim land-holdings to 10 hectares at a time Christians could avail themselves 
of 24 hectares. Commonwealth Act 41 (1936) reduced this to 4 hectares for Muslims and Lumads, 
although Christians were entitled to claim 16 (Rodil 2004: 33). 
158
 A recent visit to a transmigrant settlement area in Baturaja (South Sumatra) allowed an insight 
into the continued enclave nature of settlement projects. While indigenous settlers – at the 
appropriate percentage – have been included in projects, each ethnicity lives among their own. 
159
 Given that a major aim of the resettlement phenomenon was that of social uplift and the 
concomitant stymieing of sociopolitical unrest, by not addressing the needs of the indigene, the 
state in effect was contributing to social unrest on the settlement frontier. The indigene was often 
just as indigent as the transmigrant who came into his orbit via social uplift programs. 
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small numbers involved were more amenable to interact socially, intermarry, and 
indeed be flexible in many aspects of their cultural practice. This attitude altered 
when Balinese transmigration was ramped up and enclavism ensued. Within an 
enlarged co-ethnic cohort individuals had the choice to re-identify with their 
region-of-origin. 
 A factor contributing to integrative difficulties was the inconsistency in 
indigene-migrant attitudes, which could be calibrated, depending on whether the 
migrants were spontaneous or state-funded migrants. The general position was 
that spontaneous migrants were more amenable to integrate to local conditions – 
in certain circumstances.
160
 Often self-funded, better educated and more highly 
motivated, they were less averse to learning local languages and living in a 
dispersed manner, which appeared less threatening to the local populace. Arndt 
(1988: 60) – speaking for the Indonesian resettlement model – envisioned future 
sociopolitical problems, because transmigration in the minds of local people was 
perceived as a ‘Javanization’ tool.161 In the Philippines, given the overwhelming 
preponderance of spontaneous migrants vis-à-vis the state-funded, the 
spontaneous-assisted settler dichotomy is somewhat moot. Whatever their 
disposition, it is evident by the example of the Mindanao imbroglio that the 
lowland Christian settler is no more amenable to compromise his cultural 
particularities than is his Lumad or Muslim indigene counterpart. It is this 
example of intercultural disharmony that I now address. 
 
Transmigration: Implications for National Unity 
In theory, transmigration has the capacity to bring together a heterogeneity of 
groups, who – once exposed to each other’s cultures – might overcome 
chauvinisms, anxieties and ambivalences to become functioning citizens of the 
polyethnic nation-state. In fact the architects of state-sponsored resettlement in 
nascent postcolonial nation-states factored in the possibilities for manipulating the 
sociocultural division of their societies. They imagined transmigration as a 
facilitator for exposing diverse cultural groups to each other, if not necessarily to 
merge these cultures (transculturation), then at least to stimulate social interaction 
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 The spontaneous migrant, often with minimal state support, was thrown onto his own resources, 
and as such needed to develop modi vivendi with those among whom he had come to settle. Again 
no hard and fast rule can explain differing integrative successes, which were dependent on a range 
of factors: the degree of cultural difference, the rate of intermarriage, economic considerations 
(especially pressure on the available land resource) and suchlike. 
161
 Unfortunately, as it transpired, subsequent Dayak-Madurese violence in Kalimantan and 
elsewhere has vindicated Arndt’s predictions (Tanasaldy 2012, Tomsa 2009). 
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with the view to minimising overt ethnocultural differences and further the 
inculcation of new national identities. Central to this reasoning was the realisation 
that polyethnic postcolonial polities were premised on shaky imaginings. Their 
diversity mirrored the imperial reach of relinquishing colonial regimes, and 
withdrawal of those regimes opened up the spectre of diversity degenerating into 
disunity. The governing elite in each of the newly-independent archipelagic 
nation-states, inheriting a heterogeneity of languages, religions, ethnicities, 
cultures and classes, was anxious to minimise regionalism, insurrection and 
sectional identity. 
 Thus evolved the political environment in which the central tenet of 
national union and unity came to be a significant factor in deliberations involving 
archipelagic transmigration and land settlement policies. This was part of the 
rationale for the Philippines and its archipelagic neighbours to implement 
significant population relocations. Two of the seven stated policy goals of 
Indonesia’s Presidential Transmigration Law of 1972 – national union and unity, 
and the strengthening of national defence and security – illustrate state concerns 
(Tirtosudarmo 2001: 214). Part of this logic hinged on the minimising of 
difference rather than the celebrating of diversity.
162
 “…the first generation of 
Indonesian leaders moved toward a more transethnic nationalism – Indonesian 
civic nationalism…” adds Tirtosudarmo (2005: 16), one in which ethnic 
differences might be diluted. 
 The ‘assimilation’ and ‘pacification’ of minorities as a broader social 
objective has possibly been one of the most significant failures of Philippine land 
settlement policy. For the first four decades, as the resettlement of incoming 
Christian migrants increased, Mindanao was made more governable by the 
American colonizers initially, and early Philippine governments subsequently. As 
the frontier areas filled up, indigene-settler relations began to deteriorate. Logging 
roads into the hinterlands built in the 1950s and 1960s exacerbated the situation as 
they increased the flow of migrants to more remote areas. Indigenous land tenure 
arrangements (slash-and-burn) vied with settled farmsteads; indigenous Animist 
and Islam swidden agriculturalists competed with sedentary Christians (Paderanga 
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 The founding fathers of the Indonesian Republic – well aware of the potential for national 
disintegration – devised that the national motto of the nascent Republic be ‘Unity in Diversity’ 
(Bhinneka Tunggal Ika). Article 36A of the Indonesian Constitution reflects the gravity of the 
deliberations. While these Javanese words hail from a poem promoting tolerance between 
fourteenth century Hindus and Buddhists, they continue to resonate in a post-transmigration era 
which has witnessed indigene-migrant intolerance. 
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Jr. 1988: 144-145). More remote communities, such as the Bagobo and Ata in 
Davao Province for example, found themselves increasingly marginalised by 
settlers, squatters, corporations and timber operations. Their reaction was recourse 
to ‘outlaw’ retaliation, but without a unified response they were soon crushed 
(Abinales 2004: 96-101). 
 Far from effecting national unity aspirations, Philippine resettlement 
regions such as Mindanao have challenged the centrist notion that the minimising 
of overt ethnocultural particularities is possible. For complex sociocultural, 
economic and ethnic reasons, indigene and migrant have been unable to establish 
modi vivendi. The Philippines is not alone in witnessing the mayhem of post-
transmigration violence; several regions of Indonesia (Kalimantan, the Moluccas, 
Papua, Sulawesi, and Timor) have experienced upheavals in which the reification 
of ethnic or communal identities has led to violence and the displacement of at 
times more than a million IDPs (Hugo 2002). An indigene-transmigrant 
disconnect couched in religious terms – but more realistically viewed in 
economic, ethnic and social terms – is also occurring in Southern Thailand, a 
resettlement zone in which the ethnic Malay (in this case also Muslim) majority 
regions of the Thai nation-state face an in-migration of northerners.
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 Tirtosudarmo (2006), addressing the issue of migration and the potential 
for conflict in ‘communities of [resettlement] colonies’, acknowledges the role 
that both ethnicity and transmigration and non-cultural factors such as economic 
well-being play in the process of nation formation and state-building. “The 
process of nation-building in many postcolonial states in Asia is therefore always 
related to the problem of maintaining sustainable development in multiethnic 
societies” (p. 15). Accenting the relevance of the Mindanao conflict to the process 
of nation-building, he makes the case that “the ethnic-based conflicts that have 
broken out in the Asian region are minority group responses to the imposing 
centralistic and hegemonic policies from the major ethnic groups” (p. 15). In this 
context the Narra / Palawan resettlement zone is out of synch; its multiethnic 
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 The recent increase in insurgent violence in the three southern Thailand provinces: Pattani, 
Yala and Narathiwat – in which Malays have formed an 80 % majority – underscores the 
inconclusivity of the postcolonial condition (Brown 1988). In 1910 the Siamese government – in 
an effort to dilute Malay identity and Malay resistance – attempted to educate Pattani Malays in 
Thai. When the military regime of Marshal Phibul Songkhram (1938) naively attempted to 
assimilate Malays into the Thai nation-state, opposition to Thai authority increased; and this has 
been exacerbated by the resettlement of non-Malays in the south (Harish 2006). 
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settler cohort did not support a dominant or majority group.
164
 While group size 
matters in some circumstances, Tirtosudarmo (2006: 16) suggests it is the process 
of nation-building and modernisation that pits ethnic groups against each other as 
they “begin competing in larger economic and political systems in which, at any 
given point in time, groups differ in their numbers and their control of resources.” 
In the context of power relations and the new politics of identity it is ethnicity that 
comes to play a central role in the struggle for scarce resources. In these altered 
political circumstances: 
people are forced into new social relationships and the logical place to begin to 
look for such relationships is to identify oneself as a member of a larger 
something based on those attributes that one carries around with oneself, namely 
one’s language, historical place, race, and religion. Ethnicity, in the broader 
sense, becomes a very important cultural marker that is played out within the 
context of power relations and the new politics of identity (p. 16). 
 
The Philippine state was well aware that the ethnoreligious divide had the 
potential to be destabilising for the nation-state project. The Lumad population 
was too dispersed and culturally diverse to pose a challenge to the state, but the 
ethnic groups – for whom Islam was a Barthian boundary – could transcend their 
ethnic particularities and act collectively to defy the state; a position that ethnic 
groups acting individually may not have attempted. As land dispossession 
increased in the postwar period with the increase of transmigrant arrivals, a 
perceived intensification of Muslim ‘banditry’ prompted the state to investigate 
the causes of unrest (Eder and McKenna 2004: 70-71). Rather than acknowledge 
that economic grievances – influenced by rapid in-migration – were central to 
local disaffection for the state, the congressional report blamed Muslim culture for 
Muslim poverty. The Congress of the Philippines, House of Representatives 
(1955) went on to state: “In their ignorance and in their trend toward religious 
fanaticism, the Muslims are sadly wanting in the advantages of normal health and 
social factors and functions” (Glang cited Eder and McKenna 2004: 71). 
 Transmigration assumed an unforseen disintegrative role in the Philippine 
nation-building process. The resettlement of culturally diverse groups failed in its 
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 I am cognisant of the fact that while a dominant / minority model of resettlement failed to 
materialise among the various Narran transmigrant ethnic groups, the potential minority, that of 
the indigene failed to challenge the altered realities of resettlement. Unlike their indigenous 
confrères in Mindanao, they either merged into the new community or retreated into less settled 
zones. This was possible as population density was relatively low in the Narra Municipality. As 
transmigration to Palawan continues, and the pressure for land increases, the future of indigene-
migrant harmony might yet be tested, as it has been in other municipalities (Lopez 1986, Brown 
1991). 
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‘pacification and integration of minorities’ role primarily because the two groups 
(Christian and Muslim) failed to engage as equals. The culture of the numerically 
dominant group (lowland Christian) came to dominate the imagined national 
consciousness, and it was in this climate that the ‘social development’ of the 
Muslim was mooted. As a consequence of the Special Committee’s deliberations, 
a Commission of National Integration (CNI) instituted a scholarship program that 
was hoped would ‘modernise’ the Muslim.165 Eder and McKenna (2004: 71) 
suggest that many of the more than 8,000 Muslim CNI students – during their 
Manila educational sojourn – experienced a politicisation that made them more 
aware of their marginal situation, thereby further radicalising them. The Christian 
cultural hegemony they observed made them cognisant of the fact that the same 
Christian-dominated state that provided their scholarships continued to 
marginalise them. Far from having an integrative effect, the CNI scholarship 
unintentionally created a politicised cadre that in 1971 led to the formation of the 
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).
166
 
 An instructive addendum is in order. Simons (1997) contends that citizens 
have little or no faith in a state that cannot guarantee people’s social and economic 
security. It could be argued that the Philippine state is such an entity. In such 
milieux, identifying with those one can trust – kin, community, faith – provides a 
security frame of reference of sorts. Where the state fails society, the potential for 
particularist interpretations of societal reality can be problematic. This is 
applicable to Mindanao on several levels. Tribulation in Mindanao encompasses 
more than the indigene-settler divide. Santos (cited Tigno 2006: 25) suggests that 
a distinction needs to be made between the Moro (or Bangsamoro) problem and 
the Mindanao problem in general. What proportion of the conflict should be 
viewed in terms of intercultural discord, and what proportion should be viewed 
with reference to Simons’ ‘weak state’ scenario is unclear. In this context Tigno 
(2006: 25) observes that the Mindanao conflict has exceeded the bounds of a 
cultural or communal conflict in which faith is central: 
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 Eder and McKenna (2004: 71) declare: “As the principal policy instrument to effect integration, 
the postcolonial Philippine government continued the practice first established during the 
American period of ‘developing’ Philippine Muslims not by providing them the material resources 
of the West, but by endeavouring to remove by the selective provision of university educations the 
perceived cultural disabilities that were thought to be impeding their advancement, and, indirectly 
that of the Philippine nation.” 
166
 The MNLF began its armed separatist insurgency following several religiously-perceived 
flashpoints and President Marcos’s declaration of martial law in 1972. 
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At present the principal armed groups involve the Philippine Government or 
more specifically the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and its adjunct, the 
Philippine National Police (PNP) on the one side, and the Moro National 
Liberation Front (MNLF), and its splinter groups, the Moro Islamic Liberation 
Front (MILF) and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) on the other…167  
  
 Given the diversity of protagonists that Tigno has outlined, and the 
multiplicity of their aspirations, it would seem that it will be some time before 
conflict-fatigue, and a rationalisation of the aspirations will coincide. In the 
interim the national unity implications of transmigration will need to be 
reappraised. It is unlikely that the course of history will be undone and that the 
migrants will return to whence they came. The accident of history determining 
one group of Austronesians adopting Islam, while another Christianity, also can’t 
be undone; as cannot other ramifications of the colonial era. What can however be 
demonstrated – in light of the Narra / Palawan model of resettlement – is that 
transmigration can be a positive facilitator of national unity aspirations. 
 
Summary 
The Philippines expected much from its land settlement policies and programs. 
The objectives outlined above have been partially achieved. For example, a more 
balanced population distribution, which in turn had implications for regional 
development, has taken place.
168
 It cannot be argued that these achievements 
would not have occurred in the absence of transmigration, although I suggest that 
state-sponsored and concomitant spontaneous migrations expedited the process. 
The utilization of human and natural resources (in this case land) have not met 
expectations, given that much underemployment continues to exist alongside low 
productivity in the rural sector vis-à-vis that of other Asian rural economies. The 
reasons for this state of affairs are complex but central to low productivity must be 
the systemic failure to alter conservative land tenure patterns and its consequent 
disincentives. The disparity between the wealthy and the 12.7 million (15 percent) 
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 Tigno (2006: 25) appends: “In addition to the MNLF, MILF, and ASG, there are also a number 
of other independent break-away groups and factions operating independently of (but sometimes 
in coordination with) the major combatant groups… Moreover, the communist New People’s 
Army (NPA) has always been active in… northern and western parts of Mindanao… Aside from 
the Moro-based groups, there are also Lumad-based as well as Christian-based groupings that have 
received military equipment and training from the AFP. These are also known as the ‘lost 
commands’.” 
168
 Thus, the MPM islands (Mindanao, Palawan, Mindoro) constituting approximately 40 % of the 
Philippines in area now support 27 % of the total population, whereas in 1903 that figure was 
approximately 8-9 %. Some perspective needs to be kept. At the same time as there has been a 
redistribution of population, the total population of the Philippines has increased, creating a 
situation where, despite emigration from densely populated zones, the population of those zones 
have nevertheless increased. Cebu is a case in point (Table 4.1). 
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of Filipinos unable to meet a minimum daily requirement of 1,750 calories 
(EBYB 2012: 699) indicates that improvements in living standards and equitably 
distributed development have not resulted from the millions of extra hectares put 
into production by resettlement programs.
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 The continued Bangsamoro insurgency, as well as sporadic socio-
economic unrest, is testament to the conclusion that national union and unity has 
not been achieved by transmigratory policies; in fact it could be argued that far 
from strengthening the cohesion of the imagined Filipino state, rampant 
resettlement in zones such as Mindanao has contributed to security concerns and 
put the defence of the Republic under severe strain. The reasons for the 
insurgency are complex: the historical disconnect of much of Mindanao from the 
Spanish-American body politic, the economic marginalisation of the indigene vis-
à-vis the migrants, the minoritisation of the indigene and concomitant perception 
of cultural assailment, and the struggle to feel part of a nation-state that views 
itself through the prism of the majority, i.e. the lowland Christian. 
 Unlike the Dutch and British, who for the most part minimized their 
interference in indigenous land tenure arrangements, the legacy of the Spanish 
latifundium system of land tenure, in which many Filipinos were prevented from 
owning the land they tilled, continues to resonate in modern times. As mentioned 
above, land reform to ameliorate the inequities of land concentration has been on 
the political agenda since the time of the struggle for independence from Spain 
and the United States. However in a society where political power rests in the 
hands of landowner-legislators, change has been difficult to implement. 
 To undermine the agrarian unrest it was determined to make ‘public lands’ 
in less densely settled areas such as Mindanao, Palawan and parts of Luzon 
available for settlement. In theory this logic of resettlement had the potential of 
undermining resistance, but as has been shown, resettlement did not happen in a 
vacuum. An increasing population and a finite ‘public land’ resource determined 
that the logic was flawed, even though it may have had temporary ameliorative 
effects. The logic was further complicated where opinions differed on what 
constituted ‘public lands’. The swidden agriculturalists and usufruct land users of 
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 Again perspective is required. Increased educational attainments, health outcomes, and 
consumption is proceeding apace, but compared with some neighbours, lags behind. The extent of 
the OFW cohort, and its necessity for existing Filipino standards of living, is again testament to the 
fact that transmigration has not fulfilled the role expected of it. 
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the south saw nothing ‘public’ about the lands they deemed their patrimony or 
pusaka (heirloom) (Abreu 2008: 60-61). 
 When attempting to analyse the success or otherwise of Philippine land 
settlement programs and policies we cannot ignore the impact of rapid Filipino 
demographic change. When tentative resettlement programs were attempted at the 
beginning of the U.S. occupation, the colony’s population was less than 10 
million. Had the population not increased from the time Philippine land settlement 
programs were first mooted it is possible that the programs would have delivered 
more. The outbreak of the Bangsamoro insurgency at the beginning of the 1970s 
might be gauged as the point when the empty ‘frontier’ lands had been settled, a 
time when the Philippine population was approximately 35 million. In a decade 
hence (2020) the Philippines will be expected to support 110 million or three 
times the population of 50 years ago.
170
 In the absence of meaningful 
industrialization, emigration, or birth control, it is difficult to see how current 
(DAR) land settlement policy and programs will have any appreciable impact on 
the objectives outlined above. 
 In summation, and before proceeding to an analysis of Palawan as 
transmigrant destination, I suggest that the cultural complexity of the Philippines 
– with its 171 living languages, panoply of cultural practice and traditions, and 
ethnocultural identifications – is in itself no impediment in forging a successful 
nation-state. This presupposes that the nation-state is a relevant and worthy goal. 
The alternative is a process of acculturation and eventual assimilation into a 
dominant culture à la Australia, France, and the United States, 
171
 the maintenance 
of a multicultural state à la Belgium, Canada and Switzerland, or a process 
whereby diverse others un-reify their cultural particularities, adapt and adopt each 
other’s cultural practices (transculturation) to create a new composite identity, a 
progression in which the sense of loss is outweighed by a sense of gain. The Narra 
/ Palawan study, I suggest, reveals that the latter trajectory is possible. 
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 Both Indonesia with 130 persons per km² and Malaysia with 80 per km² have national 
population densities far below that of the Philippine’s 300 per km². Given the Philippines’ higher 
birth rate, population pressure and concomitant land: man ratios will continue to impact more 
heavily on the Philippines than on its archipelagic neighbours. 
171
 While I have previously touted Australia, France, and the United States as multicultural 
polities, a rider is in order. Although these states have outwardly embraced the notion of 
multiculturalism (and in some cases enacted legislation to facilitate the coexistence of various 
cultures), the degree of permissible cultural equivalence is debateable. It might be more 
appropriate to discern these states as polyethnic, that is, environments in which many ethnicities 
reside, but in which there is an expectation that the cultural particularities of those ethnic groups 
continuing to arrive as immigrants will be subsumed into the dominant resident culture. 
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MAP 5 – PALAWAN PROVINCE / ISLAND: SHOWING MUNICIPALITIES 
 
 Source: Google Image / <http://alturl.com/xvva2> 
 MAP 6 – MUNICIPALITY OF NARRA: SHOWING BARANGAYS 
Source: MPDO
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CHAPTER V – CASE STUDY: NARRA / PALAWAN 
 
This chapter introduces Narra / Palawan as a Philippines zone of resettlement.
172
 
(I conflate the Municipality of Narra and the Province of Palawan to suggest that 
both are characteristic zones of resettlement).
 
It addresses why the Narra 
Municipality was chosen as representative of both the transmigrant experience, 
and the concomitant sociocultural ramifications of the coming together of a 
heterogeneous settler cohort. To anchor the analysis of the transculturation that 
has taken place in this resettlement milieu, the chapter begins with an outline of 
the history of the resettlement project, the ethnic diversity of its settlers, and the 
reasons for their arrival. While Narra continues to be a magnet for spontaneous 
migrants from across the Philippine Archipelago, the historical antecedent of 
Narra as a state-sponsored resettlement project continues to influence 
contemporary perspectives of the community. Prior to locating the salience of 
Narra as illustrative of a successful model of resettlement, an outline of why and 
how the Island / Province of Palawan fits into the resettlement milieu will be 
given. The chapter concludes with a reflection on aspects of the methodology, 
including a critique of the Philippine-unique approach in defining identity in a 
broad-based sense (‘lowland Christian’ for example) and (ethnic) identity more 
particularly.
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 Palawan has been a relative latecomer to the Philippine transmigration 
phenomenon. In the first half of the twentieth century, during both the U.S. 
Insular Government and the Filipino Commonwealth administrations, Mindanao 
was the focus of state-sponsored and spontaneous resettlement initiatives. 
Mindanao might thus appear a more logical locale for a study investigating the 
transculturation phenomenon and its progenitor, the transmigration experience. 
However, the seeming inability of the indigene and transmigrant in Mindanao to 
find a modus vivendi suggested that this ‘contact zone’ has not proven to be a 
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 Narra / Palawan (Municipality and Province) should not be confused with the resettlement 
authority NARRA (National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration) which had a 
presence in Palawan as well as the Philippines at large. Likewise, the Narra central to this thesis, 
should not be confused with Narra (Pterocarpus indicus) the Philippine national tree. Once the 
thesis stabilises, there will appear instances where Narra replaces Narra / Palawan, unless both 
Municipality and Province are being alluded to. Clarity will be dictated by context. 
173
 Identity ascription and self-ascription in the Philippines is complicated in several ways: (1) by 
the diversity of ethnolinguistic heritages, (2) by recourse to sweeping ethnocultural generalisations 
such as Animist, ‘lowland Christian’, or Muslim, (3) in regional loyalties occasioned by the 
archipelagic nature of the state, and (4) by the rapid increase in internal migration (transmigration) 
during the twentieth century. 
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successful model of intercultural coexistence.
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 Concomitantly, due to ongoing 
security concerns, undertaking fieldwork in Mindanao for this thesis would have 
been both imprudent and impractical. Other regions of the Philippines (Mindoro, 
Negros Occidental, and the Cagayan Valley in Luzon) might have proved suitable 
alternative research sites, but the fortuitous choice of the Province of Palawan in 
general and the Municipality of Narra in particular, as both successful models of 
integration and continuing transmigrant destinations respectively, has proved to be 
justified. 
 Not only has the Narra model of resettlement shown the capacity for 
diverse ethnolinguistic groups to divine a modus vivendi for heterogeneous 
societies, but I suggest that it has also demonstrated that transculturation (mutual 
cultural exchange) has been a facilitator of integrational harmony, and has 
therefore played a central role in the success of Narra as a resettlement zone. In 
the absence of a blueprint for resettlement best-practice, it appears that a 
confluence of factors, including the non-dominance of any one ethnocultural 
group, intermarriage, education, the modernity project, and socio-economic 
security, has contributed to this success. When measured against the tribulation 
that has ensued in some Mindanao resettlement regions, the question that needs to 
be asked is why a heterogeneous transmigrant cohort in Palawan has managed to 
yield to transculturative effects, while this has proved less likely in Mindanao, and 
in analogous transmigration initiatives across the Malay Archipelago. 
 Transmigrants to Palawan have come from across the Philippines, from 
the Batanes Islands in the north to / and including settlers from Mindanao in the 
south.
175
 However, the vast majority of incomers have constituted ‘lowland 
Christian’ migrants from the more densely settled regions of Luzon and the 
Visayas. Their arrival is partly attributable to the perception that Palawan was an 
empty, undeveloped land. When measured against the demographic reality of 
disparities between sparsely and densely populated regions the Province did fall 
into the sparsely populated category. Viewed through the prism of the national 
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 While indigene-settler relations may have deteriorated in the decades following the ‘filling-up’ 
of the Mindanao ‘frontier’, this in no way suggests that sociocultural transformations have not 
occurred within transmigrant communities, or likewise within the indigenous communities, and to 
some extent between indigene and settler, but cognisance needs to be taken of the added 
difficulties inherent in any transculturative interactions in a zone of instability, where reification of 
extant ethnocultural certainties would be more likely. 
175
 The Batanes, lying mid-way between Luzon and Taiwan, constitute a province of the same 
name. Ironically, as the least densely populated province in the Republic, Batanes continues to be 
an out-migration region; some of its migrants have found their way to Narra Municipality – in the 
second least densely populated province – Palawan. 
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consciousness, this perceived emptiness and isolation caused Palawan to be given 
the epithet ‘the last frontier’ or ‘land of promise’ (Veloro 1996: 17). However, 
Ocampo (1996: 24) suggests a caveat needs to be inserted in relation to the 
Palawan-as-frontier image. “Frontier it was for the Spaniard, American, and 
Filipinos from other provinces, but it was home for a congery of local peoples 
(Batak-Tagbanua-Palawan-Cuyonon-Agutaynen-Cagayanen)…” Whichever the 
epithet proffered, the implication conjured up a land of plenty – in essence plenty 
of land – whose exploitation would help address the problems of landlessness 
faced in regions of the Philippines more densely populated. 
 
Palawan: ‘The Last Frontier’ and ‘Land of Promise’ 
Overview 
Located on the periphery of the ‘Spanish Philippines’, and beset for centuries by 
non-colonised people whom (because of their Muslim faith) the Spaniards 
collectively called Moros, Palawan has historically supported a relatively small 
population. This consciousness of Palawan as peripheral to the Philippine body 
politic continued into the American colonial period (1898-1946). Because of its 
relative isolation and small population the Province was chosen to house two 
institutions: the Culion Leper Colony (opened 1906) and the Iwahig Penal Colony 
(opened 1904), both of which reinforced the perception of the remoteness of the 
Province.
176
 A combination of factors – the island’s isolation, an ongoing 
traditional fear of southern Muslims by Hispanicised northerners, the depredations 
of tropical diseases such as malaria, and the machinations of political actors in 
Manila – coalesced to contribute to Palawan’s circumvention as a transmigration 
locale, in favour of Mindanao and the less densely populated areas of Luzon, such 
as the Cagayan Valley. 
 However, the improved health outcomes effected during the American 
colonial period, coalescing with a continuing high birth rate, contributed to a rapid 
increase in the Philippine population. The corollary of this was increased pressure 
on available agricultural resources, a factor that had socio-economic ramifications. 
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 The Culion Leper Colony – located in the Calamianes Island Group in the north of the Province 
– at its height supported almost 7,000 lepers as well as scientific, administrative, and nursing 
staffs. The implementation of the ‘Segregation Law on Leprosy’ meant that during the American 
colonial period the catchment zone comprised the entire Philippines. As such Culion became as 
heterogeneous as the Province at large. While Palawan had been designated a place of exile during 
the Spanish period, the American administration formalised the process by establishing the Iwahig 
Prison and Penal Farm (1904). Located west of the capital Puerto Princesa it supported / supports 
– like Culion did – a heterogeneous population, many of whom have exchanged their convict 
status for that of colonist. Refer Evangelista et al. (2005). 
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Decreasing land: man ratios reinforced the perennial agrarian issues of tenancy, 
landlessness, and accompanying insurgency. At the same time as these remained 
unresolved, an ongoing Filipino imagining that the further exploitation of ‘public 
lands’ would act as a palliative in addressing population-induced concerns 
demanded the location and alienation of new and relatively empty lands. The 
initial ameliorative impact of increased transmigration to Mindanao was negated 
by the continuing population increase and the ‘filling-up’ of that frontier, thus it 
was that the exploitation of Palawan gained momentum. Although a trickle of 
spontaneous migration to Palawan began in the interwar years, it was the 
inauguration of the state-sponsored resettlement program centred on the Panacan-
Aborlan area of central Palawan (post the Asia-Pacific War) that provided the 
impetus for further spontaneous migration. 
 Increased migration notwithstanding, Palawan’s current population density 
is still one of the lowest in the nation. This conceals the fact that the Province’s 
population increased rapidly in the years following Philippine Independence in 
1946 (Table 5.1), and especially so since Mindanao was deemed settled by the 
1960s. From an admittedly small base, the data demonstrates that Palawan’s 
population increase has outstripped most other regions of the Republic, much of 
this attributable to in-migration. 
 
Geography 
Palawan represents both a province of the Philippines and the largest island of the 
approximately 1800 islands that constitute that Province. As a province, Palawan 
ranks as the largest in the country, while Palawan Island is the fifth largest in the 
Republic, encompassing 12,189 km².
177
 It is not the size of the Island / Province 
however, but rather its peripherality to other regions of the Philippines that has 
contributed to its relatively recent exploitation for resettlement. Lying athwart the 
South China and Sulu Sea littoral, it is far removed from the Philippines’ more 
populated regions to the north-east, east, and south-east. A cursory perusal of the 
map (Map 5) reveals that the northernmost region of the Province, the Calamianes 
                                                 
177
 Statistical data on Palawan is imprecise. The Province of Palawan website states the Province’s 
area as 17,896 km², while the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) website states 
it as 17,453 km². Further confusion is generated by the inclusion or exclusion of data pertaining to 
Puerto Princesa City (PPC), which is at once the capital of the Province of Palawan, and one of 38 
independent cities of the Philippines, and as such governed independently from the Province 
which surrounds it. Statistics are further complicated by the fact that PPC encompasses some 
2,381 km² (2540 according to PPC website). That is, most of the ‘statistical city’ is in reality rural. 
Viewed in this context, PPC represents approximately one-fifth of Palawan Island’s area or one-
seventh of the Province’s. 
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Group, lies less than 300km from Manila, while Balabac Island in the south, 
separated from Sabah by the Balabac Strait, is 900km distant from the capital. 
Isolation from historic administrative centres and centuries of geopolitical 
stalemate in the struggle between the Spanish-dominated (essentially Christian-
dominated) settlements in the north and the non-colonised (essentially Muslim-
dominated) regions to the south has defined Palawan as a ‘frontier region’. 
 While Palawan Province’s ancillary island groups, located closer to 
Manila (such as the Cuyo and the Calamianes) came under the orbit and 
protection of Spain and were Hispanicised, much of Palawan Island itself 
continued to be under the influence of the Muslim Sultanates to the south and 
south-east. The Sultanates / Spanish struggle for regional supremacy contributed 
to a mythology that viewed Palawan as remote and dangerous, a perception that 
was undermined only when the Pax Americana created the conditions for the 
Province to be deemed ‘safe’ in the early years of the twentieth century.178 Only 
after this had transpired could the peripheral – though more economically 
developed and crowded – islands (especially the Cuyos) play a pioneering role in 
the populating of Palawan Island (also referred to as the Mainland). It was 
pioneering Cuyonons who demonstrated the agricultural potential of the south and 
heralded the ramping up of the ‘transmigration age’. 
 Citing the 1939 census Eder and Fernandez (1996: 10-11) illustrate the 
limited economic role that the Mainland played vis-à-vis insular Palawan prior to 
the Asia-Pacific War. The peripheral island municipalities, encompassing 18 % of 
the Province’s area, supported 52 % of its population while the Mainland 
municipalities encompassing 82 % of the Province’s area supported 48% of the 
provincial population. This demographic imbalance helped indicate the potential 
for an enhanced exploitation of the south, a factor not lost on state planners and 
politicians charged with managing the ramifications of a rapidly growing 
population. The imbalance was a catalyst for postwar immigration, and the 
changed economic focus became apparent by the decennial 1980-1990, which 
showed an annual rate of population increase for the Mainland of 4.27 %, at a 
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 Lopez (1986: 22) suggests that the “collapse of Muslim domination in Palawan was completed 
in the first decade of the American colonial occupation.” American policy aimed to undermine 
long-standing sociocultural practices such as piracy, feuding, and debt-bondage; although the 
Spanish had initiated the loosening of the Sultanate’s hegemony over parts of Palawan with their 
destruction of Jolo and Balangingi between 1846-1852. A corollary of American power was the 
evacuation of Muslims from some coastal regions of southern Palawan to new domiciles such as 
Bonobono (present day Bataraza). 
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time when the island municipalities increased 2.26 % (1996: 10-11). While 
natural increase (as a consequence of improved health initiatives) played a role in 
this growth, to a great extent the population increase resulted from transmigratory 
trends. Before addressing the social and cultural ramifications of this migration to 
Palawan in general, and the study area of Narra Municipality in particular, I 
provide here an overview of the physical setting.
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 Palawan Island, 425 kilometres in length, runs in a north-easterly direction 
from the Malaysian province of Sabah in Borneo toward Manila in Luzon from 
which it is shielded by several lesser island groups and the island of Mindoro. A 
long thin island, Palawan’s widest point does not exceed 40 kilometres. Rugged 
mountain chains, with peaks such as Mt Matalingahan (2,086 metres) and Victoria 
Peak (1709 metres), divide watersheds that terminate in the South China Sea to 
the west and the Sulu Sea to the east. A geologically stable zone, without 
volcanoes and earthquakes, Palawan has more in common with the Malay 
Archipelago region of Sunda than with other regions of the Philippines. Its fauna 
and flora mimic those of the Sundaic region (Eder and Fernandez 1996: 3-4). 
Where they are found, the coastal plains are conducive to wet-rice agricultural 
development and have become the focus for resettlement and exploitation. The 
Municipality of Narra is constituted on one such coastal plain. 
 
Pre-history / History 
Although Palawan might appear to have been peripheral to the more settled states 
in the Southeast Asian region, it was in no sense cut off from any sociocultural 
connection with the wider world. In the period 1962-66 Robert Fox and 
colleagues from the Philippine National Museum excavated the Tabon Caves in 
the vicinity of Quezon in southern Palawan, revealing a pre-Austronesian ethno-
historical past for Palawan (and the region). Pushing man’s occupation back to 
50,000 years BP to the Upper Pleistocene, in Ocampo’s opinion (1996: 24), puts 
the concept of ‘frontier’ in perspective and, as he suggests, constitutes one aspect 
of the ‘Southeast Asian Cradle’.180 Discovery of twelfth to fourteenth century 
Sung and Yuan Dynasty porcelain indicates connections with insular and 
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 Palawan hereafter will be used to define both Palawan Island and Province – context will make 
it clear which is being referred to. 
180
 By this he proposes that the discovery of the Tabon Caves revealed a link between Palawan and 
the region. Rather than being considered as peripherally situated to the rest of Southeast / East 
Asia, when viewed as a long land-bridge or corridor dividing the Sulu and South China Seas, 
Palawan could be regarded as integral to the movements of early man across the region, and thus 
central to an understanding of the pre-Austronesian insular Southeast Asia.   
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mainland Asia before the time of European expansion into the region. It also 
indicates that rather than being peripheral to any particular regime, pre-colonial 
Palawan was part of the general trade and migration routes – a factor facilitating 
intercultural exchange. Nevertheless, to the first Europeans, the region appeared 
remote from the centres of commerce and power, and it is in this context that the 
Venetian scholar Antonio Pigafetta (Magellan’s chronicler, and one of the few 
survivors to return to Spain in 1522) is credited as labelling Palawan with the 
epithet ‘land of promise’ (Veloro 1996: 16).181 
 While Spanish colonisation – in the geographical space that was to be 
considered the Philippines – began in earnest after 1565, much of Palawan 
remained outside of their jurisdiction. In the face of constant raids during the 
sixteenth to eighteenth centuries by seafarers owing allegiance to the Sulu and 
Brunei Sultanates, it was all Spain could do to hold onto the ‘Christianised’ 
northern Cuyo and Calamianes island groups. The zeal with which the Spaniards 
resisted the northward expansion of Sulu and Brunei was, as Ocampo (1996: 26) 
suggests, galvanised by a recall to the Reconquista.
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 These exertions for political 
control of Palawan had the effect of keeping the population in a state of 
unresolved lethargy. Construction, destruction, slaving, and removal from harm’s 
way created in Palawan the conditions for a notion of tripartite division, or as 
noted by the Italian Careri in 1696 (cited Ocampo 1996: 28) “…Paragua [alternate 
name for Palawan] is divided between Borneo [read Brunei] and Spain but that in 
the interior there lived wild Indios recognizing no authority.” 
 In the late imperial era, Spain, fearing a repetition of the loss of its South 
American colonies, aimed to counter rival colonial powers by extending its 
influence toward the south, leading to the establishment of politico-military bases 
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 Blair and Robertson (cited Veloro 1996: 16) state that Pigafetta (1519-1522) made the 
following journal entry “… we found a large island, where rice, ginger, swine, goats, fowls, figs, 
one-half braza long and as thick as the arm / i.e., bananas / (they are excellent; and certain others 
are one palmo and less in length, and are much better than all the others), coconuts, camotes / 
balate / sugar-cane, and roots resembling turnips in taste, are found… We called that land the land 
of promise, because we suffered great hunger before we found it… / It is called / Pulaoan.” 
182
 Ocampo (1996: 26-27) makes the case that Palawan was integral to an expanding sociocultural 
hegemony which he calls ‘Malayos Mohometanos’. Had it not been for the increasing Spanish 
intervention in the region during the seventeenth century, he suggests, it is likely that Manila and 
Luzon would have become increasingly Muslim. As it transpired trade and raids emanating from 
the Borneo and Sulu Sultanates had significant cultural impacts on the lifeways of those indigenes 
accessible to their reach – the absence of direct rule notwithstanding. “A glimpse of Tagbanua, 
Pala’wan and Molbog society and culture reveals Muslim dominance and influence in material 
culture and social organization…” (p. 26). Notwithstanding the dominance of the trade / raid 
ethnic groups (such as the Tausug and Jama Mapun among others) hailing from the south, 
intermarriage played a role in cementing relations of some Palawan indigenous ethnic groups with 
their overlords. 
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that were justified by the need to protect the “docile natives against the tyranny of 
the Moro slave takers” (p. 29). Under the guise of this paternalist ruse a politico-
military expedition arrived on March 4 1872 to found Puerto Princesa – today the 
capital and major urban area of the Province.
183
 The relocation of convicts and 
political detainees to Puerto Princesa, and further locales such as Balabac Island, 
contributed to the stereotyping of Paragua as a place of exile, thereby inhibiting 
general migration until, following the Asia-Pacific War, necessity dictated a 
reassessment of this attitude. 
 Subsequent to their success in the Spanish-American War (1898), and the 
destruction of a nascent Filipino Republic that followed, the American era in 
Palawan facilitated changes that would at once increase the diversity of 
immigrants to the Province and at the same time highlight its ‘frontierness’ – its 
‘peripherality’ as Ocampo (1996: 34) puts it. While potential immigrants might 
have been deterred by the 1902 Act that established the Culion Leper Colony and 
the 1904 formation of the Iwahig Penal Colony, these two institutions facilitated 
the employment of many functionaries and inadvertently helped to foster an 
interest in the region. Those functionaries, together with the amnestied and 
released prisoners who chose to remain, added to the Province’s ethnocultural 
diversity.
184
 At the same time as this mandated migration to the Province, a 
spontaneous, seasonal migration presaging a more permanent resettlement by a 
group of farmer-fishers from the Cuyo Islands was taking place. 
 Beset by a decreasing land: man ratio, Cuyo was unable to provide enough 
food to augment a fishing culture. Following the imposition of American political 
stability, an arrangement evolved whereby an increasing flow of seasonal settlers 
from Cuyo arrived infrequently on the Mainland to plant a rice crop, or other 
staples, on lands not their own. Following the harvest they would return to their 
islands. These seasonal settlers – albeit hailing from within the Province – became 
the vanguard transmigrants that increasingly opted to stay on the Mainland, rather 
than return annually to Cuyo. For a time spontaneous Cuyonon settlers became 
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 Spanish advances south against the Sulu Sultanate allowed a political reconfiguring of Palawan. 
Lopez (1986: 22) states that in 1858 present-day Palawan was divided into two provinces: that of 
Calimianes in the north and Paragua in the south. As well Balabac Island was designated as a 
military administrative unit. This division was negated in 1872 when the Province of Paragua 
replaced the former divisions. However, this was a short-lived arrangement as in 1905 the 
Province was renamed Palawan by the Philippine Commission Act 1363 (Ocampo 1996: 33). 
184
 One of the Narra informants was able to provide details about a family being drawn to Palawan 
in support of a relative incarcerated in Iwahig Penal Colony. Like penal colonies the world over 
(New Caledonia, Australia, and Siberia for example) their remoteness often inhibited return 
journeys, thereby contributing to the settler mix. 
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one of the largest ethnolinguistic groups on the Palawan Mainland, though their 
dominance in the intervening years has been muted by the arrival of a diversity of 
other ethnic groups. 
 The process of ethnic diversification was accelerated during the post-
Independence period when the state initiated a 24,000-hectare land development 
program (Appendix C) centred on the area now encompassed by the Narra 
Municipality. While this ushered in a period of increased immigration to the 
Province, it also gave rise to economic and sociocultural losers, as the ‘traditional’ 
lands of autochthonous groups such as the Pala’wan and Tagbanua were 
increasingly forfeit. 
 
Indigeneity 
Palawan Province supports a diverse native population (Eder and Fernandez 1996: 
5). On Balabac Island in the south live the Molbog, swidden-agriculturalists who 
today are predominantly Muslim. On Palawan Island itself there are three 
principal autochthonous ethnolinguistic groups: the swidden-agriculturalist 
Pala’wan of the south, the Tagbanua in the centre (including in the Narra study 
area), and the forest-foraging Batak people of the north. Insular Palawan supports 
several additional groups who because of their long association with the colonial 
mission were Hispanicised and are now deemed ‘lowland Christian’ rather than 
‘indigenous’. These include the Cuyonon, Agutaynen, and Kagayanen, among 
others. 
 The stability of some indigenous ethnic groups in Palawan is a matter for 
conjecture. Historically, Palawan was a region assailed by the ramifications of 
slaving, by which I mean that as well as the abduction of some indigenous 
peoples, those remaining were exposed to cultural accretions emanating from the 
dominating group. James Warren’s 1982 study of the economic importance of 
slaving to the Sulu Sultanate in particular, and the greater Malay Archipelago in 
general, helps demonstrate the unreliability of ethnic fixity in the region. For 
Palawan’s indigenous groups, exposure to a wider world – be it the Sulu 
Sultanate, Spain, America, or extant religious proselytising – had / has the effect 
of altering existing worldviews. Few could maintain their distinct lifeways by 
withdrawing to the isolated security of the mountainous interior; the implication 
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being that they would experience deculturation (acculturation to some other 
lifeway), or in some instances ethnocide.
185
 
 Groups claiming autochthonous status in Palawan (as elsewhere in the 
autochthonous world) continue to live in a state of flux. While the brief of this 
thesis is to unpack the transculturative potential for – and ramifications of – 
transmigrant resettlement in Palawan, it is nevertheless interesting to reflect for a 
moment on how fluid – even within autochthonous groups – ethnic and cultural 
identity is. Whereas Brown (1991) and Lopez (1986), in their studies of the ethnic 
Pala’wan, reveal how that group’s lifeways have altered as a consequence of the 
intrusion of lowland Christian transmigrants, Macdonald (2000) illustrates that a 
propensity exists for changed ethnic identity and lifeways to occur irrespective of 
the transmigrant intrusion. His study of the Pänimusan is salutary to an 
understanding of what constitutes an ethnic identity. The Pänimusan are coastal 
Pala’wan who are regarded by their inland co-linguists (and by self-ascription) as 
Muslim, indeed an ethnic group distinct from their inland cousins. Yet their claim 
to Muslimity is tenuous; in the absence of mosques, imams, or Hajis, the 
Muslimity claim appears to be justified by the abstinence of pork and turtle eating, 
and identification with a supralocal belief structure – Islam.186 I cite this example 
of a ‘Barthian boundary’ to illustrate how modest a difference is needed to create 
a separate discernible ethnocultural identity, one that needs to be borne in mind 
when reflecting upon the product of transcultural change in the Narra model. 
 In an era when transmigration from other Philippine regions continues 
unabated, the proportion of Palawan’s population claiming indigeneity is 
decreasing. Were it not for the pro-active policies engendered by the concept of 
the Ancestral Domain
187
, it is quite possible that those claiming indigenous status 
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 Brown (1991: 33) cautions that “the terms ‘deculturation’ and ‘ethnocide’ not be used 
interchangeably.” In her opinion ethnocide “should be limited to cases in which expanding states, 
populations, and / or missionaries have undertaken a systematic and aggressive movement to 
eradicate the lifeways and values of tribal peoples” (p. 33). In the context of those parameters, I 
suggest, that some overlap may occur. The expanding state, population (implicating the migrant), 
or missionaries may be extremely successful in some instances in destroying former lifeways: self-
governing political units, non-patriarchal societal structures, swidden agriculture, or Animism, in 
some instances, aspects of these may survive by being embedded into new sociocultural realities. 
186
 What Macdonald found interesting was the incongruousness with which the land-based 
Pala’wan regarded their coast-based co-linguists as Muslim, whereas the Muslims that had 
dominated their region prior to early twentieth century ‘pacification’ were known by their 
individual ethnic – rather than religious denotations – that is, Kagayan, Maranao, or Suluk. The 
Pänimusan model of ethnogenesis is instructive, in that it demonstrates in theory, the 
transculturative potential for situations (such as migration contact zones). How much cultural 
adoption or adaptation is required for a nascent ethnic identity to be sustainable remains moot.
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 The concept of ‘Ancestral Domain’ (AD) – while not central to the contentions of this thesis – 
nevertheless plays a role in the influencing of whether transmigrants and indigenes are able to 
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(as a percentage of the Province’s overall demography) might have declined 
further still. The Philippine societal practice of classifying groups as: Animist / 
indigene, lowland Christian, or Muslim is an inadequate way to define complex 
heterogeneities in both Palawan and in the Philippines writ large. The 
transmigrants arriving in Palawan (who have been overwhelmingly lowland 
Christian) were after all themselves indigenous to their region-of-origin, yet they 
were not afforded the status of indigeneity and the hypothetical support that this 
suggests. Professing Christianity and being adept at wet-rice cultivation did not 
preclude their poverty being as acute as that of the marginalised indigenes they 
increasingly displaced. However, representing the Philippine majority and being 
acknowledged as progressive agriculturally – as Brown (1991) and Lopez (1986) 
demonstrate in their accounts of indigene-migrant relations on the Palawan 
settlement frontier – gave the incoming transmigrants economic and political 
advantages. 
 
Demography 
The crux of the push-pull factors influencing the transmigration phenomenon in 
the Philippines was a rapidly growing population. Concurrent with the ten-fold 
population increase sustained nation-wide during the twentieth century Palawan 
experienced a twenty-fold increase and now stands at approximately one million. 
Notwithstanding Pelzer’s (1945) charge of under-enumeration for the first U.S. 
census (1903), the trend of the decennial censuses depicts Palawan’s population 
growing at a faster rate than the country at large, reflecting the increased 
migration flows to the Province.
188
 A more convenient starting point might be the 
1918 census. When compared with the 2010 census (90-year-period) the 
Philippines sustained a nine-fold increase, while Palawan experienced a fourteen-
fold one. While the rapid rise in provincial population is partly explained by 
                                                                                                                                     
achieve a modi vivendi in the zone of resettlement, thereby advantaging intercultural harmony. 
Simply stated AD claims hinge on perceived socio-economic injustices. If AD’s legal 
promulgation was in part to undo the depredations of the Regalian Doctrine or ‘pubic lands’ era, 
interpreting who is being disadvantaged is far from clear. In his article ‘Whose ancestral domain is 
Mindanao – Sulu and Palawan’ Rodil (1987) raises a challenge. Who is able to claim uninterrupted 
occupancy, and how far back must one look for justice to prevail? It might be argued that all lands 
– those under AD scrutiny and privately held – were once the lands of someone else. Neither pre-
Spanish nor pre-Sultanate custodians of the soil appear to be advantaged by AD. Just as the U.S. 
failed to return the compensated ‘Friar Lands’ to the descendants of original occupiers, so too it 
seems will it be difficult for the Sultanate lands to be returned to previous Animist occupiers. 
188
 Pelzer (1945: 81) makes the case “that the census of 1903 was not so complete as that of 1939; 
so that the increase between 1903 and 1939 was probably not quite as large as the census figures 
indicate.” Nonetheless he acknowledges that the population had increased rapidly, putting extra 
strain on the ‘developed’ agricultural areas. 
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natural increase, the greater part of the increase is attributable to in-migration 
from across the Republic. 
Unlike in Mindanao, where the accelerated 1948-1960 immigration 
attracted several dominant ethnolinguistic groups, exemplified by the Cebuanos, 
transmigration to Palawan has not been dominated by any one group, which I 
suggest has had a bearing on the potential for transculturation to flourish. In his 
study of the provincial capital Puerto Princesa, Evangelista (2008a: 48) suggests 
that the migration of people from other provinces has created a ‘melting pot’.189 
Citing the 2000 census, he states that 114 ethnic origins are represented “with 
Tagalog as the lingua franca (37%), Cuyonon (20%), Hiligaynon / Ilonggo (8%), 
Cebuano (7%), Bisaya / Binisaya (6%) and the remaining 22% other ethnic 
origins and speaking other languages.
190
 The Puerto Princesa diversity is mirrored 
in Palawan at large and the Narra Municipality in particular, a major factor 
contributing to the choice of Narra for this study. 
Table 5.1 – Population by Census: Philippines / Palawan 1903-2010 
Census 
Population 
Philippines 
% Rate of 
Increase 
Population 
Palawan 
% Rate of 
Increase 
     
1903 7,635,426 - 35,369 - 
1918 10,314,310 2.34 % 69,059 6.35 % 
1939 16,000,303 2.63 % 93,673 1.70 % 
1948 19,234,182 2.25 % 106,269 1.49 % 
1960 27,087,685 3.40 % 162,669 4.42 % 
1970 36,684,486 3.54 % 236,635 4.55 % 
1975 42,070,660 2.94 % 300,065 5.36 % 
1980 48,098,460 2.87 % 371,782 4.78 % 
1990 60,703,206 2.62 % 528,287 4.21 % 
1995 68,616,536 2.61 % 640486 4.25 % 
2000 76,498,735 2.30 % 755,412 3.59 % 
2007 88,574,614 2.26 % 892660 2.60 % 
2010 92,337,852 1.42 % 994,340 3.80 % 
     
Sources: after National Statistics Office / Eder 2000: 24-25 / Lahmeyer 
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 As previously alluded to Puerto Princesa City (PPC) is at once an urban centre (and seat of 
government for the Province of Palawan) as well as a geographical space which is essentially 
rural. Designated an ‘independent city’, PPC encompasses 2,540 km², making it the largest local 
government unit in Palawan. The 2010 Census (NSO) states the population as 222,673 making it 
the least densely populated of Philippine cities, statistical aberration notwithstanding. 
190
 The ethnolinguistic classification percentages, gleaned from the 2007 City of Puerto Princesa 
‘Socio-Economic and Physical Profile’ – as cited by Evangelista – requires a closer analysis. 
Language is not the only marker of ethnicity, and if we take the 37% speaking Tagalog, we might 
ask which groups this represents. An immigrant, who has forsaken his language for the lingua 
franca or the national language, may continue to identify with an ethnocultural heritage that is 
removed from the Tagalog one with which the statistics label him / her. 
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Economy 
While Palawan, with its 1,700 islands, beaches and coral reefs, continues to 
promote itself as a tourist destination, the basis of the economy is still agriculture, 
be it production for surplus, as in Narra, or production for self-sufficiency as 
exemplified by the age-old kaingin (swidden) agriculture, still practiced in some 
quarters (Docto and Salva 2008).
191
 Rice is the major staple, while coconuts 
provide a valuable export crop. At the same time as the ‘seemingly unsettled’ 
spaces drew farmer-migrants into Palawan from across the Philippines, so too did 
the vast coastline attract fisher-migrants, especially from the Visayas (Veloro 
1995). The historic trade in non-wood forest products such as almaciga
192
, rattan, 
and bird-nests carried on by indigenous groups is still of local significance, but is 
in jeopardy by over-exploitation. Lacuna-Richman’s 2006 study of the non-wood 
forest economy illustrates that besides seeking lands for themselves in Palawan, 
transmigrants also entered the non-wood forest product economy to sustain their 
precarious economic positions. At a time when increasing populations are 
demanding additional farmlands, and the exploitation of forested areas for their 
timbers continues, the traditional forest-based industries are under threat. 
 The expansion of mineral exploration and exploitation in recent decades 
(Eder and Fernandez 1996: 15-17) has contributed to the influx of technicians and 
a more educated cohort, some of whom have seen the potential of Palawan and, 
better resourced, are able to contribute entrepreneurial capital for the Province’s 
development. Mining in itself has been a double-edged sword. The projects 
provide much-needed employment, yet at times have created an antagonistic 
situation with agriculturalists in their vicinity. On more than one occasion it was 
mentioned by Narra respondents how the nearby chromite mines were creating 
negative environmental impacts, such as siltation and poisoning of ricelands 
dependent on irrigation water into which mine-waste had seeped. A corollary of 
negative developmental outcomes in the field of mining, deforestation, and the 
non-sustainable dynamite-cyanide fishery practices, has been the incursion into 
the Province of an array of national and international environmental NGOs, whose 
mandates overlap, but who in general have the interests of the environment and 
the people, especially the indigenous people, as their purview. 
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 Docto and Salva’s article makes the case that without realising it the indigenous Pala’wans, by 
engaging in kaingin agriculture, are practising a sustainable form of agriculture, one not reliant on 
fertilisers and pesticides. In their study sample, 84.8 % of the Pala’wan practised kaingin. 
192
 Almaciga, or Manila copal, is a resin that is harvested from the tree (Agathis philippensis). It is 
used as an ingredient in products as diverse as varnish, paint and aromatherapy. 
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Future Prospects 
Administratively Palawan formed part of the former Southern Tagalog Region 
(Region IV), which in 2002 was divided and, with Mindoro, Marinduque, 
Romblon, and Palawan (MIMAROPA) reconstituted as Region IVB. A further 
readjustment was proposed by Executive Order 429 in May 2005 in which it was 
proposed to remove Palawan from the Southern Tagalog sphere and join it with 
Western Visayas (Region VI). While the eclecticism of Palawan’s immigration 
includes both Tagalogs and Visayans, it encompasses more diversity than can be 
labelled neatly with any representative zone. Asked where he / she came from, a 
Narra transmigrant would not answer Region IVA or IX. Identification with the 
home province or indeed the ethnolinguistic heritage of the individual is a more 
salient marker of identity than any administrative assertion. A political backlash 
from within Palawan caused the issuance of Executive Order 129 in August 2005, 
which held in abeyance the proposed administrative realignment with Region VI, 
and maintained the administrative status quo. As the nation’s largest province in 
size, the division of Palawan into three separate entities has been mooted, though 
at the time of this study, this had not transpired. 
 I mention the above in order to suggest that the geographical isolation of 
Palawan continues to defy it neatly fitting into a regional grouping of any kind. 
Notwithstanding Palawan’s continuance as an in-migration area, and despite the 
population increases already alluded to, Palawan continues to rank 79th out of 80 
provinces for population density. Given the burgeoning of the Philippine’s 
population, this relatively modest density would indicate the potential for further 
transmigratory flows into the Province.
193
 As the Narra survey revealed, migrants 
continue to arrive in Palawan, though their prospects need not always involve 
recourse to agriculture. Opportunities in the bureaucracy, increased commerce, 
perception of the Province as a ‘zone of peace’, and for some a retirement locale, 
all contribute to an increased population and its ethnic mix. The above profile of 
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 The interpretations of statistics in the Philippines are fraught with difficulties. This is partially 
attributable to the employ of estimates in interstitial census periods, and partly in response to the 
atypical ways in which statistical information is presented. Cebu well illustrates this conundrum. 
To determine the population of Cebu Island (in order to ascertain population density of Cebu 
relative to other islands) it becomes necessary to add the population of Cebu Province to that of the 
three independent cities: Cebu City, Lapu-Lapu City, and Mandaue City. The consequence of this 
is that while the population of Cebu for the 2010 census is tabulated as 2.6 million, when added to 
the aforementioned cities the population for Cebu Island should read 4.2 million, greatly altering 
the density figure. Likewise is the national population data questionable. The 2010 Philippine 
Census suggests that the country’s population is 93.3 million (NSO); while the EBYB (2012) 
suggests 95.9 million, and the CIA World Factbook (Online) estimates the mid-2012 population at 
103.7 million. 
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Palawan as a resettlement zone allows a segue into the focus of this study, the 
Narra Municipality, which in many respects is a snapshot of the Province writ 
large. 
 
Narra: ‘Rice Granary of Palawan’ 
Overview 
Narra (Municipality and town) owe their nomenclature to the acronym NARRA 
(National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration), one of the recurring 
incarnations of resettlement agencies whose brief it was to help advance food 
security, ameliorate poverty, and aid Philippine development.
194
 The genesis of 
Narra as resettlement-zone hinged on the exploitability of a relatively flat plain, 
which in time came to be irrigated, thereby adding to the nation’s rice inventory. 
The economic development and success of Narra led to the Municipality being 
designated as the ‘Rice Granary of Palawan’ – an epithet still widely touted. 
While the rationale for the NARRA development – in the geographical area that 
was to become Narra Municipality (and town) – was multifaceted, its stimulus 
was predicated on the country’s rapidly growing population and concomitant food 
insecurity. 
 In spite of the dislocation caused by the Asia-Pacific War, the Philippine 
population increased rapidly (Table 5.1). In the twenty year period 1948-1970 
there was almost a doubling of the population from 19.2 to 36.7 million. A decline 
in mortality as a result of colonially inspired health initiatives coalesced with 
continuing high fertility rates to create family sizes that could not be sustained on 
the given agricultural footprint. Adding to the population pressure were the socio-
economic ramifications occasioned by political instability (as exemplified by the 
HUK rebellion), central to which was the issue of landlessness, an important 
factor contributing to agrarian unrest. Economic uncertainty following 
independence from the United States (1946) and the general issue of food 
insecurity became serious issues for state planners and politicians alike. Given the 
increased pressure on the land in more densely populated areas it was incumbent 
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 Suyat and Tejada-Suyat (2005: 14) proffer an alternative explanation. “Corpuz [a settlement 
functionary] observed that the uncleared area in the core of the settlement was a virgin forest of 
nara (Pterocarpus indicus) trees. Nara is the national tree because of its excellent quality. To 
identify the core of the settlement and to immortalize the Nara tree which would soon disappear, 
Corpuz called the place Nara. And the people called the place Nara as Corpuz had called it.” They 
add that by early 1955 the word had metamorphosed into NARRA (acronym for the new 
settlement authority). 
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upon the nascent Republic to increase the alienation of lands in less populated 
areas, such as Palawan, Mindanao, and the Cagayan Valley in Luzon.  
 The Narra Municipality lies on a broad plain situated approximately 100 
kilometres south of the provincial capital, Puerto Princesa. It is hemmed in by the 
central mountain chain to the west, where Mt Victoria reaches 1709m; to the east 
lies the Sulu Sea. It is the extent of the plain, and its dissection by several rivers 
able to be tapped for irrigation, that sustains the Municipality as the ‘Rice Granary 
of Palawan’. Via the National Highway – for the most part hugging the coastal 
plain – it takes approximately two hours to reach Barangay Población from the 
capital. Población constitutes the urban centre of what is generally referred to as 
Narra (Town). It is at once an administrative, commercial, educational, and social 
centre. Reflecting the former influence of the resettlement authorities and the 
state, Población is a precisely planned urban area that is based on a grid pattern 
(Appendix H). Historically, on arrival in the settlement project, each settler-
beneficiary was allocated a house-lot in the urban area and a farm-lot in the 
environs. In general the Austronesian mode of communal residence prevailed; 
settlers resided in town rather than on their farm-lot. 
 Prior to the resettlement of approximately three thousand families in the 
area now constituting the Municipality of Narra, the area formed part of the larger 
Municipality of Aborlan, from which it was excised by Republic Act No. 5642 
(20 June, 1969) (Appendix E). In the intervening years it has grown to become 
one of the most populous municipalities in Palawan Province with approximately 
70,000 inhabitants (SEP-2010: 6). The Municipality is divided into twenty-three 
barangays, four of which – Antipuluan, Panacan, Panacan 2 and Población – are 
deemed urban.
195
 Approximately two-thirds of the Municipality’s population 
might be deemed rural. (Appendix B). 
 
Narra: Genesis / Formation History 
196
 
The Philippine resettlement program had its roots in Commonwealth Act No. 441, 
signed on 3 January 1939 by Commonwealth President Manuel L. Quezon, 
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 The designation of Población as urban appears questionable, in view of that Barangay’s 
population density. However, while a geographical corner of Barangay Población forms the 
nucleus of urban Narra, the majority of Barangay Población is rural. The project planners used the 
National Highway as a starting point, with most barangay’s running from the Highway to the 
mountains on one side, or the Sulu Sea on the other. 
196
 For a historical background, as well as the social and economic aspects of the settling of the 
Narra Municipality I am deeply indebted to Marcial Dela Cruz (former Project Manager of the 
Pilot Special Settlement Project), Carlos Fernandez (PSU academic, and former Ministerial 
incumbent), and Leonardo Suyat (local historian and former PSU academic).  
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creating the National Land Settlement Administration (NLSA – Chapter 4). Three 
major projects were established, namely the Allah Valley and Koronadal Valley 
(both in Mindanao) and the Ma-allig Plains of Isabella, in Luzon.
197
 
 On 24 March 1949, the Rice and Corn Production Administration (RCPA) 
was established to promote and stimulate the production of staple crops in the 
Philippines. At the invitation of then Governor of the Province of Palawan – 
Alfredo Abeug Sr. – the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources 
(DANR) sent soil specialists to conduct surveys in the Province, particularly in 
the Municipalities: Taytay, Aborlan, and Bataraza. An evaluation of the results 
suggested that the Panacan sector of Aborlan be chosen as the most ideal site for 
rice and corn production.
 198
 From this beginning, notwithstanding the institutional 
changes brought about by succeeding political leaderships, development in the 
area gradually expanded. Presidential Proclamation No. 190 (June 24, 1950) 
signed by President Elpidio Quirino, reserved 25,380.7 hectares of the public 
domain of Aborlan / Palawan for resettlement purposes (Appendix C). Executive 
Order No. 355 (October 23, 1950) issued by Quirino, abolished the National Land 
Settlement Administration (NLSA), and in its place created the Land Settlement 
Development Corporation (LASEDECO). Its tenure was short-lived however, as 
via Republic Act No. 1160 (June 18, 1954) President Ramon Magsaysay 
abolished LASEDECO and replaced it by the National Resettlement and 
Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA).
199
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 While the NLSA denotes the commencement of Philippine attempts at resettlement, it should 
be borne in mind that this program was following on from earlier American colonial attempts at 
land colonisation. While colonial and Commonwealth impetuses for resettlement differed in some 
regards, both administrations were motivated by economic development and the demands of 
growing populations and social inequities. 
198
 Aborlan is the ‘host’ municipality from which Narra Municipality was excised in 1969 
(Appendix E). A pronounced American influence in the Aborlan area occurred with the 
establishment (1910) of a farm settlement school in order to “educate and civilize the cultural 
minorities…” (Suyat and Tejada-Suyat 2005: 9). In 2004 the farm settlement school 
metamorphosed to become the Western Philippines University (WPU). The ‘civilising’ mission 
among the indigenous Tagbanuas, Muslims and Pala’wans was less than benign, however. Suyat 
and Tejada-Suyat state that “(a)ll children of the cultural communities were forced to study and 
stay inside the reservation in two dormitories, one for males and one for females… no matter how 
bountiful the blessing the natives enjoyed, they felt they were prisoners…” (p. 9). 
199
 On August 8, 1963 President Diosdado Macapagal, signed Republic Act No. 3844, known as 
the Land Reform Code, creating the Land Authority (LA) and abolishing NARRA. On September 
21, 1972, Republic Act No. 6389 was signed by the late President Ferdinand Marcos, creating the 
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and the Land Authority was abolished. On June 18, 1988, 
Republic Act No. 6657 – known as the CARP [Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program] Law – 
was signed by the late President Corazon Aquino. Its obligations and functions were subsumed 
and implemented by the DAR.
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The Settlement Process
200
 
Resettlement in the Narra context was an organised process under government 
auspices. That is, a state-sponsored program in which deserving landless citizens, 
farm workers, and displaced landless tenants from densely populated areas were 
brought to the settlement project to develop the ‘public domain’ lands distributed 
for their benefit. The settlers were allocated farm-lots to clear, develop and 
cultivate, and a home-lot that they could eventually call their own after complying 
with the requirements of the settlement agency, this being the basis for the 
issuance of titles to their lands. 
 In 1956, the Central Palawan Resettlement Project began its operation 
with the arrival of transmigrants from Central Luzon and the Visayan provinces. 
The process adopted by the NARRA main office was to create a screening 
committee to vet applicants – to determine if they were qualified in farming 
practices – in order to ensure the success of the resettlement program. Thus, the 
Settlement Management Committee, once entrusted with those selected, was duty-
bound to service the needs of the settlers following their arrival in the Project. In a 
‘frontier’ zone devoid of the necessities of life a paternal oversight was necessary. 
In the early resettlement period of the NARRA Administration, a hospital and 
attendant medical personnel including midwives were provided. By rotating the 
midwives, scheduled visits to nursing mothers and their babies in remote rural 
areas could be ensured. The most common disease affecting the settlers at this 
time was malaria. It was usually acquired by the settlers while clearing their 
forested farm-lots. Supporting NARRA was the Malaria Control Unit (MCU) 
whose brief it was to minimise the malaria scourge. The death rate was reduced 
with the help of blood canvassers, microscopists and the deployment of DDT 
spraying teams (Suyat and Tejada-Suyat 2005: 31-32).
201
 
 Settlers were categorised under four headings: 
(1) Pioneer settlers – those who were the de facto occupants in the area before it 
was proclaimed as a resettlement reservation; 
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 This section also relies heavily on the reflections of Marcial Dela Cruz, Leonardo Suyat, and 
Carlos Fernandez. Marcial, as a long-time Narra resident (arrived in 1961) has seen the region 
develop from a frontier settlement to what it is today. As an agriculturalist / technician he has been 
cognisant of the problems that the Narra resettlement project faced. 
201
 Fear of malaria as well as the historical fear of the Moros had constrained earlier settlement 
attempts in Palawan. While health and hygiene initiatives have greatly reduced the occurrence of 
malaria in recent decades, the incidence of malaria in Palawan continues to be one of the highest in 
the country. 
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(2) Moved-in settlers – those who were moved by the resettlement agency from 
their places of origin to the resettlement site; 
(3) Self-propelled settlers – those settler applicants who arrived in the settlement 
area at their own expense; 
(4) Local settlers – landless citizens in the settlement area and their dependants 
who inter-married with other ethnic and indigenous groups, who applied and were 
approved by the settlement agency. 
 Further change and revitalisation occurred when the Central Palawan 
Resettlement Project was converted into a ‘Pilot Special Settlement Project’ 
(PSSP) in February 1976 (Appendix D). The NARRA entity had been replaced by 
a new managing agency, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), which at the 
time of my field-visit continued to address the needs of some settler-beneficiaries. 
The new PSSP Project Manager, Marcial Dela Cruz, after consulting with 
community leaders, realised that for the settlement to prosper irrigation was vital. 
With the help of the World Bank the two largest rivers traversing the Project were 
tapped, allowing 12,000 hectares to become more productive. In 1996, a further 
three irrigation projects (4,000ha) were funded by the Japanese government 
through the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) to irrigate areas 
above and beyond the area serviced by the World Bank-financed irrigation 
system. After their inauguration the schemes were turned over to the National 
Irrigation Authority-Philippine Medium Scale Irrigation Project (NIA-PMSIP) for 
ongoing management, a role maintained to this day. 
 
Probing the Process 
Many hardships had to be overcome in the creation of Narra as the ‘Rice Granary 
of Palawan’. Ill-equipped and unprepared for the pioneering life, many 
transmigrants became disillusioned and abandoned their goal of owning their own 
farmstead, though whether this impacted on the degree or level of ethnic diversity 
is moot. In his 1975 study of the Narra resettlement project during its formative 
years Fernandez (1975: 231) suggests that “(r)esettlement programs, viewed in the 
abstract, hold bright promise for the landless and the poor. A dream shared by 
both planners and beneficiaries is that once land is acquired, prosperity will 
follow.” The vision of distant planners was sometimes at odds with the desired 
outcome, and the reality and difficulty of pioneering was often underestimated. 
The settler-beneficiaries, at times ill-equipped educationally, technically and 
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managerially, were not necessarily able to fulfil their dreams of exchanging their 
status of tenant for landowner. As tenants in their region-of-origin they had not 
had to deal with management issues such as marketing, accounting and planning. 
Fernandez suggests that those least likely to succeed, that is, those who were 
landless – that being the deciding criteria for the settlement agency’s recruitment 
– often failed to prosper once they arrived in the frontier. Individual inabilities, 
lack of development capital, and sporadic assistance from the settlement agency 
contributed to an abandonment rate of approximately one-third (p. 226). A 
contributing factor was the difficulty involved in clearing virgin lands by people 
who in their regions-of-origin were attuned to wet-rice agriculture.
202
 
 Pioneering had several unforseen transculturative impacts. Firstly, 
Fernandez (p. 224) observes: “A random allocation of lands finds its rationale in 
the agency’s attempt to ‘randomly integrate’ settlers of various ethnic origins.” 
While this process could be subverted, it nevertheless exposed diverse ethnic 
groups into each other’s orbit. Secondly, because the pioneers were steeped in the 
lowland (irrigated) wet-rice agriculture, they were ill-equipped to revert to kaingin 
(swidden) agriculture, which in the absence of irrigation in the early years they 
had to master to survive. Fernandez suggests that “both the settler and the 
agricultural extension workers in Narra… turned to the Tagbanua and Cuyonon to 
teach them how to gird and cut the trees” (p. 224). This intercultural exchange 
between indigene and settler might have been more tentative in altered 
circumstances, and no doubt contributed to the diminishment of interethnic 
anxieties. Not only could the settler question the ethnic stereotyping and antipathy 
sometimes felt for the indigene Other, the indigene also (in this reciprocal milieu) 
could reassess his apprehension for a settler cohort Other. 
 While the economic ramifications of resettlement are not central to this 
thesis, it should be acknowledged that economic success or otherwise has the 
potential to alienate groups struggling for the same resources. Brown (1991) and 
Lopez (1986) demonstrated in their studies how intercultural dissonance could 
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 Sawah, or wet-rice agriculture across archipelagic Southeast Asia continues to define progress, 
superiority, and civilisation. Using this criterion as a marker of social status however, failed to 
resonate among early Narra settlers. Fernandez (2011) suggests that the landless settlers arrived 
with ‘technological excess baggage’, that is, they were ‘sawah-savvy’, in an area without 
irrigation. When respondents were questioned as to whether they needed to make cultural 
compromises once arrived on the settlement frontier, some admitted that they had had to revert to 
swidden-agriculture to survive, skills for which they needed to glean from the ‘less-civilised’ 
indigenes in their midst, rather than the resettlement agency which also was too technologically 
advanced. 
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occur between indigenes and transmigrants competing for a given resource – land. 
James (1979), in An Economic Analysis of Public Land Settlement Alternatives in 
the Philippines, critiques the subsidising of inefficient landless settlers by 
suggesting that self-financed settlers would have a greater propensity to succeed. 
By extrapolation this would allow a larger number of settlers to participate, 
further reducing rural unrest, one of the criteria influencing state-sponsored 
resettlement at the outset. State-sponsored resettlement was not an efficient way to 
redistribute income, James advised, adding the rider that it possibly had the 
opposite effect. The role of government, he contended, should be as a provider of 
infrastructure and more efficient land alienation procedures, rather than as a settler 
managing agency (pp. 174-178). 
 In some cases the limitations and failures of individuals as farmers 
contributed to abandonment of their allocated farm-lots. Whatever the difficulties 
involved in the Narra land development project, those unwilling or unable to 
return to their regions-of-origin found a niche nevertheless in an expanding 
community. As well as a successful cohort of wet-rice cultivators such a 
community needed a floating population to service an expanding tertiary sector. 
As settlement land became fully alienated, ongoing transmigration into the 
Municipality came increasingly to reflect a diversity of entrepreneurship and 
skills. But who were these settlers? I now turn to reflect more closely on the 
diversity of groups that arrived in the Municipality. 
 
Ethnolinguistic Heritage 
Narra’s ethnocultural diversity is reflected in the Appendix F table.203 While this 
table is limited in scope it does provide an insight into the diverse groups that 
have transmigrated to the Municipality from across the Philippines. In percentage 
terms the languages listed are: Filipino / Tagalog (31%), Other (28%), Ilonggo / 
Hiligaynon (17%), Ilocano (12.5%), Cuyono [sic] (4%), Cagayanen (4%), 
Cebuano (1.5%), Muslim (1.2%) and Bicolano (0.6%). In light of these figures, 
however, two riders need mention. Firstly, viewed from a municipal-wide basis, 
the almost one-third denoted as ‘Filipino / Tagalog’ requires closer scrutiny. The 
interviews conducted for this study reflected that the delineation Tagalog did not 
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 While the differentiation nomenclature for this table is given as ‘dialect’, the term ‘language’ 
would have better reflected what the CBMS intended. The misreading of the two concepts is not 
unusual. In conversation with UP linguist Consuelo Paz (pers. comm. 2011-04-14), it was made 
clear that the misconception was a legacy of the colonial period. 
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reflect the actual ethnolinguistic heritage of the informant. Being identified or 
self-identifying as Filipino / Tagalog because one now speaks the national 
language and associates with that tag in no way precludes a more nuanced ethnic 
identity ascription or self-ascription. 
 The second point to be made is in regard to the column ‘Others’. Taking 
Barangay Bagong Sikat as illustrative we note that fully 58 % of the population 
fall into the category ‘Other’. Anecdotal evidence indicates that the Ilonggo 
cohort at least in this particular Barangay is under-enumerated in this break-up.
204
 
The almost one-third in the ‘Other’ column in itself skews the diversity canvas. In 
the same vein the column for ‘Muslim language’ is too general in determining 
which ethnolinguistic groups are being referred to.
205
 Again the interviews 
conducted for this study reflected that a more nuanced reality of ethnolinguistic 
heritages was required. While most informants professing Islam were indeed 
representative of a single ethnic group (Maranao), this did not necessarily reflect 
the reality of all Muslims in the Municipality. Furthermore among younger 
respondents, for whom region-of-origin language loss was more pronounced, 
ethnolinguistic or religio-linguistic delineation was fraught with ambiguity.  
 Unlike Indonesia’s Transmigration Program, which existed primarily to 
address the population imbalance of Java, Madura, and Bali, the Philippine 
resettlement scene encompassed a more varied settler cohort. In other words, 
Philippine transmigrants were sourced from a much broader ethnocultural pool. 
Unlike Java, which supports three major ethnic groupings (Javanese, Madurese 
and Sundanese), most Philippine islands support a wider array of ethnolinguistic 
groups, often without there being a dominant one. In some instances an 
ethnolinguistic cohort might fit neatly into a province or island, at others a group 
might straddle several provinces, given the province’s often recent political 
incarnation. The Province of Pangasinan (Luzon), for instance, suggests a 
predominance of those deemed ethnolinguistically Pangasinense, yet 44 % of the 
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 It was the Head of the Narra Pilot School that brought my attention to potential difficulties 
associated with the enumeration practice. While the Municipal ethnolinguistic table (Appendix F) 
is constrained by space, recourse to the ‘Other’ column has the capacity to numerically advantage 
some groups when viewed on a municipal-wide basis. That is, appearing in the Barangay statistics 
as ‘Other’ may not realistically reflect a municipal-wide picture of such and such an ethnic cohort. 
205
 It is unclear if the ‘Muslim language’ ambiguity is influenced by the issue of ‘enumeration 
space’, or a deeper psycho-sociological reckoning associated with the ‘othering’ of those 
professing Islam. Obviously there is no such a phenomenon as a ‘Muslim language’ so it is unclear 
why those professing Islam were not located in the ‘Other’ column when enumerated by language. 
The interviews and anecdotal evidence suggest that some of the recent immigrants professing 
Islam are ethnic Maranao, relatively urban and involved in commerce. This in no way illumines 
the ethnicities of those professing Islam in the more distant, rural Barangay Aramaywan. 
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Province’s population at the 2000 census were ethnolinguistically Ilocano. Thus, 
when informants were questioned about region-of-origin, the short answer 
denoted a place of departure, but did not necessarily reflect the interlocutor’s 
ethnolinguistic or cultural heritage. 
 Narrans hailed from as far afield as the Batanes Islands in the north 
(located between Luzon and Taiwan), to Mindanao in the south. Briefly stated, 
their diversity and recruitment from across the country has been a factor 
influencing the non-dominance / dominance paradigm in this resettlement milieu. 
The push-pull factors that impelled migrants to the settlement frontier varied. 
Some made the move for political reasons, others for socio-economic ones. While 
landlessness and poverty was an important relocation motivator for many, there 
were those for whom security concerns were of more salience. The interviews 
showed that for those for whom political considerations were a factor, Palawan 
was attractive as a ‘zone of peace’, while for others it had been the end process of 
exile from regions of insurgency, exemplified by the HUK rebellion of Central 
Luzon. Whatever the motivating factors for their transmigration, Narra 
demonstrates that a diverse cohort of ethnic groups has managed to find a modus 
vivendi that has eluded transmigrant cohorts in some other archipelagic settings. 
 
Defining the Methodology 
Overview 
In an age of instant communication, it would be easy to pass critical judgment on 
past sociological survey techniques, as advanced by Frank Lynch and Perla Makil 
in their essay ‘Sociological surveys in the rural Philippines: Some suggestions for 
interviewers’ (Yengoyan and Makil 2004). However, Lynch and Makil’s 
strictures concerning ‘introduction to the community’, and ‘establishing rapport 
with the community’ still stands. Values of respect, deference, religiosity, and 
social custom rooted in rural hospitality continue to impact on daily lives, and 
need a period of adjustment for the researcher. Given that the main thrust of the 
research for this thesis was to investigate social change in a rural transmigrant 
community, the arrangement of introducing oneself to the settlement agency, in 
this case the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), was prudent. This was 
achieved by approaches to the Provincial DAR in Puerto Princesa, who in turn 
prepared the Municipal DAR office in Narra to afford assistance. 
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 Further assistance was afforded by Palawan State University (PSU), under 
whose auspice I was granted Visiting Research Associate status, allowing 
introduction to their Narra Campus, the PSU-CCRD (College of Community 
Resources and Development). This introduction was fortuitous as it contributed to 
a modification of the thesis as originally envisaged. It emerged that the student 
cohort (the second or third generation of settlers) had worldviews that differed 
markedly from their parents and grandparents. It was the revelation of apparent 
different worldviews among younger Narrans that helped coalesce a thought 
process suggesting that an acceleration of transcultural change was probable when 
witnessed through the prism of generational change. 
 It became obvious that interviews with respondents should not proceed 
before a rapport was established with the host community, and this was facilitated 
by a visit to the Municipal Offices to meet with the Mayor in the first instance. 
This acted as a polite imprimatur for subsequent visits to the Barangay (sub-
municipal) Offices where meetings with the Punong Barangay (Barangay 
Captain) or one of the Barangay Kagawad (Councillors) would take place. While 
the choice of interviewees was random, each barangay was aware that research 
was taking place in their area. Presenting credentials to various local authorities – 
the local offices of provincial and national government departments, schools, 
health clinics, nutrition office, religious institutions, the police and NGOs – 
contributed to a more efficient access to respondents. 
 In a society where social standing as much as age counts for more than 
might be expected in more affluent or urbanised milieux, having Marcial Dela 
Cruz (former Manager of the resettlement authority) as guide, mentor and 
translator also smoothed the process. In cases when he didn’t know a respondent, 
he at least knew their parents or grandparents, who in many instances had been 
settler-beneficiaries. Access to proficient English speakers helped in developing 
more nuanced discussions when raising issues relevant to feelings and perceptions 
during respondent interviews. Whilst the English language is used to varying 
degrees within the educational system from primary to university level, everyday 
use is sometimes superficial, the corollary of which was the need for intermediary 
assistance. 
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Change in Scope 
Initially I had planned to interview the farmer-migrants who had come to Narra 
under the auspices of the state-initiated resettlement program (and their 
descendants). However, after commencing the interviews it became clear that 
some of the original settlers – for whom the motivating force in their decision to 
transmigrate had been land acquisition – were facing land: man ratios not 
dissimilar to the areas from which they had left. That is, each successive 
generation needed to divide a finite plot of land, thereby negating the rationale for 
resettlement in the first place. Krinks (1974), while articulating a Mindanao 
settlement paradigm, had illustrated the likelihood of land: man ratios mirroring 
those of the home region within a generation. One of the respondents put the 
dilemma of land ownership on the Palawan frontier into perspective. His father 
had left Iloilo in the Visayas where the family had had a one-eleventh share of the 
rice harvest. The 6 hectares of land granted them in Narra seemed generous in the 
1950s, but with five siblings, this respondent now has a one-sixth share (in effect 
the use of 1 hectare). If extrapolated further his three children could only expect to 
have one-third of a hectare as their patrimony if they intended to continue farming 
– a plot inadequate for survival without off-farm income. 
 I mention this notion of apparent socio-economic reversion in order to 
demonstrate that the Narra of 2011, by necessity and choice, needed to encompass 
more than farmer-beneficiaries. The agricultural carrying capacity of an increased 
population could not be sustained. Not only were many of the second and third 
generation settlers not involved in agriculture, they had been joined in the last 
half-century (and continue to be joined) by non-farmer transmigrants from across 
the Philippines. The arrival of civil servants, health professionals, teachers, and 
the like has been central to Narra’s success and expansion, and as Narra 
developed into a commercial, administrative, and service centre the balance 
between complementary rural and urban pursuits began to swing in favour of non-
farmers. It was this realisation that prompted me to reassess the proposed 
respondent base. Transmigrants encompassed a settler cohort broader than that of 
farmer-settlers, and for any sociocultural study aiming to assess the ramifications 
of integrating into a new society, the study had to be more inclusive of the 
community’s socio-economic diversity. In essence the notion of ‘transmigrant’ 
needed to encompass more than farmer-settlers, and needed to reflect the 
inclusion of commercial, professional, artisan, and student cohorts.  
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 Narra, becoming a regional centre as well as servicing a rural hinterland, 
added to the diversity of the continuing immigration pattern in the Municipality. 
The Narra campus of Palawan State University (PSU-CCRD), the Narra National 
High School, St Francis Javier College, and the many primary schools employ 
hundreds of staff. However, as an expanding regional centre, it is commerce that 
continues to have an impact on population growth and diversity. The Narra 
Market zone has in recent years attracted several ‘new’ ethnic groups, for example 
a Maranao cohort from Mindanao, not involved in rural pursuits. 
While I quickly gleaned that each of the respondents (or their forebears) 
originated from somewhere other than Narra Municipality, it was the expansion of 
the study to include a younger cohort (second and third generation) that raised the 
prospect that the trajectory of transcultural change was greatly influenced by a 
generational shift. Inspirational in the decision to broaden the scope of the thesis 
to investigate how the dynamics of generation, gender and education impacted on 
the transcultural trajectory was Mary Racelis (pers. comm. 2011-03-02), an IPC 
(Institute of Philippine Culture) researcher.  
 When asked what they regarded as their identity or ethnicity younger 
respondents were more likely to identify themselves as Palaweño; that is, an 
imagined supraethnic identity denoting adherence to current location rather than 
recall to historical antecedents. In essence, they demonstrated that it was possible 
to supersede the ethnocultural baggage of their forbears, by ‘imagining’ and living 
new identities. Whether self-identification as Palaweño should be regarded as a 
process of ethnogenesis or a form of postethnicity exemplified by the notion of 
cosmopolitanism is open to closer scrutiny.
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 Before proceeding with an analysis of the Narra findings it is necessary to 
explain the complexity and difficulty associated with the defining of ethnic 
identity in particular (and sociocultural identity in general) within the Filipino 
context. 
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 Identity ambivalence is not confined to Narrans, but is I suggest a product of the migration 
phenomenon. While individuals in the Narra might transcend the local allegiances of their 
forbears, and identify either as Palaweño (a quasi-regional adherence), Filipino, or people of a 
broader world (cosmopolitan), other migration scenarios are less complex. Nation-states which are 
premised on overwhelming immigration (Australia, Canada, and the United States) undermine or 
discourage (even if not overtly) continued identification with previous lived realities and ethnic 
identifications – multicultural utterances notwithstanding. They expect a transcendence of 
ethnolinguistic or ethnocultural loyalties, for one premised on a grander narrative, that of the 
‘ethnic-less’ citizen. 
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Identity Ascription: The Limits of Labelling 
From the outset of the fieldwork the very term ‘ethnicity’ proved to be 
problematic. In the eyes of some bureaucratic institutions, as well as in academic 
discourse, the term ‘ethnic’ was sometimes equated with ‘indigenous person’ (IP). 
A request to the Provincial Planning and Development Office for data on the 
migration into Palawan by ethnicity for example, was responded to with a printout 
designated ‘Ethnic Origin by Municipality’. On perusal it was obvious that all the 
groups on the printout were groups regarded as IP; that is, those regarded as 
ethnic minorities, or marginal groups. Within this parameter a T’boli from 
Mindanao or a Tagbanua from Palawan are regarded as ‘ethnic’ groups, though a 
Bicolano or Ilocano were not regarded as ethnic. It became obvious during the 
interview process that the label ‘ethnic’ was not one with which all individuals 
identified or ascribed to. A respondent who self-ascribed as Cebuano or Ilocano 
might not see themselves as ‘ethnic’ – that being a term reserved for those whom 
they deemed to be cultural minorities, or indigenous cultural communities (Rodil 
2004). 
 Once I became cognisant of the confusion surrounding the interpretation 
of ‘ethnic’ ascription, I broadened the identity question in order to preclude any 
misunderstanding: “How would you describe your ethnicity / identity?” This 
however, did not eradicate the confusion entirely. The term ‘identity’ itself proved 
to be multifaceted. A Narran professing Islam might suggest his ‘identity’ as 
Muslim, when in actuality his ethnicity was Maranao (from Mindanao) or Jama 
Mapun (from Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi). Unlike these southern transmigrants, those 
from the north, while identifying themselves collectively as lowland Christian, 
would not answer ‘Christian’ to denote their identity. However, their self-
ascription was complicated in other ways. Several respondents ascribed to a 
‘Tagalog’ identity, despite the fact that they hailed from regions in which their 
pre-migration language had not been Tagalog, or a dialect thereof. It appeared that 
identification with the dominant culture – reinforced by the promulgation of 
Tagalog as the national language – carried kudos for some interviewees. 
Admittedly, for smooth interpersonal relations between disparate ethnolinguistic 
adherents on the settlement ‘frontier’ to take place, a link language was necessary, 
and Filipino / Tagalog (and in some settings English) filled that role. Yet I sensed 
that for some, identifying broadly as Tagalog was occurring in a supra-cultural 
context as well as a linguistic sense. 
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 A broadening of the ‘identity’ parameter was occasioned by the realisation 
that ethnolinguistic heritage alone did not adequately describe how some 
individuals self-ascribed. Self-ascription as ‘Palaweño’ (of / or belonging to 
Palawan Province) began to be noticeable once the second and third generation, 
and a more educated cohort (straddling the generations), began to be interviewed. 
Two issues presented themselves in this paradigmatic shift. In order to 
comprehend the implication of such a self-ascription, I resorted to the known. An 
immigrant to a settler-society such as Australia might identify as Australian, if not 
during the lifetime of the original migrant, then within a generation or two 
removed from arrival. His identification would be with the nation, rather than with 
the state in which he was residing in. In the Narra context, it materialised that self-
ascription as Palaweño was occurring in spite of recourse to national integrative 
and educational processes. The second and third generation, influenced by the 
promulgation of the national language (Filipino / Tagalog) generally forfeited the 
languages of their parents and grandparents. The education system and social 
milieu of their surroundings put them at odds with the ‘settler generation’ and 
contributed to a new self-identification. When asked: “Do you think or identify 
primarily as a national citizen or as a member of an ethnicity?” the overwhelming 
(though not unanimous) response was “national citizen / Filipino.” The cohort that 
self-ascribed as Palaweño could nevertheless identify concomitantly as Filipino. It 
appeared that this complex competition for, and juggling of identifications, is 
something most Filipinos manage – whether consciously or not – as a matter of 
course.
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Region-of-Origin Identity 
Self-ascription fails to fit neatly into ethnolinguistic, regional, or ethnoreligious 
casts. Illustrative of this were the respondents from the Batanes Islands lying 
between Luzon and Taiwan. They identified with their province-of-origin 
(Batanes) rather than the Ivatan (or Ibatan) language they spoke. Likewise, a 
respondent from Aklan Province (Panay Island) identified as Aklanon, it being 
unclear whether he was proffering Aklanon as his region-of-origin or his 
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 Maalouf (2003) and Davies (2000) both illustrate that a complementarity of identities may be 
juggled at once. In his dedication to a text dealing with identity in the British Isles Davies penned 
“English by birth, Welsh by conviction, Lancastrian by choice, British by chance.” I suggest that 
in the Palawan context similar dichotomies are evident – influenced partly as a consequence of the 
transmigration experience, the nation-building program, the modernity project, and the occurrence 
of transculturation. 
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ethnolinguistic status; Aklanon being an alternate name for his language, 
Inakeanon (Ethnologue 2009). While most provinces in the Philippines support 
some ethnolinguistic majority, some provincial nomenclatures do not indicate the 
predominant ethnic group therein. For example, those identifying as Ilocano are 
majorities in nine provinces (Abra, Nueva Viscaya, and Isabella among them) 
other than Ilocos Sur and Ilocos Norte, their home region. A different taxonomy is 
required for the Visayas (Panay, Negros Cebu and so forth), the island group lying 
between Luzon and Mindanao. At interview some respondents simply identified 
as Visayan, that is a regional identity, rather than an ethnolinguistic one such as 
Hiligaynon, Cebuano or Kinaray-a. 
 The issue of ‘confused’ or mixed identity will be dealt with elsewhere but, 
simply stated, both region-of-origin and / or ethnolinguistic heritage appeared to 
underpin individual self-ascription. For example, one particular respondent, while 
raised in Manila, had Ilonggo and Pangasinan antecedents. Similarly, respondents 
hailing from the Tagalog heartland in Luzon neglected, at times, to identify with 
their dialectal realities, choosing Tagalog as identity rather than the variations 
thereof – Bulacan, Manileño, or Batangueño. While migrancy, the modernity 
project, and social mobility increasingly undermine former certainties in which 
ethnic groups are correlative with a given geographical space, individuals 
nevertheless continue to use historic certainties as a reference point in creating 
current self-ascriptive realities. For example, those hailing from Mindanao and the 
island chains to the south tended to identify with Mindanao in the first instance, 
until a more succinct explanation was warranted or demanded. In this context 
several respondents, on closer questioning, modified their self-identification from 
Mindanao, to Muslim, to Maranao. 
 
Identity Triangulation Parameters 
The Philippine-specific identity triangulation model, which conflates a 
heterogeneity of ethnic groups into three ‘super-identities’ – Animist (oft equated 
with IP or Lumad), lowland Christian, and Muslim – while much cited (cf. e.g. 
Rodil 2004, Eder and McKenna 2004, Tigno 2006), is in my opinion confusing 
and found wanting. If we are seeking to establish what intercultural compromises 
have contributed to Narra’s transculturation then we come up against the 
stereotypes that the triangulation model presupposes. Looking at the broader 
canvas it becomes obvious that whichever group an individual belongs to, or 
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identifies with; they are unlikely to pronounce themselves as belonging to one of 
the aforementioned super-identities. An individual professing Christianity will 
identify himself not as a Christian per se, but as an Ilocano, Bicolano, or 
Pampangan that they know they are. However, this same individual is likely to 
identify someone professing Islam, not necessarily as a Maranao, Tausug, or Jama 
Mapun, but as a Muslim (or the long-established pejorative, Moro). Extrapolating 
the example further, the cohort originating from the lowland Christian arena – 
whom we might deem Hispanicised Filipinos – also tend to view those considered 
indigenous groups (IP) in a collective manner, rather than by their individual 
ethnic identity – Tagbanua, Molbog, or Batak.208 This modelling may also be 
mirror-reversed to show how the lowland Filipino Christian might be viewed en 
masse by either of the other two cohorts. 
 A case could be made for a rejection of this societal division, as in itself it 
fails to distinguish cultural commonalities that overlap the three-way, Animist / 
indigene, Christian, Muslim division. Numerically, politically and economically 
the Hispanicised Filipinos have come to dominate the nation-state, a situation 
representing the country’s postcolonial legacy.209 This has implications for the 
investigation in this thesis of how sociocultural change in polyethnic resettlement 
milieux are negotiated. In short, the Narra transculturation paradigm, in 
determining whether power relationships are relevant influencers of individual or 
group action, needs to take cognisance of the dominance / non-dominance 
dichotomy inherent in the triangulation model of societal division. The question to 
be asked is what role the triangulation model plays in cultural exchange or 
rejection. Above it was demonstrated that wet-rice agriculture did not save the 
Narra pioneers from privation. It was recourse to the swidden-agriculturist skills, 
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 The ‘indigenous person’ (IP) nomenclature derives partly from a phase of political-correctness 
modernising. Older texts would have used terms such as ‘national minorities’, tribals, or pagans. It 
is worthy of note that in regions of Muslimity, the ethnic groups continue to labelled Muslim; IP 
status being reserved for those indigenous ethnic groups who are Animist, or have lately converted 
to Christianity, though the taxonomy is far from clear-cut.  
209
 By postcolonial legacy I mean that which has been legated by virtue of a colonial association 
between a colonised people and their coloniser. That is, the ‘lowland Christian’ is only such 
because Spain was able to effect dominion over a wide range of Malay Archipelago islands. Had 
the Dutch or English managed to add these islands to their domains, the notion of the lowland 
Christian / Hispanicised persons would have been moot. As the Dutch and English adopted a more 
laissez-faire approach to matters spiritual where their colonial subjects were concerned, it is 
probable that had they been colonial masters of the Philippine region that the Animist / Christian / 
Muslim cultural divide between the plethora of indigenous groups would have been of less 
significance. It could be argued that similar divides have occurred in Indonesia. To this I would 
say that the Dutch / English had less to do with this divide than the Portuguese, who mirroring 
Spain’s proselytising process, inculcated their faith, before they were ousted from the Archipelago. 
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as still practised by the indigenous Tagbanua and resident Cuyonon, which aided 
in the settler community’s salvation, thereby demonstrating that social and 
political dominance has its limitations. 
 The implied power imbalance inherent in the triangulation imagining is 
easily demonstrated. A case in point is the indigenous ethnic Pala’wan, and 
Tagbanua of Palawan Province. The settling of the Province by lowland Christian 
transmigrants was not resisted by those occupying the land. In general the 
indigene / Animist moved out of the way of the incomers and the state, to occupy 
more marginal (usually upland) ground that settlers and settlement authorities did 
not yet require or requisition. Notwithstanding any cultural overlap, the hierarchal 
structure appeared to advantage the Hispanicised, lowland Christian, wet-rice 
agriculturalist over the non-Hispanicised, upland indigene / Animist, swidden-
agriculturalist. If culture is rarely in a state of stasis, especially in situations of 
interethnic contact, then what sense does it make to demarcate triangularly? If for 
example an upland ethnic Pala’wan, swidden-agriculturalist, Animist, chose to 
become a wet-rice agriculturalist, adopt Christianity, and send his children to 
college, it is moot whether he should continue to be designated as an IP. 
 I cite the above to demonstrate that imagining cultural certainties, or 
labelling the Other, fails to take cognisance of shared values that might exist in 
spite of ethnolinguistic divergences. Furthermore, the process, potential, and 
trajectory for transculturation in a polyethnic and multicultural transmigrant 
community depend, to some extent, on what psycho-cultural baggage the migrant 
arrives with. Of course, class, socio-economic security, the environment, 
education, and human agency all have roles to play and are ancillary factors that 
may influence transculturative outcomes. 
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CHAPTER VI – NARRA: TRANSCULTURATION IN PRACTICE 
 
In this and the following chapter I introduce the findings of the participant 
interviews conducted in Narra / Palawan. Before any meaningful analysis of the 
ramifications of transmigration and its corollary transculturation is undertaken, the 
nature and degree of sociocultural change that has occurred in this resettlement 
exemplar will be examined. To determine what changes have occurred it is 
necessary to acknowledge what cultural baggage the Narra settlers arrived with. In 
Chapter 7 I raise some of the factors that I deem to be catalysts influencing 
transcultural change. However, to provide some background to the ethnocultural 
diversity of this resettlement zone, in this chapter I address aspects of the settler’s 
ethnocultural legacies and how these legacies have been – and continue to be – 
modified. Firstly, I raise the dichotomous relationship between the migrant’s 
ethnolinguistic heritages and their identity self-ascriptions. The nature and degree 
of sociocultural change that has taken place is elicited by examining: (1) the 
settler region-of-origin languages and what the settlement linguistic landscape 
currently looks like, (2) religious adaptation, (3) the correlation between the 
maintenance of ethnic identity and educational attainment, (4) the degree of 
conviction that settler descendants feel for region-of-origin identities and (5) what 
role generational change has played in the portrayal of supraethnic (regional, 
national, and cosmopolitan) convictions. 
 As generational change has played – and continues to play – a significant 
role in many aspects of transcultural change in Narra, it was necessary to devise a 
method for testing this change. I divided the Narra interview participants into 
three generational (GEN) cohorts. GEN 1 comprises the pioneer settlers who were 
fully functioning adults on arrival in the settlement. I designated the non-adult 
children of pioneer or continuing migrants as GEN 2, with the supposition that 
this cohort, through the education process and socialisation, might convey 
different worldviews than their parents. The local-born I designated to be GEN 3. 
While these designations are not without their complexities, in view of the 
gathered data I suggest that it represents a practicable model of differentiation for 
investigating Narran transcultural change.
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 As a tool to facilitate an understanding of why interethnic coexistences have in some instances 
been stymied I draw upon the scholarship of academics who have studied other resettlement 
programs in both the Philippines and the wider Archipelago. 
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Participant Interviews 
The aim of this chapter is to illumine what cultural changes have taken place in 
the Narra resettlement zone. A starting point was the arrival of a heterogeneous 
cohort of ethnolinguistic groups into the Municipality. Disparate ethnic groups 
found themselves living alongside people with whom they had previously not had 
contact, and depending on their degree of cultural difference, judged each other 
hostilely, ambivalently or hospitably. The cultural baggage accompanying the 
settler to the frontier – acquired primarily as a consequence of enculturation, and 
augmented by life-experiences – was s starting point for investigation. 
 Before proceeding with the investigation of cultural change in the Narra 
milieu an understanding of culture in the context of this chapter is important. 
While addressed previously (Chapter 3), a capsule account of the term ‘culture’ 
will be a useful entrée into what follows; that is, a description and analysis of the 
participant responses to the cultural questions posed to them.  
 The social anthropologist Edward Tylor (1891: 1) described the concept 
‘culture’ as “that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, 
law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member 
of society.” I suggest that keeping elements of this description (customs, habits 
and acquired language) in the forefront of our consciousness helps in an 
understanding of what is required in defining the degree of cultural differentiae 
separating one ethnic group from another. Additionally, understanding aspects of 
the transmigrants’ cultural baggage, allows for a questioning of what cultural 
markers are integral to individual or group identity, and which are manipuable. 
That is, before the degree and trajectory of cultural metamorphosis 
(transculturation) in the resettlement zone can be appreciated, an understanding of 
the convictions or certainties felt for ethnocultural attachments is necessary. Only 
then will it be possible to investigate the liminal spaces in which ethnocultural 
certainties (whether they are deliberately or subliminally held) are valorised, and 
how these valorisations are renegotiated in the transculturative process. 
 The cultural baggage with which the settlers arrived is a necessary starting 
point for an analysis of what changes have taken place. The first sociocultural 
issue that I address is that of identity (in particular ethnic identity), which in a 
polyethnic society such as the Philippines is a significant marker of difference, 
and a basis for any analysis of transculturation and its implications. Barth (1998a: 
11) sees ethnic groups as ‘culture bearing units’, although a circular contention 
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might suggest that cultural practices contribute to the formation of ethnic groups 
in the first place (Macdonald 2001, Esteban 2002). In whichever way it is viewed, 
ethnic identity or ethnolinguistic identity is a major marker of how individuals in 
the resettlement zone are identified and how they self-identify. In the context of 
research undertaken for this thesis I gleaned that distinctions needed to be made 
between the certainties of an individual’s ethnolinguistic heritage (Cebuano, 
Ilocano, Maranao) and that individual’s identity self-ascription as defined in the 
context of resettlement. Of course other factors played a contributory role: 
isolation from region-of-origin, shared resettlement zone experiences, the diverse 
ethnic backgrounds of the local-born, and a more mobile, outward-looking 
Filipino populace following the upheavals of the Asia-Pacific War and the spread 
of mass communication. 
 Correlative to an ethnic identity – but not always relative to an ascribed 
identity – was the issue of language. It soon became clear from participant 
interviews that identification with an ethnicity was not necessarily contingent 
upon the ability to speak the language of the group to which the individual 
ascribed. Even as relatives remaining in the region-of-origin continued to use 
language as a marker to differentiate themselves from other groups in their midst, 
language diminution was the transmigrant experience. The inculcation of the 
national language (Filipino / Tagalog) and the further academic language of 
instruction (English) in the education system added to the competing struggle for 
identity maintenance. To this might be added the phenomenon of the increased 
linkages with the wider world, occasioned by the participation of self, siblings, or 
relatives in the Overseas Foreign Worker (OFW) program.
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 Other issues analysed in this chapter relate to religious adherence, and how 
the transmigration process impacts upon belief structures. An assessment of 
whether educational attainment played a role in identity maintenance is 
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 The Philippine OFW program represents a growing trend in Asian labour migration to more 
affluent economies in the region and across the world. These Filipino workers provide the 
construction workers, domestics, engineers, gardeners, nannies, nurses, and sailors from the Gulf 
States to the Gulf of Mexico, from Tel Aviv to Tokyo. Camroux (2009: 49) states that the more 
than 8 million Filipinos overseas represents 10 % of the Philippine population and some 22 % of 
the country’s workforce, a statistic rivalled by few countries. It is the remittances of the OFW that 
helps sustain the Filipino economy. As a percentage of the Philippines GDP the USD 17 billion 
remitted in 2006 accounts for approximately 13 %, eclipsing by far the remittances to Bangladesh, 
Indonesia and Mexico. Relatively hight birth rates dictate that the OFW program will continue to 
be of salience to the social, economic, and political stability of the Philippines. As such it mirrors 
some of the objectives envisaged by the transmigration / resettlement paradigm in the postwar 
years. Filipinos participating in the OFW program are more prone to eschew regional and ethnic 
identities for a national one in certain circumstances. 
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undertaken. Given the increased educational opportunities of the younger cohort 
of respondents, especially the local-born, their continued conviction in the identity 
certainties of their parents and grandparents is scrutinised. Maalouf (2003: 1-21) 
warns that identities cannot be easily compartmentalised. For example, we do not 
identify with ethnicity alone: class, occupation, religion and pastimes all 
contribute to an individual’s identity at one and the same time as that individual 
adheres to a given ethnic identity. In view of this, the question of supraethnic 
convictions, and the fit between ethnic and national identity will be canvassed. 
The chapter concludes with an analysis of whether respondents experienced a 
sense of dilution of their ethnic moorings, and how they dealt with this dilution 
and the attendant sense of cultural loss or gain. 
 
Identity Self-Ascription v Ethnolinguistic Heritage 
Before undertaking any analysis of the impact of transculturation on the Narra 
resettlement zone was possible, I needed to establish what ethnocultural material 
the transmigrants had brought with them. To do this, however, I needed to 
ascertain who this diverse group of transmigrants were, where they had come 
from, and how they identified themselves. It was only possible to start a discourse 
on sociocultural change once an individual had revealed who they were – what 
identity (ethnolinguistic or otherwise) they ascribed to – and what their actual 
ethnolinguistic heritages were. This was undertaken by posing the questions: 
(1) “How would you describe your identity or ethnicity?” 
(2) “From which region or province did you resettle?” Further, to discover the 
degree of identity conviction it was asked:  
(3) “Is your ethnicity important to you?” 
On the basis of responses to these broad questions I hoped to establish 
whether the propensity for sociocultural change was possible or likely – given 
there existed the potential to elicit responses ranging from chauvinism to 
ambivalence. 
 In theory, identity self-ascription should not have presented any confusion; 
a respondent who had two ethnolinguistic Ilocano parents was likely to ascribe to 
being Ilocano. If they had mixed Ilocano / Cebuano parentage a more nuanced 
self-ascription was expected and, as was discovered, exogamous marriages were 
both prevalent and, I suggest, a significant transculturative catalyst. Ethnic 
heritage identity was further complicated by the realisation that generational 
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change had contributed to an altered self-identification among Palawan-born 
respondents. It became apparent that the seemingly unambiguous question: “How 
would you describe your ethnicity, or your parent’s ethnicity?” required a nuanced 
response that confounded predictable certainties. To overcome the interlocutory 
impasse I needed to ask a rider question: “How would you describe your 
identity?” Rather than eliciting black and white responses to identity 
interrogation, a sizeable interview cohort suggested a juggling with multiple or 
coexistent identities and loyalties. 
Table 6.1 – Ethnic Identity by Self-Ascription c.f. Ethnic Heritage: By Generation 
Cohort GEN 1 GEN 2 GEN 3  
 Identity / Heritage Identity / Heritage Identity / Heritage    
     
Aklanon      1                        (1)    1        (1) 
Ambivalent      2      1      4    7 
Batanes       3               (3)      1     4        (3) 
Batangueño       1               (1)      1     2        (1) 
Bicolano       3               (3)                             (1)    3        (4) 
Cebuano      3               (1)      1               (1)      4        (2) 
Cuyonon      2               (2)      1               (1)       4               (2)    7        (5) 
Igorot       1      1               (1)           2        (1) 
Ilocano       7               (8)       5               (5)       2               (2)   14      (15) 
Ilonggo / Hiligaynon      3               (3)       7               (7)       1               (4)    11      (14) 
Kagayanen       1               (1)      1        (1) 
Karaya      2               (2)      2        (2) 
Manileño      1               (1)      1        (1) 
Maranao      2               (2)      3               (2)      2               (2)    7        (6) 
Mixed                        (6)                       (5)                      (17)             (28)             
Palaweño       1      1     18   20 
Pangasinense        2               (2)      1               (3)     3        (5) 
Tagalog      1               (1)            1    2        (1) 
Waray                         (1)              (1) 
     
      33            (33)     25             (25)     33            (33)   91     (91) 
Source: Interviews 
 
 The first thing to note about the interview cohort (Table 6.1) is the 
diversity of the transmigrants. Whether viewed in the context of the respondent’s 
self-ascription, or in the context of their actual ethnolinguistic heritages, they 
comprised at least 20 separate ethnic identity groups, which mirror those of the 
Narra Municipality (Appendix F) and the Province at large.
212
 What is also of note 
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 Although Appendix F – courtesy of the Municipal Planning and Development Office (MPDO) 
– is headed ‘Population by Dialect’ a more appropriate denotation would be ‘Population by 
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is the absence of a dominant group. I suggest that the lack of a dominant ethnic 
group – to which the minority groups might tend to acculturate – is a major factor 
in the advancing of transcultural change in the Narra resettlement zone. Had the 
settler cohort been limited to one, two, or three ethnicities – as was the case, for 
example, in some Indonesian resettlement projects – identification with one’s 
group might have been much more sustained. Alliances advantaging some groups 
over others are less easily forged and compromises more easily wrought in 
situations where greater diversity exists. 
 In the absence of a dominant in-group, in a developing society such as the 
Narra settlement, the struggle for resources was going to be of less salience than 
in other archipelagic resettlement zones where the dominant / subordinate model 
of resettlement existed. Among the Narra respondents the two most numerous 
ethnolinguistic cohorts were the Ilocanos and the Ilonggo / Hiligaynon. Each of 
these however comprised no more than 15 % of the total interview sample. That 
is, the balance of the respondents accounted for 70 % of those interviewed, 
demonstrating the non-dominance of any group. Even if we add the relevant 
antecedents in the ‘Mixed’ cohort, to both the Ilocano and Ilonggo, they barely 
account for half those interviewed. In view of this a dominant ethnic in-group 
would be moot. 
 Almost one-third of respondents declared a mixed-heritage, and this was 
accentuated among those Palawan-born (GEN 3) indicating that the intermarriage 
rate had accelerated once transmigrants had been domiciled in Narra. To illustrate: 
of the pioneer cohort (GEN 1) only one-fifth of respondents declared a mixed 
ethnolinguistic heritage, while half of all GEN 3 respondents had mixed 
antecedents. That is, the rate of exogamous marriage increased post-resettlement. 
This might reflect both the diversity of the original transmigrants and / or the 
absence of a dominant group(s) that could have the capacity to influence 
endogamy, as was demonstrated by Hardjono’s (2001) study of transmigrant 
marriage patterns in Riau Province, Indonesia. However, there are other factors 
that have influenced intermarriage acceptability: social and physical mobility, the 
media, adherence to a similar faith or denomination, the inculcation of national 
values over regional ones in the education system, and the introduction of the 
                                                                                                                                     
Language’. While there exist discernible correlations between many Austronesian languages, their 
dissimilarities anchor them as separate languages. Mutual intelligibility, in the opinion of Paz 
(pers. comm. 2011-04-14), is the test that needs to be applied to authenticate a language’s reality. 
If the informant indicates he / she is unable to understand the speech form of someone, then that 
person is as likely as not speaking a different language. 
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national language Filipino / Tagalog itself, which allowed for easier intra-
generational social intercourse. Intermarriage as much as sense-of-place might 
also have contributed to the phenomenon that I shall call Palaweño-ness, that is, 
identification with Palawan, over other (including ethnic) identifications. While 
identification as Palaweño smacks of a new regionalism – a Filipino attribute that 
nation-state builders decry (Pelzer 1945, Abinales 2004) – it is as a signifier of 
transcultural change that this self-ascription becomes significant. 
 Identity by self-ascription in the Narra resettlement context gains salience 
when juxtaposed against the known ethnolinguistic heritages already outlined in 
Table 6.1. In the overall interview sample approximately two-thirds (70 %) of 
respondents self-identified as members of an ethnic-linguistic cohort. However, 
this self-ascription was greatly influenced by generational change. Just as GEN 3 
were more than likely to be the products of mixed marriages, so too did their self-
ascriptive proclivities mirror their less defined statuses. More than one-half (55 
%) were inclined to self-ascribe their identity as being Palaweño, while if we add 
those ambivalent about their identities – wanting to choose neither one parent’s 
ethnic identity over the other in a mixed marriage, then it might be suggested two-
thirds (66%) of GEN 3 were prepared to acknowledge an identity that failed to 
mirror that of their pioneer parents or grandparents and put them at odds with their 
ethnolinguistic relatives still residing in the pre-migration region-of-origin. 
 The basis for self-ascription was somewhat ambiguous; ethnolinguistic 
heritage dominated the field, but did not preclude other paradigms of identity. A 
self-ascribed Ilonggo among the second-generation (GEN 2) could not speak 
Hiligaynon. Rather than ascribe as ethnolinguistically Ilonggo one respondent 
stated his identity as Visayan, that is, he imagined a regional identity premised on 
the Visayan Islands better reflected his identity.
213
 A provincial-regional identity 
such as Batangueño indicated that although the respondent spoke Tagalog, they 
did not automatically identify with a broader ‘Tagalog-dom’.214 An example of 
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 Hiligaynon or Ilonggo are interchangeable expressions for the same ethnolinguistic grouping in 
the Visayan region of the central Philippines. Ethnologue (2009) chooses to denote the language as 
Hiligaynon, whilst respondents from the region generally identified as Ilonggo. 
214
 Tagalog is at once a language and an ethnicity. While the first language of approximately one 
quarter of the Philippine population – centred primarily on Manila and surrounding provinces – 
Tagalog has come to represent more than an ethnicity / language. For those living outside the 
‘Tagalog belt’ the inculcation of Tagalog has come at the expense of other languages, which for 
some ethnic groups and regional languages (Cebuano, Ilocano, Maranao etc.) continues to be a 
cause for anxiety. In this sense ‘Tagalog-dom’ is viewed as the imposed values of one group of 
Filipinos over another. As for the people of Batangas Province, Ethnologue posits that Batangueño 
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mixed-ascription identity was premised on one parent being Pangasinan, the other 
Ilocano, where the Palawan-born respondent suggested a three-way identity 
existed, in which all three strands; Pangasinense, Ilocano, and Palaweño were of 
equal importance. One respondent hailing from Metro Manila (MM) self-ascribed 
as Manileño; the generations of domicile there have obliterated a pinpointing of 
ethnic region-of-origin. For other MM transmigrants the link with region-of-origin 
had been maintained and identification with Batanes or Maranao heritages was 
confirmed. Several respondents ascribed to the ethnicity of either of their parents; 
in one instance the ascription Maranao mirrored that of the father rather than the 
Hong Kong mother, while in another it was the mother’s identity – owing to 
hands-on maternal grand-parenting – that influenced the direction of self-
ascription.  
 The motivation for Palaweño self-ascription varied. The anthropologist 
Carlos Fernandez (pers. comm. 2011-03-05) suggests that self-ascription as 
Palaweño is an indication that identity imposition by others (parents, community, 
state) can be resisted or ignored by individual agency. The state attempts to 
impose a national, Filipino identity on its citizens, while the ethnolinguistic 
community and parents are generally reluctant to exit the security of known 
cultural heritages. For some interviewees Palaweño ascription was in response to 
what they perceived as the negative aspects of regionalism – that is, a reaction to a 
continuing Tagalog, Visayan, or Ilocano ascription that thwarted the inculcation 
of a broader national identity. The reaction was itself a contentious one, given that 
Palaweño ascription might be seen as an expression of a new regionalism – one 
that superseded those of the settler generation. By and large, however, it is 
generational change that contributes to this new self-ascription. Second-
generation or local-born Narrans as well as those more educated are more likely to 
self-ascribe as Palaweño, though this was not a universal outcome (Table 6.5). 
 I suggest that there are several factors that have contributed to Palaweño 
self-ascription. Firstly, the inculcation of the national language, Filipino / Tagalog 
via the education system meant that most second and third generation 
interviewees had something in common, a means of communication that set them 
apart from their elders, who might have continued communicating in their pre-
migration language. Thus, it became clear that second and third generation 
                                                                                                                                     
– along with Lubang, Manila, Marinduque, Bataan, Bulacan, Puray, Tanay-Paete, and Tayabas – 
are dialects of Tagalog. 
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Narrans often could not communicate well with their parents or grandparents and 
in some cases would have to juggle several languages. Their parents might 
address them in the pre-migration language, to which they would answer in 
Filipino, the language to which they were acculturated. 
 ‘Confused identity’ was the response of one Palawan-born respondent 
whose parents were ethnically different. This respondent’s opinion was that 
Palaweño ascription smacked of regionalism, which necessitated the proffering of 
a post-regional Tagalog identity. The interviews revealed that transmigrants of 
mixed-heritage might either identify with the region in which they had spent their 
formative years, or with the region from which one or other of their parents’ 
hailed. One Palawan-born respondent of mixed heritage, identifying as ‘Palaweño 
with mixed emotions’, suggested that his legacy was a ‘lost culture’. ‘Composite 
identity’ combined with exogamous marriages among respondents also had the 
potential to create ambivalent feelings with regard to identity. More than one 
Palaweño ascriptee stated that their identification with the current place of 
domicile did not preclude pride in the ethnic heritages of one or both parents.
215
 
 The divergence of ascriptions: ‘hybrid Palaweño’, to ‘GI (Genuine 
Ilocano)’ and all variants in between is a basis for understanding – in view of the 
existence of complex sociocultural parameters – the trajectory for transculturation. 
That is, identity ambivalence has the potential to facilitate transcultural change, 
while strong convictions have the potential to impede such change. 
 
Language use Modification 
Language use in the polyethnic Philippines is complicated by the need for many 
individuals to juggle several languages: the language they speak at home with 
their family, the national language (Filipino / Tagalog) if they reside outside of the 
Tagalog-speaking belt of Luzon, English if they are academically employed, or a 
combination of these. Therefore for most Narrans interpersonal communication 
was more linguistically complicated than in their region-of-origin. For example, a 
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 Advantaging one parent’s heritage over the other is not uncommon. In Choosing Ethnic Identity 
Miri Song (2003) suggests that societal demands as much as individual agency contributes to this 
advantaging. The growth of mixed race (or ethnically mixed) people plays a role in this 
contestation for identity preference. Song states that “…mixed people may feel they have to 
choose sides in relation to their multiple backgrounds; this is because, rather than recognizing or 
legitimating  the multiplicity of heritages, the politicized discourse around racial identity tends to 
be dual and exclusive in nature – for example, one is regarded as Black or White, rather than 
Black and White” (pp. 63-64). Waters (1990) posits that multiple factors impact on the choices 
made to advantage one ancestry over another: knowledge about ancestors, socio-economic status 
and education, family structure, generation, knowledge and labelling of surnames, the effects of 
‘othering’, physical appearance, and the ranking accorded ethnic groups. 
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Cebuano transmigrant hailing from the Visaya region (outside the Tagalog belt) 
and working in agriculture would probably have needed only one working 
language. However, once in the settlement zone, confronted with the necessity to 
interact with the resettlement agency, the cooperative activities expected of 
settlers, and the randomness of neighbour placements, interpersonal 
communication skills were tested. 
 A sizeable proportion of respondents adamantly professed that their 
ethnocultural identity was still important to them. Yet Narrans’ willingness to 
become multi-lingual (or in some instances discard their region-of-origin 
language) suggests that language might not be as integral a marker of ethnic 
identity as some might assume. I have already demonstrated that the Narra 
resettlement project did not support a dominant ethnolinguistic grouping that 
might have had the capacity to influence language use modification. Several 
factors have influenced the use of language in the resettlement zone. Those factors 
include intermarriage, the diversity of languages, the inculcation of the national 
language Filipino / Tagalog, generational change, mobility, and the pervasiveness 
and cosmopolitanist bent of mass communication. 
 The interviews suggested that, once in Palawan, language use modification 
took place immediately, as a matter of necessity. The monolingual first generation 
often could not communicate with neighbours – this at a time when Tagalog was 
unknown to some. The question asked of first and second-generation respondents: 
“Apart from the national language, what was your pre-migration language?” 
educed that there were more than a dozen in the interview cohort. It was revealed 
that a sizeable cohort had been conversant with more than one pre-migration 
language. Furthermore, those continuing to arrive in the Municipality were often 
multilingual. 
That established, and with reference to the ongoing arrival of settlers from 
across the Philippines, a conundrum has evolved. The pioneers came ill-equipped 
linguistically and expanded their language horizons at the expense of their pre-
migration language. Their likely recourse to Filipino / Tagalog heralded the 
diminution of both region-of-origin language(s) and ethnolinguistic certainties. 
Unlike the pioneer settlers, those recently arrived had been exposed to a broader 
sample of languages; partly as a consequence of the education process and 
increased mobility. While better equipped linguistically they were just as likely to 
resort to the national language in many interpersonal communication situations. 
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 To clarify, we may classify approximately one-third (33) of the 
respondents as local-born (GEN 3), while the first-generation (GEN 1), and 
accompanying children (GEN 2) constituted the remaining two-thirds (58 
respondents). As shown in Table 6.2, as well as eliciting the pre-migration 
languages of the pioneer generation, three further questions were added in order to 
determine what language use changes had occurred. These were:  
(1) “What is your preferred language use at home?”  
(2) “What language(s) do you use most with friends or in social situations?” 
(3) “What language do you use most in the workplace?” 
Table 6.2 – Language Use: Pre-migration / Preferred Home / Social / Work  
Cohort All All  All All 
 Pre-migration Home Social Work 
     
Aklanon - - - - 
Bago - 1 - - 
Batanes / Ivatan 3 - - - 
Batangueño  1 - - - 
Bicolano  3 - - - 
Cebuano 3 - - - 
Cuyonon 2 2 - - 
Ilocano  13 2 - - 
Ilonggo / Hiligaynon 10 3 - - 
Local-born (not applic.) 33 - - - 
Kagayanen 1 - - - 
Karaya 2 - - - 
Maranao 4 1 - - 
Mixed  10 30 - - 
Pangasinense  2  - - 
Tagalog 4 52 66 35 
Tagalog + - - 25 56 
Waray - - - - 
     
 91 91 91 91 
Source: Interviews 
 
 The Ilonggo / Hiligaynon, Ilocano and a cohort comprising settlers 
utilising more than one pre-migration language represented the major arrivals but, 
mirroring the trend for ethnolinguistic heritage as described in the previous 
section, no one language group dominated. The category ‘Mixed’ reflects the fact 
that almost one-fifth (17 %) of those arriving in Narra were conversant in / and 
utilised more than one pre-migration language other than the national language. 
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Only four respondents (7 %) of arriving migrants stated that their pre-migration 
language was Tagalog, but that is not to say that those of other ethnolinguistic 
heritages did not have some knowledge of the national language, given indigenous 
Tagalog-speakers form between a fifth and a quarter of the Philippines population. 
A distinction may be made between Narra’s migrant pioneers and the continuing 
arrivals.  
 When the settlement zone hinged primarily on the arrival of farmer-
settlers, they were often from among the lower socio-economic sector of society. 
Landlessness, agrarian unrest, population pressure, tenancy and insurrection were 
all push factors; this was reflected in the monolingualism of some of the pioneer 
cohort – those least prepared to face a new domicile linguistically. However, 
technicians, public servants, educators, and health workers needed to be multi-
lingual. This trend continues, with the increasing arrival of an entrepreneur class, 
exemplified by market traders such as the ethnolinguistic Maranao. 
 The home, especially in rural isolation, has the potential to isolate and 
insulate co-ethnics from a broader community. However, when the Narra 
settlement project was established the migrants were allocated a house-lot in 
Población, the administrative centre for the resettlement agency.
216
 As well, by 
drawing lots, each settler-beneficiary was allocated an out of town farm-lot. The 
capacity to ethnically isolate occurred when some settlers exchanged lots to reside 
near co-ethnics with whom they might better cooperatively work their farms. 
However, ethnolinguistic ghettos did not eventuate in Narra; conversely the 
pioneer generation embraced linguistic change. When asked: “What is your 
preferred language use at home?” more than one-half (57 %) of the respondents 
stated that they used Filipino / Tagalog in their homes as a matter of course. The 
fact that Tagalog was given as arrival language by four individuals demonstrates 
the speed with which ethnolinguistic identities could be influenced once 
domiciled in the resettlement zone. 
 A further one-third (33 %) employed Tagalog and one or more other 
languages within the home, reiterating further the increasing significance of the 
national language. The remaining 10 %, including some younger GEN 3 or local-
born respondents, stated that they continued to use their ethnolinguistic heritage 
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 Población has since morphed into the town of Narra, becoming the principal urban centre of the 
Municipality. As such it is the administrative, commercial, social, and educational locus for the 
approximately 70,000 people of the Municipality. Straddling the National Highway it is also a 
transit point for locations farther south. 
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language in lieu of recourse to the national language. It should not be interpreted 
that the latter group and those households mixing language use were unable or 
unwilling to use Tagalog. Older folk were more prone to communicate in their 
pre-migration language, while with children or grandchildren they would need to 
speak Tagalog. Conversely children were less likely to respond in the pre-
migration language even if they understood it. Several families juggled Tagalog 
with English – given the continuing importance of English in the education 
system and bureaucracy.
217
 Intermarriage, generational change and the need to 
socialise in the wider society contributed to changes in home language usage. In 
consequence of the high rate of mixed marriages, several couples chose the 
language of one or the other spouse to communicate within their domicile. The 
education of their children in the national language appeared to be a catalyst for 
the increased usage of Filipino / Tagalog. 
 A further indication of how language use may be contributing to broader 
sociocultural change is its use in the broader community. The question: “What 
language do you use most with friends, or in social situations?” requires careful 
scrutiny. Almost three-quarters of interview participants (73 %) volunteered that 
in social situations, or mixed company they tended to use Tagalog, whatever their 
preferred home language. The remaining one-quarter (27 %) acknowledged that 
they used a mixture of languages (a category I have deemed Tagalog +) in which 
Tagalog is the foremost language, which by some might be supplanted for a 
language appropriate to a given situation. Some older respondents fell into this 
category. Attending a Rotary Club meeting entailed switching to English to 
communicate. If a group of Ilocanos were meeting then they might speak in 
Ilocano, or Tagalog. A retired cleric of the Aglipayan Church stated that English 
had been used in his services. Among GEN 3 the majority (90 %) stated that their 
only social interaction language was Tagalog, while the remainder used both 
Tagalog and other languages as appropriate. 
 The interviews revealed that language retention among the ethnic Maranao 
has been more resilient. It is unclear however whether the attachment of the 
Maranao to their pre-migration language results from their belonging to a 
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 The medium of instruction at Palawan State University and Narra National High School 
continues to be English. In one primary school visited, billboards reflected the exhortation that a 
certain zone was to be English-speaking, while one day per week was to be an ‘English-speaking 
day’. Whether this continues into the future is dependent upon how strongly Filipino / Tagalog can 
be promoted. The reality of millions of Filipinos working abroad, adds to the status of English 
within the Philippines, given that many need the language to gain placement abroad. 
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Municipality minority faith (Islam) or whether retention is an aberration 
consequent to their more recent arrival.
218
 And yet, apparent language retention 
may be ephemeral. Given their involvement in Narra’s commerce necessitates 
their immersion in languages outside their ethnoreligious sphere. Even if the 
Maranao constitute a numerical dominance among Muslims in the urban area, like 
religions alluded to above, they do not represent ‘all’ Muslims. This necessitates 
language compromise in the mosque at least, even if social and home milieux 
afford opportunities for language retention. Not unlike other Narrans, Maranao 
children are faced with the educational inculcation of Filipino / Tagalog, 
suggesting ongoing generational compromises. 
 In their work situation, more than half the respondents (62 %) declared 
(Tagalog +); that is, they would use Tagalog and whatever other language was 
appropriate to their task. Included in this cohort were the College student 
interviewees. Two educator respondents stated that English was their work 
language, though at times they would fall into the Tagalog + cohort. An exemplar 
of this cohort would be an agricultural extension officer who might use English at 
his desk, Tagalog across the counter, and when dealing with remote rural clients, 
speak with them in Ilocano in order to make them feel at ease. Two individuals 
spoke English at work and over one-third (38 %) indicated that Tagalog was their 
work language. 
 In summation I suggest that the Narra language use modification neatly 
demonstrates a facet of the transculturation paradigm in the resettlement process. 
If we acknowledge that language is an important signifier of identity (Fishman 
2003: 123-124), then the Narra resettlement experience has encompassed 
compromise and thereby acted as a catalyst for sociocultural change, new 
accommodations and in a cyclical manner further contributed to the diminution of 
language-as-identity marker.
219
 While it could be argued that societal change 
                                                 
218
 The link between religion and language (or in some cases religion and ethnicity or race) is 
dependant on circumstance. Linkages may result from chauvinism, social isolation, or ostracism. 
Examples abound: the Patagonian Welsh, Utah Mormons, Pennsylvania Amish, Australian 
Lutherans, and diasporic Jews are representative of the three models. Australian Lutherans 
epitomise neatly the religion / language duality; prior to the World Wars religion and language 
were for them integral. Not so for German Catholics who formed part of a wider Catholic 
community in Australia. 
219
 To illustrate the language / identity correlation Fishman (2003: 123-124) advances the case of 
Turkey. “As part of its over-all post World War 1 program of seeking a new Turkish identity (in 
contrast with its old Ottoman-Islamic identity) governmentally sponsored language planning 
conscientiously and vigorously moved to attain script reform… [including the] vernacularization 
and simplification of non-technical Turkish… [with] the language of the Anatolian peasant held up 
as a model of purity and authenticity…”  
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within the Philippines has impacted on Narra language use modification, the 
reality is more complex. Anecdotal evidence suggests that language use 
modification among relatives in the region-of-origin has not evolved along the 
path experienced in Narra. Narrans – across generations – have embraced the 
national language as a means of interpersonal communication, whereas in the 
region-of-origin ethnolinguistic diversity has not materialised to the same degree. 
 It should be noted that Filipino / Tagalog is being inculcated via education 
and the media but with a majority ethnolinguistic cohort remaining extant in some 
provinces, recourse to Tagalog in the non-Tagalog zone for social and 
employment intercourse is less pressing. The implication is that when Palawan-
born individuals visit their cousins in the region-of-origin their ability to 
communicate is constrained, because as Palaweños they may have already 
rejected their parents’ / grandparents’ region-of-origin language. As revealed by 
several respondents, recourse to Tagalog or school-English during visits to 
relatives limits spontaneity, putting the transmigrant offspring at a social 
disadvantage. 
 As younger Narrans’ understanding of their parent’s pre-migration 
languages decreases – or else they openly reject the use of these languages as their 
social milieu broadens – the Tagalog + cohort will most likely continue to 
diminish. By contrast a reification of altered identities, a national Filipino one in 
conjunction with a regional Palaweño one, will likely develop. It would appear 
that the language use trajectory has been inevitable. Members of the pioneer 
generation, thrown together in adverse circumstances, were willing to learn each 
others’ languages. The progression to adopting Tagalog and the increased 
rejection by the Palawan-born of pre-migration languages contribute to ongoing 
change.
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 Rural-to-rural transmigration to Narra did not create ghettos. While a 
perusal of the documents ‘Population by Religious Affiliation’ (Appendix G), and 
‘Population by Dialect [read Language]’ (Appendix F) confirms that individual 
barangays host ethnicities and religious cohorts disproportionate to their share of 
the population, it appears that ‘rural ethnic ghettos’ have not eventuated. Reasons 
for this might be the rate of intermarriage, the diversity of ethnic heritages and 
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 Settler societies the world over: Argentina, Australia, the U.S., and newer post- decolonisation 
settler societies: France and the U.K. have faced similar scenarios. In each of these a dominant 
existing national language has impacted on new arrivals. An added observable fact is that these 
settlement models are urban-based, and depending on the diversity of the immigration have had 
the potential for ghettoisation. 
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religious persuasions, and the commodification of land once the settlement agency 
granted title to the farm-lots. By contrast, three examples – Davis (1976), Waters 
(1995), and Hardjono (2001) – illustrate that rural-to-rural resettlement does have 
the capacity to effect ‘rural ethnic ghettos’.  
 Waters’ study of German rural resettlement in Russia and the United 
States demonstrates that in certain circumstances immigrants (in this case Volga 
Germans in Russia and Hutterites in North America) may resist acculturation with 
the surrounding society, a process that can be sustained for centuries.  
Similarly Davis and Hardjono have investigated cohorts of Indonesian 
transmigrants for whom little transculturation has taken place. Davis posits that 
Balinese settlers were amenable to acculturating with groups among whom they 
settled in Sulawesi, when their numbers were few, but once a critical mass of their 
own ethnic group was reached, language, religious observance, dress, and diet 
could be reinvigorated, that is a reification of their culture occurred when their 
position altered to one of being a dominant group, rather than a minority in a 
given settlement zone. Indeed, unlike the Philippines where the national language 
was a link language, in the Indonesian context the national language (Bahasa 
Indonesia) could be employed when economically necessary while the ‘rural 
ethnic ghetto’ supplied all other sociocultural needs. 
 
Religious Adaptation Paradigm 
Religious transculturation in the Philippines (as elsewhere across the Archipelago) 
has been a process of producing faiths that are distinctly regional in nature and 
outlook. That is, they are manifestations, or syncretic versions of transplanted 
faith structures. The remnant Hinduism of Bali, the Buddhist / Hindu fusion of the 
Tengger people from the Mount Bromo massif in East Java and the diverse 
Muslim and the Christian adherents across the Archipelago are hybrid examples, 
neatly epitomising regional realities.
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 In essence and name they are synonymous 
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 All faith / belief structures (including the monotheist) introduced into the Archipelago had to 
contend with existing sociocultural practices and diverse Animist belief systems. Not all extant 
cultural practices at odds with new faith structures could be eliminated, and it is in the context of 
partial compromises that syncretic faiths emerged. An example of the changing role played by 
religious change is that of gender equity. Women in Austronesian societies had greater status in 
the pre-monotheist period. The coming of Christianity and Islam reversed much of this status, by 
the inculcation of patriarchal societal structures. Matrilineality (among the Minangkabau in 
Sumatra) and gender equality (among the Pala’wan of southern Palawan) has survived in pockets, 
but cultural change has been widespread. For a graphic illustration of how archipelagic gender 
relations and broader cultural mores were undermined by the grafting of sixteenth century Spain’s 
patriarchal values onto a Philippine society refer to Carolyn Brewer’s (2004) text Shamanism, 
Catholicism and Gender Relations in Colonial Philippines, 1521-1685. 
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with the colonial and trader-instigated faiths that overwhelmed existing 
Animisms, but in lived experience they diverge from the orthodox. For example, 
few Spanish Catholics would accept the passion with which a Filipino Catholic 
engages in the annual Easter Crucifixion exhibition. Esteban (2002) and 
Macdonald (2001) demonstrate how religious ascription among evolving ethnic 
communities continues to be a means utilised in improving marginal temporal 
situations. Macdonald illustrates the effect of religious transculturation with his 
analysis of the ethnic sub-group Pänimusan. 
 Living in the south of Palawan Island, the Pänimusan to all intents and 
purposes appear to mirror their co-linguals, the ethnic Pala’wan. Living on the 
coastal fringe, among migrant Muslims from Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, 
they identify as Muslim. As Macdonald notes, their adoption of the proscription 
on eating pork and turtle appears to be one of the few religious practices that the 
Pänimusan undertake. Wedged economically between the ‘genuine Muslims’ (for 
example, the Jama Mapun and Tausug) traders, and the Animist interior Pala’wan, 
they appear to be involved in a state of ethnogenesis. While appearing to stand at 
the top of the social scale in the ethnic Pala’wan world, in Macdonald’s opinion, 
they stand at the bottom of the social scale in the Muslim world.
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 Although these 
observations concern a section of Palawan’s autochthonous population I insert this 
observation to illustrate that identities – including religious / belief structure 
identities – are not static, and have the potential to be embellished or diminished. 
 In order to test the hypothesis that movement to the ‘frontier’ had the 
potential to dilute devotion and thereby demonstrate the propensity for 
transcultural interaction, I posed the questions: “What is your religion / 
denomination?” and “Do you practice the same religion / denomination as you did 
in your region-of-origin?” For the pioneer generation (GEN 1) this was 
straightforward; they were raised in eras when there were greater certainties. If 
one’s parents were Roman Catholic, Seventh Day Adventist, or Muslim, one 
generally followed suit. I suggest that the potential existed for renewed religiosity 
in a frontier setting where one was removed from former environmental 
certainties; however, the participant responses showed that the opposite was also 
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 What Macdonald is inferring is that in the Muslim world the Pänimusan – with their minimal 
observance of religious practice and proscription – are regarded as ‘incomplete Muslims’ by other 
ethnic groups professing Islam. Conversely, even their partial observances of practice and 
proscription aligned them – in the eyes of the wider ethnic Pala’wan world – with those Muslim 
ethnic groups (for example the Tausug and Jama Mapun) that had dominated regional commerce 
for centuries, thus advancing their status, and elevating them on the social scale. 
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possible. It is not clear whether this is an element of transcultural change due to 
the heterogeneous milieu of Palawan, or simply the manifestations of the options 
that a modern world has to offer, but the fact that change in religious observance 
is possible augments the transcultural paradigm. The increasing intermarriage 
pattern in the resettlement zone necessitates religious decision-making that 
involves the offspring of such unions. 
Table 6.3– Religious Affiliation: By Interview c.f. Municipality Records (2005) 
Cohort Adherents / Interview Adherents / Municipality 
   
Aglipayan 4 (4.4 %) 1840 (2.5%) 
Baptist 2 (2.2 %) 2308 (3.3%) 
Baptist / Fundamentalist 1 (1.1 %) - 
Bread of Life Christian 1 (1.1 %) - 
Church of Christ 2 (2.2 %) - 
Church of God in Christ 1 (1.1 %) - 
Evangelical / Pentecost - 609 (1.0%) 
Iglesia Ni Cristo 2 (2.2 %) 2476 (3.5%) 
Islam 8 (8.8 %) 826 (1.2%) 
Life Church 1 (1.1 %) - 
Others - 19807 (28.8%) 
Roman Catholic 59 (64.8 %) 38670 (56.2%) 
Seventh Day Adventist 8 (8.8 %) 2131 (3.0%) 
Tribal Religions - 129 
United Methodist 2 (2.2 %) - 
   
 91  68806 
Source: Interviews / Municipality of Narra (CBMS)  
 
 Perusing the ‘Population by Religious Affiliation’ document (Appendix G) 
it appears that several barangays are over-represented in adherents of a given faith 
when measured against the overall data for the Municipality. An example would 
be the Seventh Day Adventists in Barangay Estrella Village or the Muslim 
adherents in Barangay Antipuluan; two barangays visited for this project. While 
on a municipal-wide basis the Adventists were 3.1 % and Muslims 1.2 % of the 
total population, in Barangay Estrella Village, Adventists represented 10.1 % of 
the population, while in Barangay Antipuluan adherents to Islam registered at 4.5 
%. I mention this to pre-empt any perception that religious enclavism (in the vein 
of ethnolinguistic ghettoism mentioned above) has developed in Narra. While it is 
true that the majority of Muslim adherents resided in three barangays: Antipuluan, 
Aramaywan and Población, this is easily explained. Antipuluan and Población are 
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designated as urban barangays, and since many of the recent Muslim immigrants 
are engaged in commerce and trade they have made their homes within orbit of 
the marketplace. 
 The interview participants reflected a spectrum of religious affiliations that 
mirrored the Municipality at large. The biggest cohort of adherents identified as 
Roman Catholic, though a dozen other persuasions were recorded. 65 % of 
participants identified as Catholic as against 56 % for the Municipality records. Of 
the respondents the Aglipayan, Muslim, and Seventh Day Adventist cohorts were 
over-represented when compared with the Municipality at large, though I suggest 
this does not influence the overall religious landscape, the degree of religious 
stability, change, and / or cultural compromises associated with a mixed-faith 
environment. 
 While settlers in general kept the faiths that they arrived with, one-fifth 
(18 %) altered their affiliation after arrival. Their accompanying children were 
more consistent; their conversion rate reduced to half their parent’s rate (8 %). 
The local-born cohort exhibited a more complicated picture. They sometimes had 
to choose which parent’s religion they would adopt; therefore while almost one-
fifth (18 %) of the local-born stated that they had faiths different from their elders, 
a similar cohort among the local-born revealed that they had adopted the faith of 
one parent over the other. No respondent stated they were without faith, though 
degree of observance appeared to vary. One respondent suggested that her father 
had converted to marry and had subsequently never set foot in the church of his 
wife. Whether this pragmatic act implied irreligiosity or subliminal retention of 
original faith was not made clear. Sociocultural flexibility was exhibited by 
instances where spouses adhered to different faiths. One respondent who had 
married interfaith where each party wished to have the ceremony in their family’s 
place of worship made the pragmatic compromise to have the ceremony in the 
church of a third faith, a compromise that appears to have been acceptable. 
 Interfaith marriages, that is, situations in which spouses practised different 
faiths, appeared to be more prevalent in those professing Christian denominations; 
however one respondent who had converted to Islam revealed that his spouse had 
remained a Roman Catholic. Anecdotal evidence suggests that interfaith 
arrangements for self or offspring were tolerated and imagined to be limited to 
within the broader Christian faith. That said, there did not appear to be a 
proscription as such for Muslim and Christian intermarriage. However, several 
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Christian interviewees suggested that they would be against their children 
marrying someone who was Muslim. Conversely several Muslim respondents 
appeared to be more receptive to their offspring marrying someone who was 
Christian, the supposition being (in the eyes of the respondent parent) that the 
Christian party would convert to Islam. 
Table 6.4 – Religion: Continuity v Change 
Cohort GEN 1 GEN 2 GEN 3  
     
Same religion 27 23 27 77 (85 %) 
     
Changed religion 6 2 6 14 (15 %) 
     
 33 25 33 91 
Source: Interviews 
 
 In summation I wish to speculate why Narra’s religious reality does not 
mirror that of other resettlement projects in both the Philippines and the 
Archipelago. I acknowledge that religion is not the only marker of difference 
between transmigrants and others, yet its invocation as a differential between 
those opposing resettlement and the settlers themselves – in resettlement zones 
other than Narra – requires explanation. In contrast to several resettlement zones 
in Mindanao, where communalist violence (the tribulation of the resettlement 
phenomenon) and displacement has hinged on recourse and reification of 
opposing religious traditions, Narra (and Palawan) continue to experience 
reasonable stability. That is not to say that amity has reigned supreme. In 
Palawan’s south, where both Animist and Muslim have been impacted upon by an 
influx of primarily Christian transmigrants, there continue to be anxieties that 
manifest in religious reification. I suggest that several factors have a bearing on 
why Narra as resettlement zone has avoided the negative tribulatory outcomes 
experienced elsewhere. 
 Firstly, the volume of transmigrants from across the Philippines – both 
Christian and Muslim – has been of a magnitude able to overwhelm any potential 
antagonism from the indigene population (who may themselves have been 
Animist, Christian or Muslim) already resident in the Municipality. Secondly, a 
hegemony of sorts was created and sustained by settler recruitment from those 
areas of the Philippines more densely populated (the north and east) that was 
home to predominantly Christian Filipinos. Thirdly, the Muslim arrivals into the 
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Municipality have not come from among those in the Palawan Island’s south – 
itself a Muslim in-migration area for centuries (Evangelista 2008a) – but rather 
from areas such as Mindanao where destabilising internecine violence has 
impacted on livelihoods and safety. Fourthly, those Muslims (exemplified by the 
Maranao) that have come to the Municipality, generally earn their livelihoods as 
traders and merchants, and therefore have not competed for land with previously 
privileged settler-beneficiaries.
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By these observations I am not implying that an increased juxtaposition of 
the Animist, Christian and Muslims trinity in the Municipality would be grounds 
for social and political instability. Rather, that in Narra (unlike in certain 
Mindanao migration zones) ethnic and communal reifications have not been 
invoked in defence of economic advantage. Two factors contribute to the 
avoidance of tension. Firstly, there is the numerical imbalance between the 
communal cohorts. Secondly, the ethnoreligious cohorts fill differing niches in the 
local economy. 
 
Maintenance of Identity v Educational Attainment 
A correlation between the continuing conviction for a given ethnic identity and 
the level of education of the respondent became apparent. Surmising that an 
increased level of education has the potential to broaden people’s worldviews, the 
tertiary-educated would appear to be advantaged in any re-assessment of 
individual ethnocultural identities. Conversely, the ethnocultural worldview of 
those less educated, hailing from the marginalised in society, might be expected to 
remain more inflexible. Fernandez (1975: 231-232) states: “Given their 
backgrounds as poor tenants, with low educational attainment, and limited 
technical or managerial skills, the settlers are in a very vulnerable position.” Not 
only were the weak forced back into the proto-typical landlord-tenant relations 
from which they fled in their regions-of-origin, they had the potential to seek 
security in known-realities – that of their ethnic or identity group. Viewed against 
Fernandez’ Narra of the 1970s, the interview responses of the current survey 
required a nuanced assessment. Four decades on, in a more globally connected 
world, Filipinos – many of whom have relatives working abroad and in some 
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 A cohort of Muslims within the Municipality, who do not fit this criterion are those residing in 
the rural Barangay Aramaywan, where they represent 6.2 % of the population and are involved in 
agriculture. It should be noted that despite the transmigration of Muslims into Palawan Province, 
in percentage terms their position vis-à-vis the general position has not altered. Yet, in essence, 
those continuing to arrive are joining the urban sector. 
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cases  married abroad – are likely to have a more cosmopolitan outlook than the 
former narrower identity ascriptions of the pioneers. 
 To determine if educational attainment played a role in settlers’ spiritual 
attachments to ethnolinguistic heritages it was necessary to marry the responses to 
the following questions: 
(1) “Is your ethnicity important to you?” 
(2) “Have you experienced ethnic dilution since resettlement?” 
(3) “Do you feel a sense of cultural loss since resettlement?” 
Individuals might well state that their ethnicity was very important, but if 
they held that they had experienced ethnic dilution and went on to state that they 
didn’t feel a sense of cultural loss, then they were categorised as having ‘mild 
convictions’ regarding their heritage identity. For example, one-third (31 %) of 
the tertiary-educated respondents stated that they maintained strong passions for 
their ethnolinguistic heritage (Table 6.5). Similar scrutiny was applied to the other 
cohorts. Before proceeding, a note of caution is warranted; the sample appears to 
be heavily weighted in favour of the tertiary-educated because included in this 
cohort are a number of undergraduates from the Narra Campus of Palawan State 
University. However, when viewed alongside the interviewees in toto their 
inclusion has appeared not to skew the overall convictions displayed by the 
tertiary-educated cohort. 
Those with the highest educational attainment – the tertiary-educated 
group – are divided between those that maintained weak (43 %), mild (26 %), or 
strong (31 %) convictions for their parent’s ethnolinguistic heritages. While the 
degree of conviction was not contingent upon the attainment of a tertiary 
education, the small sample of Masters and Ph.D. elucidated a more cosmopolitan 
outlook. Although some of the younger tertiary-educated maintained that their 
conviction to their ethnic heritage was steadfast, at the other end of the spectrum 
an ambivalence toward heritage was evident; that is, where feelings for inherited 
identities were ‘neutral’. One respondent revealed that he did not identify with 
any ethnicity and suggested that his current lived reality was one of 
‘postethnicity’. The self-ascription of an increasing cohort as Palaweño was 
further evidence of how inherited loyalties had lapsed. Yet, one tertiary 
respondent viewed this new allegiance as just a further form of regionalism – 
which was critiqued as a hindrance to a national Filipino identity. 
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Table 6.5 – Identity Conviction: By Educational Attainment 
Cohort Primary Secondary Tertiary Total 
     
Conviction /  strong 5 5 22 32 
     
Conviction / mild  5 18 23 
     
Conviction / weak 1 5 30 36 
     
Total 6 15 70 91 
Source: Interviews 
 
 It appears that the act of transmigration itself has had a bearing on how 
individuals see themselves vis-à-vis their resettlement fellows. The intercultural 
contact zone has played a role in the re-alignment or altered self-ascription of 
some individuals. Notwithstanding the propensity for interethnic marriages to 
contribute to mixed or ambivalent notions of self-ascription – especially among 
offspring cohorts – a more subtle manifestation of identifying with ethnic 
antecedents is apparent. The evidence suggests that ethnolinguistically diverse 
migrant cohorts thrown together in a resettlement environment experience their 
ethnicity differently from those that migrate to already-settled regions of the 
country. One respondent, who had been born in Metro Manila but whose 
antecedents had been Cebuano, suggested that during her time at University in the 
capital she had felt an affinity with other Cebuano students with whom she had 
primarily socialised. Working for a national corporation before transmigrating to 
Palawan, and committing to an exogamous marriage, has altered this respondent’s 
worldview, to the point where she feels comfortable in admitting neutrality 
towards a former strongly felt ethnic identity.  
 Among respondents with a secondary education an equal three-way 
division existed between those voicing strong, mild, or weak convictions for their 
ethnolinguistic antecedents. As tertiary education becomes more widespread, the 
secondary-educated cohort is destined to decline and reflect an older group of 
respondents. This model of decline also holds for those having primary education 
only. This cohort is for the most part represented by the pioneer generation, for 
whom a limited primary education had been the norm. While the primary-
educated form the smallest cohort of the interviewees, they displayed the strongest 
attachment to their ethnic heritages, 83 % suggesting strong convictions and 16 % 
falling in the weak-conviction category. Anecdotal evidence suggests that some 
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among the GEN 3 educated in Narra are departing for larger urban areas in other 
provinces – a reverse migration of sorts. Whether this exodus from the 
Municipality (and Province) of a more educated, articulate and nuanced cohort 
will impact on the region’s overall level of interconnectedness with an 
increasingly globalised world is far from clear. 
 In summation I suggest that a number of factors coalesce in order for 
education to play a role in an individual’s identity dilemma. Firstly the Filipino 
state mandates that the education system be conducted in Filipino / Tagalog, 
which regularises a mode of interconnectedness across the country. However, in 
the regions-of-origin – despite this regularisation – the necessity to use the 
national language is limited in situations where an ethnolinguistic population 
remains dominant. For example, in regions where ethnic Ilocanos predominate, 
there is less incentive for individuals or families to communicate in a language 
other than their heritage language. 
 However, in resettlement regions such as Narra, being versed in the 
national language has circular and recurring impacts. In this limial space, where 
ethnolinguistic diversity reigns supreme, education in a common language has 
allowed social interaction and intermarriage on a scale not imagined in the region-
of-origin. This has ensured the national language’s status as the lingua franca, 
rather than merely a language of advancement, which it might continue to be in 
Cebuano or Maranao regions-of-origin. With the national language thus employed 
– that is, as social and advancement language – the transmigrant offspring, not 
having to juggle their heritage language with the national language, are better 
situated to participate in higher education. This, I suggest, impacts on educational 
attainment, which in turn – if we examine the weakening identity convictions of 
the tertiary-educated as interviewed above – contributes to reassessments of 
identity self-ascription. 
 While languages continue to be powerful markers of ethnic identity in 
resettlement zones such as Narra, their diminution – in the face of ethnic diversity 
– contributes to a situation in which further interethnic cooperation is probable. 
Factors influencing ethnic-language diminution include the combined effects of 
the inculcation of a national language, and the increased educational opportunities 
this affords. The educational milieu further allows a liminal space in which 
younger cohorts of Narrans are able to reassess former identity certainties, a space 
conducive to additional transculturative transformations.  
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Offspring Convictions 
The potential for transcultural change is dependent upon, in the first instance, the 
identity convictions of those moving to the settlement frontier. The adamancy of 
one interviewee that he was a ‘genuine Ilocano’ (GI) well illustrates the 
articulation of a strong identification with ethnolinguistic region-of-origin – in 
rhetoric at least. It has already been demonstrated that the pioneer settlers were 
amenable to change in the use of language, were prepared to marry outside their 
ethnic group and adopt or adapt customs of their neighbours. However, reality 
dictates that migrants would necessarily arrive with cultural baggage, and the 
propensity to compromise former lifeways would depend on individual agency. 
Secondly, the identity convictions of settler children and subsequent generations 
would further influence transcultural outcomes. Hypothetically, if one belonged to 
a dominant group, with economic and political advantages, then the identity 
convictions of succeeding generations might be sustained – or even reified into 
something more potent. The resultant ethnic chauvinism might be sustained if the 
progeny of the pioneers continued to identify strongly with the identity of 
preceding generations.
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 To gauge the convictions of post-pioneer Narrans, the question was posed: 
“Do your children feel as strongly about their ethnicity as you do?” While there 
were inconsistencies, the responses were instructive, and may be précised thus; 
the further removed the offspring were from settlement date the greater would be 
the diminution of attachment to ethnic heritages. Simply stated, almost one-half 
(43 %) of the pioneer generation deemed that their children felt no, or little 
attachment to the ‘identity-baggage’ of their parents, thereby demonstrating an 
ambivalence. That did not preclude a degree of feeling or a respect for ethnic 
heritages. Rather, that the heritage was not central to decision-making about life-
choices (every-day language use, who to socialise with, and whom one should 
marry). Again, I suggest that the ethnic diversity of Narra contributed to this 
ambivalence. This contrasts sharply with resettlement projects in both Indonesia 
and Malaysia. Anecdotal evidence from a visit to Baturaja (South Sumatra) 
suggests that offspring identity convictions there more closely mirrored that of 
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 A modern example would be Protestant youth in Ulster continuing to identify strongly with 
their pioneer forebears – the settlers that arrived in the ‘Irish Plantations’ during the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries. Their cultural practices reflect the anxiety they feel about the uncertainties 
inherent in coexisting with the Other and having to concede a position of economic and political 
dominance once protected by the state. 
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their parents. The continuing enclave nature of this particular settlement and the 
lack of ethnic diversity no doubt contributed to the reassurance with ‘the known’.  
 At the other end of the spectrum, one-third (33 %) of the respondents in 
the Narran pioneer generation responded that their offspring’s attachment was as 
great as their own. While I acknowledge that this was a mediated response it is 
possible that a direct approach to their offspring might have evinced a more 
nuanced response. That observation notwithstanding, the revelation that some 
offspring households continued to speak the pre-migration language and maintain 
strong links with the region-of-origin appears to indicate that attempts at identity 
maintenance were being pursued. However, closer scrutiny revealed that whatever 
the rhetoric – whether offspring conviction was strong or partial – transculturation 
was taking place. In the face of non-dominance of any group, even the ethnic 
marker of language was being assailed. Factors such as the education system 
(premised on the languages of instruction Filipino / Tagalog and English), 
intermarriage, and the changing economic basis of society from an agricultural 
base to one of commerce and services, conspired to make it more difficult to 
maintain a holistic ethnocultural separateness within the settlement zone. 
 This contrasts with the Baturaja model of resettlement mentioned above. 
While it is true that the Indonesian education system is premised on the language 
of instruction Bahasa Indonesia, once back in the bosom of their families, living 
in ethnolinguistic enclaves that might be Balinese, Javanese, or Ogan (the local 
autochthonous group), recourse to region-of-origin language, customs and belief 
structures could more easily be observed and defended. 
 The responses of second-generation and local-born respondents (Table 
6.6) show that attachment diminution progressed rapidly, so that the local-born 
respondents – with children old enough to be cognisant – could suggest that no 
child had a strong attachment to their parent’s ascribed identity. Further, the vast 
majority (92 %) of the local-born respondents with applicable (compos mentis) 
children suggested that their children felt little or no attachment to either their 
parent’s identity convictions, or more generally a conviction for the ethnic region-
of-origin. That said, where individuals identified as Palaweño, their offspring 
would overwhelmingly feel similar sentiments. However, it was association with 
the ethnolinguistic heritage that was central to the line of questioning. While the 
sample was constrained by the fact that seventeen of the overall sample were 
childless at the time of interview (majority not yet childed), and a further fifteen 
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had children too juvenile to have coherent identity feelings, the sample 
nevertheless indicated a trend, that is, a diminution of ethnic identity conviction, 
the further in time a respondent was from arrival date in Narra. 
Table 6.6 – Progeny Attachment to Parent’s Identity Conviction: By Gradation 
Cohort GEN 1 GEN 2 GEN 3 Discounted Total 
      
Strong attachment 10 2 -  12 
      
Partial attachment  7 4 1  12 
      
Ambivalence 13 11 11  35 
      
Juvenile    15 15 
      
Childless    17 17 
      
Total surveyed  30 17 12 32 91 
Source: Interviews 
 
 Gradations of attachment were not set in concrete, however. Due to the 
number of interethnic marriages, responses were complicated by divided loyalties. 
One respondent suggested that her children wanted to maintain links with the 
identity of each parent, a situation that precluded dogmatism. Conversely, 
attachment could lean toward one parent or the other. As one Ilongga stated, if 
anything, her children’s attachment was closer to their Chinese father. Strong 
offspring conviction – at times predicated on the maintenance of the pre-migration 
language in the household – was complicated by the offspring’s dual heritage 
where interethnic marriage had occurred. 
 For one respondent who had children born on both sides of the 
transmigration process, there was a divide in conviction between those that had 
been born in Palawan and those born in Iloilo – the region-of-origin – and this 
despite the fact that both sets of children had been educated and socialised in 
Palawan. One pioneer respondent stated that while his children could speak 
Igorot, his grandchildren were monolingual in Tagalog. This would indicate that 
identity inculcation – while possible with one’s own children – was less likely a 
generation further removed, especially in view of contemporary social and 
economic realities. 
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 Globalisation is another phenomenon impacting on the likelihood or 
otherwise of maintaining strong convictions for one’s ethnolinguistic heritage. 
Narra (and Palawan) may have been geographically isolated from the Philippines 
at large in the recent past, but with modern communications this is no longer the 
case. With an increasing population vying for resources and opportunity and a 
finite frontier in which few new lands are available for further resettlement, 
Palaweños – mirroring Filipinos at large – are increasingly seeking employment 
in the wider world as nurses, ships engineers, maids, or technicians in the Persian 
Gulf and elsewhere. Several respondents had children working internationally or 
had married abroad. If anything, these expatriates identified as Filipinos – with the 
Philippines (a national affiliation) rather than with a specific region of it – and 
especially so if their forebears had already made the move from region-of-origin 
to Palawan in the first place. In essence these expatriates were continuing the 
diminution of conviction for an ethnolinguistic heartland. The reality of having a 
fifth (Camroux 2009: 49) of the country’s working population abroad may have 
implications for the inculcation of a broader national (or for some a cosmopolitan) 
identity in lieu of a narrower one premised on ethnicity.
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Supraethnic Attachments
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Individual ethnolinguistic ascription, as Nagata (1974) has shown, does not infer 
an inflexible, given identity. One’s ascription may be Cebuano, Ilocano or 
Maranao, but regional proclivities, religio-cultural attachments and national 
loyalties all compete to create what Nagata deems ‘situational loyalties’. Yet 
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 By this I mean that an identification as Filipino-first may come more readily for those 
participating in the OFW program. Wherever they are in the world it is probable that they will be 
identified by others (and identify themselves) as Filipino rather than their narrower regional or 
ethnic affiliation. For those not participating as OFW, the potential exists that a continuing ethnic 
affiliation will be maintained, in one sense because they are less mobile than their OFW 
compatriots, and in another sense because not having the opportunity to participate in the OFW 
environment might engender feelings of exclusion (in a struggle for resources sense), which rather 
than stimulate national feelings may prompt ethnic or communal reification. An analogous 
exemplar exists for example in that of the Turk national as gastarbeiter in Germany. The German 
citizen, employer, and state have little interest in knowing whether the gastarbeiter is ethnic Turk, 
Kurd, or Arab. Likewise the ethnicity of the Ilocano or Maranao abroad is of little concern to those 
in the environment to which they proceed. That is not to say that given sufficient numbers in the-
abroad-environment, that members of these ethnicities might seek each other out. That said, there 
also exists among emigrants abroad a feeling of a shared experience that allows the gastarbeiter, 
migrant and sojourner to feel some affinity with others in his liminal position. 
226
 In another section of this thesis I invoke the term ‘supraethnic’ to examine the notion of 
‘Palaweño’ identity and ascription. That is, the prefix supra was employed to represent the idea of 
‘beyond’ or ‘transcending’ the ethnic, which the term ‘Palaweño’ is inferring. A further 
interpretation might be that of describing the cosmopolitan as a ‘trans’ or ‘supra’ ethnic. However, 
in this section I use the term ‘supraethnic’ to represent the attachment various ethnicities might 
feel for the nation-state in which they reside. 
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when diverse groups share a political or social space, they are as likely as not to 
juggle their markers of identity in ways that create cultural overlap and 
harmonious intersections – thus precluding social tension. However, when 
attempting to maintain state cohesion the polyethnic archipelagic nation-state is 
faced with greater challenges than that of the classic European model of the 
nation-state. Centuries of state intervention and proscriptions have created a 
French citizen who speaks French and is nominally Catholic, an Irish citizen who 
speaks English and maybe either Catholic or Protestant, or a Dutch citizen who 
speaks Dutch and was previously segregated by the Catholic-Protestant divide. 
The degree of proscription was such that in some cases the nomenclature for the 
nation came to mirror the language spoken there-in; Poland (Polish), England 
(English), Germany (German). This has not been possible in the Archipelago. 
 Not only was the postcolonial archipelagic nation-state faced with creating 
institutions that suited its diversity, decisions about national languages, religions 
and other supraethnic markers had to be faced in a climate of regional and ethnic 
sensibilities, and often in the fraught atmosphere of the hurried nature of the de-
colonisation process. While Indonesia chose Bahasa Melayu – a minority 
language (and trade lingua franca) – as a national language to placate the 
anxieties of the 59 % of non-Javanese in that imagined nation-state,
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Philippine sense of inculcating a national ideal, while less hurried, was just as 
fraught with anxiety. Both Spanish and American rule had emanated from the 
Tagalog belt, and this influenced the decision-making process in choosing a non-
imperial language for a national language and a catalyst for inculcating a national 
loyalty. Unlike Indonesia, where 41 % of the population were ethnically Javanese, 
the Tagalogs represented at best one-quarter of the country’s population. A further 
aspect of difference is the fact that Filipinos, more than Indonesians, had been 
exposed to the languages of their colonial overlords. I mention this by way of 
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 The choice of Bahasa Melayu to represent the national language of the putative Indonesian 
state occurred in 1928 when young intellectuals gathered in Batavia to promulgate the Sumpah 
Pemuda (Youth Pledge): one fatherland, Indonesia; one nation, Indonesia; and one language, 
Bahasa Indonesia (Ricklefs 2001: 233). This choice did not reflect a rejection or reaction to the 
language of the coloniser, Holland, but rather a pragmatic choice dictated by the fact that it had 
been Dutch policy to limit exposure of their language to the colonial populace at large 
(Groeneboer 1998). A French visitor in 1940 stated: “Dutch colonial policy has never for a 
moment considered that the Dutch language could play a part in the culture and civilization to be 
given to the native. On the contrary, by opposing him with a language intended to mark the 
distance which sets him apart from the European, the Dutch have striven and still strive, though 
vainly, to deprive their ward of contact with the outside world” (p. 268-269). This differed 
markedly from the U.S. policy in the Philippines where the language of the coloniser became the 
lingua franca of the colony, and a link with the outside world. 
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illustrating that the inculcation of a supraethnic identity – one based on the nation 
rather than on ethnic or regional loyalties – has impacted on regional and 
ethnolinguistic attachments. In a sense this contributes to the creation of spaces in 
which transcultural change is more possible. The process, I suggest, is one of self-
perpetuation; once one has begun to experience change in one aspect of one’s life, 
further change is less angst-ridden and more probable. 
 To gauge the degree of supraethnic attachment in the settlement zone – 
where theoretically there existed a space for reification of one’s ethnic identity (as 
evidenced in Mindanao) – I posed the question: “Do you primarily think and 
identify as a national citizen or a member of an ethnicity?” How should one 
interpret the revelation of an individual who identifies strongly as Cebuano, 
Ilocano, or Maranao, while then admitting that his first loyalty was to the 
Philippine state? The intersection of responses to questions # 1 (self-ascription), 
and # 4 (identity conviction) with # 21 (supraethnic conviction) (Appendix A), 
illustrates how individuals juggle their identities. It is unclear what percentage of 
one’s identity is marshalled in order to define one’s ethnocultural heritage as 
weighed against a national persona. The Filipino diaspora previously mentioned 
faces this question on an ongoing basis. When abroad – whatever their diverse 
ethnocultural proclivities – they generally identify as Filipino, but on repatriation 
this identification may be renegotiated in favour of a pre-expatriate reality. 
 The majority (81 %) of respondents stated that their first loyalty was as a 
national citizen, or Filipino. However, a subsection of this cohort admitted that the 
degree of conviction was tempered by the individual’s particular circumstances. 
Yes, they had feelings for the state, but these were reflective of previous 
socialisation and environment. One respondent, for example, acknowledged a 
three-way loyalty, that is, citizenship with reservations: Filipino first, Palaweño 
second and Aklanon (Panay Island) third. The divided loyalty theme was not 
contingent upon educational, economic or age factors. One pioneer respondent 
professed Filipino loyalty as primary, with the codicil ascription of being 
cosmopolitan, ‘a person of the world’. The response from one educator was that 
of ambivalence; while grudgingly acknowledging primary conviction for the state, 
reservations hinged upon the perception that the ‘state ideal’ fell short of its 
potential.
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 An alternative response from another educator was that it was 
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 The ‘state ideal’ in this respondent’s opinion envisaged a scenario where the state would better 
guarantee its citizens social and economic security; that is, in deed rather than rhetoric. 
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incumbent upon educators to be national role models and to inculcate the national 
ideal.  
 A minority (19 %) stated that in their current location (Palawan), ethnicity, 
region-of-origin, or a combination of ethnicity and cultural marker such as 
religion, better represented their primary loyalty. This ranged from primary 
conviction reflected in attachment to a Palaweño loyalty only, to a position where 
Palawan was primary, but the state had almost equal billing. One respondent 
suggested a stronger Palaweño conviction than Filipino, while a contrary opinion 
stated a reluctance to subscribe to a born-again or postethnic notion. A less 
complex stance encompassed that of ethnicity or language-group only. 
 While Philippine academe proffers a simplistic triangulation of Filipinos 
as ‘lowland Christian’ ‘Muslim’ and ‘upland indigenes / Animist’, no response 
from the majority of respondents who identified as Christian, put faith in the 
forefront of their identification with the state. This may result from the perceived 
certainty surrounding the touting of the Philippines as a ‘Christian Asian country’ 
(Malcolm 1951) – in the manner in which Indonesia is constantly being referred 
to as the ‘world’s largest Muslim nation’. Whatever the bias, several respondents 
in the survey professing Islam were divided as to their supraethnic conviction. 
One Maranao suggested he was a Filipino Muslim, while a co-ethnic defined his 
conviction for his Maranao heritage, in which Islam played a central role.  
 The illustrated examples show that while Narra as a zone of intercultural 
interaction continues to impact on individual attachments, the lack of dogmatism 
revealed in the range of convictions allows a space for further transcultural 
interactions to occur. The fact that a respondent, who had proudly admitted his GI 
(Genuine Ilocano) credentials was as likely to admit that he was a proud Filipino, 
puts ‘situational loyalties’ into stark relief. Maalouf’s (2003: 23) suggestion that 
“identity isn’t given once and for all” but rather something that is “built up and 
changes during a person’s lifetime” holds true for transmigrants and their 
descendants more than it does for those they left behind. Like migrants the world 
over they are confronted with more choices that need to be addressed than their 
non-migratory relatives, and among those choices is the one tested by dimensions 
of loyalty. I suggest that convergent responses to questions of supraethnicity and 
ethnolinguistic identity conviction among the majority of interviewees denote a 
propensity for further sociocultural amendments to an individual’s identity – as 
 230 
suggested by Maalouf – and that these amendments will be drawn from, and be 
influenced by, the cultural baggage of their ethnically diverse fellow-settlers. 
 
Sense of Ethnic Dilution and Cultural Loss 
Resettlement has the potential to result in two outcomes: a reification or 
diminution of identity, the latter both influencing and being influenced by the 
transculturative process. While reluctant to stray into the realm of social 
psychology à la Tajfel (1981), it is the individual that determines whether he has 
experienced a diminution or dilution of his ethnic certainties and in the process 
experiences a cultural loss.
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 The degree to which the individual reacts to 
ethnocultural stimuli in his midst, or the alacrity with which he is able to interact 
with fellow (but ethnically disparate) settlers has the propensity to determine 
whether harmony will reign in the resettlement zone. The responses of Narra 
interviewees reflected that some individuals – especially among the pioneer 
cohort – had great difficulties in letting go of known sociocultural realities and 
adopting or adapting new ones. Their progeny find it less difficult.  
 The adage: ‘absence makes the heart grow fonder’, connotes the 
possibility that away from regions-of-origin a potential for recourse to ethnic 
certainties might eventuate. Factors that could influence this inclination among 
pioneer transmigrants might include a perception of a lack of success in the 
resettlement milieu; a perception that some other group was succeeding at one’s 
expense, or simply to justify one’s position in a basic struggle for resources, in 
which one’s family and identity group – rather than the settler cohort at large, 
facing similar hardships – would feature foremost as agents for action. 
Superimposed on these anxieties could be suspicion of the ‘other’, ethnic 
chauvinism, and homesickness. 
 To comprehend the dimension of ethnic dilution and / or sense of cultural 
loss in Narra two questions were posed: “Have you experienced ethnic dilution 
since resettlement?” and “Do you feel a sense of cultural loss as a result of 
resettlement?” The responses indicated that there was no mutual inclusivity 
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 Tajfel acknowledges the pressures faced by individuals – one plus one creates a group and 
influences individual action – attempting to make sense of their social-psychological identities. It 
continues to be the individual who has the capacity to determine whether he wishes to cling 
diligently to his known ethnocultural enculturation or whether other options are more amenable. 
While he cites (1981: 197-206) several examples of the devaluation of national or ethnic affiliation 
by the children of resettled migrants, it is difficult to isolate the individual / group divergence. The 
fact that some (not all) individuals are prepared to reject or modify former ethnocultural certainties 
would indicate that in spite of group (including generational peer) pressure the individual 
continues to be the final arbiter of his ethnocultural future – whatever the potential sense of loss. 
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between the two notions. However, a rider needs inserting here. Half the pioneer 
generation (GEN 1) responded that they had not experienced a diminution of their 
ethnic identities, though when the majority (88 %) of this cohort volunteered that 
they had not felt a sense of cultural loss, a more nuanced scrutiny was required. 
On reflection the responses could be interpreted in several ways: either they felt 
little sense of ethnic dilution and felt they were maintaining their culture, or that 
cultural loss had occurred and it didn’t bother them greatly. That is, a ‘no’ 
response to either question might be interpreted as ‘we are holding our own’. 
Based on anecdotal evidence I suggest that a disconnect exists between the 
‘actual’ maintenance or diminution of ethnic certainties and cultural loss and the 
‘perceived’ versions of the same. An example to illustrate this is language. A 
respondent might claim that he holds fast to his Ilocano or Maranao ethnic 
heritage at the same time as he has learned and primarily uses another language – 
usually Filipino / Tagalog as medium of communication with friends, work 
colleagues, and children. 
Table 6.7 – Sense of Ethnic Dilution and Cultural Loss: By Generation 
Cohort GEN 1 GEN 2 GEN 3  
     
Sense of ethnic dilution / yes 16 16 7 39 
     
Sense of ethnic dilution / no 17 9 26 52 
     
 33 25 33 91 
 
     
Sense of cultural loss / yes 4 6 10 20 
     
Sense of cultural loss / no 29 19 23 71 
     
 33 25 33 91 
Source: Interviews 
 
 At the other end of the spectrum the responses of local-born participants 
also need some unravelling. One-fifth (21 %) of the local-born (GEN 3) felt a 
sense of ethnic dilution – that is, of their forebears' heritage – while the majority 
(79 %) suggested otherwise. This response, it must be remembered, was from a 
cohort who identified increasingly with the new regional Palaweño identity, and 
might be regarded as a reaction to the previous pioneer reality of identifying with 
the past. Their perception, or otherwise, of having experienced a diminution of 
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their antecedent identity, appeared not to influence their identification with 
Palaweño-ness. While the GEN 3's sense of ethnic dilution was minimal and 
understandable, in the matter of cultural loss almost one-third (30 %) admitted 
that they felt a sense of cultural loss; possibly a nostalgia influenced by parents 
and grandparents. 
 GEN 2 responses fell somewhere between their pioneer parents and their 
local-born offspring. Two-thirds (64 %) felt that they had experienced dilution of 
their ethnic heritage, while only a quarter (24 %) inclined to state that they had 
experienced a sense of cultural loss. On reflection, I sense that admitting to a 
dilution in one’s ascribed identity or acknowledging that ethnocultural diminution 
had occurred should not necessarily be interpreted in a negative sense. One 
Ilonggo respondent suggested that yes, he had experienced ethnic dilution, an 
adaptation necessary for adjustment to a new home, and that the cultural loss of 
his language was not all negative – the adoption of Tagalog being a convenient 
medium for discourse. Conversely, language diminution for a fellow Visayan was 
expressed as a cultural loss in which he felt dependent on his majority language 
(Ilocano) neighbours. 
 While acknowledging socio-economic progress, one respondent regretted 
the cultural loss associated with diminution of marriage and mourning rites that 
their culture-group had performed pre-migration. For a Maranao respondent 
cultural loss was expressed as not being able to practice Ramadan in the manner it 
had been in pre-migration Mindanao. However, this was offset with the revelation 
that there were fewer restrictions for females in Narra than in the Maranao ethnic 
heartland. In a similar vein one local-born respondent paraphrased her parent’s 
lamentation that Narra weddings were not accompanied by the slaughter of a 
carabao (buffalo), as had been practiced in Luzon. 
 On the matter of ethnic diminution, one 85-year-old respondent 
(transmigrated from Batangas Province in 1951) is representative of many. He 
admitted to a decreased longing for his region-of-origin, a diminution of his 
Batangueño identity, and the cultural relegation of his pre-migration language – 
Batangueño. As a consequence of cultural accretion he has learned the Ilocano 
language (of his Ilocana wife), the indigene Tagbanua and Pala’wan languages, 
and the national language that he uses at home and socially. 
 Rather than a sense of cultural loss, one respondent intimated that for him 
resettlement had engendered ‘cultural gain’ in that he had formerly had no 
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connection with other ethnic groups. The embracing of a new Palawan (Palaweño) 
identity occurred without a sense of cultural loss in one case. Local socialisation – 
or ‘acculturation’ as one person put it – appeared to have the same effect. Yet 
other responses suggested ethnic diminution with the erosion of language use, 
levels of respect and diminished hospitality. The decline of cultural practices such 
as use of native songs and wedding and funeral customs contributed to a sense of 
loss, but did not slow the pace of change. 
 Several respondents for whom the attributing of an ethnic label was 
problematic, who were ambivalent about ethnic or regional proclivities, or who 
considered cosmopolitanism better suited their disposition, appeared to be 
minimally impacted by changes occurring in the settlement zone. The presence of 
co-ethnics was one response to not feeling a sense of diminution or loss. 
  In summation, the interviews and anecdotal evidence show that the tempo 
of sociocultural change for Narra transmigrants increased for each succeeding 
generation. Overall, immunity from transcultural change was difficult. The 
changing nature of economic pursuits – increasing urbanisation and attendant 
service sector pursuits – led to more social interaction than would be likely in 
isolated farmsteads. Intermarriage, the non-dominance of any one group, the 
adoption of Filipino / Tagalog as medium of communication all contributed to this 
change. While a sense of ethnic dilution and cultural loss was expressed by some, 
few attempts at altering the culture flow were attempted. Altered language use 
patterns best epitomises the fact that nearly everyone arriving in Narra / Palawan 
experienced sociocultural change to some degree. With language a prime marker 
of ethnolinguistic identity, when that language is superseded by necessity or 
generational change, transculturality is in progress. Whenever the pioneer settler 
is confronted with a possible non-endogamous partner, and grandchildren with 
whom he wants to communicate – but who are unlikely to speak a pre-migration 
language – his wish to retain his culture-language appears fraught. 
The responses to enquiries regarding cultural adaptation – in the fields of 
identity self-ascription, language use modification, identity maintenance, 
offspring conviction, supraethnic attachments and sense of cultural loss – in this 
chapter, provide the foundation for testing the hypothesis that transculturation in 
the Narra resettlement zone has impacted positively on ethnocultural identity, 
which has in turn facilitated interethnic harmony. 
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CHAPTER VII – NARRA: TRANSCULTURATIVE CATALYSTS 
 
In the previous chapter I discussed some of the findings of the participant 
interviews. The interviews began with determining how individuals in the Narra / 
Palawan resettlement zone identified themselves. Self-ascription, it was revealed, 
did not always coincide with ethnic heritage, and for younger Narrans identity 
was increasingly premised on a sense of being Palaweño – regarded by some as an 
alternative regionalism. During the process of distilling the degree and nature of 
any transculturative changes that had taken place in the Municipality it was 
established that there had been a substantial diminution of pre-migration language 
use. Further, it emerged that there existed a correlation between the level of ethnic 
identity maintenance and the educational attainment of Narrans. Concomitantly, 
when respondents were questioned about the degree of conviction their offspring 
exhibited for inherited ethnocultural attachments, it transpired that diminution was 
occurring. The further distant the individual offspring was from the pioneer 
generation, the weaker was their degree of conviction for former ethnic 
attachments. An analysis of interviewee’s supraethnic (Filipino) convictions 
concluded that ethnocultural attachments, or former regional proclivities, did not 
appear to be diminished by recourse to a broader national identity. It was less 
discernible whether (and how) transculturation had impacted on Palawan 
transmigrants and their progeny – whether participants perceived that they had 
experienced cultural loss and / or a sense of ethnic dilution. 
 This chapter will elaborate on some of the factors or catalysts that have 
contributed to sociocultural or transculturative change in Narra. The basis for the 
assertions made continues to be the revelations of the participant interviews, 
though anecdotal evidence and the contribution of key informants have helped to 
expand the insight. The first catalyst I examine is what links transmigrants (and 
their progeny) continue to maintain with the region-of-origin. I then investigate 
the extent of non-endogamous marriages and how they have impacted on the self-
ascription of succeeding generations. Given Narra’s ethnic diversity – with no 
dominant group able to dominate the sociocultural scene – I explore the nature of 
socialisation in the resettlement milieu. Before addressing the concept of cross-
cultural cooperation, the notion of cultural compromise will be addressed. 
Cultural compromise and negotiation is the quintessence of what allows diverse 
ethnic elements in the resettlement zone to coexist harmoniously. By compromise 
I do not mean ‘acculturation’ whereby one group – typically a numerically weak 
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or ‘civilisationally weak’ (Zialcita 2006: 145-159) one – bows before a dominant 
group, but rather ‘transculturation’, whereby there is an interchange of cultural 
practices without attendant dominance baggage.
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Links with Region-of-Origin 
The potential for transcultural change in the resettlement zone is challenged by the 
multi-layered loyalties to family, co-ethnics, region-of-origin and friends. These 
loyalties influenced the push-pull factors associated with transmigration. Some 
interviewees had difficulty tearing themselves from extended family. It was 
revealed, more than once, that for the pioneer generation homesickness was of 
real concern for many. Not only did some transmigrants abandon their allocated 
farm-lots because they were unable to succeed at frontier farming, many 
genuinely grieved for the relatives and region they had left behind. However, 
despite the hardships faced by settlers (Veloro 1995, 1996), the push-factor of 
poverty and the pull-factor of land determined that few would return to regions-of 
origin. In an age when migrants arrived in Palawan by sea, to return was 
expensive and rarely contemplated. However, this did not mean loss of contact. In 
the interim the nature of communication has become more diverse: air travel, the 
cell-phone, and Internet are affordable for the offspring-generations, potentially 
putting relatives and co-ethnics in closer touch with each other. Yet the continuing 
interaction with the past appears not to have stymied the transculturation 
phenomenon – the shedding of region-of-origin languages in favour of the lingua 
franca Tagalog being but one example. 
 Responses to the survey question: “Do you maintain links with or visit 
your region-of-origin?” revealed a generational shift away from identifying with 
the heritage of parents and grandparents. The participants revealed that, despite 
easier communication, maintaining links with region-of-origin depended on 
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 By ‘civilisationally weak’ I do not imply the existence of any moral turpitude, but rather that 
some groups in the polyethnic Philippines have not experienced the same consciousness-raising 
interaction with the diverse ethnicities in their midst. In his civilisational trinity trajectory: 
‘primal’, ‘chiefdom’ and ‘civil culture’ Zialcita (2006) eschews the term ‘civilisation’ à la Tylor 
for the label ‘civil culture’. 
The ‘acculturation’ / ‘transculturation’ dualism is poignantly illustrated in Elaine Brown’s 
(1991) thesis Tribal Peoples and Land Settlement in which she recounts an intercultural exchange 
thus: “…while playing in the school yard, little Palawan [sic] girls lacking underpants (knickers) 
have been ridiculed by Christian Filipino girls. In humiliation, these girls fled school and have 
never returned. Those girls’ experiences have encouraged other parents to furnish their daughters 
with underpants or shorts” (p. 166). The effect, I suggest, was acculturative – one group was 
coerced into compliance or mimicry. A transculturative outcome would have encompassed some 
Pala’wan girls adopting knickers, while some Christian Filipino girls would reject their wearing. 
The ‘civilisational’ model dictates that in a progressive world all girls will wear knickers. 
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generational ascription, and as shown above the Palawan-born increasingly 
eschewed former heritage identities for a new Palaweño identity. Linkage for this 
group (GEN 3) with region-of-origin might be superficial. In general, succeeding 
generations did not feel an obligation to extended family in the region-of-origin, 
whatever they felt about the uniqueness of their ethnic heritage. The decreasing 
links with region-of-origin among succeeding generations, I suggest, acted as a 
transculturative catalyst. Unlike the pioneer generation, succeeding generations 
were less burdened by their ethnocultural baggage and more responsive to 
interaction with their peer group irrespective of the diversity of their ethnic 
heritages. 
 In the previous chapter it was revealed that the majority of respondents – 
discounting the local-born who were more strident in expressing their new 
Palaweño identity – maintained that their ethnolinguistic heritage, regardless of 
volunteered self-ascriptions, continued to be an important marker of identity. This 
revelation has not impeded sociocultural interaction and exchange amongst Narra 
migrants. Bearing this in mind, the maintaining of links with region-of-origin 
might be interpreted as encompassing a notion of nostalgia, rather than a re-
connection or reification with the asserted claims of pre-migration identities. 
Whatever the rhetoric, there were individuals who, despite stating that their ethnic 
heritage conviction was strong, had not maintained links with family or their 
region-of-origin. 
 Over half (58 %) of the pioneer respondents (GEN 1) stated that they 
visited their region-of-origin often. The denotation ‘often’ proved to be imprecise; 
some interviewees were able to return annually, while for others return visits were 
irregular. If a respondent had visited five or more times, I deemed that as ‘often’, 
two to five visits were deemed ‘seldom’, though this construal needed to take 
cognisance of the respondent’s age. Five visits would be viewed as ‘seldom’ for a 
60-year resident, while for a 20-year-old GEN 3 respondent it would appear as 
‘often’. Whatever the model employed, context illuminates the trend. One-third 
(30 %) of GEN 1 seldom visited their region-of-origin; several respondents had 
visited once, while a similar number had never paid a return visit, although this 
cohort did maintain communication of a sort. 
 Linkage with region-of-origin decreased for GEN 2 respondents. One-
third (32 %) disclosed that they visited often; with a similar response (36 %) 
admitting that they had visited seldom. One-fifth (20 %) had made a single visit, 
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while among the remainder one respondent had never visited and a further two 
had no connection at all with the region-of-origin. At the other end of the 
spectrum, almost one-third (30 %) of GEN 3 admitted that they had no connection 
with the region-of-origin; a further 9 % had connections, but had never visited. Of 
the balance; 18 % visited often; one-quarter (27 %) had visited seldom; and 15 % 
had made one visit back. 
Table 7.1 – Maintaining Pre-Settlement Linkages: By Generation 
Cohort GEN 1 GEN 2 GEN 3  
     
Visit often 19 8 6 33 
     
Visit seldom 10 9 9 28 
     
Visit once 2 5 5 12 
     
No visit 2 1 3 6 
     
No connection - 2 10 12 
     
 33 25 33 91 
Source: Interviews 
 
 The first thing to note is the correlation between the three cohorts’ length 
of residence in Palawan and the diminution of their contact with region-of-origin. 
It seems that absence does not always make the heart grow fonder. While one-
third of respondents advised that they were in cell-phone and / or email contact, 
this was less likely for the local-born. Anecdotal evidence suggests that once 
socialised as Palaweño, with Tagalog replacing the language-of-origin, 
communication with relatives was not as comfortable or spontaneous.
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 Linguist 
Consuelo Paz (pers. comm. 2011-04-14) suggests that while communication with 
region-of-origin could be conducted in the national language Filipino / Tagalog, 
many of the people in the regions (including young people) felt more comfortable 
speaking the Ilocano or Bicolano, and so forth of their region-of-origin, reserving 
the national language for appropriate occasions. Hence, the local-born Palaweño, 
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 This holds true for migrants the world over. A personal communication with a Philippine-born 
UTAS student corroborated this notion. Having arrived in Tasmania as a ten-year-old, and 
subsequently socialised in English and Tagalog, the student revealed that return visits to Bicolano 
relatives in the Philippines were attended by linguistic difficulties; that is, while the relatives learnt 
English and Tagalog, they were more comfortable with the Bicol language, which the UTAS 
informant was not. This difficulty holds for many younger Palaweños; their socialisation is in 
Tagalog, not in the region-of-origin language with which their relatives continue to communicate. 
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having eschewed the language of their antecedents was put at a disadvantage 
socially with his region-of-origin relations. 
 The increased mobility afforded to the postwar generation produced a 
further complication. A number of interviewees, when asked the ‘maintaining 
links’ question, found it difficult to respond succinctly; they had made several 
migrations before eventually settling in Narra. Furthermore, mobility had afforded 
interethnic interaction on a wider canvas, complicating the region-of-origin 
reference point. It emerged, for example, that the reference point for one 
interviewee who had been born in Manila of a Maranao (Mindanao) father and a 
Chinese / Bicolana mother, was his father’s religion rather than either of his 
parents’ region-of-origin. That is, he was at ease with Maranaos in Narra not 
because of their ethnicity but because the majority of them espoused his faith. For 
others the reference point was more confused; having been born in one place 
(Metro Manila for example) they had linkages with that place rather than the 
region or province from whence their parents or grandparents hailed. 
 In summation the interviews indicated that with each successive 
generation the links with the region-of-origin continued to weaken. This has had 
implications on several levels. Firstly, those living in the Narra settlement zone 
were thrown onto their own sociocultural resources. Unconsciously they have had 
to weigh up what aspects of their culture needed to be retained in order to bolster 
their ethnic credentials, while at the same time subordinating those aspects 
detrimental to their coexistence with others. What they needed to negotiate was 
which facets of their lifeways would be useful in their new locale and which 
would hinder economic success and / or smooth interethnic, and interpersonal 
relations. Two examples illustrate the point. From an economic perspective, the 
Narra pioneer’s need to eschew wet-rice cultivation by reverting to slash and burn 
agriculture (Chapter 5) – which while regarded as ‘civilisationally’ retrograde –
was nevertheless an (agri)cultural necessity. In the matter of smooth interpersonal 
relations, what is significant is the alacrity with which the pioneer generation 
learnt their neighbours’ languages. 
 Secondly, the resettlement experience itself differentiated Narrans from 
their region-of-origin kin and co-ethnics. The shared privations of the frontier 
were instrumental in creating a bond between settlers, which distanced them from 
kin who had not shared in these privations. The pioneer narrative was one of 
hardship: paucity of rations, unsuitable skills for developing virgin forest lands, 
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accidental death while land-clearing, malaria, and the isolation of the settlement 
from the perceived security of a nearby town. Before the National Highway was 
constructed Puerto Princesa was often inaccessible by road. The aura of 
resettlement privation helped generate a sense of a differing identity. Describing 
the settling of Quinlogan (southern Palawan), Veloro (1996) suggests that for the 
pioneer generation a pecking order evolved, one based on the degree of sacrifice 
and privation (penitensya) they had experienced. The Narra pioneer generation, 
for whom letting go of the past would have been the most difficult, demonstrated 
that they had the capacity to do just that. The new camaraderie that developed 
among a heterogeneous settler cohort excluded or at least minimised the previous 
connections with region-of-origin certainties. 
 
Intermarriage 
Marriage between persons of different ethnolinguistic, religious, and other 
cultural particularities might be regarded as facilitating transcultural change. The 
process requires compromises. For example, couples with different pre-migration 
or home languages, or diet or rituals (marriage, birth, and death) need to 
determine which strategies they will adopt for harmonious coexistence. As 
already demonstrated, a sizeable Narra transmigrant cohort strongly affirmed a 
continuing ethnic pride. The prevalence of exogamous marriages, however, 
necessitated a dilution of ethnic convictions and attendant cultural particularities. 
For such intercultural relationships to succeed, compromises, by one party (or 
both) had to be accommodated. In the majority of cases neither the respondent’s 
self-ascription nor their ethnocultural heritage appeared to impact on decisions 
made with regard to marriage options. Among the factors facilitating interethnic 
marriage were the adoption of a new lingua franca (Filipino / Tagalog), a broader 
range of social interaction, and the possibility of maintaining pre-marriage 
religious convictions. 
 There were two facets to the matrimonial issue. Firstly, to discover the 
degree of miscegenation that had occurred in Narra, respondents were asked: “Are 
you married to a person of your ethnicity?” For those not yet married (including 
the majority of PSU undergraduates) an ancillary inquiry was made to discover 
whether their parents were of differing ethnicities. Secondly, to gauge if there 
existed a preference among parents about whom their offspring might marry, 
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respondents were asked: “Would you prefer your children to marry within your 
ethnicity or identity group?” 
Table 7.2 – Marriage Patterns / Marriage Preference for Progeny: By Generation 
Cohort GEN 1 GEN 2 GEN 3  
     
Married – Endogamous 18 6 3 27 
     
Married – Exogamous  12 17 18 47 
     
Unmarried –             
Parents Endogamous 
2 2 3 7 
     
Unmarried –              
Parents Exogamous 
1 - 9 10 
     
 33 25 33 91 
 
Child Marriage Preference 
– Self-choice 
24 21 21 66 
     
Child Marriage Preference 
– Reservations 
7 4 11 22 
     
Child Marriage Preference 
– n.a. 
2 - 1 3 
     
 33 25 33 91 
Source: Interviews 
 
 Whichever way the data is viewed, it becomes obvious that generational 
change continues to impact on decisions or preferences that individual 
respondents made, or would be likely to make, with regard to marriage options. 
Of the GEN 1 marriages – either entered into pre-migration or on the settlement 
frontier – (60 %) were endogamous; that is, somewhat more than half the pioneer 
cohort was married to a person mirroring their own ethnolinguistic heritage. The 
balance of the pioneer marriages (40 %) were exogamous, or interethnic. For 
GEN 2 the trend was reversed; one-quarter (26 %) of respondents were 
endogamously married, the balance (74 %) were exogamous. This tendency was 
magnified for GEN 3: 14 % endogamous, compared with 86 % exogamous 
marriages. This trend gains salience by the acknowledgment that 25 % of those 
claiming interethnic marriages had spouses of mixed parentage. A further 
observation reveals that while some of the GEN 2 had been children who had 
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accompanied their parents to Palawan, they were as likely as local-born second or 
third generation respondents to marry across the ethnic divide. 
 In all cohorts, among the unmarried, those with mixed parentage exceeded 
those who had parents of the same ethnicity, and from this it could be surmised 
that they too will not feel any compulsion to marry within their identity ascription. 
The enquiry about what marriage preferences parents had for their children 
elicited varied responses: the overwhelming majority of Narrans were unwilling to 
interfere in their offspring’s marriage proclivities. Of the parents surveyed, 75 % 
stated that ‘self-choice’ in choosing a mate was the expected norm. 25 % 
maintained they had reservations about whom their children should marry; that is, 
a preference for the marriages to be within certain ethnolinguistic and / or 
ethnoreligious parameters. However, even among this cohort there was a fallback 
position that envisaged ‘self-choice’, regardless of the parent’s reservation. Of 
interest was the revelation that a small group of parents, who had themselves been 
married exogamously, nevertheless harboured reservations about whom their own 
children should marry. 
 Several respondents, who would have preferred endogamous liaisons for 
their children, were realistic enough to accept the reality that their children had 
married ‘out’ despite their reservations. A smaller cohort was less concerned 
about interethnic marriage than about interfaith relationships. Of these, two 
Christian respondents voiced that they did not mind which denomination their 
offspring married so long as it was within the broader Christian faith. Muslim 
preferences were more likely to come with a codicil for differing arrangements for 
male and female progeny, although there was no consistency in any imagined 
marriage arrangement. In one instance it was suggested that male offspring could 
marry Christian females, who it was assumed would then become Muslim. Again, 
preference did not seem to indicate dogmatism, as one Muslim respondent already 
had children who had married out of faith without conversion, and without 
recrimination. 
 One respondent, having herself made an interethnic marriage, and 
avowing that ultimately they would support their children’s choice, stated that she 
preferred her children to marry within the ethnic band Tagalog, Ilocano or at least 
Pangasinan, or Bicolano. A further position (from a female respondent) was that 
her preference was for offspring to marry into the husband’s ethnic grouping, 
though again no dogmatism was involved. Having mixed antecedents did not 
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dissuade one respondent from favouring one side of the ethnic divide for their 
offspring. Preferences notwithstanding, several respondents had offspring or 
siblings who had married abroad (Canada, Denmark, France and Australia), 
further defining the transcultural paradigm. 
 Among the respondents, those yet unmarried (20 %) embodied primarily 
the GEN 2 and GEN 3 cohorts. Their numbers were represented principally 
among the PSU undergraduates. To test the reliability of the generational trend 
toward an increasing interethnic interdependence I posed to the unmarried cohort 
the hypothetical question: “If you were parents, would you prefer your children to 
marry within your ethnicity?” Their responses mirrored those of the married 
cohort. That is, one of decreasing dogmatism. The largest segment advocated 
‘self-choice’; a smaller group had endogamous preferences, but would accept 
realities as they developed. One female student (Muslim) respondent imagined 
future daughters would marry co-ethnics (in this case Maranao) but would allow 
sons free choice. A fellow-Muslim respondent expressed an endogamous 
preference. 
 The role of intermarriage as a transculturative catalyst in the Narra model 
of resettlement is not as evident in other archipelagic transmigration zones. 
Factors contributing to exclusionary matrimonial attitudes include social status, 
ethnic, racial, and religious chauvinism, and ‘civilisational’ status.232 The social 
standing of transmigrants – be it in the Philippines or farther afield – reflects the 
fact that they often hailed from among the poorest, the landless, and the least able 
in society (Fernandez 1975, Arndt 1983) and in consequence were often looked 
down upon by those already residing in the resettlement area. As already alluded 
to, in her Riau study Hardjono (2001) illumines that few migrants were prepared 
to marry exogamously, notwithstanding identical adherence to Islam. Malaysia’s 
1958 FELDA resettlement project at Lurah Bilut (Lee and Bahrin 2006), while 
incorporating Chinese, Indian and Malay settlers, did not experience the Narra 
model of miscegenation. The constraints being race, religion, and ethnicity.
233
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 By ‘civilisational’ I infer the divide between the perceived superior statuses of wet-rice 
cultivators when contrasted with the indigene slash-and-burn agriculturalists in resettlement areas. 
Wet-rice cultivation was regarded by state planners, economists, and politicians as the epitome of 
development, of progress, while indigenous practices were regarded as wasteful, backward. 
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 While my visit to Lurah Bilut was a cursory one, anecdotal evidence suggested that 
intermarriage was not occurring. What was most probably intended by the interlocutor was that 
‘interracial’ marriage was not occurring – interethnic marriage (intra-race) would, I imagine, not 
have been stymied. What was patently obvious was that within this resettlement project, housing 
had been zoned along racial lines. This mirrors the reality of enclavism as occurred in some 
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 Mindanao (Tigno 2006) and Lampung (Wertheim 1957) both exemplify 
the ‘civilisational’ divide. In these cases transmigrants entered zones already 
occupied by swidden agriculturalists, who owned their lands communally. 
Resettlement projects premised on individual ownership of land contributed to 
that resource being commodified, and as shown in Chapter 4 this generally 
disadvantaged the indigenous peoples in most regions, which in turn contributed 
to the reification of ethnocultural proclivities. In Mindanao the indigene-settler 
interface was more troubled, in that the migrants were Christian while the 
indigenes were Muslim or Animists. Because of the numbers involved, in-group 
identification prevailed, permitting the shunning for the most part of interfaith 
marriage, for example. In the context of intermarriage the Mindanao and 
Lampung examples reveal the antithesis of the Narra resettlement reality. The data 
demonstrates that even when Narrans had reservations about interethnic and 
interfaith matrimony, the maintenance of intercultural relationships (or their 
socialisation) with the wider community, was not precluded.
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 In summation I suggest that exogamous marriages were both a facilitator 
of transculturative change and an act of transculturation itself. Previously it was 
established that a sizeable proportion of younger Narrans have forgone an identity 
ascription mirroring that of their parents and grandparents and now ‘imagine’ 
themselves as Palaweños. This, I suggest, correlates neatly with the role played by 
intermarriage. Notwithstanding the fact that both a Filipino and Palaweño identity 
could be ascribed to concomitantly, intermarriage has put Narrans out of step with 
their region-of-origin co-ethnic kin. Because of the diversity of ethnicities in the 
settlement zone Narrans are a step removed from the Filipino-ethnicity dichotomy 
that encapsulates the identities of most Filipinos. Intermarriage has allowed 
Narrans to ‘imagine’ a third identity – one that cannot be imagined by their kin in 
the region-of-origin. The ramification of this is that a space has been created in 
which further transcultural change can take place. 
 
                                                                                                                                     
Indonesian resettlement zones, but is the antithesis of the Narra model in which house-lots and 
farm-lots were drawn by lot to encourage the mingling of ethnic groups. 
234
 To restate, I consider that the absence of a dominant group (in both numerical and political 
context) has contributed to Narra’s success as a model of resettlement. The heterogeneity of the 
Narra settler cohort avoided the dominance paradigm faced by alternative resettlement regions 
both in the Philippines and the wider world. 
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Resettlement Zone Socialisation
235
 
I now examine the social interaction of Narra transmigrants, and demonstrate how 
diverse ethnocultural groups acquired a sense of community that facilitated 
transcultural change. Socialisation helped break down barriers between 
ethnocultural groups, which in turn assisted the forging of a new Palaweño 
identity. The following example illustrates the process of socialisation. One 
elderly respondent from the pioneer generation stated that for him loneliness had 
been an important catalyst impelling his interethnic connections. As Appendix F 
shows his Bicolano ethnicity represented a minority of approximately 0.6 % of the 
Municipality’s diverse population – their dispersal across all barangays furthering 
a sense of ethnic isolation. As an educator, this respondent was obligated to 
socialise widely; his pre-migration language (Bicolano) ill-equipped him for the 
role. He faced initial difficulties teaching and understanding others, Ilocanos for 
example. His socialisation continued on a more personal level. Whether from 
loneliness or love, this respondent married across ethnic lines, an Ilongga, a 
process smoothed by his having learned, from other settlers, his partner’s 
language (Hiligaynon). This illustration aptly represents the socialisation process 
and how it underpins the Narran transculturative trajectory. 
 However, the above example of socialisation should not be regarded as a 
replicable precedent. In settler-societies the world over, migrants, when beset by 
racism, ethnic chauvinism, exclusionary practices and when being overwhelmed 
by the integrative and acculturative demands of host societies, may seek the 
certainties of their ethnocultural anchors, their known worlds. The travails faced 
by pioneer Narra transmigrants – isolation, homesickness, malaria, hunger, and 
disillusionment – had the potential to propel individuals and families towards their 
co-ethnics, thereby hampering interethnic socialisation. Previously mentioned 
archipelagic resettlement scenarios – the lowland Christian transmigration to 
Cotabato (Mindanao), the Javanese movements to Lampung and Riau, the 
Balinese passage to Central Sulawesi, and Javanese and Madurese transfer to 
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 I use the term ‘socialisation’ to mean the act of socialising with others; that is, social 
intercourse on a day-to-day basis, whether in work situations, neighbourliness, or wider social 
interaction. Henri Tajfel (1981) differentiates between inter-individual behaviour and intergroup 
behaviour, which, I suggest has a bearing on the degree of socialisation possible. It takes only one 
negative inter-individual experience, for judgements to be made about that individual’s ethnic, 
religious, or cultural particularities. A wider socialisation conversely shows up the futility of 
stereotyping at the behest of one negative inter-individual experience. 
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Kalimantan – have all experienced reifications of ethnic identities at the expense 
of interethnic socialisation. This was not the Narra resettlement zone experience. 
 Simons (cited Fenton 2008: 144) suggests that “…deficiencies of state 
authority in impoverished societies have a profound influence on the choices 
people make about whom they can trust.” Archipelagic nation-states, variously 
authoritarian and variously able to satisfy the social requirements of their citizens, 
force those citizens to rely on the ‘known’ and in the case of transmigrants this 
means relying on their kin rather than on the state. The Cebuano settler in 
Mindanao, or Balinese resettled in South Sumatra, facing the trauma of relocation 
and not receiving the state support needed, are at times thrown onto their own 
resources and the security of what is familiar, their ethnocultural heritage. Arndt 
and Sundrum (1977: 89) suggest that isolation, enclavism and separation are 
inherent in rural-to-rural resettlements in ways that would be impossible in rural-
to-urban settings. They suggest that urban integration – including via the 
pathways of social interaction and intermarriage by young people – is a less 
fraught process than that experienced in the isolation of frontier settlement 
projects. In ethnocultural transmigrant enclaves the scrutiny of the community has 
the power to influence what social choices individuals make. In this environment 
personal restraint, censure and ridicule by others limit both integrational and 
transculturational possibilities. 
 Despite similar travails faced by the pioneer generations in a range of 
migration milieux, the Narra model of resettlement has defied the intra-ethnic 
resolution of adherence to in-group solidarity. Rather than resort to the security of 
their co-ethnics, Narrans cooperated, soon made cross-cultural friendships, 
attachments, and married interethnically. The propensity for social interaction and 
the space for this to occur were not unique to the Narra settlement zone, but Narra 
does demonstrate the potential for harmonious interethnic relations to occur. 
Interethnic socialisation between Ilocano and Cebuano in Narra should be no 
more remarkable than that between Javanese and Balinese in Baturaja, or various 
ethnic groups in Mindanao – and yet it was. I suggest that it was the absence of a 
dominant group (or groups) that was the variable defining the Narra socialisation 
model when juxtaposed with others. 
 To determine what degree of socialisation had occurred, or was occurring, 
or whether there was a rejection of intercultural dialogue, I posed the question: 
“Do you socialise primarily with persons of your ethnicity?” To nuance the 
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response I established several categories of social interaction: (1) those who 
socialised primarily with co-ethnics, (2) those who preferred to socialise with co-
ethnics, yet stated that they mixed with all comers, and (3) those for whom ethnic 
distinction did not factor into social relations, that is, they were without 
reservation ‘total mixers’. 
 The overwhelming response to the interview question was that interethnic 
social interaction (that which I deem socialisation) without reservation was as 
widespread among the GEN 1 of the pioneer years as it was among the GEN 3, or 
the local-born Palaweños. Overall 80 % of interviewees divulged that they were 
‘total mixers’, and that ethnolinguistic deliberation did not influence their social 
interactions. For GEN 3 this figure rose to 90 %. Two individuals in GEN 1 and 
one in each of the other cohorts admitted that their primary socialisation was 
within their ethnic group. That left 15 % of the interviewees who stated a 
preference for co-ethnic socialisation, but who in reality mixed widely. In 
actuality, whether individuals had reservations or social interaction preferences, 
the interviews revealed that 95 % of respondents socialised widely outside the 
limitations of their ethnocultural heritage. Among the GEN 3 – many of whom 
professed a transethnic Palaweño identity – this would appear to be a logical 
response. For the GEN 1 pioneers, however, the revelation that there were no 
constraints on social mixing across the ethnic divide is indicative of a rejection of 
chauvinism and ethnic reification. 
Table 7.3 – Socialisation Preference: By Generation 
Cohort GEN 1 GEN 2 GEN 3  
     
Ethnic Preference 2 1 1 4 
     
Preference – however…  5 7 2 14 
     
Total Mixers 26 17 30 73 
     
 33 25 33 91 
Source: Interviews 
 
 Interethnic socialisation was widespread enough for some individuals to 
be unconscious of it. One GEN 3 respondent admitted that she had not been aware 
that the ethnic group to which she nominally belonged (Ilonggo) was the largest in 
her barangay; an indication that ethnicity was not a consideration in her everyday 
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world. It might be argued that a college education and employment in urban Narra 
opened the socialisation horizons for this respondent, though her returns to the 
barangay would continue to influence who her premier interactees would be – 
which it turned out were broadly-based. Living in the isolation of the rural 
Barangay Princess Urduja, the Batanes respondents presented a more complex 
example of social interactions. Their remoteness facilitated a wider maintenance 
of social customs in spite of their small numbers within the Municipality. Several 
individuals aside, their social cohesion did not preclude interaction with other 
ethnic cohorts in their community. That the Batanes were from the pioneer cohort 
– which in rural isolation might be imagined to be less socially interactive with 
outsiders – makes their interaction all the more significant. 
 A Cebuano respondent, recently arrived from Mindanao (to where his 
parents had transmigrated), volunteered that in Narra his social interactees were 
his uncle’s Cebuano friends, whereas in Mindanao most of his friends had been 
Maranao, or as he put it – Muslim. Conversely, a Maranao migrant to the 
Municipality stated that most of his friends were Christian, equating Christianity 
as the reverse of his self-ascription to being a Muslim. Several tertiary-educated 
respondents baulked at the idea that social interaction premised on the basis of 
ethnicity could be entertained. Mixing socially did not, however, preclude a 
feeling of comfortableness within the orbit of one’s co-ethnics. The revelation that 
several respondents had sought out their co-ethnics for socio-moral support whilst 
studying in locales distant from their families and regions-of-origin, appeared not 
to influence interethnic socialisation once domiciled in Narra. 
 Anecdotal evidence suggests that it was the shared difficulties of 
pioneering that promoted the first cross-cultural socialisations. As demonstrated 
by the Bicolano example above, however, myriad factors, including diversity and 
size of ethnic groups, socio-economic similitude, the necessity of teamwork, and 
shared experiences, were conducive to closer interethnic socialisation. The 
settlement agency strategy of having settler-beneficiaries ‘draw straws’ to 
determine which farm-lot they would receive resulted in the ‘mixing’ of ethnic 
groups and to the social exposure with ‘unknown others’. The random home-lot 
allocation encompassed living alongside a mix of ethnic neighbours, facilitating 
the exposure to previously unfamiliar languages and cultural practices. 
Nevertheless, there were instances when allocated farm-lots were exchanged so 
that co-ethnics or family relations could reside nearer to each other; however this 
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phenomenon was not widespread, and of itself appears not to have impacted on 
the wider interethnic socialisation trajectory. 
 The Filipino concept of bayanihan (mutual cooperation) was integral in 
forging cross-cultural socialisation. To achieve a sustained progress in an era 
before mechanisation, clearing land for crop sowing and rice planting required the 
marshalling of human resources. The bayanihan system of cooperation exposed 
the settlers – very often for the first time – to the cultural practices of the Other. 
From bayanihan’s economic imperative it was but a short step for groups to 
cooperate in other social ways: for wedding celebrations, in time of sickness, or in 
support of a promising student studying outside the settlement and this occurred 
regardless of ethnocultural proclivities. As expressed by one respondent, the 
bayanihan concept continues to play a transcultural role as a socialisation adjunct, 
in unanticipated ways. When in recent years an attempt to establish a saranay 
(mutual-aid organisation), premised on the Narra Ilocano community, met with a 
subdued response, the organisers decided to continue with the project but made it 
eligible to interested parties other than the Ilocano cohort. The continuation of the 
organisation as a multiethnic entity demonstrates succinctly, I suggest, the impact 
that cross-cultural socialisation has had in Narra. 
 Other cooperations in the manner of bayanihan exist in Narra. In Carlos 
Fernandez’s (pers. comm. 2011-03-05) opinion these function to effect both 
integration in the Municipality, and to transcend ethnic particularities. Such 
cooperative efforts are exemplified by churches, schools, the market, the 
bureaucracy, cooperatives, PTA, irrigation organisations, service clubs, and 
Sangguniang Kabataan (junior government). While organisations such as the 
Narra Hacienda de Panacan Tricycle Operators and Drivers Association, the 
Palawan Unified Adventist Multipurpose Cooperative, the Executive Barangay 
Health Community, the Southern Star Game-fowl Association, Inc. and the Narra 
Muslim Association Inc. have the potential to divide society along class, religious, 
ethnic, and recreational pastime lines, the opposite holds true. The Adventists 
encompass transethnic adherents; the Muslims comprise more than the Maranao 
majority; the tricycle drivers embrace various ethnicities. These examples 
demonstrate that socialisation across ethnic boundaries has occurred and has 
played a central role in Narra resettlement outcomes.
236
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 This does not hold in all settlement models. In his discourse on German resettlement in North 
America, Waters (1995) demonstrates that for the ethnically German Anabaptist Hutterites, 
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 In summation, I suggest that interethnic socialisation occurred at the very 
outset of Narra’s inauguration as a resettlement project and that that trajectory 
persists as migrants continue to arrive in the Municipality. A rider of sorts might 
be proffered at this point. While Christian and Muslim settlers, and resident 
indigenes, continue to share the Narra spatial setting, the degree of socialisation 
between the three culture groups is contingent upon differences as much as shared 
experiences in the settlement zone. Evangelista (2002: 18) suggests that the key 
factors in social relationships are kinship and ethnicity. While having the national 
community in his purview, extrapolation to the resettlement zone is not 
unreasonable. Interethnic socialisation appears to be less constrained where 
cultural markers are not too dissimilar.
237
 That said, the premise that transethnic 
socialisation has been the norm in Narra stands. Even an organisation such as the 
Palawan Unified Adventists Multipurpose Cooperative – predicated on a religious 
foundation – consists of migrants from across the country, and as with the Ilocano 
social security saranay attempt at incorporation discussed above, may over time 
possibly open its membership to include non-Adventists.
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Cultural Compromise / Modification 
By ‘cultural compromise’ I do not mean to imply that individuals have forsaken 
the cultural fundamentals defining their ethnic identities, but that their altered 
ways of life might not resemble the ethnic praxis with which they had arrived in 
the settlement zone. In this section I shall examine aspects of the cultural changes 
that transmigrants have experienced, why these changes have occurred and how 
they have been shaped. That is, I offer an analysis of the way migrants now live 
                                                                                                                                     
language, religion, pacifism, and their communal concept of (agri)culture acted as boundaries that 
separated them from society at large. Likewise, in Patagonia, the ethnic Welsh managed to keep 
their cultural differentiae separate from both the Argentine state, and the other ethnicities living in 
their orbit. Language, religion, a penchant for choral singing, isolation, and a historical antipathy 
toward the inequities of the nation-state in regard to ethnocultural minorities were aspects of their 
lifeworld which supported their ethnic identity for a century and a half – though intermarriage, the 
modernity project, the incursion of the state and opportunities elsewhere are eroding the resolve of 
even this ethnocultural cohort. 
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 Refer also Evangelista (pers. comm. 2011-03-04). In the context of dissimilarity I would proffer 
the example of cultural differences occasioned by the Christian-indigene / Animist-Muslim divide. 
As the interviews revealed, these cultural markers do not preclude socialisation, but do make it a 
more complex and fraught proposition. 
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 A parallel example, which admirably demonstrates the point, is the Union Jack Club, a social 
organisation formed to assist the integration of British immigrants into Australian society in the 
1950s. As it transpired the Club came to embrace migrants other than British, including recent war 
adversaries, the Italians and Germans. The rationale for the inclusion being that the migrants 
(whatever their ethnic affiliation) had more in common with each other than with the host society 
at large – region-of-origin language notwithstanding. My point is that often the shared immigrant 
experience was as important as, and at times superseded affinity relationships with co-ethnics. 
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their lives vis-à-vis the lives they may have lived when aligned with the lives of 
their kin and co-ethnics continuing to live in the region-of-origin. These changes, 
I suggest, could occur by deliberate decision, or by osmosis, without the 
individual even acknowledging that they had adopted a facet of someone else’s 
culture. It is not the mode of transmission that is important, but the fact that 
cultural exchange (transculturation) has taken place. 
 Transcultural catalysis is given impetus in situations where groups and 
individuals are prepared to accept, adopt or modify the customs of others in their 
midst. Ilocanos continuing to live in Ilocos Norte or Cebuanos continuing to live 
in the Visayas are able to maintain their preference for goat-meat and raw fish 
respectively. However, in a resettlement milieu such as Narra their cultural 
predilections would be tested, if only by an altered resource base, increased 
intermarriage, peer group influence, inquisitiveness, or for the pioneer generation 
the unavailability of many foods. The aforementioned notwithstanding, it must 
also be kept in mind that while members of an identity group may adopt each 
other’s cultural practices (or the practices of outsiders) this does not preclude their 
potential for acting in exclusionary or chauvinistic ways.
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 While PSU anthropologist Jackie Abela (pers. comm. 2011-04-02) states 
that Narra is “a smorgasbord of cultural practices that have contributed to a halo-
halo (a mixture) ethos,” the responses to the interview questions reflected how 
widespread cultural changes have been.
240
 Catalysts influencing cultural 
absorption and adaptation might be précised thus: the resolve of individual 
agency, compromises required within mixed marriages, and peer influences. As 
discussed previously, one-third (36 %) of the married interviewees acknowledged 
endogamous relationships, while two-thirds (64 %) were in interethnic marriages. 
To determine the degree of cultural compromise realised among Narrans, the 
interview questions: # 12 (re marriage arrangement), # 17 (re cultural 
compromise), and # 24 (re adopted practices) were posed (Appendix A). The 
responses reflected that, of the possible culture-altering catalysts, interethnic 
spousal relations were among the most significant. For ease of comprehension I 
shall divide the responses thematically: cuisine, language, agriculture, traditions, 
                                                 
239
 In Australia, the era of the exclusionary White Australia Policy (WAP) – during which Asians, 
including Chinese were not allowed to enter Australia – did not deter the adoption of ‘Chinese 
food’ as a cuisine. In a sense racial chauvinism capitulated to the cultural attribute food. 
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 Halo-Halo is a popular Filipino dessert that is a mixture of shaved ice and evaporated milk to 
which are added various boiled sweet beans and fruits. A further archipelagic equivalent is es 
campur in Indonesia. 
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the perceptions of others, religious and spiritual beliefs, and cross-cultural 
cooperation. 
 
Cuisine 
The interviews determined that diet and food preparation is the sphere in which 
cultural compromise is widespread. Respondents consistently raised the issue of 
changed diets as a result of their resettlement. Factors such as privation, 
intermarriage, and socialisation influenced the way Narrans were exposed to the 
consumption patterns of their settlement-mates. To illustrate I shall juxtapose two 
noticeably diverse diets: the Visayan fish-rice diet and the Ilocano diet predicated 
on meats, pinakbet (a mixed vegetable dish), and corn, in addition to rice. 
Visayans consumed raw-fish dishes but less meat or leafy vegetables; however the 
introduction of Ilocano cuisine spread the consumption of meat including goat, 
dog and buffalo. Other regional proclivities added to the dietary range. Coconut 
oil use is widespread in the Bicol region, while in the Visayas spices feature more 
significantly than in other locales. Exposure to coconut wine, fried food, tamilok 
(woodworm) and other local specialities added to the dietary blend. In recent 
years, increasing mobility, prosperity and a general cosmopolitan exposure to the 
wider world via the OFW program has altered further the cuisine exposure and 
dietary preferences of Narrans. 
 Initially, the pioneer generation were supported by the resettlement 
agency. They were allocated basic food rations to sustain them until their farm-
lots could be cleared and became productive. However, the reality was that the 
rations were discontinued long before their plots could support them. The ensuing 
periods of privation and hunger forced many to abandon the clearing of their land 
and to relinquish their farm-lots altogether (Fernandez 1975: 224-228, Suyat and 
Tejada-Suyat 2005: 26).
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 Afflicted by the shortages many were forced to modify 
their food consumption patterns, yet at the same time introduced their dietary 
proclivities into the settlement zone, thereby exposing others to different cuisines. 
Migrants whose life had hinged on rice as a staple might access corn in its stead. 
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 Fernandez (1975: 223-224)) states that subsistence rations were given on credit, and were at 
times inappropriate to farm diets and cultural proclivities. One administrator deploring the practice 
of selling these rations quipped:  “If they do not have the taste for [Scandinavian] sardines, 
[Australian] butter, and [CARE] powdered milk, it is just as well. We do.” Suyat and Tejada-Suyat 
(2005: 26) outline that when rations slackened desperate folk broke into the bodega and pilfered 
rice. Without rice settlers were forced into eating cassava and camote (sweet potato). “The 
farmer’s rice was the camote root and his fish the camote tops…It was not merely a life of 
austerity. It was famine.” 
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The raison d’être of the Narra resettlement project was the development of 
ricelands, but in the early years before the introduction and building of the 
irrigation infrastructure, its production was severely constrained.
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 Interethnic socialising and marriage have played an important role in 
disseminating regional cuisines. One GEN 2 Ilocana who admitted a strong 
attachment to her ethnic heritage divulged that compromises were required when 
she married her Cuyonon husband. His heritage encompassed a cuisine without 
the use of ginger and the variety of vegetables essential to Ilocano cooking; she 
described her husband’s cuisine as ‘simple’ and bland. In this transcultural 
household altered gastronomic practices included the use of tamilok (wood-worm) 
into the respondent’s diet, while her husband was introduced to goat and dog 
meat. An Ilocano respondent married to an Ilongga précised the interchange as 
pinakbet (leafy vegetables) versus fried food. A further cultural interchange, 
involving a Bicolana / Ilocano couple, centred on the variance between fish and 
pinakbet consumption. 
 
Language use 
Compromises in language use followed the trajectory of that outlined for dietary 
changes: intermarriage, the dictates of the work environment, general socialisation 
and bureaucratic interaction all influenced the changes. While I have already dealt 
with language use modification in the previous chapter, it is language use as a 
cultural compromise that I address here. Language is an important marker of 
ethnic identity (Das Gupta 1975, Fishman et al. 2001, Harris et al. 2003) therefore 
any compromise of the ‘linguistic’ in ethnolinguistic would appear to be a catalyst 
for further transculturative changes. Narra resettlement is different from the usual 
(or classic) models of settler-societies where migrants were expected to use the 
dominant or state language. At the time of the pioneer settlement in Narra, the 
language issue was in a state of flux. When Tagalog was chosen to represent the 
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 In ‘The agroecological mythology of the Javanese and the political economy of Indonesia’, 
Dove (1985) outlines the centrality of wet-rice agriculture in the national psyche. The rice 
‘philosophy’ was also at the forefront of Filipino state planner’s consciousnesses; to the detriment 
of alternatives and possibly more appropriate agriculture given the lag in irrigation infrastructure 
or suitability of soil and terrain. Food culture is difficult to ‘undo’ but not impossible to influence, 
as witnessed by the large-scale introduction of the potato into Europe, a region previously 
dominated by grains; or China and a wider Asia in which rice is a quintessential staple to which 
has been added the maize (corn) of the Americas. The way food culture endures change is neatly 
exemplified by China’s production of rice (197m tonnes), corn (164m tonnes), wheat (115m 
tonnes) and potato (72m tonnes) (EBYB 2012: 572, FAO 2008). 
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national idiom, it was one among many languages, but often was not spoken by 
the diversity of transmigrants to Palawan.
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 Interethnic marriages, especially during the pioneer years, necessitated a 
different strategy from that of the classic settler-society, one of plunging into a 
national or mandated language. There were a range of options: one partner 
learning the language of the other, both partners learning each other’s language, or 
recourse to a third language – which increasingly came to be represented by the 
national language Filipino / Tagalog. The reality of the Narra frontier was the 
inculcation of Filipino via the education system, a factor epitomising cultural 
compromise. Not only was the use of specific languages influenced by the 
adoption of a ‘neutral’ idiom, the lapse, rejection, or subversion of a given 
language among the transmigrants had cumulative effects further influencing the 
transculturative process. For example, an Ilocana respondent married to a 
Cuyonon spoke to her husband in Cuyonon, and addressed her children in 
Tagalog. It should be added that she additionally spoke Ilonggo (Hiligaynon) and 
the Palawan indigene languages Tagbanua and Pala’wan. In this sense the 
respondent was exposed via language to an extended ethnocultural cohort. A GEN 
1 Bicolano respondent declared that he spoke both Bicolano and Ilonggo 
(Hiligaynon) with his Ilongga spouse, Tagalog with his children and generally in 
social situations. 
 Socialisation also had an impact on language compromise. Pioneers 
readily opted to learn the languages of those among whom they toiled and resided. 
Among the first generation respondents it was not uncommon for an individual to 
juggle four or five languages. However, this practice is changing with the 
inculcation of Filipino / Tagalog and English via the school curriculum. The 
transition to a critical mass of Filipino speakers has now been reached in Narra, 
with the consequence that, unless of course they maintain strong contact with their 
antecedent regions-of-origin, most Narrans – be they Palaweños ascriptees or not 
– have less need to juggle a range of languages.  
 
                                                 
243
 When Tagalog was chosen to represent the national language toward the end of the American 
era Cebuano speakers, almost as numerous, were aggrieved. Language penetration figures are 
slippery, but extrapolating EBYB, Ethnologue, and NSO data it would appear that English as 
lingua franca continues to dominate. Any discourse of Tagalog as lingua franca needs to be 
juxtaposed against Tagalog as ethnicity. 
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Agricultural Practice 
(Agri)culture, in both form and practice, is a further arena in which cultural 
compromises occurred, and significantly so in the pioneer period. Although Narra 
is increasingly becoming a mixed economy, agriculture premised on wet-rice 
cultivation was its raison d’être. Narra’s success of being Palawan’s ‘rice granary’ 
was to some extent premised on the compromises migrants had to make. I suggest 
that agriculture has played a role of some importance as a transcultural facilitator. 
Firstly, in the early years of land clearing and development it threw together 
various ethnicities (including the indigenes and informal settlers), who, in lieu of 
the resettlement agency’s or individual’s inability to make a reality of wet-rice 
agriculture, forced the migrants to resort to the agricultural practice of kaingin 
(swidden) agriculture. Secondly, it introduced practices (such as labour exchange) 
specific to some ethnic groups (Ilocano) that were adopted by others. Thirdly, 
because of the cuisine preferences peculiar to given ethnic groups, it broadened 
the range of foodstuffs available to all, allowing an intersection with transcultural 
dietary realignments.  
 Despite the inflow of Ilocanos, corn production has been eschewed in 
favour of wet-rice. A respondent formerly growing rain-fed rice, corn and cane, 
and hailing from what he deemed was an ‘upland’ region, had to switch to 
irrigated rice-growing, which was entirely alien to him. For others – especially 
during the pioneer period – acquired skills as irrigated-rice growers had to be set 
aside as they reverted to a primitive form of kaingin agriculture (Fernandez 1975: 
224-225, Suyat and Tejada-Suyat 2005: 24-25). Fernandez states: “The majority 
of settlers…come from parts of the country where the slash-and-burn (kaingin) 
cultivation has long since disappeared from the cultural landscape” (p. 224). For 
lowland irrigation-savvy agriculturalists, clearing land was an alien experience 
with which many could not cope. They (along with the resettlement agency’s 
agricultural extension officers) had to seek instruction from the indigenous 
Tagbanua and earlier Cuyonon arrivals for guidance in land clearing and the 
application of kaingin agricultural practices. 
 Several respondents reiterated the agricultural trajectory they faced: from 
the rain-fed agriculture of their region-of-origin to becoming kaingineros, and 
eventually, when irrigation infrastructure became available, reverting to a wet-rice 
regime. This ‘forced flexibility’ allowed a space where former certainties could 
(and would) be challenged. As previously mentioned, the Ilocano practice of 
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labour exchange was adopted widely by others. Several respondents stated that 
their status previously had been as landless sharecroppers; they had not had the 
liberty to make choices about agricultural practice – these having been the 
preserve of the amo (landlord, employer) or encargado (overseer). In the 
resettlement zone, even the routine choice of selecting a sickle or bolo (machete) 
was influenced by preferences that reflected the regional differences of the diverse 
pioneer cohort. That is, an interchange of implements occurred in tandem with an 
interchange of ideas, idioms, and cuisines. 
 An unintended transcultural catalyst has evolved as a consequence of the 
Geertzian philosophy of ‘agricultural involution’. While Geertz (1963) had in 
mind the agriculture of Java, his thesis – hinging on the finiteness of land and its 
increasingly diligent exploitation – has implications for the Archipelago at large 
and the resettlement zones of the Philippines in particular. The deteriorating land: 
man ratios are testament to the fact that the Narra Municipality is not immune to 
the pressures of ‘agricultural involution’. These pressures are being circumvented 
by the increasing movement out of agriculture, especially by the GEN 3. One 
respondent revealed that he had diversified from rice to pigs because too many of 
his siblings were sharing the original land grant, which begs the question of what 
is to become of his own children. As stated by him, the original farm-lot of six 
hectares would have been sufficient for a settler with six children, but the need of 
six inheriting siblings to share that agricultural space vindicates Geertz’s 
assertion. The unintended consequence is that being squeezed from the land into 
urban pursuits requires further micro-managing of cultural certainties, and fosters 
further interaction with a more diverse urban milieu. The limitation of the 
Municipality to absorb excess rural Narrans furthers the transcultural potential. 
Seeking opportunity, some find their way to urban areas of the Philippines while 
many join the growing OFW program, whose unintended consequences are 
additional cultural modifications and compromises. 
 
Traditions: Secular 
Tradition and customs are embedded in the DNA of a culture’s repository. If 
ethnicities, in the words of Barth (1998a), are ‘culture bearing units’, maintained 
within these is a diverse melange of traditions – some religious, some secular. 
Dress, circumcision, hairstyle, architecture, and music are but a small sample of 
what differentiates one ethnolinguistic group from another. Cultural practices, 
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while not invulnerable to change, may endure without regard to the rationalising 
of their existence or maintenance. Some practices may be shared by many ethnic 
groups, further ethnic group boundaries notwithstanding. An example is the 
practice of male circumcision. The Philippines has one of the highest male 
circumcision rates in the world (WHO 2007), with in excess of 90 % of the male 
population having undergone the procedure. Muslim Filipinos – for whom male 
circumcision is a religious requisite – constitute approximately 5 % of the 
population, which presupposes that regardless of ethnic proclivity, the majority 
Christians and Animists also practice near universal male circumcision.
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 The above reveals the influence that the repository of tradition – the ethnic 
group – can muster. Yet traditions transferred to Narra have not gone 
unchallenged; they have been rejected by some, endorsed by others, and adapted 
to suit an increasingly transculturated population that is despite its diverse past 
becoming increasingly interdependent via intermarriage, regional acculturation 
and globalisation. Several examples will illustrate the quandary faced by those 
attempting to cling to tradition, those wanting to share in others’ traditions, and 
those reluctant to support old ways in a new environment. 
 A respondent originating from Pangasinan (Luzon), but married to a local-
born husband of Cuyonon heritage suggested that the Philippine custom of respect 
shown by the young to their elders via mano or mano po (hand-kissing) among the 
Cuyonon was very pronounced – to the point of obsequiousness. Conversely a 
Cuyonon mourned the fact that youthful respect in Narra was not what it had been 
in Cuyo. Two influences might be at play here; that society at large has moved on, 
or that living in a polyethnic or multicultural environment has meant that some 
customs will become less pronounced in a transcultural milieu. One tradition that 
has gained increasing cross-cultural acceptance is the Ilocano practice of pinning 
money on to the bride’s dress at weddings. Conversely, several respondents 
bemoaned the demise of the three-visit courtship tradition. 
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 As a cultural tradition male circumcision is in a state of flux. For those mandated to accede to 
religious dictates (Jews, Muslims) its application is fairly universal. Cultures as diverse as 
Australia (50 %), Japan (<5 %), Sweden (<5 %), U.K. (20 %), U.S. (70 %) show that even similar 
cultures can support traditions that are implemented at great variance. The speed with which a 
tradition can be adopted is exemplified by the case of South Korea. Whereas the Philippines – 
along with the Austronesian world at large – is in male circumcision maintaining a pre-Islamic, 
pre-imperial cultural tradition, in contrast South Korean male circumcision – which has risen from 
zero to universal adoption since the arrival on the Peninsula of U.S. forces in 1945 – is an 
‘invented tradition’. I mention this by way of demonstrating that traditions can move 
interethnically as well as being adopted or transculturated. 
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Intergroup Perceptions 
Perception of ‘others’ has the potential to either stimulate or stymie sociocultural 
change. The diverse ethnolinguistic groups that transmigrated to Narra arrived 
with cultural values particular to themselves, and these they used as a yardstick to 
measure, critique and stereotype others in their midst. Many of the GEN 1 
pioneers, previous to their arrival in the resettlement zone when they were poor, 
landless, and socially isolated, were among the least able to rationalise the 
prejudices they held about ‘others’. Even if a Cebuano had never socialised with 
(or met) an Ilocano, he would have had a perception, a stereotypical image of the 
quintessential Ilocano. Once settled in Narra this might have influenced caution in 
the dealings with those different from himself and thereby might have limited his 
intercultural socialisation and cooperation. In determining to how and to what 
degree the perception of the Other in the resettlement zone had evolved, I posed 
the questions: “Has your perception of other ethnicities altered since your 
resettlement?” and “In which respect?” 
 Before unpacking some of the ‘perception’ observations of respondents, an 
exemplar will serve to illustrate the stereotypicalities and prejudices individuals 
grappled with. The Ilocanos – with a reputation for thrift and hard work (a trait 
that is lauded by some and mocked by others) have been labelled with epithets 
ranging from frugal, grasping, covetous, to tightwad. When asked: “What 
ethnocultural markers of others have you adopted / modified since interacting 
with the wider settler community?” one respondent stated that she admired the 
Ilocanos and in imitation of them was striving to be more frugal. A Palawan-born 
interviewee of Ilonggo antecedents suggested that in contrast to her Bicolano 
husband – whom she stated exhibited a regional trait of being more direct / frank 
– her identity group was more softly spoken, less brusque. The cultural 
characteristics perceived in these two examples have differing implications. 
However ambivalently the Ilocano is viewed, it appears that he contributes to a 
more efficient society.
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In the main GEN 1 respondents revealed either that they already had an 
open and positive attitude toward others prior to embarkation, or that their 
perception of others became positive later on within the resettlement milieu. For 
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 When viewed alongside the Kalimantan (Borneo) resettlement zone experience, the alleged 
directness of the Bicolano might be perceived as divisive. The apparent ‘directness’ of the 
Madurese in Kalimantan juxtaposed against the more ‘polite’ or ‘reticent’ ethnic cohorts in their 
midst, became a stress point contributing to ethnic violence in that locale (Tanasaldy 2012: 220). 
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the local-born, the perception reality was less strained. Unless unduly influenced 
by doctrinaire kin or co-ethnics their socialisation amidst (and with) an 
increasingly heterogeneous cohort of peers prepared them for a furtherance of 
social interaction. For example, a GEN 3 respondent stated that on resettlement 
her Waray (Visayas) parents felt anxious among other ethnics and their attendant 
melange of languages. This included a negative perception of Ilocanos (don’t 
marry one!), although once settled in the Municipality the respondent’s parents 
eventually gained Ilocano friends, which mediated formerly held perceptions. 
 Positive perceptions of the Other were at times hindered by the language 
barrier. One respondent revealed that he had had initial reservations about those 
with whom he could not communicate, his limitation being his region-of-origin 
language and English. The inability to speak Tagalog confronted numerous 
migrants. Facing an array of other languages was daunting, but eventually 
language interaction improved along with more positive perceptions of the Other. 
Again the issue of loneliness was a theme alluded to by several interviewees. In 
the opinion of one respondent it was a psychological sense of isolation that helped 
to dictate a positive reassessment of the Other. Several interviewees expressed 
that in general they held positive perceptions of the Other (or at minimum an 
ambivalent view) before arrival in Narra, positions that were maintained once 
settled. A respondent working as an agricultural technician suggested that his 
perception of others was conditioned by his requirement to have a broad working 
relationship with a diversity of ethnic cohorts. 
 An interviewee revealed that during the pioneer days of the settlement, it 
was easier to cooperate with one’s own group. But any initial interethnic 
aloofness or guardedness was counterbalanced with the recognition that fellow 
settlers faced similar coexistence concerns. Interpersonal communication 
difficulties notwithstanding, one respondent stated that interaction with others was 
central to surviving in the early resettlement zone. A more positive perception of 
others materialised with a closer working relationship. In a branch of the 
Municipal bureaucracy the sole Muslim employee stated that shyness and anxiety 
were a real concern although the positive and supportive workplace environment 
had turned out to be a catalyst for reinforcing the positive perceptions of 
colleagues of diverse ethnic backgrounds. 
 Pre-transmigration positive perceptions were also in evidence. One 
respondent stated that his perception of others was already optimistic when he 
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arrived in Narra, and he considered that living among others was a way to 
experience new opportunities. Returning for a moment to the ambivalent 
perception of the Ilocano as alluded to earlier in this section, for one Narran there 
was a great respect for the wet-rice culture of the Ilocano, which had been 
introduced with their migration. Another volunteered that just because Ilocanos 
eat dog-meat doesn’t make them bad people. He added that although he 
personally didn’t like to eat dog, in a social situation (such as a wedding) he 
partook so as not to offend. I suggest that this response embodies the lengths to 
which individuals and groups will go to endeavour to accommodate difference 
and ‘fit in’ to altering sociocultural environments.  
 At the outset, however, for some it was difficult to set aside chauvinisms 
and prejudices. A former resettlement agency functionary admitted that she 
previously perceived indigenous groups in the settlement zone as less developed, 
a sociocultural prejudice and an oblique critique in view of the fact that the 
Tagbanua had been instrumental in educating the starving pioneers on how to 
clear their lands and implement kaingin agriculture. One Cebuano perceived that 
his ethnic group was more advanced culturally and socio-economically. The 
respondent who suggested that her culture-group was more polite, gentle and 
humble inferred that some others were not. As demonstrated by a respondent who 
had converted from Christianity to Islam, former reservations and / or ambivalent 
perceptions of the Other could be overcome under certain circumstances. 
 Historically, perceptions of Muslim Filipinos by the Hispanicised 
Christian Filipinos have been negative.
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 When viewed in context with the social 
upheavals that have ensued between the lowland Christian transmigrants and the 
indigenous Muslims – whose lands were forfeit for ‘development’ in Mindanao 
and the south – the legacy of mistrust has continued. Several respondents 
volunteered that they felt an antipathy toward Muslims, yet in spite of this 
sentiment migrants continue to arrive in Narra and Palawan from Mindanao and 
the south, in large measure because of the continuing unrest in their region-of-
origin and the perception that Palawan is a ‘zone of peace’. This might be an 
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 Attitudes between religo-cultural groups suffer from a historical amnesia. Some who profess 
Christianity today had antecedents who formerly professed Islam. The Metro Manila region at the 
time of Spanish subjugation was ruled by Rajah Sulayman. Both Christian and Muslim Filipinos – 
as are those exemplified by the indigenous Lumads who continue to identify as Animist – are 
descended from Animist-Austronesians who have since the 13C been assailed by West Asian 
belief models. In the case of Palawan this process of missionaryisation continues among the 
remnant Animist Pala’wan and other minority groups. 
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opportune time to segue from a perception of the Other through the prism of faith 
to briefly examine some examples of religious practices that are subject to cross-
ethnic evaluation, adoption and adaptation. 
 
Traditions: Religious 
Religious proclivities and the traditions that underpin their continuance, while 
seemingly invulnerable to change, are not as monolithic as might be imagined. 
The two monotheisms, Christianity and Islam, introduced into the Archipelago by 
commerce, conquest, and colonialism, are not copies of the faiths that emanated 
from Europe and West Asia. They are a syncretic version of faiths to which were 
fused the supernatural apprehensions of ingrained indigenous Animisms. In their 
long trajectories both monotheisms absorbed pre-prophetic folk accretion of the 
regions through which they passed. For Islam the route to the Philippines was via 
India and the Archipelago, a seven hundred years journey that reached Mindanao 
in the fourteenth century. Cultural accretion for Filipino Christianity occurred via 
Spain and Mexico, beginning in the sixteenth century. I mention this by way of 
introducing the notion that no matter what accretions have occurred in the Filipino 
versions of revealed faith, the process is far from complete; cultural modification 
and cultural compromise continue. 
 In a country where more than 100,000 people have perished in indigene-
settler violence, in which recourse to religious tradition has been central as a 
rallying point, the Barthian boundaries of faith are observably a serious matter. In 
this context it is easy to overlook the role that Palawan has played in the trajectory 
of both faith dissemination and its possible impact on transcultural change. I 
suggest that Palawan be viewed as the final destination, the end point, of the 
aforementioned monotheistic trajectories. Islam coming from the west and south, 
and Christianity issuing from Spain (via Mexico) in the east, both encountered the 
Animisms of Palawan. As such, Palawan continues to be a zone of interfaith 
coexistence, while at the same time one of proselytisation. The degree and 
trajectory of transculturation in this milieu is dependent on the decisions that 
individuals make, what aspects of indigenous beliefs are amenable to be fused 
onto ‘revealed’ belief structures. The act of proselytisation itself might be viewed 
as a tussle between the forces of acculturation and transculturation. 
 At the time of Spain’s ouster by the Americans at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, the religious modus vivendi was that Muslims controlled the 
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coastal areas of southern Palawan, the Animist indigenes the interior, while 
Palawan’s northern islands, and increasingly the northern Mainland was occupied 
by the Hispanicised Filipinos. Pax Americana halted Muslim intransigence in the 
south, and it was this hiatus that allowed greater incursions of lowland Christian 
settlers from the north and east. 
 As elsewhere across the Archipelago, Animism in Palawan is under 
pressure from missionary proselytising, intermarriage and the cultural pressures 
emanating from a globalised world. In the Philippines however, it continues to 
exude influences that conspire to make the monotheist belief structures in essence 
syncretic. Narra respondents revealed that even within a nominal persuasion such 
as Roman Catholicism, regional religious practices continue to exist. When these 
practices arrived with the transmigrants, far from being rejected by Catholics from 
other regions or by those of other denominations, some of these practices were 
actually adopted more widely. I suggest that the inclination for this to occur 
indicates the propensity for Narrans to adopt or adapt such cultural practices that 
would be less amenable in more monoethnic regions of the country. 
 While aspects of the supernatural aswang (ghoul – an evil creature 
believed by many Filipinos to be able to assume different forms) may be 
dismissed by mainline religious proponents, it would appear that aswang beliefs 
continue to augment transcultural practice by crossing ethnocultural boundaries. 
One respondent exemplified this by suggesting that his parents had adopted the 
superstitions practiced by ethnic groups different from their own on arrival in 
Palawan. Thus the injunction by some parents to be in before dark is given as a 
general warning to avoid the malevolence of evil spirits. One highly-educated 
respondent, who saw herself as a modern, ‘globalised’ daughter-in-law, was 
aghast when advised by her mother-in-law that ‘seeing or hearing an owl during 
pregnancy would be harmful to her unborn’. It was suggested anecdotally that 
Cuyonon transmigrants exuded more spirituality and superstition than other 
groups; however, what is interesting for this thesis is that in Narra individual 
belief structures could be re-calibrated to fit new realities. Several examples help 
to illustrate the point. 
 The practice by some Christians of preparing food and firewood prior to 
Holy Week (Easter) in order that they need not work on this auspicious occasion, 
and the desisting from handling a bolo (machete) during this period, have been 
adopted by others who had not heeded such injunctions previously. This is not to 
 262 
say that the converse has happened. One interviewee indicated that the 
sociocultural injunctions accompanying his parents to Palawan were not as 
rigorously observed by him – some not at all. Whether this reflects generational 
change or the demands of a more complex transcultural society is not clear. The 
observation that couples (and sometimes their children) did not always practise 
the same religious faith might have been a contributing factor in the decision-
making process of what traditional practices would be adopted or adapted. The 
Ilocano tradition of placing offerings of food near the altar during the All Saints 
celebration has been adopted by some Catholics hailing from other ethnolinguistic 
regions. 
 A further example of the interplay of religio-cultural traditions is the 
revelation of one Roman Catholic respondent who related that when she 
suggested that her husband have a priest bless his newly-launched fishing-boat 
she was told that he had already dealt with the blessing: his choice was a quasi-
Animist / Islamic ceremony in lieu of the optional priest blessing, one in which 
the spilling of chicken’s blood sufficed. To what extent this ritual was Animist-
based and what segment Islamic was not made clear: what is significant is the 
intercultural nature of the act, an example of transculturation in action. 
 Changes in cultural practice have affected the Muslim minority in greater 
ways than those endured by the Christian majority. Given their minority status in 
both Narra Municipality and the Philippines in general, the Muslim settler’s 
ability to blend into a more encompassing societal structure has not been 
straightforward, taking into account the sociopolitical dominance of the lowland 
Christians. Anecdotally it would appear that the Muslim settlers have had 
transcultural experiences in which there appears to be a palpable sense of loss. 
One respondent suggested that several factors – their numerical minority status, 
their obvious degree of religious ‘difference’ (in some instances dress, or 
observance patterns), and historical lowland Christian antipathy – coalesced to 
create an environment in which some Muslims felt that they were tolerated rather 
than embraced as fellow-Filipinos.
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 In A study of Muslim / Christian Social Relations, Hall (2010) demonstrates the complexity in 
the sharing of cultural particularities in a dichotomous Christian / Muslim environment. Hall 
observes that in General Santos City (Mindanao) social boundaries can be breached but the 
numerically dominant group dictates the degree to which this is possible. While the political 
primacy of the Christian settlers remains, there are religious events such as All Soul’s Day, in 
which the possession of a practice becomes blurred. Hall adds that the increasing rate of 
intermarriage across ethnic lines results in some unusual articulations of identity and practice. 
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 As a consequence, it was stated that to avoid difficulties with the 
surrounding community there was a tendency to modify or curtail some religio-
cultural practices. It was revealed that the ethnic groups practising Islam could not 
celebrate their ‘holy days’ as exuberantly as they would have in pre-migration 
Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi or Bukidnon. Be they ethnic Maranao or Jama Mapun, it 
appeared that little of their cultural values influenced Narran ethnicities that 
identified as Christian. Conversely, several Muslim respondents revealed that they 
were impacted upon by the traditions and cultural practices of the majority. 
Whether altered population percentages would influence the degree of religio-
cultural interchange is a moot point. However, the perception of a majority / 
minority (Christian / Muslim) dichotomy acts similarly to other majority / 
minority exemplars in the resettlement world, that is, the advantaging of one 
cultural tradition over others when there is an absence of diversity.
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 Such 
milieux are likely to encourage a reification of culture, or alternatively a qualified 
acculturation, rather than advantage the transculturative trajectory. 
 
Cross-Cultural Cooperation 
Narra’s success as a zone of resettlement has been contingent upon the degree to 
which a heterogeneous cohort of peoples and cultures (whether ethnic, linguistic, 
religious) cooperate in their day-to-day lives. This might be at the individual level, 
within the parameters of special interest groups (churches, service clubs, and 
irrigation association), or within the bureaucracy (Municipal, and Barangay). To 
ascertain the reach of cross-cultural cooperation I posed the open-ended question: 
“Do you cooperate with other ethnicities in the resettlement area?” 
 The responses elicited an affirmative 99 %. The only dissenting voice was 
a recent arrival who, outside his college attendance, was under the patronage of a 
strict Cebuano uncle who controlled his movements. Despite the overwhelming 
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 The absence of a majority / minority dichotomy has played an important role in the success of 
Narra as a settlement zone. The diverse transmigrant cohort, with no group approaching numerical 
dominance, was drawn from across the Philippines. This differed markedly from Indonesia 
resettlement model in which two or three ethnic groups provided the transmigrant cohort, who 
came to dominate ethnically certain settlement projects. This has relevance in the matter of 
religious persuasion as well as ethnicity. I suggest that had it been possible for settlers in Narra to 
be drawn from a wider range of belief structures (Animism, Baha’i, Buddhism, Confucianism, 
Hinduism, Jainism, Judaism, Taoism, and so forth) than the Christian and Muslim cohorts – in 
which no group approached dominance – then the negative consequences of the dichotomous 
religious nature of Palawan resettlement might have been proved moot. Just as ethnolinguistic 
diversity and non-dominance advanced transculturation in the Narra contact zone; a similar 
outcome, I suggest, might have been expected from a diverse religious cohort in which no one 
group was dominant.  
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response, a note of caution is in order. The notional ‘yes’ answer to the interview 
question obscures the degree of cooperation possible given the negative attitudes 
of several respondents to minority groups. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the 
existence of negative feelings towards ethnic groups professing Islam, and 
allusions to the backwardness of certain autochthonous groups, such as the local 
Tagbanua, occurred in tandem with the self-assertion of being a co-operator. A 
local-born Narran suggested that cooperation with others in the community was a 
‘given’, and that this cooperation was proffered without deliberation. Cooperation 
for those in the teaching profession and advisory bureaucracies, such as the DAR 
and the Nutrition Office was especially manifest; as one respondent put it, 
“diversity demands cooperation.” 
 Community organisations facilitate cooperation. Fernandez (2011) 
suggests that they are transethnic levelling devices. Narra abounds with such 
entities: the PTAs, churches, irrigation associations, multi-purpose cooperatives, 
service clubs, local government initiatives, NGOs, and suchlike. The following 
example helps illustrate the lengths to which an organisation will go (and the 
compromises required) for it to be inclusive and cooperative. The Aglipayan 
Church priest acknowledged that his services were conducted in English. He 
explained that this was to embrace the various ethnolinguistic groups, who 
although they shared a faith, did not share a common language. In Narra, English 
is regarded as a neutral language that does not advantage one ethnic group over 
the other.  
  In a municipality of 70,000 persons, with a police complement of only 27, 
dispute settlement necessitating cooperation is crucial. Given that nuanced 
responses are required to mediate disputes that are at times cross-cultural, the 
cooperation between the Lupon Tagapamayapa (Justice of the Peace) and the 
community is essential. The Sangguniang Kabataan (SK – Youth Council of the 
Philippines), which has a chapter in each barangay across the country, plays a 
similar role.
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 The SK acts as an advisory body for the views of 15 – 21 year-olds 
in society and represents a widespread mechanism for cooperation, which in view 
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 SK (Sangguniang Kabataan) is a uniquely Filipino institution. Each barangay in the Philippines 
is mandated by law to have its own chapter of the Katipunan ng Kabataan (KK – Youth 
Federation). Membership is restricted to those between the ages 15 – 18 who have resided at least 
six months in a given barangay. The SK initiates policies, programs, and projects for development 
of youth in their respective barangay, for which monies are set aside. The SK Chairperson 
automatically sits on the Sangguniang Barangay (SB – Village Council) as ex-oficio member. 
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of Narra’s ethnic demographic is of more salience than in the more monoethnic 
regions of the country. 
 Taking Barangay Población (Narra township) as representative, the ethnic 
‘enclave’ nature of settlement is conspicuously absent. Cross-cultural cooperation 
is witnessed in many non-formal, social situations. Thus, at times such as high 
holidays, weddings, and other social occasions there exist opportunities to 
transcend residual ethnocultural divides, which in turn provides conduits for 
lasting friendships and ongoing supraethnic cooperations. Cooperation in Narra, 
be it in response to bureaucratic initiatives (the DAR, the Municipal and Barangay 
councils), or social ones (church, PTA, service clubs) act as a catalyst for the 
further social interaction (socialisation) of Narrans. As illustrated in the 
‘socialisation’ section earlier in this chapter, the attempt to establish an Ilocano 
saranay (help each other) organisation expanded to include others, thereby 
increasing interethnic cooperation. Cooperations are also experienced in rural 
areas of the Municipality. In the agricultural sphere where ploughing, planting, 
and harvesting schedules are time-driven, these pursuits become vehicles for 
sharing and co-operating. The reality of interethnic or intercultural cooperation in 
Narra decreases the potential for chauvinism – a positive transculturative 
facilitator. 
 
Primordialism of Culture? 
Before proceeding, I wish to raise the issue of primordialism à la Geertz (2000) 
and Shils (1957) and its potential to influence or retard transcultural change. 
Stated simply, how sacrosanct is the culture content of any ethnolinguistic or 
identity group? The degree of (in)vulnerability of an ethnic group’s cultural 
baggage may influence and determine the way in which individuals and groups 
are prepared, or willing, to view and interact with the Other in their midst. Indeed, 
a single boundary (religion or language) has the capability of shaping attitudes, 
and establishing the parameters by which the Other (and the Other’s culture) will 
be judged, accepted, or denied. The inviolability afforded a given cultural practice 
will help uncover the sacrosanctity (or otherwise) of the ambit claims of 
primordialism. 
 The Narra interviews were premised on the relative positions of 
ethnocultural diversity, incorporating the cultural baggage that the settlers had 
brought with them from their regions-of-origin. The cultural practices and 
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particularities in that baggage had the potential to culturally divide transmigrants 
in this ‘contact zone’. This presupposed that settlers had less in common than 
might be imagined: indeed, the very notion of ethnolinguistic identity is based on 
differences – not like attributes. Yet we know that many cultural practices (dietary 
predilections, male circumcision, and respect for elders) transcend the boundaries 
of the more than one hundred ethnolinguistic groups that comprise the 
Philippines.
250
 Which practices are primordial and therefore likely to influence or 
hamper change is a moot point. Where cultural differences do exist, the degree of 
difference between ethnocultural groups may not be an insurmountable barrier for 
intergroup interaction or integration, be it in the resettlement frontier or wider 
world. What should be noted is the reality of the ‘lifeways’ of any identity group. 
Contrast the minimalist degree of Muslimity invoked by Macdonald’s (2001) 
ethnic Pänimusan – who keep the taboo on consuming pork or turtle – with 
Zialcita’s (2006: 233) assertion that some Mindanaon and Indonesian Muslims are 
not averse to keeping the taboo on raising pigs and consuming raised pork, yet are 
amenable to eating wild pigs they have hunted in the forest. 
 If the cultural practices of Barth’s (1998) ‘culture-bearing units’ are not set 
in stone it might be asked what degree of primordiality any culture-group can 
claim in the aftermath of millennia of commerce, slaving, resettlement, and 
colonialism? Or put more succinctly, how long a given ethnicity has adhered to a 
given cultural practice? Examination reveals that what constitutes a matter of 
importance to a particular culture-group may be less imbedded than imagined. 
While not wanting to diminish the passion with which a practice continues to be 
sustained by this group or other I nevertheless raise the question of the possible 
constancy and longevity of such a practice. If a culture-group can adopt or adapt 
some practice or other without trauma, then concomitantly (in theory) its removal 
or substitution could just as well occur.  
 Viewed in this context, the potential for transculturation might not be as 
fraught a proposition as imagined. The sixteenth century religious restructuring in 
Western Europe illustrates the point. The hitherto overarching power of the 
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 Not only are many cultural practices pertinent to a broad range of Filipino identity groups; they 
may be applicable to the Archipelago, the Austronesian world, or a more globalised dimension. 
Respect for elders is illustrative. In the Philippines this is reflected in the Mano Po gesture, in 
which the child presses the offered hand of an elder against his forehead. The Javanese show inter-
generational respect by linguistic politeness. Confucianism in China and Australian indigenes alike 
valued respect for elders. That said these traditions are being undermined as individualism and 
respects for greater ‘knowledges’ (higher education, cosmopolitan attitudes) transcends that of the 
elder ‘knowledges’ of the past. 
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Roman Catholic Church was questioned by those wanting to reform the practices 
of the Church, and due to irreconcilable differences and political opportunism a 
religious schism – known as the Protestant Reformation – was ushered in. The 
ensuing internecine struggles, in which millions died, left a legacy that resonates 
to this day – parochial schools and hospitals, marriage injunctions, and in some 
cases divided political parties, divided labour unions, and employment 
opportunities that favour one religion over another.
251
  
What is of salience in this exemplar is that the adoption or retention of a 
given religious persuasion often did not fall to the individual, the catalyst for 
change being the fiat of a monarch or the like. If arbitrary decisions can dictate 
worship patterns and inculcate new loyalties – for which individuals were (and 
are) prepared to die – then might such unassailable positions be redirected by fiat 
or individual agency, thereby undermining the sanctity of primordialism as a 
definer of cultural exclusiveness. Viewed from this perspective, the Narran, 
whatever his self-ascribed ethnolinguistic identity, would appear to be in a state of 
cultural limbo. At the same time as he is reluctant to question the violability of his 
cultural DNA, he is exposing himself to ongoing transculturative influences. 
 Zialcita (2006) casts doubt on the fastness of primordialism, and the 
concomitant sacrosanctity of cultural DNAs. He questions the very notion of 
identity and uses his predecessor Franz Boas as an example of a voice that 
challenged the former flawed Eurocentric scholarship designed to underpin the 
imperialist mandate. Identity, Zialcita suggests, should be interpreted culturally 
rather than in a psychologistic or biologistic manner, which he regards as racist. 
“…there is no correlation between ways of thinking and body form. People think 
differently from each other because they grow up in a particular culture, each of 
which has its own way of interpreting the world. …it was normal for a culture to 
accept new ideas from other cultures but that these are inevitably filtered and 
transformed by the pre-existing local tradition” (p. 231). 
 Zialcita attempts to defend the lowland Hispanicised Christian Filipino 
culture from being assailed by those who cannot accept the syncretic or fused 
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 The Thirty Years War (1618-1648) culminating in the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) epitomises 
the capacity and intensity with which one identity ‘boundary’ – religion – can have for division 
and destruction. It is estimated that the population of the German states alone reduced by a third 
from 12 million to 8 million during this period. While this schismatic ‘boundary’ has been eroded 
in the latter half of the twentieth century, the instability of Northern Ireland in modern times 
continues to exemplify the power of a ‘boundary’ that has the capacity to divide an ethnicity, itself 
already a division of mankind. 
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nature of this culture. He states: “Two fears have haunted discussions of identity 
among thoughtful Filipinos since independence in 1946. One fear is that… 
Filipino identity is ‘schizophrenic’. Another fear is that because the lowland 
Christian majority’s way of life is the child of two different cultures, the Western 
and Eastern, it must therefore be ‘illegitimate’, that is a ‘bastardised’ culture” (p. 
211). In defence of the authenticity of lowland Filipino culture a comparison is 
made with the Javanese, who Zialcita suggests are not critiqued for being 
‘schizophrenic’, but regarded as being representative of the ‘true Asia’. Yet how 
‘authentic’ is Javanese culture? Javanese Moslem peasants revere the Animist 
‘spirit of the rice’ Dewi Sri and “offer gifts to the founding spirit of their village, 
and fear certain places as the abode of spirits” (p. 213). Further they embrace the 
Hindu places of worship, the Mahabharata, and the Brahmanic tradition of 
meditation. Unlike the lowland Christian Filipinos the Javanese do not feel the 
need to apologise for their syncretic culture. 
 I raise this issue to demonstrate that the transcultural changes (cuisine, 
agriculture, languages, and social practices, both religious and secular) that have 
occurred in the Narra contact zone are less singular than might be expected. While 
some cultural practices in Narra have metamorphosed in a single generation, we 
do not know how long it took for the syncretic Javanese cultural practices to settle 
into a modus vivendi. If Boas and Zialcita concur on the reality of continuing 
cultural interchange, then it might be asked at which point the primordiality of the 
Cebuano, Ilocano, or Maranao identity originates, and at what point aspects of the 
culture cease to be the ‘authentic’ markers of a particular ethnic tradition. 
 Two aspects of culture – religion and cuisine – help to illustrate the 
potential fickleness of a cultural tradition and its relationship to an ascribed 
primordiality. Islam and Christianity are central to the cultures of the Javanese 
and lowland Christian Filipinos respectively. Yet for certain Javanese, Islam 
overlies Animist, Buddhist, and Hindu traditions. For lowland Christian Filipinos 
the trajectory is an overlaying of Animism and in some cases a prior attachment to 
Islam.
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 It would appear that religion at least cannot be relied upon as a 
primordial marker. Cuisine also is a questionable reference point. While the vast 
majority of Austronesians favour rice as a staple, Ilocanos among others embraced 
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 Constantino (2008: 25) suggests: “Manila and its environs were already outposts of Bornean 
principalities” at the time that Miguel Lopéz de Legazpi’s arrived in the Archipelago to claim it for 
Spain (1565). “If history had taken its course undisturbed, the Muslims might have Islamised the 
whole archipelago” he adds.  
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maize when it arrived from the Americas. Pierre Chaunu (cited Zialcita 2006: 
239) suggests: “The Philippines constitutes the only true end-point of the world.” 
By this he was inferring that the Philippines, as terminus of the Manila-Acapulco 
galleon trade, should have been the first place where plants from the Americas – 
maize, tomato, chilli, tobacco, and so forth – might have lodged themselves. Yet 
the chilli, recognised as quintessentially Southeast Asian, without which no 
Javanese meal would be complete, exists in the Philippines only incidentally.
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 In this sense the primordialism defence, which imagines certain ingrained 
cultural practices to be attributed to given ethnic groups, might be viewed in a less 
sanguine manner. As the Narra resettlement model shows, cultural attributes of 
given ethnic groups may be adopted, adapted, or discarded under certain 
conditions. The transculturation process shows that learned cultural practices 
(enculturation), however ingrained, may be unlearned (deculturation), and in that 
sense questions the inviolability of any premise of primordialism. 
 
Summary 
In this and the previous chapter, I have examined, from the perspective of the 
migration experience, what have been the sociocultural ramifications of 
transmigration in a specific zone of resettlement – that centred on the 
Municipality of Narra in Palawan. The participant interviews, and key informant 
engagements illustrate that Narra reflected a space in which an ethnoculturally 
heterogeneous migrant cohort had experienced a degree of cultural exchange that 
was neither planned nor coerced. The mutuality associated with that cultural 
exchange contributes to the transculturation schema as envisaged by Ortiz and 
Malinowski seven decades ago. Their theorising – in the context of the hitherto 
immigration to Cuba of a diverse settler cohort – that all migrants contributed to 
the Cuban sociocultural legacy, encouraged them to imagine the term defining 
that process as ‘transculturation’. 
 Compared with Cuba, the timeline involved in the Narra transculturation 
process (two generations) is quite remarkable, and I suggest could not have been 
imagined by Ortiz / Malinowski when they coined their neologism. I acknowledge 
that there are extenuating circumstances advantaging the speed of Narran 
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 An analogous example is that of the potato. Native to South America it became by the 
nineteenth century a quintessentially European (especially Northern European) staple. China 
which is regarded as quintessentially a rice-staple nation is now the world’s largest potato 
producer with more than 20 % of world production. Conversely South America as a region has the 
lowest level of potato production (FAO, 2008). 
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transcultural exchange when compared with other models in time and place. 
These include degrees of similitude occasioned by the Austronesian connection, 
the zeitgeist of the modernity project, an absence of a dominant / dominated 
dichotomy, and so forth. Nevertheless, the interviews gleaned that whether 
interlocutors were adamant about their region-of-origin identities or not, the 
process of transculturation was occurring around them, involving them even if 
unconsciously, and was not resisted. Factors analysed above: degree of 
intermarriage, language use modification, resettlement socialisation, and so forth 
have all contributed to the transcultural outcome in Narra that has not been 
replicated on the same scale, or is replicable, both in other regions of the 
Philippines, and in the wider migrancy world. 
In testing the hypothesis that transcultural change in the Narra model of 
resettlement has been contingent upon a set of catalysts that have facilitated such 
cultural change, this chapter has outlined some of those catalysts – continued links 
with region of origin, the rate of intermarriage, resettlement zone socialisation, 
cultural compromises made and cross-cultural cooperation among them. In the 
vein of this line of enquiry the chapter also questioned the basis for the hallowness 
of the primordialism concept. 
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CHAPTER VIII – CONCLUSION 
 
Given the finite nature of the agricultural ‘frontier’, resettlement programs as 
represented by the Narra / Palawan project, are becoming less feasible than 
previously. However, this does not mean that the migration and resettlement of 
heterogeneous peoples phenomenon has decreased. The former state-initiated, 
rural-to-rural transmigration of peoples in the Archipelago has been replaced by 
the spontaneous movements of migrants, both intranational and international: a 
process that is predominantly rural-to-urban or urban-to-urban.
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 Furthermore, 
the movement of peoples worldwide – whether for economic or political reasons – 
is on the increase, and with this movement there is a concomitant increase in 
intercultural encounters. As a consequence of this movement, greater numbers of 
people than ever are called upon to reflect on their ethnocultural identities and 
question what aspects of their ethnic identities are important to them, which of 
their cultural particularities continue to be relevant, or need maintaining, and 
which are to be jettisoned once they are resettled. Juxtaposed against this dilemma 
is the need for the migrant-settler to examine what aspects of his new cultural 
environment might be adopted or adapted. 
I began this thesis by suggesting that the rationale for the investigation was 
to understand why the Narra / Palawan resettlement initiative – in light of the 
uneven sociocultural outcomes of some resettlement elsewhere – appeared to be a 
successful one. To this end a line of enquiry was established to make sense of the 
differing outcomes. The thesis was prompted by the need to better comprehend 
why disparities in sociocultural integration have contributed to the tribulation of 
ethnic violence and displacement in some zones of resettlement (exemplified by 
Mindanao), while others have witnessed a smoother pluricultural transition. The 
research has demonstrated that several factors have the capacity to impact on the 
type of coexistence that is possible in milieux of intercultural interaction. The 
chief of these factors is the propensity with which individuals and groups are 
prepared to compromise aspects of their ethnocultural identities via a process of 
mutual cultural exchange we now know as transculturation.  
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 At the same time as ‘frontiers’ were developed and settled, an urban-ward movement of 
population continued apace. In the second-half of the twentieth century – in the Philippines and 
Indonesia for example – urbanisation has absorbed migrants by a factor of ten when compared 
with rural-to-rural migration. Rather than decreasing, population movements are possibly the 
greatest in magnitude (in relative terms) of any previous period in human history. Among factors 
influencing this movement are: economic opportunity, ongoing sociopolitical persecution, the 
boredom and strictures of rural life, and the ease of mobility. 
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 To test the hypothesis that interethnic harmony is contingent upon the 
degree to which individuals and groups are prepared to compromise aspects of 
their ethnocultural lifeworlds the thesis posed two fundamental questions: (1) 
‘What cultural changes take place among heterogeneous populations disrupted by 
resettlement?’ and (2) ‘Under which circumstances are transmigrants’ 
ethnocultural identities maintained, diminished, or amplified as a consequence of 
the resettlement process?’ Narrans, it has been revealed, were quite amenable to 
adapting aspects of their (and adopting aspects of others’) ethnocultural lifeways 
to create an environment in which a sociocultural modus vivendi could ensue. 
Several factors have contributed to this outcome, and might be useful to support a 
hypothesis that would explain replicability (or otherwise) in further migration / 
resettlement milieux – whether archipelagic or in the wider world. 
 The accretion, reification or diminution of ethnocultural identities in the 
Narra / Palawan zone of resettlement, I suggest, is determined by the degree of 
transculturational change that a given individual or group is prepared to accept 
and this is further dependent upon: (1) the degree of cultural difference of those 
settled (religious practice, language, customs), (2) the numerical strength of a 
given settler cohort, (3) the diversity and numbers of the settler cohort(s), in 
which no dominant group exists, (4) access to education, the mass media and the 
world beyond the settlement area and (5) the degree of ongoing mobility for 
individuals – both social and economic. The interaction of these factors is what 
has facilitated transcultural change in Narra, the consequence of which is the 
development of a widely ascribed supraethnic identity – that of the Palaweño. 
This ascription, while not necessarily superseding national or ethnic proclivities, 
is nevertheless an affirmation that signals the the fact that transcultural changes 
have taken place. 
 The thesis reveals that increasingly Palaweño-ness differentiates Narrans 
from their relatives in the regions-of-origin. The data confirms that the longer the 
separation from co-ethnics the more likely respondents would sanction the 
Palaweño self-ascription. Whether this re-ascription would have been possible in 
the absence of the transculturation trajectory is moot, yet when measured against 
ethnic and communal reifications that have taken place in other resettlement 
scenarios referred to in this thesis, it is clear that the resettlement experience itself 
(the shared experiences, privations and successes) is not enough to bind the 
transmigrant to others in his midst or guarantee harmonious integrations in 
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evolving societies. A circular line of reasoning is possible: that mutual cultural 
exchanges (transculturation) facilitated a re-positioned Palaweño identity in Narra 
/ Palawan, or that identification with the notion of Palaweño-ness itself 
encouraged increased sociocultural interactions among an ethnically diverse 
settler cohort. 
 In light of the data gathered I suggest that the Narra / Palawan resettlement 
scenario differs from contemporary archipelagic (and wider world) resettlement 
scenarios in the following respects. Firstly, generational change is being 
accelerated by the degree of intermarriage, the corollary of which is that 
succeeding generations are less likely to self-ascribe as narrowly as their parents. 
Mixed parentage requires an individual to discern what aspects of each parent’s 
ethnocultural heritage the offspring will decide to encompass. Secondly, among 
an ethnically diverse settler cohort, the inculcation of the national language as a 
lingua franca allowed for the fast-tracking of cross-cultural communication, in 
ways not replicable in the region-of-origin, where the national language continued 
to be used as an ‘auxiliary’ rather than the lingua franca. 
 Mutual cultural exchange in Narra has been further advantaged by three 
intersecting factors: the degree of cultural difference among ethnic groups settled, 
the number of settler cohorts involved, and the relative numerical strength of the 
settler cohorts in percentage terms. The data shows that no one ethnocultural 
group dominated the Narra resettlement milieu, thus precluding the prospect of 
one group’s cultural values being advanced over others. Furthermore, the degree 
of cultural difference within the settler cohorts was not so great that any one group 
would be viewed adversely. The Narra / Palawan transmigrants hailing from 
across the Philippines, while ethnically distinct, were culturally less distinct. 
Primarily, they represented the majority lowland Christian strata of society.
255
 
Social and economic mobility in Narra, the thesis reveals, has not 
impinged on transcultural re-alignments. If anything, the education sector, in 
tandem with an increased rate of intermarriage has been shown to advantage 
further mutual cultural exchanges. No ethnocultural cohort appears to have 
dominated the contact zone socially and economically, in the way Hall (2010) has 
demonstrated to have been the case in Mindanao, for example. It appears that the 
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 While acknowledging that the degree of cultural difference between settlers was not so great as 
to impinge on the potential for transculturation to occur, it should also be noted that in the Narra 
Municipality, the numerical dominance of the transmigrants (as a group) vis-à-vis the indigene 
was of such a magnitude as to preclude the indigene-migrant reactions that have been a feature of 
other Philippine (e.g. Mindanao) resettlements. 
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more highly educated settler descendants in Narra have a wider worldview than 
their pioneer forbears. This fact, combined with the greater mobility occasioned 
by the ‘modernity project’, has meant that as well as an exchange of cultural 
particularities, Narrans are absorbing cultural desiderata at rates that accelerate the 
undermining of former ethnocultural lifeways. 
 To recapitulate then, the thesis demonstrates that in certain circumstances 
ethnically diverse peoples are able to integrate into new societies and create for 
themselves new lifeworlds predicated on a revised cognisance of their former 
lifeways. Narrans have managed this by the accretion of mutual cultural 
exchanges. Beginning with the learning of each other’s languages in the pioneer 
days, transculturation has proceeded to include other aspects of culture that once 
divided ethnic groups whose lifeworlds were synonymous with an ethnic 
homeland. What is significant is the timeframe in which these changes have taken 
place. It is a mere six decades since President Quirino signed Proclamation 190 
(Appendix C), paving the way for resettlement in what is now the Municipality of 
Narra. The transcultural changes that have been wrought have been effected by at 
best three generations, a very compressed timeframe when compared with the 
Ortiz / Malinowski overview of the transcultural changes experienced in the 
Cuban migrancy / integration milieu. 
 Whether reflecting on Narra or the wider world migrancy / resettlement 
phenomenon, the ‘transculturation’ concept, I suggest, continues to be a relevant 
tool for understanding intercultural possibilities – one that should not be 
undervalued or disregarded. It may not appear to be as useful in circumstances of 
dominance, as the mutuality of cultural exchange cannot be guaranteed in such 
situations. However, because no blueprint exists for best-practice sociocultural 
interaction, no migrant or host can determine before ‘contact’ what of each other’s 
cultural baggage may be mutually culturally exchanged, appropriated, or 
repressed. Whatever initial difficulties diverse groups of migrants face in ‘contact 
zones’ the world over, for the sake of integration and harmony (as evidenced in 
Narra) it appears that the finding of modi vivendi are required to allay feelings of 
sociocultural dissonance.
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 The manner in which transculturation is engaged or 
rejected in this process has a bearing on the outcomes sought. 
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 While the resolving of difference may take centuries to eventuate, addressing the differences is 
of paramount concern. Ireland in general and Ulster in particular is a salient example of the depth 
to which individuals and groups will go to maintain sociocultural positions. It has taken four 
centuries for the people of Ulster to find any common ground that dents hitherto intractable 
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 In tandem with an investigation of the Narra / Palawan transmigration / 
transculturation paradigm, the thesis considered the national unity implications for 
nation-states that support a heterogeneity of ethnic groups. Two factors are at 
play: the world’s rapidly increasing population, and an increased migrancy, both 
preclude the continuance of monoethnic states. The repercussion of this is that all 
nation-states increasingly need to embrace their ethnocultural diversity if a 
harmonious national coexistence is to be maintained. Using the archipelagic 
transmigration parameter as a model, the thesis revealed that not all intercultural 
interactions will necessarily result in transcultural tendencies. Resettlement and 
integration may involve a mutual cultural exchange as theorised by Ortiz / 
Malinowski, or a process of acculturation in which the latest migrants continue to 
accede to the norms and influence of an already-resident dominant group, or a 
scenario in which ethnic groups maintain cohesion while residing in propinquity 
with others – represented in essence by the concept of multiculturalism. 
 Irrespective of the coexistence model (asymmetrical acculturation, 
multiculturalism or transculturation à la Ortiz) to which individual nation-states 
ascribe, no set of sociocultural and political factors guarantees coexistence for all 
time. What the Narra / Palawan study reveals is that, under certain circumstances, 
sociocultural transformation predicated on a reciprocal, or mutuality of cultural 
exchange is possible. In that sense Ortiz’s transculturation theorisation has been 
vindicated. However, demographic trends, politics, and the modernity project may 
yet determine the theory’s future. What cannot be discounted – in view of the 
world’s existing ethnocultural diversity (within a limited number of nation-states) 
– is that modi vivendi for coexistences need to be kept in the forefront of 
consciousness. 
 One of the main contributions of my thesis is that it has provided evidence 
to show that polyethnic milieux need not develop into antagonistic or reifying 
contact zones (such as Mindanao) as a consequence of migration. I did not have 
the luxury of Ortiz’s four and a half centuries retrospective in developing a theory 
to explain Cuba’s transculturation trajectory. In the Narra / Palawan context 
therefore, what might be instructive would be a further study – two generations 
hence – to determine whether the Narran transcultural trajectory was being 
maintained. At the time of my fieldwork Narra continued to be a zone of in-
                                                                                                                                     
positions of support for one side or the other in the Catholic-Protestant schism. Furthermore the 
antagonisms generated in Ireland were readily transplanted across the globe to new settler societies 
in North America and Australasia. 
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migration, and therefore amenable to further cultural influences. Given the 
inconstancy of cultural particularities – a factor influenced by the ‘information / 
technology age’, an ongoing migrancy, cultural imperialism, social mobility and 
the modernity project, among other factors – the ethnocultural future in 
resettlement milieux such as Narra would appear to be indeterminate. 
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APPENDIX A – QUESTIONNAIRE: NARRA / PALAWAN (2011) 
1. How would you describe your ethnicity?     
   [    ] 
2. From which region / province did you / your parents resettle? What 
year? [   ] [   ] 
3. Do you maintain links / visit your region-of-origin?   
   [    ] 
4. Is your ethnicity important to you?     
   [    ] 
5. Do you socialise primarily with persons of your ethnicity?  
   [    ] 
6. What is your preferred language use at home?    
   [    ] 
7. What language do you use most with friends / in the workplace? 
 [   ] [   ] 
8. Apart from the national language, what was your pre-migration 
language?   [    ] 
9. What is your religion / denomination?     
   [    ] 
10. Do you practise the same religion / denomination as in your region-of- 
origin?  [    ] 
11. What is the highest level of education you have completed?  
   [    ] 
12. Are you / your parents married to a person of your ethnicity? If not, 
what cultural markers have you compromised on in your household? 
   [    ] 
13. Do your children feel as strongly about their ethnicity as you do? 
   [    ] 
14. What is the preferred language [home / school / work] of your children?
   [  /  /  ] 
15. Would you prefer your children to marry within your ethnicity?  
   [    ] 
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16. Does your current livelihood mirror that of your region-of-origin? 
   [    ] 
17. If so, are their cultural compromises that you have needed to make? For 
example, wet rice v swidden v other… [   ] 
18. Have your work / business pursuits increased your interaction with 
other ethnicities? [    ] 
19. Do you cooperate with other ethnicities in the resettlement area? 
   [    ] 
20. Has your perception of other ethnicities altered since resettlement? In 
which respect? [   ] [  ] 
21. Do you primarily think as a national citizen or member of an ethnicity? 
   [    ] 
22. Have you experienced ethnic dilution since resettlement?  
   [    ] 
23. Do you feel a sense of cultural loss as a result of resettlement?  
   [    ] 
24. What ethnocultural markers have you adopted / modified since 
interacting with other settlers? [    ] 
25. What is your age group? Under 15 / 15-24 / 25-34 / 35-44 / 45-54 / 55+ 
   [    ] 
  
Comments          
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APPENDIX B – Narra Municipality: Area, Population, Density by Barangay 
Name of Barangay Area (Sq. Km.) 
Population 
(Persons) 
Population 
Density 
(Person / Km²) 
Urban Barangays    
Antipuluan 12.37  5,482 443 
Panacan  2.22  4,229 1,903 
Panacan 2  3.00  4,471 1490 
Población (Narra) 53.28 10,954 205 
   Urban Average 
Sub-total 70.87 25,139 1,011 
    
Rural Barangays    
Aramaywan 65.06  4,134 64 
Bagong Sikat 25.66  1,853 72 
Batang-Batang 7.80     986 126 
Burirao 34.89  2,798 80 
Caguisan 14.64  1,452 99 
Calategas 75.45  5,678 75 
Dumagueña 23.80  3,742 157 
Elvita 34.15     882 26 
Estrella Village 49.59  1,246 25 
Ipilan 9.74  1,780 183 
Malatgao 19.49  2,076 106 
Malinao 80.17  3,190 40 
Princess Urduja 64.72  5,348 83 
Sandoval 14.95  2,705 181 
San Isidro (Bato-Bato) 135.38  2,228 16 
Tacras 24.72  1,016 41 
Taritien 66.12  1,741 26 
Teresa 8.62  1,483 172 
Tinagong Dagat 5.38  1,044 194 
   Rural Average 
Sub-total 723.25 45,382 93.02 
    
Total 794.13 70,521 84.73 
   Municipal Average 
Source: MPDO (2009) 
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APPENDIX C – Proclamation No. 190: Proposed Land Alienation 
MALANCAÑAN PALACE 
Manila 
 
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES 
 
PROCLAMATION  NO. 190 
 
RESERVING FOR RICE, CORN AND OTHER FOOD PRODUCTION 
PURPOSES CERTAIN PARCELS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE 
BARRIO OF PANACAN, MUNICIPALITY OF ABORLAN, PROVINCE OF 
PALAWAN, ISLAND OF PALAWAN. 
 
 Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural 
Resources and pursuant to the provisions of section Eighty-three of 
Commonwealth Act Numbered One Hundred Forty-One, as amended, I hereby 
withdraw from sale or settlement and reserve for rice, corn, and other food 
production purposes under the administration of the Rice and Corn Production 
Administration of the National Development Company, subject to private rights, 
if any there be, and to future classification and final survey, and to the condition 
that the timber and other forest products therein, as well as the use and occupancy 
of the areas indicated as timberland or forest reserve, shall be place[d] under the 
administration and control of the Bureau of Forestry, in accordance with the 
Forest Laws and regulations, the following described parcels of the public domain 
situated in the Barrio of Panacan, Municipality of Aborlan, Province of Palawan, 
Island of Palawan, to wit: [here follow several pages of survey details] 
 
 The total combined area of the three lots is TWO HUNDRED FIFTY-
THREE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED SEVEN THOUSAND NINE 
HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE (253,807,989) SQUARE METERS, more or less. 
These three lots combined as one lot, is bounded on the north by Public Land, on 
the Southeast by the proposed National Road, on the South and on the West by 
Public Land. Bearing true, the Declination 1020’ E. 
 
 Points referred to are marked on the plan now in progress of preparation 
for submittal for verification and approval of the Bureau of Lands. Surveyed 
January 23, to March 24, 1950, by the Certeza Surveying Company, Inc. 
 
 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the 
seal of the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed. 
 
 Done in the City of Manila, this 29
th
 day of June, in the year of our Lord, 
nineteen hundred and fifty, and of the independence of the Philippines, the fourth. 
 
(SGD.) ELPIDIO QUIRINO 
President of the Philippines 
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APPENDIX D – Proposed Conversion of Central Palawan Resettlement Agency 
Republika ng Pilipinas 
KAGWARAN NG REFORMANG PANSAKAHAN 
(DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM) 
Tanggapan ng Kalihim 
Diliman, Lungsod ng Quezon 
3008 
 
Department Special Order No. 35 
Series of 1976 
 
 In the interest of the service Team No. 04-14-111 (Central Palawan 
Resettlement Agency) Narra, Palawan, Region IV, is hereby converted into a Pilot 
Special [Project] Settlement Project and shall henceforth be under the direct 
supervision and management of the Office of the Secretary. 
 
 A Management Committed to supervise and monitor the operations of 
Project is hereby created and shall be composed of the following: 
 
Undersecretary, Ernesto Valdes      – Chairman 
Assistant Secretary, Benjamin R. Labayan     – Member 
Assistant Secretary, Jose C. Medina      – Member  
Director, Romeo C. Casteñeda, BURE     – Member 
Director, Oscar C. Villaseñor, BLADD     – Member 
Director, Severino Madronio, BFM     – Member  
Director, Guadencio Besa, BALA      – Member 
Mr. Delfin Romero, Special Assistant     – Member &  
        Executive Officer 
 
 Mr. Marcial dela Cruz, Agrarian Reform Team Leader 1 is hereby 
designated Project Manager of the Pilot Special Settlement Project and as such 
shall be under the direct supervision of the Office of the Secretary thru the 
Management Committee. 
 
 As Project Manager, Mr. dela Cruz shall be responsible for the 
management and the implementation of plans and programs for the full 
development of said Project. 
 
 All orders, circulars and / or memoranda inconsistent herewith are hereby 
revoked, superseded and / or modified as the case may be. 
 
 This Order shall take effect immediately. 
 
 February 10, 1976 
 
      (SGD.) CONRADO ESTRELLA 
Secretary 
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APPENDIX E – Act Creating Municipality of Narra 
SIX CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLIC ) 
OF THE PHILIPPINES       ) H. No. 165555 
FOURTH SESSION        ) 
 
(REPUBLIC ACT NO. 5642) 
 
AN ACT CREATING THE MUNICIPALITY OF NARRA, PROVINCE OF 
PALAWAN 
 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of the Representatives of the Philippines in 
Congress Assembled: 
 
 SECTION 1. The barrios of Malatgao, Tinagong Dagat, Taritien, 
Antipolohan, Teresa, Pancacan, Narra, Caguisen, Batang-Batang, Bato-Bato, 
Malinao, Sandoval, Dumagueña, El Vita, Calategas, Aramaywan, Tacras and that 
part of Barrio Abo-Abo now belonging to the Municipality of Aborlan, Province 
of Palawan, are now separated form the said Municipality and constituted into a 
distinct and independent municipality to be known as the Municipality of Narra. 
The seat of the new municipality shall be in the present site of Barrio Narra. 
 
 Section 2. The Mayor of the Municipality of Aborlan elected in the 
elections of November 15, 1967, shall be the Mayor of the Municipality of Narra. 
The Vice-Mayor of Aborlan elected in the last elections shall be the Mayor of 
Aborlan. The councillor who obtained the highest number of votes in the last 
election shall be Vice-Mayor of Narra and the one who obtained the second 
highest shall be the vice of Aborlan. The appointment of councillors to fill the 
vacant positions in both municipalities shall be made in accordance with the 
provisions of Republic Act Numbered Five Thousand One Hundred and Eighty 
Five. 
 
 Section 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval. 
 
Approved, June 31, 1969. 
 
       CERTIFIED TRUE COPY: 
 
       (SGD) C. N. ZABANAL 
        Records Division 
 
 APPENDIX F – NARRA MUNICIPALITY: POPULATION BY DIALECT / LANGUAGE (2005) 
Barangay 
Total 
Population 
          
  
Filipino / 
Tagalog 
Cuyono Cebuano 
Hiligaynon 
/ Ilonggo 
Ilocano Bicol 
Muslim 
Language 
Agutaynen Cagayanen Others 
            
Antipuluan 4660 2096 150 51 234 478 93 212 - 8 1338 
Aramaywan 5175 2656 68 157 1025 46 1 322 - 21 897 
Bagong Sikat 1787 133 16 - 36 555 5 - - - 1042 
Batang Batang 1141 113 16 - 125 39 4 - - 626 218 
Burirao 2334 60 39 61 825 41 8 - - - 2080 
Caguisan 1162 77 110 44 99 117 29 - 7 289 390 
Calategas 4822 278 46 128 2951 40 8 23 - 648 700 
Dumangueña 3702 648 - 9 926 35 4 - - - 2080 
Elvita 933 642 3 10 34 185 2 - - 5 52 
Estrella Village 1437 373 2 23 206 216 16 - - 15 583 
Ipilan 1570 283 14 44 91 47 3 - - 16 1072 
Malatgao 1962 494 45 3 5 48 1 - - 24 1342 
Malinao 2919 1649 22 8 24 154 5 - - - 1057 
Panacan 8314 2376 619 88 2820 396 63 26 4 17 1905 
Población 12482 7070 1381 51 394 2262 75 218 3 47 981 
Princess Urduja 5110 983 101 2 - 2625 68 - - 52 1279 
Sandoval 2574 151 48 94 397 241 8 - - 49 1586 
San Isidro 1809 489 13 99 661 174 5 1 - 19 348 
Tacras 1096 156 70 30 73 38 10 10 - - 709 
Taritien 1594 276 43 5 116 819 12 3 2 19 299 
Teresa 1285 79 129 7 110 41 2 1 11 693 212 
Tinagong Dagat 938 97 25 85 474 32 2 - - 125 98 
            
Total 68806 21179 2960 999 11636 8629 424 801 30 2673 19460 
            
Source: MPDO / CBMS NB: Original documentation equates language with ‘dialect’.
 APPENDIX G – NARRA MUNICIPALITY: POPULATION BY RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION (2005) 
Barangay 
Total 
Population 
         
  
Roman 
Catholic 
Aglipayan 
Iglesia ni 
Cristo 
Evangelical / 
Pentecost 
Baptist 
Seventh Day 
Adventist 
Islam 
Tribal 
Religions 
Others 
           
Antipuluan 4660 2532 57 300 23 64 117 212 - 1355 
Aramaywan 5175 2182 - 75 10 947 196 322 - 1443 
Bagong Sikat 1787 449 - 97 86 21 213 3 - 918 
Batang Batang 1141 942 64 2 - 16 - - - 117 
Burirao 2334 1046 12 71 21 139 85 - - 960 
Caguisan 1162 390 - 19 - 37 - - - 716 
Calategas 4822 3134 5 30 13 48 194 28 - 1370 
Dumangueña 3702 1490 496 13 17 147 7 6 129 1397 
Elvita 933 471 15 37 23 8 16 - - 363 
Estrella Village 1437 690 7 15 9 88 145 - - 483 
Ipilan 1570 548 8 58 6 43 102 - - 805 
Malatgao 1962 1690 92 39 38 43 19 - - 41 
Malinao 2919 1680 72 17 18 127 6 - - 999 
Panacan 8314 6594 8 178 22 150 110 19 - 1233 
Población 12482 7749 998 755 102 267 452 218 - 1941 
Princess Urduja 5110 2488 - 240 122 49 58 8 - 2145 
Sandoval 2574 978 - 61 - 23 69 7 - 1436 
San Isidro 1809 999 - 46 15 64 38 1 - 646 
Tacras 1096 58 - 196 - - 219 2 - 621 
Taritien 1594 931 - 210 38 12 72 - - 331 
Teresa 1285 936 6 27 30 3 8 - - 275 
Tinagong Dagat 938 693 - - 16 12 5 - - 212 
           
Total 68806 38670 1840 2476 609 2308 2131 826 129 19807 
           
Source: MPDO / CBMS
 APPENDIX H – MAP 7: NARRA / POBLACIÓN 
Source: MPDO
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